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Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. By
David J. Kalupahana. Honolulu: The University Press
of Hawaii. 1975. Pp. 265. $12.00
A philosophical work such as this one comes but once
in a long while. Though it is an outgrowth of the
author's thesis presented to the University of London
in 1966, it has been expanded and updated. By any
standard it is an important work. There is no doubt
in my mind that it will be read and reread in the
years to come and will become a key work in any
philosophical analysis of Buddhist doctrines. I
personally wish to congratulate the author for
expounding on a most difficult but central conception
of Buddhism and analyzing its ramifications in a
very thorough. lucid, and objective manner.
At the outset, it must be noted that Kalupahana
has drawn deeply from his own personal background and
culture to present the concept. Throughout the book,
therefore, the Sinhalese spirit and humanistic
approach is well displayed in bringing forth the
early Buddhist and Theravaada understanding. This is
indeed a singular contribution and an added bonus.
I shall concern myself with two aspects of the
work: (1) what it sets out to do; and (2) comments on
certain problematic areas.
The book sets out to focus on the concept of
causality, which is referred to as the central
philosophy of Buddhism. Kalupahana takes the
historical route but looks at the concept as posed
within the Buddhist tradition. Thus he starts by
listing the four pre-Buddhistic causal theories found
in the pali Nikaayas and the Chinese AAgamas (pp.
5-6). They are (I) self-causation (saya.m kata.m),
(2) external causation (para.m kata.m), (3) both
internal or self-causation and external causation
(saya.m kata~n ca para. m kata~n ca), and (4) neither
internal nor external causation (asayamkaara.m
aparamkaara.m). Under the second theory, there are
five other subtheories: time (kaala), creation by God
(II'svarak.rta), inherent nature (svabhaava), action
or behavior (karman), and fate (niyati).
Kalupahana says that where the Vedic tradition
accepted self-causation or the identity theory as
well as the divine creation theory, the non-Vedic
tradition upheld the rest of the theories (p. 6).
Thus, Chapter 1 is concerned with the Vedic theories
and chapter 2 the non-Vedic theories.
The Buddha, of course, was against self-causation
theory because he was acutely aware that the problem
of personal identity was intimately connected with
the theory of moral responsibility (13). As to the
divine creation theory, the Buddha rejected it
because "they were misdescriptions of an aspect of
reality that pertains to extrasensory perception"
(21). Thus the conclusion is that these theories
either deny moral responsibility or are detrimental
to the true religious life (22).
In the non-Vedic tradition, Kalupahana groups
many of the theories under the rubric of naturalism.
His analysis of materialism, an offshoot of
naturalism, brings out the interesting discussion of
causation through inherent nature (svabhaava). He
ends by stating that "we are inclined to believe that
svabhaavavaada was part and parcel of Materialism,
even in pre-Buddhistic times" (26). He also labels
svabhaavavaada as "natural determinism" and states
that the Buddhist classified it as external causation
because its workings were purely physical and that
man had no power over nature. (31-32). However, it
must be stated that the materialism of Saa^mkhya
based on insentient matter (prak.rti) required the
external spiritual principle (puru.sa) to create the
initial movement of matter.
Closely allied with svabhaavavaada is
niyativaada, external causation, which is best
described
p.340
as complete determinism or fatalism and whose
proponents were the AAjiivikas. The examination of
Paali and Chinese sources shows that for them, "once
the nature of the species (sa^ngati) is determined by
Destiny (niyati). that species begins to evolve
(pari.naama) according to its nature (bhaava =
svabhaava) (35). This is complete determinism and not
indeterminism or chance occurrence (yad.rcchaa), as
Kalupahana rightly observes.
The Buddhist criticism of external causation of
the deterministic type is basically that it
undermines belief in moral responsibility, that
psychological and moral natures are not given
their due, and secondly that determinism, if carried
to the extremes, will inevitably lead to annihilation
of man (40-43).
The third type, of causation, which combines both
self (internal) and other (external) causations, is
represented by the Jaina system. It is also referred
to as the relativist theory, which assumes the nature
of plurality as it necessitates human exertion
internally, and time, God, nature and karman
externally(47). In a word, the Jaina theory asserts
that things or events are partly determined and
partly undetermined. When an act is done, according
to Mahaaviira, the individual is bound by that act
(karman). The Buddha, of course, criticized such
karman-determined nature since this would negate any
attempt at future doings, that is, that all present
acts are due to past acts and all future acts are due
to present acts, which is an absurdity.
