Muula-Madhyamaka-kaarikaa
By Alex Wayman
Philosophy east and west
volume 38, no.1(January 1988)
P 47-57
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press.
P.47
The steady increase of translations and scholarly
studies of the Maadhyamika school of Buddhism would
lead one to suppose that the topic had become
thoroughly clarified. Yet in recent times, articles
and studies have appeared that challenge traditional
conclusions. The present writer, for example, wrote
an article on Naagaarjuna that even claimed for this
celebrated author the role of inaugurating
Mahaayaana Buddhism (granting that certain earlier
scriptures would later be included in the category)
and `ghost' authorship of the A.s.tasaahasrikaa
Praj~naapaaramitaa-suutra;(1) and the present writer
wrote another article that included a new
translation of the Muula-Madhyamaka-kaarikaa(MK),
chapter 2, and rejected the usual conclusion that
Naagaarjuna denied motion.(2) Another writer,
Kalupahana, has put out a new translation of MK,
denying therein that Naagaarjuna is a Mahaayaanist
and deciding that Candrakiirti's Prasannapadaa
commentary on MK has departed so far from the intent
of MK as not to deserve translation (although
European scholars some time back translated the
whole of this commentary).(3)
With such astonishing claims by myself and now
by Kalupahana, the matter deserves further attention
to sort out some of the relevant evidence. I have
chosen a study of the Tathaagata chapter (chapter
22) of MK, because this chapter dovetails with the
chapter 2 examination of gataagata. The question
that needs answering is how does Naagaarjuna
construe the term tathaagata? Of course, various
theories have been offered about this word.(4) We
shall soon see that the usual explanations do not
face up to this chapter of MK, especially the last
kaarikaa (number 16), which uses the term tathaagata
along with jagat, since both terms have the root
gam- (to go). Thus Naagaarjuna informs the attentive
reader that the problem is not, as Kalupahana opined
on kaarikaa 1-2, one of `agent' but rather whether
the realm in which there is gata (the gone) or agata
(the come) implies a realm in which there is sthita
(staying), recalling that in chapter 2 Naagaarjuna
set forth that a person either goes or stays. Since
Naagaarjuna did not deny motion in chapter 2 of his
MK, this helps for understanding MK chapter 23, in
which it is clear that the Tathaagata went (gata).
Before going further, Kalupahana's striking
claims deserve responses. As to Naagaarjuna not
being a Maahaayanist, Kalupahana points out that
Warder had previously written an article claiming
this. If they so understand the MK, they should be
able to translate the verses correctly. However,
Kalupahana on MK 24.32 claims that Naagaarjuna
criticizes the Maahaayana bodhisattva practice, but
fails to translate the te (Tibetan khyod kyi,
"according to you") which shows that the verse
represents the opponent's view, not Naagaarjuna's.
The reader is
p.48
invited to compare Kalupahana's (or for that matter,
some other translator's) rendition of MK chapter 2
with mine in the article mentioned,(5) or with my
rendition of MK chapter 22 in the present
article,(6) and decide for himself which of them
better makes sense of Naagaarjuna's verses. Besides,
Naagaarjuna's Ratnaavalii chapter 5, portrays the
six paaramitaas and the ten Bodhisattva stages that
are characteristic of Maahaayana Buddhism.' Granted
that someone may raise a question, doubting that the
Ratnaavalii is really by Naagaarjuna. It is a
wonderful trait of humans to raise questions that
elicit answers, provided they do not conclude that
their question is itself the answer.
Kalupahana's attitude toward Candrakiirti's
commentary may well be due to a disappointment
shared by other readers who expected Candrakiirti to
help in understanding the MK. My article on
Naagaarjuna dealt with this matter:
Candrakiirti, of course, would not hold that the
student must read his commentary in order to
understand the MMK [the Muula-MK], for that would
imply that no one had ever understood it previously.
The precise opposite seems to be the case,
Candrakiirti expected the student to have already
understood the MMK in terms of the words of the
verses, and to read his commentary for his system,
usually called Praasa^ngika-Maadhyamika. This should
have been noticed from his kind of commentary, which
is not grammatical, i.e., on the words in their
order of occurrence, but the kind of commentary
which says more. Furthermore, the Prasannapadaa has
more difficult Sanskrit than does the MMK, so if one
cannot understand the MMK by its words, it appears
useless to go to the more complicated
commentaries.(8)
Accordingly, I did not employ Candrakiiti's
commentary, but did refer to Buddhapaalita's, in my
translation of MK 2--since I was concerned with the
words employed by Naagaarjuna. Here also, when
rendering MK 22, I am concerned with the words, and
find the commentaries (Candrakiirti's:
Sanskrit-Tibetan; Buddhapaalita's: Tibetan) useful
for more information. In so doing, my own
explanation of the verses is along the lines of
Kalupahana's by way of the premise that one can
comment on the verses by means of one's own
background of research, and not have to rely on one
of the commentaries, except sporadically. I do not,
however, denigrate Candrakiirti's commentary, as
Kalupahana does. And admittedly my comments follow a
certain school of interpretation, namely, accepting
the relevance of canonical Buddhist teachings as
concerns the notion of Tathaagata.
