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The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May of 1998 provide an especially compelling context for reflection on social and political thought in India. Inspired by the jaipur experiment, an attempt by scholars to find in the classics of India's past t he resources to respond to the India of today, Daya Krishna, one of the original participants, offers us The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society and Polity. In his own words, it "presents for the first time the way India's intellectual enterprises appear to those located in contemporary times. It focuses on the problems they addressed and the conceptual structures in
terms of which they articulated their thought" (pp. vii-viii). And, as Krishna is quick to add and to remind us periodically (and emphatically) throughout the book, the intent of this focus is that we might make use of our ancestors' attempts to understan d their world as we face intellectual challenges of our own.

Krishna sets out both to present and to address anew the intellectual and existential problems that classical thinkers sought to answer, the conceptual structures that arose as the result of their efforts, and the dilemmas those concepts posed for late r thinkers. To this end, he expertly leads the reader through the many twists and turns of conceptual tensions that have driven the debates and development of Indian thought about humanity, society, and polity for millennia. In doing this he shows us both what is distinctive about the Indian context and problematics and what is common in the evolution of many societies.

The book is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the central problematics that developed in the course of the Indian history of ideas. Here, Krishna holds, "a problem, ultimately, is what is felt as a problem," and much of the text is de voted to showing how and why debates originated and took the shapes they did (p. 13). Beyond this, there is also a vigorous and interesting active participation in these debates, revealing their contemporary relevance. There are so many threads to this di verse intellectual history that Krishna often seems to wander from one problem area to another without any transition or connection. But this is not so, as the con-

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cepts and problematics return in later chapters, each time in the new light of a new context. The second part of the book, as promised in the title, focuses on conceptual structures. For Krishna this means literally listing concepts, analyzing them in context and then examining the context itself. Here, as in part 1, there is both a philological task and a contemporary exploration, resulting in a rich and interesting use of ancient and pivotal concepts of Indian thought.

The first chapter treats the Vedic roots of the problematics that recur throughout the rest of the book. Chief among these are the theory of the var.nas (castes), especially the `Suudra class, and the tension between dharma (one's duty to others) and m ok.sa (the personal spiritual imperative). The second chapter turns to the `Srama.na (non-Vedic) traditions. Here the Saa.mkhya theory of the three-fold division of prak.rti (all that is not pure consciousness) into sattva (intelligibility), rajas (activi ty), and tamas (inertness) becomes a system of static concepts, resulting in tensions similar to those generated by the concept of the var.nas. From here he moves on to an intensification of the dharma/mok.sa tension, appearing as the householder/spiritua l life conflict exemplified in the Buddha, and in Mahavira in the Jain tradition. Chapter 3 is devoted to the theories of aa`srama (the stages of life) and puru.saartha (the aims of life), and here several themes from the previous chapter are brought toge ther. "The problematic of the puru.saartha ... [can be] seen in terms of the conflict between dharma and moksa, symbolized by the conflict between the brahmana and the ksatriya at the varna level and the grahastha [householder] and the sannyasa [renunciat e] at the asrama level" (p. 65).

Chapter 4 turns to political thought through the sm.rti `saastras and the vyavahaara `saastras (legal teachings) and the artha`saastras (political science), bringing the previous problematics to a new level of social analysis. Among other things, the m aintenance of law and order, punishment, and the proper role of a king are taken up here.

Chapter 5 begins part 2, Krishna's analysis of lndian conceptual structures. The first concept is humanity itself, and the first task is determining what makes humans different from other beings. The answer, for India, is not rationality, as Aristotle thought, but morality. This takes us back into the problematics of part 1, but now Krishna leads us through the web of the central concepts and their meanings. Chapters 6 and 7 repeat a similar process in the domains of society and politics, respectively. The last chapter is a brief epilogue, reiterating the overarching thesis that classical thought should be put to use by philosophy today.

