P.656

Quite  a  number  of  studies   of  East  Asian  thought   or
comparative   philosophy,  including   Steve  Odin's  earlier
writings, have drawn attention to the usefulness  of American
pragmatism  and its extension  into process metaphysices  for
making  sense  of Confucian  or Buddhist  philosophy  in term
already  known within Western  thought.  In regard  to Zen or
Confucianism, a few  studies  have  built  on  this  apparent
affinity  to promote an intimate  East-West  dialogue wherein
each tradition  is used not only to illuminate  the other but
to propel it toward further  development.  The Social Self in
Zen  and American  Pragmatism, however, is the first  indepth
study to incorporate modern Japanese philosophy and social.

P.657

psychology  fully  into  this  dialogue, drawing  them into a
commom frame-work with Western theories of the social self on
the basis of George Herbert  Mead's  theory  of the self as a
dialectic between a socially created "Me" and a creatively
responsive "I."
Odin joins voices  with philosophers  like John Dewey, Alfred
North  Whitehead,  Jurgen  Habermas,  Hans  Joas,  and  Ernst
Tugendhat  ans sociologists  like Peter Berger, John Baldwin,
and Kathy Ferguson in regarding Mead's conception  of self as
a momentous  achievement, ranking him along with Martin Buber
and John  Macmurray  as a paradigmatic  figure  in what  Joas
calls the "social turn" in Western  thought  in the twentieth
century. Following Habermas, Odin sees Mead as representing a
paradigm  shift  in  Western  thought  from  a  subjectivist,
Cartesian  model  of self to a bipolar  theory  of the social
self arising  through  an interaction  between the individual
and society, viewing this as a great advance  over the German
tradition of philosophical  anthropology  ending in Heidegger
because it viwes the process of individual no longer as prior
to, but as simultaneous with the process of socialization.
    As  the  development  of  French  postastructuralism  was
founded  upon Saussure's  semiotic  concept  of the arbitrary
relationship  between signifier  and signified, the pragmatic
concept of the self as socially  constructed  was founded  on
Charles  S.   Peirce's  semiotic  notion  of  personhood   as
intersubjectively constituted by a sign process of linguistic
communication in a community.  Odin demonstrates the intimate
relationship  among  Peirce,  James,  Royce,  Dewey,  Cooley,
Whitehead, and  Mead  in  the  development  of  the  semiotic
communication  model of personhood, while he also takes pains
to  clarify   the  distinctions   between   their  respective
philosopies.
    Seconding  scholars  of Japanese  society  such  as Takie
Lebra,  David  Preston,  Robert  J.  Smith, and  David  Plath
regarding  the usefulness  of Mead`s theory for understanding
Japanese concepts of self, Odin also undertakes  a systematic
examination  of  the  most  important  developments   in  the
Japanese philosophy of self in the twentieth century.  In the
process,  he  makes  it  apparent   that  many  of  the  same
influences that gave rise to the philosophy of the contextual
self  in  the  West  were  also  actively   involved  in  the
development  of Japanese theories  of self in the samecrucial
period between the 1890s and the 1930s.  Both Watsuji Tetsuro
(1889-1960)  and  Martin  Buder  (1878-1965) ,  for  instance
grounded  their concepts of self as "betweenness"  on similar
critiques  of  the  individualism   of  German  philosophical
anthropology  ending  with  Heidegger.  Both  Nishida  Kitaro
(1870-1945) and Buber recognized the epochmaking significance
of Feuerbach`s  1843 turn from a monological  to a dialogical
concept of personhood, regretting that later philosophers had
generally missed the significance  of this insight and fallen
into  one  or another  of the  extremes  of individualism  or
collectivism.