The Tathaagata chapter of MK appears to fall
into these verse groups: kaarikaas 1-9, Does a
Tathaagata Adopt Personal Aggregates (skandha) ?
kaarikaas 10-14, Tathaagata and Voidness
(`suunyataa); kaarikaa 15, Seeing a Tathaagata; and
kaarikaa 16, The Tathaagata and the Moving World
(jagat). Because of these verse divisions, I have
employed two renditions of the term svabhaava;(9)
for kaarikaas 1-9, the rendition "one's own
origination," and for kaarikaas 10-16, the rendition
"own-nature." Anticipating a conclusion, the
rendition "own-nature" intends that "own-nature"
belongs to the unmentioned, but implied, world of
`staying' that is complementary to the world of
'going'. My translation of the verses agrees
p.49
usually with the grammatical interpretation in de
Jong's French translation, (10) and accordingly
diverges from Kalupahana's rendition.
DOES A TATHAAGATA ADOPT PERSONAL AGGREGATES?
skandhaa na naanya.h skandhebhyo naasmin skandhaa na
te.su sa.h/
tathaagata.h skandhavaan na katamo `tra tathaagata.h
// 1 //
The Tathaagata is not the personal aggregates
(skandha). Nor is he different from them; to wit,
the personal aggregates are not in him, nor he in
them, nor is he possessed of the personal
aggregates. When then is a Tathaagata?
The authority for translating the verse in this
manner is Candrakiiti's Madhyamakaavataara, where
this very verse is cited under 6.144. That is to
say, when contemplating each of the five personal
aggregates (ruupa and so forth) in four ways to
counter what are called the 'twenty reifying views'
(Paali sakkaayadi.t.thi), the four ways amount to
one denial of identification and three denials of
difference.(11) That Candrakiirti would clarify the
structure of the verse in his M-avataara, but not in
his commentary on the MK, agrees with his assuming
the reader's ability in the kaarikaas themselves.
What then is Tathaagata? He 'went' (gata) that way
(tathaa) . The opening scripture in the Paali
canonical Samyuttanikaaya tells that a certain deva,
as dawn was approaching, came to the Jeta Grove
where the Buddha was staying and asked how he had
crossed the flood. The Buddha responded: "Not
staying (Paali appati.t.tham) , friend, and not
conjecturing (Paali anaayuham), did I cross the
flood."(12) This shows that the Buddha went (gata)
and avoided wayward views (Sanskrit d.r.s.ti), so he
is Tathaagata. If he had stayed (sthita) it would
have been in the personal aggregates, and so he
could not be called 'Tathaagata.'
buddha.h skandhaan upaadaaya yadi naasti
svabhaavata.h/
svabhaavatas ca yo naasti kuta.h sa parabhaavata.h
// 2 //
If a Buddha (exists) by adopting personal
aggregates, he does not exist by way of his own
origination. When someone does not exist by way of
his own origination, how can he exist by way of
another's origination?
If a Buddha exists by adopting the five pure
aggregates (skandha), morality (`siila), intense
concentration (samaadhi) , (perfected) insight
(praj~naa), liberation (vimukti), and the knowledge
and vision of liberation
(vimuktij~naanadar`sana),(13) he does not exist by
way of his own origination (of these), since they
were adopted by previous saints. And just as they
were not his own origination as a basis for
existence as a Buddha, how can he exist as such by
another's origination of these?
pratiitya parabhaava.m ya.h so `naatmety upapadyate/
ya`s caanaatmaa sa ca katha.m bhavi.syati
tathaagata.h //3//
When someone exists in dependence upon another's
origination, it is not valid to call him a 'self'.
When someone is without self, how will he become a
Tathaagata?