To get some sense of how the project is carried out, consider the exploration of the conceptual structure of society in chapter 6. Krishna begins by noting that there is no equivalent for the word "society" among classical Indian concepts, but instead there are a cluster of concepts through which individuals understood both themselves and others leading to an interesting contrast between the Western socialcontract theory of the origin of society and the theory of the sacrifice of the primal Being, who represents an original unity, which is then divided into the var.nas, or castes. The ensuing discussion of the var.nas is an excellent example of the main thrust of the book. Rejecting any kind of conservatism that would confine the concepts of the var.na s to their classical formulation, Krishna boldly asks what a par-

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ticular society might look like if one var.na (or its function) were considered most important. After considering the relatively easy cases of the braama.na-, k.satriya-, and vai`sya-centered societies, he focuses on the most difficult (because it is t he least valued in Indian society), the `suudra case.

In his quest to develop an ideal `suudra society, he first considers the question from the angle of the `suudra function, noting that their jobs are always the most bio-logical ones and thus least desirable to perform, but always foundational and insep arably integral to all other tasks. Thus, from a functional standpoint, there is no task without its `suudra part, and in a `suudra-centric society the basic life activities would be highly regarded as inextricably interconnected with all other activities or functions. At this point Krishna considers and rejects Marxism in this light as ultimately not valuing `suudra tasks, but instead trying to eliminate them through technology.

Krishna ultimately finds `suudra tasks inadequate to the development of an ideal `suudra society, and so turns to the `suudra attitude, which is one of service to others. The key here is that the service is for others, with the recipient of the service being considered superior to the servant, and he shows how this could apply to the other var.nas. For instance, a braama.na could learn and teach with his students at the center of his consciousness. Krishna then tries to place a number of Indian and non -lndian concepts into the framework of the `suudra attitude and finds most to be lacking the 'for others' attribute. For instance, dharma, or duty, is for its own sake and not for the sake of others.

After a brief digression, Krishna finishes the chapter with a very interesting account of the creation of a social fabric, drawing on the ancient Vedic exchange between the yajamana or beneficiary of a ritual sacrifice and the .rtviks or paid performer of the sacrifice, in the development of the network of obligations that eventually grew from this in India. This is coupled with a discussion of the cycle of sa.mskaaras, or ritualistic ceremonies, as constituting a socialization process that turns a "bi ological being into a socio-cultural being," to form altogether an intriguing description of social bonds.

The generally positive tone of this review is not meant to imply there are no problems here. Perhaps the most glaring is the inadequate treatment of the Buddhist and Jain traditions, and in fact any non-Sanskrit texts. This is due to a very heavy relia nce on the Dharmasoka-readily admitted in the preface, but to be responded to by competent scholars in the relevant fields nonetheless. In addition, there is a strange silence concerning the evolution of one of the var.nas that still exerts a strong influ ence in contemporary Indian society: the brahmins. Although he never promises to address every aspect of var.na, this does seem like an important omission. This leads to my final objection. While Krishna does refuse to let classical Indian thought lie dea d, he never really brings it to life, either, in the sense of using social and political philosophy to address any concrete questions today. His work remains firmly in the arena of abstraction and thus does not fully complete his own goal of utilizing anc ient texts to address contemporary problems. Still, the method of inquiry he develops would certainly prove useful in such an undertaking by scholars familiar enough with both areas.

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While most scholarship devoted to classical thought deals only with metaphysics, epistemology, theology, or spirituality, this work refreshingly fills a gap in the arena of social and political thought. Although not appropriate for undergraduates, it w ould be most helpful for those of us teaching undergraduates, for two reasons. First, it provides a historical context for many of the crucial concepts we teach to undergraduates, and second, it adapts and considers these classical concepts in a contempor ary manner, bringing classical Indian thought into modern
social and political philosophy. Anyone interested in either of these could learn much from this book and from Daya Krishna's method of bringing the past to life without living in it.