P.658

    Both Watsuji and Nishida were deeply influenced by Mead's
teacher,  William  James, in  the  earlier  stages  of  their
thought.  Both Watsuji and another of Mead's teachers, Josiah
Royce, were deeply  influenced  by Watsuji's  teacher  Nitobe
Inazoo  through  his  book  Bushidoo: The soul  of Japan, and
Nishida  in turn  was  deeply  influenced  by  Royce.  In the
post-war   period,  one  of  the  major  influences   on  the
amae-centered  Japanese social psychology theory of Doi Takeo
was Mead's theory of self.  Thus it seems clear that the rise
of the dialogical  model of self in Japanese  thought as well
was not simply a linear continuity from pre-twentieth century
Buddhist  and Confucianist  thought ¢w allowing Odin to argue
that  East Asia has also  seen  a paradigm  shift  toward  an
intersubjective  communication  model  of the self.  (If both
were paradigm shifts, however, it seems to me they are shifts
of  a  different  nature, one  in  which  the  substantialist
concepts  that  were  at  the  core  of  the  tradition  were
discarded,  and  one  in  which  the  core  concepts  of  the
tradition   were  rearticulated   with  the  aid  of  Western
philosophical concepts).
    It  is  ironic,  however,  that   the  concepts   of  the
interrelationa self developed by these Japanese thinkers have
all  been  used  as core  building  blocks  in the  extensive
literature  on Japanese  uniqueness  that  is often  subsumed
under the category of nihonjinron.  If they are so similar to
concepts of the self that have been articulated for about the
same  length  of time  in the West, even  in the paradigmatic
"land  of individualism"  that  is supposed  to be the  polar
opposite of Japanese society, and on the basis of the English
language, then there would  seem to be something  not totally
objective   in  their   being  used  to  define   the  unique
characteristics  of  the  Japanese  self.   In  view  of  the
preponderance  of West-to-East  influences  over those in the
other  direction, it might not be overly  difficult  to argue
that these Japanese concepts of self are essentially  Western
derivations  that  have  been  disguised  by  admixture  with
Buddhist   and  Confucian   concepts  or  by  their  apparent
derivation  from distinctive  words in the Japanese language,
and thus to impugn the originality  of the Japanese  thinkers
who put them forward.
Deeply conscious, however, of how all philosophical positions
are syntheses  of the ideas  of many other  thinkers, Odin is
careful  to give  full  credit  to  the  specific  points  of
originality  in the thought  of each thinker  he deals  with.
Thus, without minimizing the distinctive  characteristics  of
Japanese  thought  or demeaning  it all as ethno-ideology  in
disguise,  he  takes   up  the  task   of  expanding   Mead's
intersubjective  model  of the social  self into an East-West
contextualist  model of personhood that can integrate all the
various insights into the social construction  of self within
a single coherent framework. If his study thus undermines the
overly   ethnocentric   and   particularistic    aspects   of
nihonjinron,  it   does   so   not   in   a  confrontational,
deconstructionist, or condescending manner (like Peter Dale's
The Myth of Japanese  Uniqueness).  but through the promotion
of

P.659

dialogue and the patient demonstration of the fact that "I am
in you and you are in me," each of us leading  the other to a
fuller realization  of ourselves.  It was Mead himself, after
all, who taught  that inferiority  and superiority  complexes
are overcome  by social  feeling  and social  dialogue.  This
respect  for the  Other  is one  of the salutary  results  of
Odin's unabashed preference for the pragmatist version of the
decentered  self over the French  deconstructionist  version,
whose dissolution of the self into a differential  network of
empty  traces  and  floating  signifiers,  he  charges, means
nothing less the "total liquidation of the human subject."
Yet  regard  for  the  Other  must  be  integrated  with  the
fundamental  mission of philosophy  to articulate universally
valid ethical norms.  Thus, after clarifying  the content and
development   of  the  Japanese  thinkers'  concepts  of  the
social      self      and     defending      them     against
misinterpretations, Odi  does  not shrink  from  the task  of
subjecting them to the same judgment to which he subjects all
the  thinkers  whom  he takes  up.  Do their  conceptions  of
the  dialogical  self  strke  a proper  balance  between  the
individual  and society  so that  the individual  is properly
integrated  with both his social and natural environment, but
without   totally   submerging    his   identity   into   the
collectivity? Viewed in this light, he concludes, Watsuji and
his school have failed to solve the problem  of individualism
versus collectivism  because the individual  pole of his dual
self   ultimatedly    dissolves   into   the   social   pole.
Consequently, Watsuji's identification  of Buddhist emptiness
with the absolute totality, which is further identified  with
the deified Japanese state or kokutai, ends up falling into a
totalitarian  idelolgy.  Nishida, he finds, comes  closer  to
establishing  a middle  position  with  his  emphasis  on the
irreducible  self-creativity  of the I, tough  this  is still
undermined by his political writings, where he identifies the
imperial  house  as the  empty  but  unifying  center  of the
totality  that is the true self, the center  that establishes
the  order   of  world   history.   Most   postwar   Japanese
intellectuals  would agree with Odin that a sound  theory  of
the self must incorporate an idelolgy critique of the sort of
oppressive  power  relations  that  threaten  to smother  the
autonomous dimensions of selfhood.
In Odin's analysis, Mead's model of self not only reveals the
self as a mutually  constitutive  dialogue  between  self and
other, but  also  as  a  mutuallly  constitutive  interaction
between human beings and nature, and a mutually  constitutive
interaction between mind and body, Enriched and elucidated by
the  insights  of  other  philosophers  of the  social  self,
therefore, this model can point the way to the healing of the
various  pathologies  that have arisen from concepts  of self
that alienate the subject from other selves, from nature, and
from the body ¢w all three of which are now recognized  to be
part of the unbounded field of interconnected  existence that
grounds and sustains the self. By the same