That 'nonself' (anaatma) is examined by the sole
aspect of `nonself-dependence' (asvaatantrya) is
taught also in Asa^nga's `Sraavakabhuumi.(14) And
the Udaanavarga,
p.50
its Tathaagata chapter 21.2, has this celebrated
verse about the 'self':
I am the Tathaagata,(15) teacher of gods and men;
have comprehended enlightenment as a revealer by
myself; having reached omniscience, am endowed with
the powers; incomparable and unequalled, who can
teach me!
yadi naasti svabhaava`s ca parabhaava.h katha.m
bhavet/
svabhaavaparabhaavaabhyaam .rte ka.h sa tathaagata.h
//4//
If there is not one's own origination, how can there
be another's origination? Except for one's own
origination and another's origination, who would be
the Tathaagata?
For the meaning, notice the definition of
`Tathaagata' in the Praj~naapaaramitaa`saastra.(16)
(1) He preaches the character of dharma
(dharmalak.sa.na) according to the manner (tathaa)
in which he understood it (gata). (2) In the manner
by which the (earlier) Buddhas have gone on the path
of acquirement (yoga) and security (k.sema), so
(tathaa) the (present) Buddha has gone (gata), and
there are no more rebirths. That is why he is called
'Tathaagata'. Thus, the first sentence of kaarikaa 4
can be construed as intending that the Buddha's own
attainment shows the way for others to follow the
path, while the second sentence intends that the
present Buddha followed the course of preceding
Buddhas; hence both his own attainment and their
attainment is implicated in the name 'Tathaagata'.
skandhaan yady anupaadaaya bhavet ka`scit
tathaagata.h /
sa idaaniim upaadadyaad upaadaaya tato bhavet //5//
If someone could be a Tathaagata without adopting
personal aggregates, he might adopt them now and
later adopting them, be (a Tathaagata).
Candrakiirti's commentary provides a hint of the
meaning, giving the illustration that Devadatta
existed before he acquired riches, and acquired them
later.(17) Therefore, it appears that Naagaarjuna
understands the first explanation of the term
'Tathaagata' (given already under kaarikaa 4) to
mean a Tathaagata who has not yet advanced to
yoga-k.sema. Later, this Tathaagata could acquire
the five pure aggregates (the yoga), and then secure
them (the k.sema) by way of the ten powers and other
Buddha natures.
skandhaan caapy anupaadaaya naasti ka`scit
tathaagatah./
ya`s ca naasty anupaadaaya sa upaadaasyate katha.m
// 6 //
A Tathaagata does not exist unless he adopts
personal aggregates. Anyone, not adopting them, does
not exist. How can he appropriate them?
A Tathaagata, in order to exist, must adopt the
ordinary personal aggregates, ruupa, and so forth.
According to Buddhapaalita's commentary, since
sa.msaara is without beginning or end, there does
not exist anyone who has not adopted the aggregates,
and how can anyone appropriate them if he had not
done so previously.(18)
na bhavaty anupaadattam upaadaana.m ca ki.m cana /
na caasti nirupaadaana.h katha.m cana tathaagata.h
//7//
No adoption occurs prior to its adoption. No
Tathaagata exists without an adoption (of skandhas).
p.51
The first half appears to deny the Saa.mkhya
position that the effect preexists in the cause, as
though there were a pregenetic adoption. And a
Tathaagata must adopt personal aggregates in order
to exist. Naagaarjuna, in his Friendly Letter (to a
king). the Suh.rllekha, kaarikaas 59-60, stresses
the value of human birth for practice of the Dharma
and progress toward enlightenment.(19) Hence, the
personal aggregates (skandha) of a human are meant.
The five are formation (ruupa), feelings (vedanaa),
ideation (sa.mj~naa), motivations (sa.mskaara), and
perceptions (vij~naana).
tattvaanyatvena yo naasti m.rgyamaanas ca pa~ncadhaa /
upaadaanena sa katha.m praj~napyate tathaagatha.h // 8 //
Who being sought for in five ways does not exist as
different from the elements (=aggregates) or as the
adoption (of aggregates), how can he be designated a
Tathaagata?
The five ways are the five personal aggregates
listed under the preceding verse. He can be
designated a Tathaagata because the Paali canon
Sa.myutta-nikaaya, at 2.25, has a famous remark:
"Whether Tathaagatas arise or do not arise, there
remains this realm (dhaatu), the continuance of
dhamma, the rule of dhamma, the having of this for
condition." This rule of dhamma (Sanskrit dharma)
means the Dependent Origination of the natures
(dharma) of which the five personal aggregates are
composed. Thus, the continuance of the five personal
aggregates is independent of whether there is a
Tathaagata.
yad apiidam upaadaana.m tat svabhaavaan na vidyate /
svabhaavata`s ca van naasti kutas tat parabhaavata.h // 9 //
But also this 'adoption' (of aggregates) is not
found by way of its own origination. And when
something does not exist by way of its own
origination, how can it exist by way of another's
origination?
