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The Gaudapaadiiya-Kaarikaa  (GK) is widely regarded as one of
the  eraliest  statements  of what  subsequently  became  the
well-known  school of Advaita Vedaanta.  Scholarship  in this
century has been active on three main issues surrounding it:
(1) when  it was  composed  and  by  whom, (2) whether  it is
a unitary or a composite  work, and (3) to what extent it has
been influenced  by Buddhism.  The three issues are obviously
interrelated, but each deserves recognition in its own right.
Richard King's Early Advaita Vedaanta  and Buddhism  bears on
all three, identifying the last as its gravitational  center
of interest.
    The  author's   conclusions   are  that   the  text   "is
pre-`Sankarite  since it shows no evidence  of any influences
in the post-sixth-century  era" and in all probability is not
from  the hand of Gaudapaada  (p.36);  that it is a composite
work;  and that  "all four prakara.nas  display  evidence  of
Buddhist influence" (p.236).  It is in identifying the nature
of the  influences  on the  text  that  the  author  makes  a
distinct advance. He specifies the nature of these influences
textually in terms of each prakara.nas(p.236), and also tries
to  spell them  out  in  terms  of the two main philosophical
schools of Mahaayaana  Buddhism in  India  ¢w the  Madhyamaka
and the Yogaacaara.
    King's analysis  of how Madhyamaka  Buddhism  and Advaita
Vedaanta turn in different  directions  while arriving at the
same crossroads is particularly lucid. The crossroads are the
"inconsisitencies  of the common sense notions of duality and
change"(p.126), succinctly identified by Bradley as follows :
something, A, changes, and therefore it cannot  be permanent.
On the  other  hand, if A is not  permanent, what  is it that
changes?"(p.129)
    [In this debate]  over the status  of object  (A) and its
    various  modes  or states  of manifestation  (x1, x2, x3,
    etc.) the  Buddhist  accepts  the empirical  efficacy  of
    changes  in states  but does  not accept  the independent
    reality of the possessor of these states (A). This is the
    doctrine  of the no-self  which rejects  such notions  as
    mentally fabricated reifications (prapanca). In   Advaita
    Vedaanta (A) is accepted and it is the manifested  states
    that are denied  ultimate  reality  since reality  cannot
    chang. Thus, both the Madhyamaka and Gaudapaadian Advaita
    derive their positions from the logical dichotomy between
    an  entity  and  change.....  [B]oth  as  it  were  grasp
    separate "horns" of the dilemma....(pp.130-131)

    The clear  recognition  of this distinction  enables  the
author  to be more precise  in pinpointing  both the Buddhist
influence  and  its  limitation in  the  context  of  Advaita
Vedaanta, as when it is pointed  out  that  the  Gaudapaadian
doctrine  of non-origination (ajativaada) " is dependent upon
the Madhyamaka understanding of the non-arising ( anutpaada )
of dharmas"(p.237). The author admits  the conclusion  is not
novel  but it acquires  clear  content  in his hands, when he
explains:

    Both the Gaudapaadian doctrine of non-orgination  and the
    text's  belief that it is not in conflict  with any other
    view  are drawn  from  an absolutistic  (mis-)reading  of
    Naagaarjuna's   arguments   in  the  MMK.   The   GKtakes
    Naagaarjuna's  rejection of  all views   (d.r.s.t.i)   as
    incipient  forms of absolutism  and adopts it for its own
    pruposese. All views, the authors of the GK argue, entail
    an  unorginated  absolute.  This  is  seen  as the  final
    vindication of ajaativaada.(p.237)

    At the  same  time, the  limitation  is suggested  by the
fact"that   the  prima  facie  similarity   of  Advaita   and
Maahaayaana   ideas,  in  actuality,  reflects  their  direct
incommensurability" (p.238).  So far as Madhyamaka Mahaayaana
is  concerned, the  two  schools  of Advaita  and  Madhyamaka
"reach a philosophical impasse precisely over the question of
'Svabhaava: Nihsvabhaava'"(p.237).
    Turning next to Yogaacaara Buddhism: the "discussions  of
the equality of dream and waking states" and "the doctrine of
non-duality (advaya) of consciousness ¢w i.e.  the denial  of
the validity of subject-object  divisions in experience"  are
identified as "Yogaacaara-inspired themes" (p.236) .  Indeed,
it is asserted that " the ontological denial  of  origination
(ajaativaada) on the one hand  and the epistemological denial
of subject-object duality (advaya-vaada) on the  other, found
in  the  Gaudapaadiiya - Kaarikaa " are  dependent  upon  the
"Madhyamaka in the case of the former and the  Yogaacaara  in
the case of the latter" (p.203).
    Not only are the streams of influence  clearly identified
in terms  of the two schools, but it is also  suggested  that
teher are even other influences  at work not noticed  earlier
on account  of the "philosophically  narrow  and historically
misleading  assumption  that  the  Madhyamaka  and Yogaacaara
schools  are the only Mahaayaana  influences"  (p.240) on the
text under  review.  According  to the author, this "reflects
an inadequate  grasp  of  the absolutistic : non-absolutistic
divide  between Advaita Vedaanta  and scho ; astic Mahaayaana
on the one hand, and  a failure to qppreciate  the  diversity
of Mahaayaana ( encompassing absolutistic

P.663

approaches also ) on the other" (p.240)  ,   especially    as
"certain    pre-Gaudapaadian    texts   of   the   Mahaayaana
tradition....appear at times to uphold  a form of ontological
absolutism akin to the doctrines."
    It is difficult to claim conclusiveness in such contested
matters, but the nuanced  arguments  are here presented  with
admirable philosophical and historical sophistication  and in
the light of previous and existing scholarship  in the field.
This book, which also has a translation of the MK appended to
it, is therefore to be highly commended.
    Occasionally,  however,  hints  of  overenthusiasm   seep
through  like  a slow  water  leak.  For instance, the writer
holds the author(s) of the GK guilty of the "imposition of an
absolutistic  ontology onto the mainstream (non-absolutistic)
philosophical texts of the Mahaayaana and Yogaacaara schools"
(p.241).  Would  it  not  be  more  accurate  to  accuse  the
author(s) of the GK of deriving an absolutistic ontology from
the aforementioned  texts  rather  than imposing  it on them?
In fact, is any kind of accusation really  in order? Does the
GK claim  to present  the  Buddhist  point  of view? One  may
accuse it of using Buddhist  grist for its Advaita  mill, but
Advaita does the same to the Vedic texts. The quest for truth
in  Hinduism   is  notoriously   source-blind.   Christianity
appropriates  the basic scripture  of Judaism, imparts  to it
its own spin, and then  proceeds  to use it against  Judaism.
Christianity  could  then  be  accused  of imposing  its  own
interpretation  on Judaism, but this  is a far cry from  what
the author of the GK is doing with Buddhist ideas. The point,
briefly, is that a preoccupation  with historical  influences
may  blind  one  to the  existential  obviousness  of certain
procedures. For instance, Natalia Isayeva wondered during the
course  of an international  seminar  on Dharma  held in July
1997 at the Indian  Institute  of Advanced  Study  in Shimla,
India, whether  the  differences  in the texture  of the four
prakaranas   in  the  GK  may  not  reflect   he  existential
differences in the four states of consciousness dealt with in
the Gk. ¢w Worth a thought?