The fourth type of causation theory is
noncausation (ahetuvaada) , variously labelled as
chance occurrence (yad.rcchaa) or fortuitous
origination (adhiccasamuppaada). This is, of course,
the extreme position and is not subscribed to by the
Buddha because it is the way to utter
irresponsibility. The Buddha knew that there must be
a foundation for acts in man and a way to unity of
all men in society.
With the above preliminary analysis of the
pre-Buddhistic conceptions of causation well-defined
and established, it becomes relatively easy to enter
seriously into the discussion of the Buddhist concept
of causation. Thus, with chapter 3, Kalupahana starts
at the very beginning of the interpretative
problematic, that is, the clarification of terms.
The first and foremost term is paticcasamuppaada
or pratiityasamutpaada. Kalupahana goes through the
various connotations of the term, introducing
interpretations by such classical Buddhist scholars,
as, Buddhaghosa and Candrakiirti. as well as, such
modern scholars as Edgerton, Monier-Williams,
Soothill and Hodous, J„schke, S. Das and de la Vall‚e
Poussin. He rightly points out that the group of
conditions (hetusamuuha) referred to in the texts,
both Paali and Chinese, do not refer to a difference
between hetu (cause) and pratyaya (condition) as so
many modern interpreters have maintained. As a matter
of fact, hetu and pratyaya were synonymously and
interchangeably used (57, 59). He concludes thus:
"early Buddhist theory transcends the common-sense
notion of causation. While recognizing several
factors that are necessary to produce an effect, it
does not select one from a set of jointly sufficient
conditions and present it as the cause of the effect.
In speaking of causation. it recognizes a system
whose parts are mutually dependent. This dependence
has been designated the 'dependent origination'
(pa.ticcasamuppaada), which conforms with the
definition given by Buddhaghosa. Thus, although there
are several factors, all of them constitute one
system or event and therefore are referred to in the
singular" (59).
It was later, however, that the Buddhist began to
look into the several factors that cause an event to
change. So in the Abhidharmika schools, notably the
Sarvaastivaada, hetu and pratyaya became
distinguishable aspects of the rise of events.
In chapter 4, Kalupahana comes to grips with the
heart of the matter as he expounds
p.341
on the two important aspects of the Buddha's
discovery on the nature of dhamma or dharma: (1)
'causation' (pa.ticcasamuppaada, yin yan fa) and (2)
'causally produced dhammaa' (pa.ticcasamuppane ca
dhamme, yan sheng fa ) (68). He says, "it is a
distinction between the causal relation and the
causally related. The problem of causation,
therefore. involves two aspects; the rule or pattern
according to which things change. and the things
themselves that are subject to change"(68).
The nature of dhamma is closely connected with
the theory of impermanence (anicca) and momentariness
(khanavaada), that is, the manner in which a dhamma
presents itself or has existential status. It is here
that the concept of self-existence or own-nature
(svabhbhaava) enters. The Sarvaastivaada postulated
the four ways in which change takes place with
respect to the dharmic analysis (74-75) . This
analysis is criticized by the Maadhyamika as being
untenable or inapplicable to the very concept of
causality (79).
Where the Sarvaastivaada postulated the
svabhaava, the Sautraantika rejected it and did not
recognize a static moment, for dharmas are constantly
arising and disappearing. But they were still left
with the problem of explaining the connection between
two successive moments(81).
Kalupahana's conclusion is that the causally
produced dhamma (pa.ticca-samuppana-dhamma) is an
empirical phenomenon which includes the mental
concepts (dhammaa) as well.
Chapter 5 is an extension of the last but here
Kalupahana enters into the central conception by
discussing the nature of change or the pattern by
which an event takes place. According to early
Buddhism, there are no accidental occurrences because
everything is causally conditioned or produced
(pa.ticca-samuppannam) . The Buddha, of course,
discovered the conditioned nature of things. Buddhist
texts are replete with assertions to the effect that
he who perceives the causally conditioned nature of
things als o perceives the truth (dhamma), and he who
perceives the truth also perceives the conditioned
nature. Thus Kalupahana goes into an exhaustive
analysis of the formula for the pa.ticcasamuppaada,
that is, "When this exists, that exists; from the
arising of this, that arises, etc." His point of
departure here, which is a singular contribution to
the subject at hand, is an analysis of
pa.ticcasamuppada, as described in the Samyukta
Nikaaya (II, 26), as synonymous with what he refers
to as the causal nexus. The causal nexus has four
main characteristics which are: "objectivity"
(tathataa) , "necessity" (avitathataa) ,
"invariability" (ana~n~nathataa) , and
"conditionality" (idappaccayataa). By understanding
the characteristics, one is able to understand the
causal nature of the concept of pa.ticcasamuppaada or
popularly referred to as the Wheel of Life, for
example, the connection or continuity between
"ignorance" (avijjaa) and "dispositions" (sa^nkhaara)
(91).
