Analysis in Theravaada Buddhism
By Donald W. Mitchell
Volume 21, no. 1(1971)
Philosophy East and West
p.23-31
P23
I
In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume observes
that "When I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other.... I never can catch myself at
any time without a perception; and never can observe
anything but the perception."(1) Hume's observation
is made at the beginning of his inquiry into the
question of selfhood and, when taken in the context
of his thought in general, it has far-reaching
effects. Given these "particular perceptions," the
question immediately arises as to what it is that
integrates them into that entity we refer to as a
self. And when this question is asked in the context
of Hume's thought in general, it becomes extremely
problematic. A traditional answer to this question
might be that these perceptions, like qualities, all
inhere in some substantial subject. Hume's position,
however, is that any type of substance is simply an
idea derived from reflection; it is not an
"impression of sensation." We know only particular
qualities; any "substance" we posit in which these
qualities would inhere is simply a mental construct.
From this Hume concludes that "We have therefore no
idea of substances distinct from that of a
collection of particular qualities, nor have we any
other meaning when we either talk or reason
concerning it."(2)
If perceptions do not inhere in some substantial
subject it would seem that the integrating factor of
selfhood must lie in some relation between the
perceptions. Hume, however, rejects both the
relation of identity and the relation of cause and
effect. He rejects the former because it seems
self-contradictory.(3) To claim that some x is
identical to some y is to say that x and y are the
same and yet two. The relation of identity involves
a pair, but a pair implies differences, not
identity. Hume's rejection of identity is not as
consequential, though, as his rejection of any
necessary cause and effect relation, for this means
that "All events seem entirely loose and
separate."(4) In other words, while we do observe
that one event follows another, we can never observe
any necessary connection between them: "When we look
around us toward external objects and consider the
operations of causes, we are never able, in a single
instance, to discover any power or necessary
connection, any quality which binds the effect to
the cause and renders the one an infallible
consequence of the other. We only find that one does
actually, in fact, follow the other."(5) Given this
position, Hume feels that he can only conclude that
the self is "a bundle or
--------------------
Donald W. Mitchell is a graduate student in
philosophy at the University of Hawaii.
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), I.
iv. 6 (p. 252).
2 Ibid., I. i. 6 (p. 16).
3 Ibid., I. iv. 2 (pp. 187-218).
4 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, ed. C. W. Hendel (New York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1955), p. 85.
5 Ibid., p. 74.
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collection of different perceptions, which succeed
each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are
in a perpetual flux and movement.... They are the
successive perceptions only that constitute the
mind."(6)
From the foregoing comments on Hume's analysis
of substance and relations, it can be seen that the
central argument against such a Humean concept of
the self is based on the fact that such "loose and
separate" perceptions, which are not "owned" by
anything, are not intelligibly connected--that is,
the relation between the constituents of Hume's
"bundles" has not been adequately illuminated. Hume
himself was well aware of this problem, and in fact
he confesses in the appendix of his Treatise that
"there are two principles which I cannot render
consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either
one of them, viz., that all our distinct perceptions
are distinct existences, and that the mind never
perceives any real connection among distinct
existences."(7)
The problem of reconciling these two claims is
still with us today. For, as A. J. Ayer points out,
since Hume many empiricists have held this view of
the self in one form or another, but have never been
able to show adequately what it is that integrates
and orders such a Humean "bundle" of perceptions.(8)
What I wish to show in this paper is first that
there is a similar position concerning the analysis
of the self into discrete moments of perception in
Theravaada Buddhism;(9) and second, that while the
Western concern with such a Humean analysis of the
self has been basically epistemological in an
empirical context, the Buddhist position has been
maintained on a religious level that stresses the
psychological and ethical. It is psychological in
that there is a concern not only for perception, but
also for the emotional response to perception and
the psychological state of mind to which these two
factors give rise. It is ethical in that these
psychological states of mind, or dhammas (Sanskrit:
dharmas), are further analyzed and then classified
in an attempt to show a certain path to the
purification of one's consciousness. And it is
basically religious in that the classification of
psychological states in an ethical hierarchy makes
transparent the "path" one must follow to reach the
ultimate religious goal of Theravaada Buddhism;
namely, the transcendental state of nibbaana
(Sanskrit: nirvaa.na). I will conclude by putting
forward a possible response that Theravaada might
give to the above-mentioned criticism of the Humean
position. In doing so I will refer to Ayer's
statement of the criticism because I believe it
touches the central problem with the Theravaada
position: that is, the problem that arises
--------
6 Hume, Treatise, I. iv. 6 (pp. 252-253).
7 Ibid., appendix (p. 636).
8 A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1956), pp. 192, 198-199.
9 In this paper, I will be using "Theravaada" to
refer to the Theravaadin tradition as one of the
Eighteen Abhidhamma Schools and not as referring
to the whole of the Southern Buddhist
tradition--which would also include other
Abhidhamma schools such as Sarvaastivaada and
Sautraantika.