Upaadaana is the ninth member of the Buddhist
formula of Dependent Origination
(pratiitya-samutpaada). It arises dependent on the
preceding member, t.r.s.naa (craving), and so does
not arise by way of its own origination. However, it
does not exist by way of t.r.s.naa's origination,
since this 'craving' is not the cause of upaadaana
('adoption') , but only the condition for its
arising.(20)
TATHAAGATA AND VOIDNESS
eva.m `suunyam upaadaanam upaadaataa ca sarva`sa.h /
praj~napyate ca `suunyena katha.m `suunyas
tathaagata.h //10//
Thus, adoption and adopter are completely void (of
svabhaava). How can the Tathaagata be designated as
void by what is void?
As recorded in the Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 4.54, AAnanda
asked the Buddha about the saying "The world is
void! The world is void!" (su~n~no loko su~n~no loko
'ti), and the Buddha explained: "Because it is void
of self or of what belongs to self, therefore, 'The
world is void'." So, here, because it is void of
adopter and of adoption, the world is void. As to
the ability of words to designate something as
`void', this is a matter dealt with by Naagaarjuna
in his Vigrahavyaavartinii.
p.52
The opponent claimed that words being void (of
svabhaava) were incapable of denying anything or
establishing the voidness of anything. Let us accept
K. Bhattacharya's translation of this text, 70, "All
things prevail for him for whom prevails this
voidness (prabhavati ca `suunyateya.m yasya
prabhavanti tasya sarvaarthaa.h). Nothing prevails
for him for whom voidness does not prevail
(prabhavati na tasya kimcin na prabhavati `suunyataa
yasya)."(21)
`suunyam iti na vaktavyam a`suunyam iti vaa bhavet /
ubhaya.m nobhaya.m ceti praj~naptyartha.m tu
kathyate //11//
One should not say he is void or nonvoid, both or
neither. But one may use terms for (such)
designation.
Having insisted that words, although void of
own-nature (svabhaava), have the power to designate
something as 'void', Naagaarjuna does not admit that
words are always employed wisely. in order to
designate something as 'void', one should add 'void
of' (something). Notice in the preceding that simply
to say "The world is void" does not convey much
comprehension to the hearer, and so the Buddha had
to add: "void of self or of what belongs to self."
Then, how can a person of ordinary comprehension
state what the Tathaagata is void of, when declaring
the Tathaagata 'void'? Hence, one should not say he
is void and so forth. The Pa.tisambhidaamaga of the
Paali canon has lofty praise of a Tathaagata in the
'Faculties' chapter:(22)
na tassa adi.t.tha.m idh' atthi ki~nci atho
avi~n~natam ajanitabbam /
sabba.m abbinnaasi yad atthi neyyam. Tathaagato tena
samantacakkhuuti.
Here in this world there is nothing he has not seen,
nothing not understood, nothing unknowable. He has
experienced supernormally all that is knowable.
Therefore the Tathaagata is called All-seer.
Therefore, the Tathaagata is not explained by the
word 'void'--how much less by the word 'empty'!
`saa`svataa`saa`svataady atra kuta.h `saante
catu.s.taya.m/
antaanantaadi caapy atra kuta.h `saante catu.s.taya.m //12//
How can the eternal, noneternal, and so on kind of
four alternatives be in the peaceful? How can the
finite, nonfinite, and so on kind of four
alternatives be in the peaceful?
Candrakiirti's commentary(23) points out that these
two sets of four alternatives are among the fourteen
avyaak.rta-vastuuni, meaning the questions which the
Buddha refused to answer. The verse mentions the
first set, namely, that the world is eternal,
noneternal, both eternal and noneternal, and neither
eternal nor noneternal, and the second set, namely,
that the world is finite, nonfinite, both finite and
nonfinite, and neither finite nor nonfinite. The
third set is alluded to in the next verse, number
13; they are: the Tathaagata exists after death,
does not exist after death, both exists and does not
exist after death, and neither exists nor does not
exist after death. The last two of the fourteen are:
the self (jiiva) is identical with the body, and the
self is different from the body. As to the question,
p.53
"How can they be in the peaceful?" the peaceful is
apparently a reference to Nirvaa.na, or to a person in
whom the phenomenal turbulence has been appeased and
so finds these fourteen questions not worth
answering.
yena graaho g.rhiitas tu ghano 'stiiti tathaagata.h /
naastiiti sa vikalpayan nirv.rtasyaapi kalpayet // 13 //
The one attached to the gross positing, imagining
that the Tathaagata exists or that he does not
exist, would also imagine (the alternatives) for one
in Nirvaa.na.