Kalupahana rightly says that early Buddhism did
not simply accept mere constant conjunction of two
things or constant association of succession (95-96).
Moreover, the early Buddhists looked upon the
occurrence of events by virtue of a plurality of
causes. His apt illustration is presented in Figure 2
(98) where suffering (dukkha) is shown to be the
result of many diverse causes. He shows with good
documentation and analysis that the Humean
understanding of causation was limited, akin to the
Sautraantika's attempt to understand the successive
events by way of momentary experiences but which
failed to account for their causal continuity
(100-103). Hume, in short, only saw causation as a
succession of discrete momentary impressions.
Kalupahana's strongest contribution in this
important chapter is the distinction made
p.342
between the concepts of causation and "causal
uniformity" (dhammataa) or "causality" (100) .
According to him, the former is given in experience
but the latter is bused on inductive inference. This
point will be commented on later.
Having described the nature of causality, which
holds for every sphere of existence. Kalupahana
expands this in detail in chapter 6. He explains the
nature of physical causation as found in the early
texts, but his attention is more on the analysis of
the nature of causality as it is relevant to human
experience and behavior with the goal of justifying
morality or moral action without resorting to
determinism. It is said that the Buddha always gave
different answers to different situations in regard
to moral behavior (127). He concludes thus: "the
effect (phala, pao) of a deed (komma, yeh) is not
determined solely by the deed itself but also by the
nature of the person who commits the deed and. we may
add, by the circumstances in which it is committed"
(131). The chapter ends with the discussion of the
famous Twelve-fold Formula of Causation
(pa.tccasamuppaada) found in the early texts and the
various interpretations that have arisen about it by
modern and contemporary scholars.
The next two chapters are devoted to Later
Developments (7) and to Causal Correlations (8). The
later developments are on the Sarvaastivaada and
Sautraantika views on causality, where the former
reasserts a form of satkaaryavaada or the identity
theory subscribed to by the Saa.mkhya system and the
latter, a form of asatkaaryavaada or the nonidentity
theory subscribed to by the Vai'se.sika system. The
correlation or correspondence in both may be
simplistic but aids in the understanding of the
respective Buddhist schools on the central
conception, and also with respect to the position
taken by the Maadhyamika. Kalupahana ends by stating
that, "whereas in early Buddhism the theory of
causation was employed to explain all types of
causation available in the world of experience,
including nirvaa.na, in Maadhyamika thought it was
employed to explain only the relativity of the
phenomenal, the theory itself being considered
transcendental" (162).
With regard to causal correlations, Kalupahana
takes up, in detail, the understanding of the
twenty-four types of pratyayas, the thrust of the
chapter being the comparisons of the types as
presented by the Theravaadins on the one hand and by
the Sarvaastivaadins and Yogaacaarins on the other.
He ends by asserting that, "nearly eighteen of the
twenty-four causal correlations enumerated in the
Pa.t.thaana have counterparts in the Sarvaastivaada
and Yogaacaara theories. We have not been able to
find parallels for six of the relations enumerated by
the Theravaadins. However, in addition to those
mentioned, the Yogaacaara list contains thirteen more
relations for which parallels are not traceable in
the Theravaada Abhidhamma" (173).
In the concluding chapter, Kalupahana cogently
reasserts his empirical standpoint by analyzing the
Buddha's silence, that is, with reference to the ten
indeterminate or unexplained metaphysical questions.
T. R. V. Murti's concern with the Buddha's
transcendent reality or the unconditioned reality,
which is beyond empirical descriptions and
verifications, is not satisfactory Nor is K. N.
Jayatilleke's distinction that the first four
questions are empirically limiting and the last six
logically meaningless . Kalupahana's own answer to
the famous silence is that "the Buddha confined
himself to what is empirically given.... He sometimes
resorted to linguistic analysis and appeal to
experience to demonstrate the futility of
metaphysics. As a result of his empiricism he
recognized causality as the reality and made it the
essence of his teachings" (185).