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when one rejects the existence of any soul or
permanent substance behind man's consciousness;
namely, the problem of a continuing self-identity.
II
Theravaada Buddhism states that "there is no actor
apart from action, no percipient apart from
perception. In other words, there is no conscious
subject behind consciousness.... Mind is simply the
consciousness of an object."(10) Or in the words of
the most famous Paali scholar and commentator,
Buddhaghosa (fifth century A.D.): "There is grief
but none suffering from grief, there is no doer but
there is action, there is quietude but none being
quieted, there is the path but none going along the
path."(11)
Thus, at first sight, it seems that the
Theravaada position resembles that of Hume. Going
beyond the Humean analysis, however, Theravaada
posits that the perceptual moments of consciousness
can also be analyzed, which results in the "89
dhammas," or the most basic psychological moments of
consciousness that the Theravaada philosopher could
envision. I have called these dhammas psychological
because they include both the "perceptual moment"
and its emotive accompaniment. For example, one
dhamma in the realm of sensuality is "consciousness
by way of sight accompanied by hedonic indifference
(upekkha)."(12) One should note here that such an
analysis of consciousness into these dhammas will
throw light on the three major truths of the
Buddhist religion: namely, that there is no self
(anattaa) but only a constant flow of these
impermanent states (anicca), and that any attempt to
"cling" to these transient moments brings suffering
(dukkha). It was with these truths in mind that the
Theravaada philosopher began the task of analyzing
these dhammas and then ordering them into an ethical
hierarchy; that is, a hierarchy that begins with
"impure" psychological states of mind and ends with
pure states, thus giving the Buddhist monk a "path
of purification" (visuddhimagga) that would lead him
to the religious goal of nibbaana.
In the purification process one can distinguish
three developments. The first of these stresses the
development from unwholesome psychological moments
which carry bad kamma (Sanskrit: karma) to those
moments which carry no kamma. This development goes
through four stages. The first stage
(akusalavi~n~naa.na) contains those dhammas which
are considered to be unwholesome or those which are
not conducive to the attainment of nibbaana. These
dhammas are characterized as immoral (akusala), for
they are accompanied either by hate (dosa), greed
(lobha), or ignorance (moha), which are considered
to be the
-----------------------------
10 S. Z. Aung, "An Introductory Essay, " in
Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy, ed. Mrs.
Rhys Davids (London: Luzac & Co. for the Pali
Text Society, 1963), p. 7.
11 N. Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism (Calcutta:
Calcutta Oriental Press, 1941), p. 264.
12 Anuruddha, Compendium of Philosophy
(Abhidhammatthasangaha), p. 83.
P26
three basic evils (hetus) of existence.(13) These
dhammas are also totally bound up with sensuality
(kaama). An example of a dhamma in this stage is
"Voiltional consciousness, accompanied by grief and
connected with hate."(l4) The next stage
(kusalavi~n~naa.na) contains wholesome dhammas and
begins to rise above sensuality and the three evils.
An example would be "consciousness accompanied by
touch accompanied by joy."(15) The third stage
(vipaaka) is not only wholesome but brings good
effects or kamma. In Theravaada, however, as in much
of Eastern thought, it is deemed better to avoid all
acts which bring any kamma--good or bad. The reason
for this is that kamma (good or bad) brings about
rebirth; that is, actions which have any effects
bring with them the possibility of further rebirth
where these effects will be worked out. Thus the
final stage in this first development is called
kiriyaa or consciousness having no effects (kamma).
The second development is a "rooting out" of the
three basic evils (hetus). As mentioned above, these
are hate, greed, and ignorance. The highest state of
consciousness attainable, according to Theravaada,
is nibbaana, which is often referred to as ultimate
knowledge and blissful nonattachment. From this it
is obvious that ignorance would be considered an
evil since it is the opposite of knowledge; however,
the reason for choosing greed and hate may not be so
easily seen. The reason is that greed is a desire to
"possess" an object and therefore is considered an
attachment. Hate, on the other hand, is a desire to
"be rid" of an object and thus is also considered an
attachment. Attachment, then, has a twofold nature.
