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Professor   Nagao's   book   is  an  attempt   to  understand
Maadhyamika  along the lines of  Tsong-kha-pa's  Steps on the
Way to  Enlightenment  (Lam-rim  chen-mo),  a text that Nagao
(now emeritus professor of Buddhist studies at the University
of Kyoto) first studied  during visits to Lamaist monasteries
in  Mongolia.  This  reading  is  contrasted  with  the  more
familiar one (at least  in East Asia) of Chi-tsang's  San-Lun
school,  whose   overemphasis  on  emptiness   falls  into  a
dogmatism that devalues dependent co-arising  and  hence  the
conventional world.
    Two main themes are  interwoven.  First, the  fundamental
standpoint  of  Maadhyamika is that emptiness (`suunyataa) is
identical  with  dependent co-arising (pratiitya-samutpaada).
It  is important not to elevate  one over the other, for then
one ends up with either a purely negative  logic of emptiness
or a merely organismic view of dependent-arising  being. This
also  relates  to  Nagao's  lifelong  concern  to  understand
the relationship between Maadhyamika  and Yogaacaara  as  not
adversarial but complementary;  identifying   emptiness  with
dependent co-arising makes  other-dependence  ( paratantra in
Yogaacaara) the  key   term   for   both,  the   gab  between
delusion  andliberation.  " [T]he   other-dependent   pattern
entails  the path and plays a mediating  role among the three
patterns  as the skillful method for entering  the  unmarked"
(p.82).  This seems to  me  not  only  right  but  essential,
although the  point  goes  beyond  the  importance  of cause-
effect  relationships   for  any  spiritual  path:  for  both
schools, other-dependence is the intermediate    stage   that
dissolves   our   essentialist   commitments   and,  by  then
refuting itself (if there are no things, there are no others)
, opens up the  possibility of tathataa, "thusness."
    The other main theme is the absolute disjunction  between
the two

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truths.    "The   only   true   and   absolute    dichotomous
contradiction,  which  can  never  be  resolved,  is  between
worldly  convention  and ultimate  meaning"  ¢w a claim  soon
contradicted: "The  actual  world  is not  two  but  one, and
therefore  the two truth realms  cannot be made so completely
other  as to refer  to  separate  worlds  of meaning."  Final
absolute  meaning  is "completely  other," beyond  cause  and
effect, ineffable  and silent, yet  on the  other  side, "the
ordinary  realm of worldy  convention  itself  comprises  the
entire content of ultimate  meaning  (pp.  26, 97, 102, 110).
The book becomes a series of reflections, usually erudite and
often insightful, on both of these claims. Nagao's reason for
describing   the  two  truths   as  unrelated   is  to  avoid
overemphasizing  either: if we don't  distinguish  them  they
tend to fuse into one, and we either end up prisoners  of the
conventional, as the only truth we konw, or suppose  ultimate
meaning to govern worldly conventions. The opposite danger of
dissociating  them  completely  is  to end  up detesting  all
worldly and conventional activity (pp.100-102) .  Then  isn't
the  challenge  to understand  the difference-in-identity  or
identity-in-difference  of the two perspectives? Whatever the
limitations  of  thought, it becomes  the  task  of  Buddhist
philosophy  to illuminate  this relation as much as possible.
Although  Nagao elaborates  both, I can't  see that these two
apparently inconsistent claims are ever reconciled.  However,
the prose is so dense and difficult  that another  factor may
be  interfering   with  his  argument:  the  quality  of  the
translation.  The reason  I can  only  suspect  this  is that
nowhere  in the text could  I find the title  of the Japanese
original  from which  this book is translated, and my efforts
to discover it in Japan have also been unsuccessful.
One of the  main  attempts to clarify  things  introduces  an
element  that is not part of the foundational  standpoint  of
Maadhyamika. Nagao  refers    to   another  kind  of  "other-
awareness": the dependent co-arising  manifestation  of truth
"comes from beyond";  it  is  a  turning  toward  as  of   an
other-power (pp.48,59) .   This  Pure  Land  notion   may  be
somewhere  in  Tsong-kha-pa, but  it may  also  originate  in
Nagao's  own  Joodo  Shinshuu  background;  in  either  case,
there's  no reference  to this sort of "other dependence"  in
the Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa.  Any appeal to an other power is
inconsistent  with the main thrust  of Naagaarjuna, who works
to deconstruct  all dualisms such as that between other-power
and self-power, and to deny  what  Nagao  asserts, that  "the
light  [of discernment]  must  be introduced  from elsewhere"
(p.47) .   This   also   applies   to  Nagao's   concept   of
two-dimensional  activity, the ascent to transcendence  ("the
divine realm") and the descent to worldly reengagement  ("the
human  realm") ,  both  of  which  he  judges  necessary  for
authentic   religious   teaching.   Again,  these   dualistic
metaphors  are not Naagaarjuna's  and I think we remain  more
true to his perspective if we look at them critically, asking
how much they help us and how much they hinder.
    That ties in with our  tendency  today to ask: what might
these meta-