P.660

token, this model  can point  the way to the full development
of the person in all its dimensions that has been the goal of
philosophy  and  religion  from  time  immenmorial.  In  this
connection  Odin  affirms  the  interpretation  of  Confucian
self-cultivation  developed  by David Hall and Roger  Ames in
Thinking  Through  Confucius,  wherein  the  achievement   of
authoritative  personhood  consisits  in the realization  (as
both   understanding   and   achievement)  of  the  self   as
contextually  and  dialogically  constituted,  a  realization
achieved    through   creative    acts   of   ethicoaesthetic
signification  that  respond  to and  are  structured  by the
ritual  forms of our sociocultural  context  (tatemae).  "The
locus of the self is therefore  neither in the subject nor in
the  object  but  in  a  'situtation'  unified  by  pervasive
aesthetic  quality arising through the valuative  transaction
between organism and environment" (p. 194)
In attempting  to rearticulate  via  the  media  between  two
one-sided but persistent views of the self, Odin is taking up
a mission  shared  by all of the  other  philosophers  of the
social  self  that  his  book  discusses, whether  in Europe,
America, or Japan, for all made  a similar  claim  that their
theory  of self  was the one that best  preserves  the proper
balance  between  the two extremes.  This  is a mission  that
parallels  the effort of phenomenological  sociologists  like
Alfred   Schutz   (1899-1959)  to  rescue   the  concept   of
individual  autonomy  from  the deterministic  tendencies  of
Durkheimian   organicism   and   Parsonsian   " structural -
functionalism . " Moreover, as Maruyama  Masao  shows  in his
study  of " Orthodoxy  and   Legitimacy  in the  Kimon School
" (translated by this reviewer in Sino-Japanese Studies 8 [2]
and 9 [1]), it is essentially  the same mission that underlay
the continual  rearticulation  of the orthodox interpretation
of  the  Way  (Tao-tung) aginst  heterodoxies  on both  sides
throughout   the  history   of  both  Chinese   and  Japanese
Confucianism.  At the  same  time, of course, it is a mission
cotinuours  with the original  core of the Buddhist tradition
¢w  the  articulation   of  a  middle  position   between  an
eternalist  or substantialist  concept  of the self  and  and
annihilationist  concept that denies the continuity of karmic
causation  through the past, present, and future.  It is just
this middle concept of the self ¢w or concept of no-self
(muga) ¢w that has consistently  proven itself to provide the
foundation for a responsible  and positive personhood capable
of acting integratively  to overcome  the inertia of the past
while gratefully  affirming  all of the determinative  causes
and  conditions   of  its  cultural,  familial,  social,  and
ecological field.
I have only minor criticisms of this book.  The typographical
errors and cases of incorrect romanization  of Japanese terms
may perhaps be overlooked, but more serious  is the fact that
only a portion  of the Japanese  terms mentioned  in the text
are listed in the glossary, to the frustration  of the reader
who needs the characters to identify the terms. The book as a
whole, moreover, contains rather too much repetition, which

P.661

if cut  down  would  have  have  reduced  the book  to a more
manageable  size.  If this  repetitiveness  has a good  side,
however, it is that in many cases chapters  or sections could
more or less stand alone as reading  assignments, without the
necessity of reading the whole book. In view of the length of
the book  and  its  excessive  level  of difficulty  for most
under-graduate  students, this  relative  lack  of "dependent
co-existence" of its various parts may well turn out to be an
advantage.