It is either a pulling of an object toward oneself
(greed) or pushing it away (hate) . Thus all
attachment can be characterized as derivative from
the basic evils of hate and greed. Therefore, as one
moves toward nibbaana, one's consciousness is
purified by the progressive disappearance of hate,
greed, and ignorance.
Finally, there is a development form lowly
concern with mundane sensuality and desires (kaama)
to a higher concern for achieving the suprammundane
state (lokuttara) which opens into nibbaana. Here,
as in the first development, there are four stages.
The lowest stage, containing dhammas with the three
evils (sahetuka) that are concerned with sensual
pleasures and desires, is called the "realm of
sensuality" (kaamaloka). The second stage is the
"realm of form" (ruupaloka) and consists of fifteen
meditations in which the above-mentioned "evils"
(hetus) of hate, greed, and ignorance are absent
(ahetuka).
In order to clarify these first two realms it
might be useful to compare the Theravaada move from
the sensual to the formal with Plato's distinction
be-
----------------
13 "Hetu" literally translated means "cause" and
refers to the fact that these three "evils" are
the cause of future rebirths.
14 Anuruddha, p. 83.
15 Ibid.,p. 85.
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tween the world of material objects and the world of
ideas. For Plato our perception of objects which
participate in the forms does not give us a clear
and distinct knowledge of reality. For, as our
knowing is mediated by the senses, we do not see
things as they really are. Our senses perceive the
object only indirectly, like shadows on the wall of
a cave. However, besides interfering with knowledge,
the senses also hinder us from obtaining the "Good."
That is, they give rise to sensual desires and other
emotions which hinder the pure intellectual
contemplation of the Good. It is the quest for such
pure intellectual contemplation that leads Plato to
the world of ideas--or the pure forms of the
material objects. These forms are intuited directly
by the intellect and therefore the emotions and
ignorance given rise to by the senses are avoided.
This same mode of thought is found in the
Theravaada distinctions between the realm of
sensuality and the realm of form. The former realm
is characterized by ignorance and emotions
(basically greed and hate) which arise through the
working of the senses. One obtains the latter realm
by extreme "concentration" (samaadhi) which, as for
Plato, does not make use of the senses; one directly
intuits the forms, which are characterized as the
"subtle residuum" of matter.(16) The only dhammas in
this realm of form are the fifteen meditations
(jhaana) which make no use of the senses.
Here, however, the similarity between Plato and
Theravaada ends. For Plato's inquiry stops with the
world of ideas, as it has given him the metaphysical
explanatory power he needed to structure his theory
of knowledge and morality. In its religious quest
for an absolutely pure state of consciousness
Theravaada posits two more realms (lokas). First is
the "realm of the formless" (aruupaloka), where even
the "subtle residuum" or form is left behind. Here
the dhammas consist of concentrating on formless
objects of thought--for example, space (aakaa'sa)
and consciousness (vi~n~naa.na). Finally one enters
the supramundane realm (lokuttara) where there are
only eight dhammas: the four "paths" (maggas) to
sainthood and the four "fruits" (phalas) that arise
from following these paths. The final path leads
directly to Theravaada sainthood (arhat) and the
realization of nibbaana.
Thus it can be seen that the Theravaada
philosopher has analyzed man's psychological states
of mind into an ethical hierarchy that leads to his
ultimate religious goal: nibbaana. In summary, this
path of purification starts with unwholesome sensual
states of consciousness characterized by greed,
hate, and ignorance, and progresses to higher states
of wholesome intellection of the forms and the
formless ground of existence, thus bringing good
kamma and in the end enabling man to escape rebirth
entirely by escaping all kamma--good
---------------------
16 Ibid., p. 12.
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or bad. The progress thus far has been in "mundane
consciousness" (lokiya), but has been purified to
the extent that there is a passage to the "pure
consciousness" (ariya) where one begins the four
paths to sainthood and nibbaana.
III
A. J. Ayer states that if being a person consists
only of discrete perceptual experiences, then there
is no logical relation between these experiences;
that is, where does one find a force to keep one's
experiences together in an ordered manner? How do
we maintain any self-identity? What is it that
relates my experiences so that I maintain a certain
identity throughout my life? Ayer feels that "some
continuity of memory is necessary...."(17) That is,
given a series of experiences, we must thread them
together by assuming that they are all related
either actively or passively with memory. However,
this can only be so if "every detail of every
experience is subsequently recollected."(18) For in
the series of experiences all preceding experiences
must be recollected totally in the later experiences
if they are to be related by memory. But this would
mean that every experience is related to previous
memories, so the question is, What is this relation
of accompaniment between memories? Thus Ayer
concludes that memory is not sufficient and whatever
the relating power might be, "nothing more
illuminating can be said [of it] than that it is the
relation that holds between experiences when they
are constituents of the same consciousness.(19)
A similar analysis of memory is made in
Theravaada and it leads to a similar conclusion. For
it is said that with memory "each expired state
[experience] renders service (upakaara) to the next.