We are indeed indebted to Kalupahana for keying
on the principal doctrine and present-
p.343
ing a thorough accounting of it in both the Buddhist
and non-Buddhist traditions. But in so doing. it was
inevitable that there would arise certain problematic
areas in interpretation. The first is with respect to
the explicatory language in use. The strains on any
translator are ever present, but it is even more so
with the philosopher. This is quite evident with
Kalupahana in focusing on the doctrine and cognate
ideas.
A simple term, such as, hetu, translated as
"cause," is more than a simple idea of cause in
Buddhist thought, and this is even more implicated by
the conjunctive phrase, hetu-pratyaya, which is a
unique concept. Thus, when it comes to the principal
doctrine, pa.ticcasamuppaada, the uniqueness knows no
bounds. Kalupahana has rendered it as causality, the
term equated or identified with reality (dhamma),
according to the Buddha. In advancing his
understanding, he makes the bold distinction that
"only causal uniformity or causality is based on
inductive inference and that causation itself is
given in experience" (100). The distinction is either
unclear or confusing. If he is to interpret
everything from the empirical approach, how is the
distinction justified? It seems to me that inductive
inference and experience are two aspects of the same
reality, unless one is making an illicit introduction
of the mind in the experiential process, but that
would not be buddhistic at all. At times, he is
careless and identifies pa.ticcasamuppaada as
causation (54-55, 68. 131) and so the reader
sometimes sees the distinction between causality and
causation and sometimes not. In general, we may say
that causation is a generic term while causality is
more specific; in his distinction, however, the
understanding seems to be reversed. Yet, due to our
set Western orientation, the use of cognate terms,
such as, causes, causal principle, causal connection,
causal necessity, causal condition, causal
continuity, causal efficiency, causal process, etc.,
becomes very clear on the one hand but increasingly
nebulous on the other, that is, as referred to
Buddhist reality. Granted that the terms are to be
seen or used in quotes, it is difficult to know when
the quotes are on and when they are not. Our Western
orientation is even more fired and pursued when he
invokes Western thinkers, such as, Bunge, Russell,
Stebbing, Collingwood, etc. to analyze the causal
nature of things in an attempt to focus on the
Buddhist nature of things. The introduction of these
thinkers is good, but at the same time effort should
have been made to reveal the limitations on the
subject matter at hand. It should be noted, however,
that he is on the right track in analyzing Hume, but
perhaps he failed to go far enough. The crucial point
in Hume is not that he considered causation as
"nothing but a succession of discrete momentary
impressions" (101) but that he pointed out
persuasively that, in strict empiricism, the
necessary connection between two events cannot be
asserted.
In rendering pa.ticcasumuppaada as causality,
Kalupahana is naturally not abandoning its original
meaning; as a matter of fact, throughout the book, he
is discharging extreme care to reveal the original
meaning on the basis of a strict empiricism. it is
only when set Western terms are applied to depict the
phenomenon that the problem arises. For example, his
definition of a cause as, "the sum total of several
factors that give rise to a consequent" (59) is
general and fair enough to normal understanding of
the term. Yet the definition must be pursued in a
strict manner. Following Western thinkers, especially
J. S. Mill, he supports the view of a many-one rather
than the one-one relationship, that is, cause effect,
in early Buddhism. This is reasonably acceptable.
However, the question arises whether the many-one
relationship is applicable to the central concept. In
many respects, it is either a logical view of the
sequence of events or a mere description of the
consequent event; it does not really describe th e
manner in which the many factors or conditions
p.344
come into play to produce the particular consequent.
As such. it falls short of the Buddhist understanding.
In other words, granted that the early Buddhists
referred to the various conditions (paccayas) in the
singular to denote the causal relation to the effect
or consequent, still, the problem of bringing the
plural factors or conditions together into a sum
total is not answered; nor is the necessary
connection between the sum total conditions and the
consequent. Strictly speaking, the answer can neither
be found in empiricism.
Again, following Stebbing's account of experience
in which we "distinguish between occurrences that we
regard as being regularly connected and occurrences
that we consider to be accidentally or casually
conjoined" (67) , Kalupahana finally draws a
correspondence between the distinction and the
Buddha's discovery of pa.ticcasamuppaada on the one
hand and the causally produced dhammaa on the other
(67-68). This is the difference between the causal
pattern (or rule) and the causally conditioned
entity. The correspondence is, of course, in
question. In so doing, there seems to be a search for
or a reading in of a pattern, or rule at the expense
of the process involved in the experiential events.