This verse may provide a clue to the prohibition
which the Bhagavat announced to the first five
disciples, namely, that they should not address a
Tathaagata as 'long-lived one' (aayu.smat). That is
to say, the disciples would be guilty of the 'gross
positing'. In other words, that title, `long-lived
one', could be relevant for one who 'stays'
(sthita), but the name 'Tathaagata' means 'one who
went that way'.
svabhaavata`s ca `suunye 'smi.ms cintaa
naivopapadyate /
paraa.m nirodhaad bhavati buddho na bhavatiiti vaa // 14 //
The speculation that the Buddha exists or does not
exist after death is not admissible, since he is
void of own-nature.
The statement that the Buddha is void of svabhaava
does not constitute a denial of svabhaava, but
rather assigns svubhaava to a status complementary
to the Tathaagata, as in the celebrated remark
already cited, "Whether Tathaagatas arise or do not
arise, there remains...."(24) The inadmissible
speculation is in terms of remaining.
SEEING A TATHAAGATA
prapa~ncayanti ye buddha.m prapa~ncaatiitam avyaya.m /
te prapa~ncahataa.h sarve na pa`syanti tathaagata.m // 15 //
Those who verbally elaborate the incessant Buddha
who has transcended verbal elaboration--none of
them, impaired by verbal elaboration, can see the
Tathaagata.
This verse agrees with Udaanavarga, chapter 22,
verse 11. This chapter, on the 'Hearer', immediately
follows the 'Tathaagata' chapter (21). It is a
reassonable assumption that Dharmatraata's
Udaanavarga delighted Naagaarjuna who was probably
very young when it first appeared.(25) Udaanavarga
22.11 follows, rendered from the Tibetan:
/ gan dag gzugs kyis nes par 'dzin /
/ na la sgra yis rjes su 'bran /
/ 'dun pa'i 'dod chags dban gyur la /
/ skye bo de dag na mi ses //
Those who apprehend me by (corporeal) formation, and
follow me by speech, those persons, when dominated
by passionate craving, do not know me.
While the message, as originally told, is said to be
by a certain dwarf (Paali) Bhaddiya, rendered in the
commentary to the Udaanavarga in the Tibetan canon,
'Phags pa Lan-tshwa-bza^n-po,(26) the application in
the present context is certainly
p.54
to the Tathaagata. Asa^nga, in his Yogaacaarabhuumi,
in the section on `sariiraarthagaathaa, cites the set
of five verses, Udaanavarga 22. 11-15, and
explains:(27)
It is like this: The ordinary person (p.rthagjana),
who has not completely eliminated his passionate
craving, when he sees a Tathaagata possessed of the
thirty-two characters of the Great Person,
apprehends and thinks, "Gosh! This Bhagavat is a
Rightly Perfected Buddha! His Doctrine is
well-stated. His congregation of auditors is rightly
installed." Thereafter, this person relies on
unworthy persons, heeds pernicious doctrines... and
comes to blame the Buddha, his Doctrine, and his
Congregation ('di ltar 'di na so so'i skye bo'i
'dun pa'i 'dod chags ril gyis ma spans pa la las de
bzin gsegs pa'i skyes bu chen po'i mtshan sum cu
rtsa gnis dan ldan pa mthon ba na / kye ma bcom ldan
'das de ni yan dag par rdzogs pa'i sans rgyas yin no
/ de'i chos ni legs par gsuns pa yin no / nan thos
kyi dge 'dun ni legs par zugs pa yin no snam du nes
par 'dzin te / de phyis skye bu dam pa ma yin pa
bsnen pa / dam pa'i chos ma yin pa thos pa la brten
nas /.... sans rgyas dan chos dan dge 'dun la yan
skur pa 'debs te /).
Ancient Buddhism declared that the signs of a
Complete Buddha were held in common with the
Universal Emperor (cakravaartin); so one could not
know just from those signs that one was looking at a
Complete Buddha. According to Naagaarjuna's verse,
the ordinary person did not really see this
Tathaagata. The Udaanavarga commentary on this verse
points out that the 'passionate craving' is a
hindrance to samaadhi (tin ne 'dzin gyi sgrib pa);
and commenting upon the part, "Those persons... do
not know me," cites the well-known precept: "The man
whose mind is equipoised, sees exactly as it is"
(mnam par bzag na ji lta ba bzin du mthon bar `gyur
ro).(28) Buddhapaalita's commentary on the MK verse
explains the term prapa~nca (verbal elaboration) as
'existence and nonexistence', 'permanence and
impermanence', and so forth;(29) hence the term
suggests the creation of divisive cross-purposes
(dvandva), or two things where there are really one,
and that it is instigated by the 'passionate
craving'.(30) And so one does not see objects
exactly as they are.