In other words, each, on passing away, gives up the
whole of its energy (paccaya-satti) to its
successor. Each successor, therefore, has all the
potentialities of its predecessors, and more. [All
this] takes part in a memory-process."(20) However,
for this to be true, Theravaada saw the need to
place it in a greater matrix of relation (paccaya);
that is, there is need for a force to direct this
memory process in a certain direction. This is
necessary if Theravaada wants to claim that one can
give up the normal directions in life and follow the
above-analyzed "path of purification." But where
Ayer claims that nothing can be said of such a
relation except that it holds in general for
consciousness, Theravaada attempts the following
analysis.
For Theravaada the world does not consist of
objects that are substantial,
-------------
17 Ayer, pp. 198-199.
18 Ibid.,p. 195.
19 Ibid., P.199.
20 Aung, p.42.
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"static" entities, but rather all objects are
considered to be "events" or "processes." When
Theravaada speaks of being (bhava) it conceives of
it as an active process. Therefore when discrete
dhammas are posited, one should not take these to be
static existences. Each dhamma should be considered
an event, not a "solid" sense-datum. Theravaada
further analyzes these "events" (i.e., the dhammas)
into three phases. First is the "genesis" (uppaada)
where the formal structure and material content of
the former moment give rise to the present moment.
That is, every moment of consciousness (dhamma) is
dependent on the preceding moment, from which it
receives both material content and formal influence.
These two elements received from the preceding
moment give rise to the "ordering of thought"
(cittaniyaama) and the particular direction (viithi)
that the present moment takes.
All this can be changed, however, in the second
stage of the event, which is called the
"development" (.thiti). Here the present moment is
no longer influenced by the past but by external and
internal forces. More specifically, the development
of the dhammas is conditioned by the external
circumstances (paccaya) in which it takes place, and
by the internal volition (cetanaa) as it both
focuses on, and reacts to, these circumstances. Both
of these conditioning factors produce "determined
effects" (sa^mkhaaras) in this development stage.
(Here sa^mkhaaras refers to the conditioned or
determined effect of will and circumstance in the
moments of consciousness, and does not have the
connotation that it does in Hindu philosophy--which
I will discuss later.)
In these two stages we can distinguish two
aspects: first, the passive side of consciousness
(upapattibhava) as shaped and ordered by the past
in the stage of genesis; and second, the active side
(kammabhava) as the determining of the stage of
development by will (cetanaa) and circumstances
(paccaya). It is in the third stage of "dissolution"
(bha^nga) that the resultant of these factors
(sa^mkhaaras) gives rise to, and transfers all its
power to, the next moment.
From this analysis one can see that, for
Theravaada, the perceptions are ultimately only
moments in a "flow of consciousness." Thus each
perception is a process that arises from the
preceding perception, develops, and passes on its
effects to the next perception. It is the "life
continuum" (bhava^nga) at the base of this flow of
consciousness that, for Theravaada, allows us to be
regarded as subjectively continuous, and supplies
the continuing process required for connection of
the above-mentioned perce ptions.(21)
This process is considered to be the functioning
of the dhammas and takes place on the subliminal
level. However, the process of consciousness can be
analyzed not only in terms of dhammas but also in
terms of what are called in Theravaada the eight
moments of apperception: (1) disturbance of the
stream of consciousness; (2) attention is averted;
(3) sensation arises; (4) contact
------------------
21 Anuruddha, pp. 265-266.
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arises; (5) feeling arises; (6) perception arises;
(7) volitional reaction; (8) reflection until again
lost in stream of consciousness.(22)
Further, a third analysis can be made in terms
of kamma which at the level of subliminal
consciousness is considered to be the ethical force
that relates perceptions. Kamma literally means
"deed" or "action" and refers to the "law of deed"
(Kamma) which states that moral deeds carry
consequences--"as you sow, so will you reap." In
much of Indian philosophy (e.g., Yoga and Vedaanta
Kamma is used to denote that one's actions produce
"impressions" (sa^mskaaras) in the actor which then
function as determinates to his future action.
