P91

        In  his  own  words,  Streng's   article  would  (I)
        describe  some key elements  of the formulations  on
        causality in both Hiinayaana and Mahaayaana Buddhism
        in   India,  (2)  analyze   the   role   of  thought
        (image-ing)  itself   in  some  important   Buddhist
        statements  on causality, and (3) discuss the notion
        of  the  twofold  truth  in  Buddhism  as  a way  of
        understanding  different  expressions  of  causality
        within  the  Buddhist   effort   for  release   from
        suffering.  Under  (1) he raises  what he calls  two
        existential  questions: Is a person simply a product
        of  a  force   (or  forces)  independent   of  human
        activity? If human beings are not totally determined
        by an external force, is there a regulatory order to
        which one is responsible when exercising freedom? In
        contrast, Gomez'  paper appears  entirely  concerned
        with these two questions  of Streng's  part (1).  It
        might be concluded  that Streng  is trying  to cover
        too  much  in his article.  I shall  revert  to this
        point later. In any case he makes a number of points
        which, to me, are indeed  valid.  It was proper  for
        him to stress the role of images, both for right and
        wrong views.  It was also germane  to introduce  the
        two levels  of truth, which in Naagaarjuna's  system
        validate   all  establishments   of  sa.msaara   and
        nirvaa.na, according  to Tibetan traditions.  It was
        proper  for him to stress  the role  of images, both
        for right and wrong views. He is, of course, correct
        in  employing   hetu  as  'cause'  and  pratyaya  as
        `condition,' thus with  different  meanings.  Streng
        makes  only one paali  scriptural  reference, namely
        the Discourse to Kaccaayana (Sanskrit, Kaatyaayana),
        followed   by   some   citations   from   Mahaayaana
        scriptures.    The   Paali   passage   is   in   the
        Samyutta-nikaaya  (nidaana-vagga), a discourse which
        criticizes  the views that the world exists  or that
        the world  does not exist, and sets  forth  a middle
        view, which  is the view  of dependent  origination.
        But the same  nidaana-vagga  of the Samyutta-nikaaya
        has other passages on causality  that are celebrated
        and  important;  and fully  deserving  of discussion
        with  appropriate  comparisons  on the  very  issues
        which Streng tried to cover.

            In contrast, Gomez' article restricts  itself to
        the free-will  question, along with good structuring
        of the evidence  and a proper  number  of scriptural
        references  from  the same  class  of scripture--the
        Paali  sources.   In  this  type  of  approach,  the
        individual  links of the argument  should be strong.
        In the course  of his argument, Gomez considers  two
        passages from the Samyutta-nikaaya.  As the first of
        these,  Gomez   cites   the  Natu.mhasutta   of  the
        nidaana-vagga, and asserts  that  it represents  the
        notion  of nonself  in terms of detachment.  Gautama
        explains, in Gomez' rendition: "This body, monks, is
        not yours, nor does it belong  to others.  It should
        be known  it should  be considered, monks, as former
        deeds purposefully  performed  and thought  out...."
        (and   so   on,   with   attention    to   dependent
        origination)  .    Let   us   consider   the   terms
        abhisa^nkhatam