THE TATHAAGATA AND THE MOVING WORLD
tathaagato yat svabhaavas tat svabhaavam ida.m jagat /
tathaagato ni.hsvabhaavo ni.hsvabhaavam ida.m jagat // 16 //
Were the Tgthaagata to have own-nature (svabhaava),
then this moving world would have own-nature. Given
that the Tathaagata lacks svabhaava, this moving
world lacks svabhaava.(31)
Naagaarjuna's final verse of the chapter shows what
the Tathaagata and the jagat have in common--going;
and it shows what they both do not have--svabhaava.
In short, svabhaava (own-nature) perforce has no
'going'. Indeed, according to the commentator
Buddhapaalita, this svabhaava is the same for the
Tathaagata and the jagat. Thus the comment (Derge,
ed., f. 266b-1, 2):
"What be the own-nature of a Tathaagata is the
own-nature of the moving world (jagat). Since the
own-nature of a Tathaagata is the own-nature of the
moving world, the examination of Tathaagata is also
the examination of the moving world" (/ de bzin
gsegs pa dnos nid gan / de ni 'gro `di'i no bo nid /
gan gi phyir
p.55
de bzin gsaegs pa'i no bo nid gan yin pa de ni 'gro
ba 'di'i no bo nid kyan yin pa de'i phyir de bzin
gsegs pa brtags pa 'di nid kyis 'gro ba 'di dag
kyan brtags pa yin no /).
It seems to be a contradiction in terms to speak of
the Tathaagata lacking svabhaava, and then to refer
to the "own-nature of a Tathaagata." In fact, there
is no contradiction. It is almost as when we use an
expression like "our world" and then admit that the
world is not ours. The point of the discussion is
that Naagaarjuna never denied 'svabhaava'; he never
claimed that fire lacks the own-nature of burning;
rather he insisted that an actual fire is not due to
its own-nature. But, in a manner of speaking, it is
necessary to refer to the svabhaava of a Tathaagata
in order to say that the Tathaagata lacks svabhaava.
A passage from the ancient Paali canon should
clarify the foregoing in part. This is
Sa.myuttanikaaya 5.41-42, in the Tathaagata-sutta:
sattaa apadaa vaa dvipadaa vaa catuppadaa vaa
bahuppadaa vaa
ruupino vaa aruupino vaa sa~n~nino vaa asa~n~nino
vaa
nevasa~n~niinaasa~n~nino vaa, tathaagato tesa.m
aggam akkhaayati
araham sammaasambuddho;
Of sentient beings (Sanskrit sattva) , whether
footless, two-footed, four-footed, or many-footed;
whether having (material) formation or not having
(material) formation; whether ideational, or
nonideational, or neither ideational nor
non-ideational--of these, the Tathaagata, the Arhat,
the Rightly Complete Buddha, is declared the chief.
Notice that the Tathaagata is counted among sentient
beings, agreeing with Naagaarjuna's verse and its
commentary that the same examination can be made for
the Tathaagata as for the moving world (jagat). The
Paali passage begins with jagat language by
classifying sentient beings by their number of feet
for purposes of locomotion. It then classifies by
'formation', which, as was already mentioned,
deceives those who have not equilibrated their
minds. Finally it classifies by ideation, which
characterizes a 'sentient being'. Hence, the
Tathaagata is a kind of flowering of the sentient
world. Whatever is appropriately said of the
Tathaagata does not apply to the realm of staying
(sthita), called the realm of Dharma. But it must
also be admitted that the Tathaagata uses this realm
of Dharma, and that to see the Tathaagata is to see
the Dharma. So it is said in the Sa.myutta-nikaaya
(3.120) and other places that "he who sees the
Dhamma sees me, and he who sees me sees the Dhamma."
In conclusion, the annotations which the present
writer has brought to bear upon the sixteen verses
of this chapter rest upon the testimony of ancient
Buddhism. It was not necessary to appeal to the
special language of the Mahaayaana scriptures, such
as the Samaadhiraaja-suutra. But this is not to deny
the applicability of such scriptures, as cited in
Candrakiirti's commentary. Bach commentator follows
his line of comments in accordance with a lineage
which he continues. The present commentary is not
exempt from this condition. Indeed, there is little
purpose to speculating about such matters. If
authentic scriptures cannot be alluded to, if one
has to guess through it, why add another commentary?