In its no-self theory (anattaa) Buddhism rejects
any permanent substance which would carry
impressions of past deeds. Therefore the problem
arises as to how kamma, as the effect of one's
deeds, can modify one's subsequent character and
fortunes if there is no substantial self in which it
can inhere. The answer to this problem was alluded
to in the above analysis of the threefold process of
the dhamma moment (i.e., genesis, development, and
dissolution). In that analysis, the process of kamma
is implied when the will (cetanaa) and external
circumstances (paccaya) bring about a conditional
effect (sa^mkhaara) in the development of a certain
moment of consciousness (dhamma) which will then be
transferred to the next moment. Will and
circumstances are the germs of kamma, and the
effects of such kamma influence the future
"direction" of the flow of consciousness.
In this way, then, we can visualize the working
of kamma in the dhammas. However, it must be kept in
mind that these dhammas are moments in the flow of
consciousness. To use a Buddhist metaphor, when the
wheel of life is analyzed as a static entity the
spokes (dhammas) are apparent. But when the wheel is
turning in the regular life process, the spokes are
not seen. This life process is called in Theravaada
"dependent origination" (pa.ticcasamuppaada) and
refers to the belief that every moment (dhamma) in
the life process "depends" on the preceding moment
and "originates" the next. This process extends
through the moments, where kamma arises, and is
referred to as the process of kamma. Therefore, the
dhammas are parts of this process of kamma (i,e.,
dependent origination) and, insofar as they
themselves are processes, give rise to particular
instances of kamma which are passed on, through
dependent origination, into the future.
It is through analyses such as these that
Theravaada explains the relation which holds between
experiences and that allows for order and continuity
in a conception of the self as a stream of
perceptions. At the bottom of all such analyses lies
the claim that selfhood is found in the stream of
consciousness, which can be analyzed into discrete
perceptions for a certain ethical and reli-
-------------------
22 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London:
George Alien & Unwin, 1962), p.186
P31
gious purpose. While Hume analyzes the self into
"loose and separate" perceptions between which he
cannot find any relation, Theravaada analyzes the
self, as a stream of consciousness, into dynamic
segments of this process. Thus the problem of
relation does not arise in Theravaada in the way it
does for Hume. Let me give an example of how this is
so in terms of the "sense-data" theory of
perception.
A question that has been raised about this type
of theory, which, like Hume, distinguishes discrete
sense perceptions or sense-data, is that there seems
to be no guide for distingushing where one
perception ends and another begins. For example,
does one sense-datum include a tree only? Or does it
include the bird in the tree? Or does it also
include the flowers below, and the children playing
around it? Or are these all distinct sense-data in
themselves? There seems to be no general rule to
delimit a moment of perception. Theravaada would
respond that this problem shows that there is a
stream of consciousness which moves from one thing
to another in a continuous process of perception,
and that any analysis would only distinguish
segments of this stream of consciousness, and not
independent perceptions or sense-data.
Theravaada feels that such a position is
justified because the analysis of the stream of
consciousness into dhammas is for a specific
purpose. For Theravaada analysis is guided by the
quest for an ethical purification of consciousness.
That is, while Theravaada does maintain that there
are discrete moments of consciousness (dhammas), it
does so only for the purpose of making transparent a
certain path for ethical purification. The viewing
of Theravaada analysis within its religious context
and as posited for the specific purpose of
liberation cannot be stressed enough. An example of
this intent can be seen in the following text from
the Mahaavagga: "Perceiving this, [the nonexistence
of the self] O priests, the learned and noble
disciple conceives an aversion.... And in conceiving
this aversion he becomes divested of passion, and by
the absence of passion he becomes free...."(23) In
the Sarvaastivaada text, the Vij~naanakaaya, this
intent is even more clear: "Even if your pudgala
(self) exists, he is not useful for salvation...
because there is no use for him, therefore the
pudgala does not exist."(24)
Finally, from this it can be seen that analysis
for Theravaada is a normative enterprise which is
guided by the religious quest for which it is
intended. So, when one notes that the Theravaada
concept of the self is similar to Hume's position,
one must qualify this observation in the light of
the ends they were attempting to achieve by their
analyses. Hume's analysis sought an epistemological
end while the analysis of theravaada is made in an
attempt to show the path to a purely religious goal.
It is in light of such a difference in ends that
Theravaada analysis manifests its uniqueness
-------------------
23 H. C. Warren, Buddhism in Translation (New York:
Atheneum, 1963), p.147.
24 Conze, p.129.