Moreover, it would seem again from the linguistic
standpoint, which indeed influences the final
epistemological acceptance, that the phrase,
"causally produced dhammaa," may tend to be
interpreted in such a manner that the dhammaa may be
separated from the pa.ticcasamuppaada.
It is my understanding that the dhammaa is an
instance, a manifestation, of pa.ticcasamuppaada; for
indeed the Buddha made the famous assertion, "He who
sees pa.ticcasamuppaada sees the dhammaa:"
We do not, strictly speaking, have a solution to
the problem of causation from the traditional point
of view. The concept of pa.ticcasamuppaada is
buddhistically unique and, so far, no amount of
causal analysis has done it justice. It seems to me
at least that the elements of scientific philosophy,
especially those oriented in process phenomena or
ontologies, have exhibited the closest affinity to
Buddhist thought and thereby have shown the greatest
promise in comparative analysis. But at the moment we
do not have the methodology nor the linguistic tools
to fully account for the concept. Empirically, it is
difficult to describe the concept because the concept
itself is part and parcel of the very empiricism that
we set out to define and understand. Yet, this does
not mean that the concept is impotent or meaningless,
since it is really the very process by which we
individually live. This then brings us to the second
problematic area, which is empiricism.
It has long been my view that the concept of
empiricism requires reassessment, redefinition, and
enlargement. More specifically, the nature and
extension of the empirical realm needs to be
reexamined, and it might be added that the nature and
extension are not unrelated.
With regard to the nature, we believe, for the
most part, that we comprehend and apprehend its total
character at all times. There are serious doubts
about this. For example, the so-called causal nexus
that Kalupahana discusses pointedly (91-95) is an
important empirical concept. He expounds on the four
main characteristics which were delineated
earlier.They present the "morphological" nature and
are all important components or phases of the
empirical process. Separately, the role of each may
be understood to a large extent but compositely in
process, they defy our understanding. The conclusion
to be derived here is that the underlying nature of
the empirical realm is rendered somewhat clear, but,
at the same time, the clarity is infinitely
complicated by the unaccounted areas or realms within
empiricism.
It can be said that, on the whole, we are limited
to visible and manipulable matters, be they tangible
or nontangible, such as, sense impressions, concepts,
psychological phe-
p.345
nomena. and even the elements of logic. These are
clear and distinct to our senses as well as to the
conscious mind. But we know very well that in
Buddhism. the mind or consciousness does not exist or
preexist independently of perception. nor do the
sense faculties. Moreover. all that is clear and
distinct does not make up reality. There are truly
nonperceptual realms of existence in the subtle
process of our experiences. which. in many ways, make
those clear and distinct realms possible. Taking a
pet example, we do not only see the islands but feel
the waters and skies that surround them as well . All
are in the state of inviolable contiguity and all
mutually define each other. plus the fact that all
are in constant movement. This is the meaning of
dependence or interdependence in the rise of events.
It is the depiction of pa.ticcasamuppaada as such.
Thus the nature of the empirical realm must be viewed
more closely or in minute detail, leaving out
nothing, in order to account for every phase of the
experiential development.
All this brings us to the extensional character
of empiricism. From time to time Kalupahana resorts
to the Buddha to advance the idea that the inductive
inference of pa.ticcasamuppaada at play must come by
way of extrasensory perception (104-109, 129). He
says categorically that "even extrasensory
perceptions and emancipation are not considered
supernatural occurrences in Buddhism. They are
natural causal occurrences" (42). He then goes on to
quote from the Anguttara Nikaaya (V. 3, 313) to prove
his point. The quote, of course, is subject to
different interpretations. Where he takes it
undeniably to refer to a case of extrasensory
perception, other readers, myself included, would not
go to that extent. For them, it is still possible in
the state of concentration, still within the natural
empirical realm, "to know and see what really is" or
"to realize the knowledge and insight of
emancipation." To introduce at this conjuncture such
extrasensory perception, as psychokinesis,
clairaudience, telepathy, and retrocognition, is
really to undermine all that has been said about the
strength and cogency of empiricism. It would be
difficult to square empiricism with the
transempirical nature of things. This is indeed the
weakest part in the exposition of the central
concept. Perhaps, it is time to demythologize some of
the obvious accounts presented in the early (or even
later) works on Buddhism and focus on a wider
empirical context in which the doctrines could all be
accommodated. Such terms as lokuttara, for example,
need to be reappraised in the light of a wider and
more extensive system of empiricism.
KENNETH K. INADA
State University of New York at Buffalo