Indeed,
p.56
in common between the preceding approach to this
chapter 22 and the approach to my previously
published translation of chapter 2 is an attitude
toward the author Naagaarjuna that he was a
religious genius. His MK is a kind of relic. It
requires of the translator both a command of
language, meaning the kind of Sanskrit Naagaarjuna
employs, and an evocation of the context of the
disputes then current.(32) So it is easy to
criticize previous translation attempts, as does
Kalupahana in addition to myself. And that does not
mean that we necessarily do better.
NOTES
1. A. Wayman, "Naagaarjuna: Moralist Reformer of
Buddhism," Studia Missionalia 34 (1985): 63-95.
2. A. Wayman, "The Gait (gati) and the Path
(maarga)--Reflections on the Horizontal," Journal of
the American Oriental Society 105, no. 3
(July-September 1985): 579-588.
3. David J. Kalupahana, Naagaarjuna: The
Philosophy of the Middle Way (Albany, New York,
1986), Preface, pp. xiii-xv, and p. 7. At p. 26, he
opposes the adulation of Naagaarjuna as a 'second
Buddha', which my article(n. 1, preceding)
justifies, on the grounds that he inaugurated
Maahaayana Buddhism.
4. Cf. Le Traite de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse,
as translated by Etienne Lamotte, vol. 1 (Louvain,
1944), p. 126, for various references.
5. There (article of n. 2, preceding) I showed
the usage of gati in some other branches of Indian
literature, and investigated the verb form gamyate
in Sanskrit grammar, as a preparation for
translating MK, chap. 2.
6. Here, for translating MK, chap. 22, I assumed
that because the Udaanavarga has a Tathaagata
chapter, some verses would be relevant (they were!);
I assumed that important teachings about the
Tathaagata in early Buddhist literature and later
repeated, such as "whether a Tathaagata arises or
not, there remains...," and what the Buddha said to
the first five disciples, "Do not call a Tathaagata
'long-lived one' (aayu.smat)," would all be relevant
(and they were!); and I assumed that the remark on
the first page of the Sar.myutta-nikaaya about
crossing the flood, because that requires 'going',
would be relevant (and it was!). Moreover, I thought
that the commentaries of Buddhapaalita and
Candrakiirti, fortunately available to me, would be
useful for certain verses (and they were!).
7. Cf. Michael Hahn, Naagaarjuna's
Ratnaavalii(Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese) (Bonn,
1982).
8. Wayman, "Naagaarjuna," p. 89.
9. It should not be surprising that the same
work employs the term svabhaava in more than one
sense; cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und
Begriff bei Dharmakiirti," Wiener Zeitschrift fur
die Kunde Sudasiens 15 (1971): 179-211, for various
senses of this term as employed by Dharmakiirti.
10. J. W. de Jong, Cinq Chapitres de la
Prasannapadaa (Paris, 1949), has a translation of
both the verses and Candrakiirti's commentary, with
the Tibetan text for these.
11. Cf. A. Wayman, "The Twenty Reifying Views
(Sakkaayadi.t.thi)," originally in Studies in Pali
and Buddhism (1979), reprinted in Buddhist Insight:
Essays by Alex Wayman, ed. by George R. Elder
(Delhi, 1984), pp. 215-223, esp. p. 218.
12. I employ the edition in the
Naalandaa-Devanaagarii-Paali-Series (Bihar
Government, 1959).
13. These five are called jina-skandha
(aggregates of the Victor); cf. Louis de La Vallee
Poussin, L'Abhidharmako`sa de Vasubandhu (1924),
under VI, 76c (p.297).
14. Cf. Alex Wayman, Analysis of the
`Sraavakabhuumi Manuscript (Berkeley, California:
1961), pp. 130-131.
15. According to Praj~naavarman's
Udaanavargavivara.na, ed. [from Tibetan] by Michael
Balk (Bonn, 1984), vol. 2, in comments upon this
verse at p. 609, this usage of the term 'Tathaagata'
shows having gone (gata) for the sake of others, the
candidates to be taught. Hence, it is the first kind
of Tathaagata, as will be alluded to in the following
verse, MK 22.4. It is this Tathaagata who needs a
'self'.
p.57
16. Le Traite, vol. 1 (n. 4, preceding), p. 126.
17. de Jong, Cinq Chapitres(n. 10, preceding),
p. 77 and p. 147.
18. I employ the edition of Buddhapaalita's
commentary in the Tibetan Tanjur, the Derge edition
(published in Tokyo, 1977), the Dbu-ma section, vol.