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physical claims mean phenomenologically? Nagao touches on the
important point when he quotes the Diamond-Cutter suutra that
"this understanding arises when one has no abiding point when
he quotes the Diamond-Cutter  Suutra that "this understanding
arises when one  has no abliding point." Emptiness  cannot be
"grasped" without experiencing  the freedom of nonattachment,
exemplified in  the  nonabiding   cessation  (aprati.s.thita-
nirvaa.na)  of  the bodhisattva.  It  is  clear  in the other
prajnaapaaramitaa  suutras (as long as we are not in quest of
somewhere to abide) that  this  is what liberates: "No wisdom
can we get hold of, no highest perfection, no Bodhisattva, no
thought  of   enlightenment   either.... In form, in feeling,
will, perception and awareness,  nowhere  in them they find a
place to  rest  on. Without a home they wander, dharmas never
hold them,  nor do they  grasp at them..." (The Perfection of
Wisdom  in  Eight Thousand Lines and its Vers Summary, trans.
Edward Conze  (Bolinas,  California: Four Seasons Foundation,
1973), 1:5-6,  pp. 9-10).  This is not a process of ascent to
some  divine realm followed by return to the human realm, but
a transformation in the way we experience this world: "To the
extent  that  beings  take  hold of things and settle down in
them,to that extent there is defilement.But no one is thereby
defiled. And to the extent that  one  does  not take hold  of
things and does not settle down in them,  to that  extent can
one conceive of the absence of  I-making and mine-making.  In
that sense can one form the concept  of the  purification  of
beings,  i.e.,  to the extent that they do not take  hold  of
things  and do not settle  down in them, to that extent there
is   purification .   But  no  one  is   therein   purified "
(ibid., no.400, pp.237-238).  When  this  is applied  to  the
concept  of  truth,  it  becomes  a  self-reflexive  critique
that  kicks  the   ladder   out  from   beneath   itself   as
well as all other attempts  to grasp  the truth  ¢w including
the  two-truths  doctrine  ¢w which  is why the  foundational
standpoint  of Maadhyamika  is  that  no foundation  is to be
found in anything, anywhere.  That is how Maadhyamika can be,
as Nagao concludes, "a standpoint  that is not a standpoint;
it comes into play only in regard  to 'that which is admitted
by the other'"(p.141)
    Nagao ends by observing that Maadhyamika reasoning, which
he little discusses,  can be studied only in connection  with
the split between the Svaatantrika  and  Praasangika schools.
Maadhyamaka  Schools in India does just that.  It develops an
interpreation  of their debate  first suggested  by bSod-nams
Sen-ge, a fifteen-century  Tibetan  scholar, in  The  General
Meaning  of  Maadhyamaka   (dBu-ma  spyi-ston) .   The  usual
understanding  of  that  disagreement  (as  in  Tsong-kha-pa)
locates  the  divergence   in  different   attitudes   toward
language: the  Svaatantrika  spokesman  Bhaavaviveka  affirms
that  essences  exist  in  languange, while  the  Praasangika
defender Candrakiirti  denies even those essences.  bSod-nams
Sen-ge  saw  the  principal   issue  as  more  subtle,  being
pedagogical  as well as epistemological.  Della Santina  puts
this  in context  by describing  the formalization  of Indian
logic after Naagaarjuna, which was an inevitable  response to
the

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evolving   tradition   of   public   debate.   Bhaavaviveda's
independent  syllogism  (svatantra-anumaana) is  "an  obvious
compromise  on the part  of a Maadhyamika  scholar  with  the
increased  formalization  of Indian logic, "but this tendency
also  affected   the  Praasangikas,  including   Candrakiitri
(p.55).  They  disagreed  over  what  is convernitoally  real
(vyavahaara). Praasangika denies such validity even to common
processes of cognition (they presuppose duality), which meant
they had to rely solely  on reductio  ad absurdum  arguments;
the Svaatantrikas (epistemlolgical  realists) believed it was
necessary to agree to the conventional  existence of a common
substance   in  order  for  arguments   to  result  in  valid
inferences logically compelling to one's opponent.
    In  explaining  the  issues   involved,   Della   Santina
discusses  in   detail   Naagaarjuna's   Vigraha-vyaavartani,
which refutes   all  supposedly  valid  forms  of  cognition.
One   argument   is   just   as    effective    against   all
" foundationalism "  in  philosophy :  "  If   it   is   held
that   all   entities   must   necessarily   be   established
through  the valid instruments  of cognition  themselves  are
established  or proved" (stanza 31).  There is no escape from
infinite  regress.  In discussing  the  first  stanza  of the
Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa,  Della   Santina   reviews   all  of
Naagaarjuna's  arguments against origination and then devotes
a chapter to her refutation of each of the four alternatives,
refutations  which are just as important  today because  they
not only refer to Indian theories  of Naagaarjuna's  time but
reflect the dialectical  nature of reason: our tendencies  to
perceive  (respectively) identity, permanence, and substance;
difference,   impernamence,  and   modes;   syncretism;   and
skepticism or nihilism.
    The  debate  over the acceptability  of  the  independent
syllogism  finally  came  down  to  the nature of the logical
subject  ( substratum ) .  The   syllogism`s   validity   was
questionable   because    it   employed  emutually    opposed
orders  of  reality :  it  was  agreed  that  the  predicates
( which  negated   origination )  belong   to  the  level  of
ultimate   reality,  while   the   subjects   and   reasoning
belong   to   the   level   of   empirical   reality.   Their
incompatibility  meant  such  arguments  could  not be valid.
Della Santina concludes  that the Praasangikas  won logically
as  well  as historically: they  were  more  consistent  with
Naagaarjuna  himself  and  more  sophisticated  ¢w  but  that
sophistication  was  largely  a product  of the  debate.
    The  Praasangika/Svaatantrika   debate  makes  me  wonder
what  is  really at stake in all such quests to discern  what
is really  (as  opposed  to  conventionally)  real.  When  we
decide  that something  is  real  or  unreal,  as part of our
search for being, what  difference  does  that  make  to  our
lives?  If  our intellectual  search is a sublimated  attempt
to  ground ourselves  by "grasping   the  concepts that grasp
reality," we have yet to feel  the force  of the  Maadhyamika
critique  of philosophy.