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        abhisa~ncetayitam. In a similar context, the teacher
        Asa^nga,   in   his   Abhidharmasamuccaya,   defines
        volition  (cetanaa) as the mental  deed (manaskarma)
        which    is   the    instigation    of   the    mind
        (cittaabhisa.mskaara),  the  activity  inciting  the
        mind  to virtue, vice, and  the  undefined.  Now the
        passage  in  question   does  not  seem  to  portray
        nonself,    as    Gomez     claims,    but    rather
        nonbelonging-to-self.  It sets  up  a riddle.  "This
        body, monks, is not  yours, nor  does  it belong  to
        others."  former  karman (that is, mental karman, or
        volition),  what  was  instigated  (abhisa^nkhatam),
        what was purposely  thought out (abhisa~ncetayitam).
        This reminds  us of Epictetus, the freed  slave, who
        taught in his Stoic philosophy that his body was not
        his  own, because  it  was  not  in  his  power  and
        belonged  to the Giver.  The Buddhist passage agrees
        with Epictetus  that the body  does   not belong  to
        oneself, but  does  not  agree  that  it belongs  to
        another.  for  example, the Deity.  In Buddhism  the
        body  is the  slave  of the former  karman, wherefor
        karman (that is, manas-karman, or volition) is not a
        slave  but  rather  the  master.  Thus  the  passage
        anticipates  the Paali commentarial  tradition which
        assigns   the   first   two  members   of  dependent
        origination, avijjaa and sa^nkhaara, to the previous
        life,  with  sa^nkhaara   explained  as  the  former
        karman.  When  dependent  origination  is identified
        with the metaphorical tree or suffering--a term that
        occurs  in the Da`sabhuumika-suutra--the  first  two
        members  are the manure (that is, Sanskrit  avidyaa)
        and the ground (that is, Sanskrit  sa.mskaara).  the
        third being the seed (that is, Sanskrit  vij~naana).
        Here the metaphors are consistent with the old Paali
        passage: "This  body, monks, is not yours, nor  does
        it belong to others."  Ah, then, what does it belong
        to? The ground, or sa.mskaara, which I translate  as
        'motivations'. The ground was also Gautama's witness
        during  the assault  of Maara.  Gomez had previously
        cited  the  Devadahasutta  of  the  Majjhima-nikaaya
        where `Saakyamuni explains how he argued against the
        niganthas  who wrongly held that pleasures  or pain,
        or the two mixed, are all caused by former deeds. As
        Gomez   points   out,  here  Gautama   affirms   the
        effectiveness  of human  effort  and stresses  right
        attitude.  Of course, such  passages  as that of the
        Devadahasutta are not in conflict with the dependent
        origination   passages   of   the   Samyuttanikaaya.
        Feelings in dependent origination are No.  7, having
        as  condition   'contact'  (of  sense  organ,  sense
        object, and perception).  The Buddha explains in the
        Bhuumija-sutta  of the nidaana-vagga  that  feelings
        have not been caused  by oneself, another, both.  or
        neither.  In any case, one should  be dispassionate.
        which Gomez mentions.  I suppose  this is consistent
        with  Streng's  point  about  views, in his part II,
        where he makes much ado about `attachment'.

            What I miss in Gomez'  paper  is any utilization
        of the actual  arguments  about causation  which the
        great  Buddhist  teachers  had--who  of course  were
        quite   familiar   with   the   scriptures   of  the
        Samyutta-nikaaya's  nidaana-vagga (or the equivalent
        section   in  the  Sanskrit   Samyuta-aagama) -which
        obviously  color Naagaarjuna's  Madhyamaka-kaarikaa.
        In this matter, Streng's  article  is hardly better,
        because he only refers to Naagaarjuna en passant. In
        the first verse of his

                                P93

        Madhyamaka-kaarikaa,  Naagaarjuna   denies   that  a
        dharma  ever arose  without  a cause  (or by chance)
        (ahetuka.h) .   And  since  causality   is  such  an
        important  topic, other  teachers  have  had to deal
        with  it;  for  example, the argument  set forth  by
        Vasubandhu  in  his  Abhidharmako`sa   concerns  the
        validation of the karmapatha (path of karman) in the
        stream of consciousness.

            Finally, what I miss in Streng's  article is any
        utilization  of metaphorical  language in the manner
        of the Buddhist  scriptures, such as I have employed
        above with the word 'ground'.  The Samyutta-nikaaya,
        nidaana-vagga, in its latter  half, also resorts  to
        metaphors  and  similes  to get  the  point  across.
        According to Buddhist tradition the celebrated Wheel
        of Life (the bhavacakra) was devised  as a pictorial
        device  to  communicate   the  Buddhist   theory  of
        causation, since purely  declarative  sentences  may
        simply obscure  the very theory they aim to clarify.
        However, I am not  insisting  that  such  metaphoric
        language  be utilized  in a discourse  on causality.
        The  two articles  being  discussed  illustrate  the
        varying   relevance.   In  Gomez'  case,  since  the
        treatment  was  restricted  to a given  topic  (free
        will) in a restricted  stretch  of the paali  canon,
        straightforward  language was feasible, but examples
        were resorted to.  In Streng's case, since he jumped
        from the Paali scripture  to Mahaayana, and tried to
        cover  many  facets  of the problem  in one article,
        then  if  it  be  granted  that  such  crowding   of
        points--no  matter  how  valid--does  nor  permit  a
        marshalling  of evidence necessary for conviction in
        each case, I suppose  it is because  he did not know
        the technique: of symbols.  In a forthcoming article
        in  History  of  Religions  (May  1974),  on  mirror
        symbolism  in Buddhism, I show how it is possible to
        pass  from  an  early  to a later  period, from  one
        Buddhist  school  to another.  from  one country  to
        another--all in one article, provided one does it in
        terms  of  a  symbol--in   this  case,  the  mirror.
        Therefore, I do not criticize  Streng for trying  to
        cover so much in one article, but rather  for trying
        to  do  it  with  discourse  mostly  unrelieved   by
        examples;  perhaps what the Indian logicians  called
        the  internal  pervasion  (antarvyaapti) --the  mere
        thesis  and reason without  the illustration  agreed
        upon by all the parties.