1, i.e. vol. Tsa (here, f. 263a-4 ff.), beginning:
'khor ba la thog ma dan tha ma med do.
19. Cf. Lozang Jamspal and others, Naagaarjuna's
Letter to King Cautamiiputra (Delhi, 1978).
20. It is of course quite reasonable that when
Naagaarjuna uses the term upaadaana, it can be
construed as the term for the ninth member of
Dependent Origination; MK, chap. 26, is devoted to
this twelve-membered formula. Again, while t.r.s.naa
is a condition (pratyaya) for upaadaana, it by no
means can be taken as its cause, but Naagaarjuna
takes it as concomitant in MK, 26.6B: t.r.syamaana
upaadaanam upaadatte caturvidham, "While craving,
one indulges in adoption of four kinds."
21. K. Bhattacharya and others, The Dialectical
Method of Naagaarjuna (Vigrahavyaavartanii) (Delhi,
1978), p.47.
22. Arnold C. Taylor, ed., Pa.tisambhidaamagga,
vol. 2 (London, 1907), p. 31.
23. de Jong, Cinq Chapitres(n. 10, preceding),
pp. 82-83.
24. For this kind of 'voidness', cf.
Pa.tisambhidaamagga, vol. 2, the treatise on
voidness (su~n~nakathaa), p. 179; or the translation
by ~Naanamoli, The Path of Discrimination (London:
The Pall Text Society, 1982), pp. 357-358, "What is
voidness by characteristic?" and so on. Here the
type is lakkha.nasu~n~nam, and of the examples,
naturally the one of two kinds (i.e. of lak.sa.na).
The translation of the example: "The characteristic
of the fool is void of the characteristic of the
wise man, and the characteristic of the wise man is
void of the characteristic of the fool." In this
case, the rendition 'devoid' may serve better than
'void'. For the case of MK 22.14, the characteristic
of going is devoid of the characteristic of
remaining, and the characteristic of remaining is
devoid of the characteristic of going. Here the
characteristic of remaining is the svabhaava, and
the characteristic of going is the Buddha after
death.
25. This is by the reasonable dating of
Naagaarjuna's life as spanning practically the
entire second century A.D., and by the dating of the
Udaanavarga composition at the beginning of that
century.
26. Udaanavargavivara.na (n. 15, preceding), p.
634.
27. Photoreproduction of Peking Tibetan canon,
vol. 110, p. 15-5 to p. 16-1.
28. Udaanavargavivara.na (n. 15, preceding), pp.
634-635.
29. Buddhapaalita's commentary (n. 18. preceding),
Tsa, f. 266a-4, 5: yod pa dan med pa dan rtag pa dan
mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i spros pa rnams.
30. An illustration is found in Kaalidaasa's
`Sakuntalaa, the incident in which `Sakuntalaa with
two girl friends, with a smallish pot (suitable to
her size), and attired in a tight-fitting garment of
bark cloth, bends to water the basin of hermitage
trees. Unknown to them, she is being observed by the
king. As though by sympathetic magic of male-female
craving, `Sakuntalaa asks her friend to loosen her
garment; and promptly the discussion shifts to her
two breasts. Here, the one waterpot is succeeded by
two breasts, by the power of craving. Cf. M. B.
Emeneau, Kaalidaasa's `Sakuntalaa, translated from
the Bengali Recension (Berkeley, California: 1962),
pp. 6-7.
31. I have noticed several translations of this
verse along the same lines adopted by Kalupahana.
This is his (p. 310): "Whatever is the self-nature
of the tathaagata, that is also the self-nature of
the universe. The tathaagata is devoid of
self-nature. This universe is also devoid of
self-nature." In fact, de Jong's French translation
is similar. Grammatically, the translation is
impossible. The reason is that svabhaava.m ida.m
jagat shows that here svabhaava (both cases in the
first line) is an adjective, and these translations
agree in taking it as the subject of the sentence!
Both lines must be construed as nominative absolute,
as I have done. Furthermore, the renditions agree
that jagat means 'universe'. But then the verse is
gibberish, and completely fails to render
Naagaarjuna's point that the gata of Tathaagata
agrees with jagat in having the same root 'to go'.
The way these translators have rendered the verse
leaves the reader with the conclusion that
Naagaarjuna said that both Tathaagata and world have
svabhaava and both lack it, as though Naagaarjuna
could not make up his mind.
32. Probably MK 2 was the most severely
misrendered by the translators, who apparently
wondered why Naagaarjuna was saying such silly
things about motion. Oh, never admit that the
translators do not know enough about the words and
the contexts to do a competent job!
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