Prasa^nga and deconstruction:
Tibetan hermeneutics and the yaana controversy
By Nathan Katz
Philosophy East and West
Volume. 34, no.2
April 1984
P.185-204
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lecturing at Harvard University last year, the Dalai
Lama commented on the difficulties involved in such
Buddhist hermeneutical principles as whether a given
test is definitive(niitaartha) or in need of
interpretation (neyaartha). "Were I to explain the
positions of the Buddhist schools (siddhaanta) on
this topic," he said, "not only would you become
confused, but I would become confused as well."(1)
Indeed, these issues are intricate. Whether a given
text is definitive or interpretable depends, of
course, on the views expressed in that text from the
perspectives of each of the schools. We also find
texts stratified according to tantric classification
systems, which themselves vary. Texts are spoken of
as belonging to this or that 'vehicle' (yaana), and
this yaana-system is compounded by discourse that
refers not simply to the texts as such, but to
attitudes through which the texts are practiced.
Moreover, one and the same suutra seems to propound
and negate the entire yaana discourse. As one might
expect, there are also highly elaborated systems for
classifying the attitudes of the practitioner,
systems found in the earliest Buddhist texts and
modified throughout the long history of Buddhist
thought. So it seems that the Dalai Lama's comment
reflects more than his characteristic humility: the
issues confronting any investigator wishing to gain
an overview of Buddhist hermeneutical principles are
vast, complex, and relatively uncharted.
Therefore, rather than attempting to gloss even
the main controversies in Buddhist hermeneutics,
which would be more the task of a book than a brief
essay. I intend to present a rather elementary
typology. Identifying one particular hermeneutical
problem, which is felt to be representative of the
sort of issues over which Buddhist hermeneuticians
have pondered, I will proceed to discuss Buddhist
hermeneutics through a twofold typology.
The first type of hermeneutical strategy, which
I call text-based hermeneutics, is that which led
the Dalai Lama to his comment. From the perspective
of this strategy, a given text may be called
definitive (niitaartha) or in need of interpretation
(neyaartha). Or, a given text may be seen in the
particular context of other texts: thus it may be
said to belong to this or that class of tantras, or
it may be said to belong to one or another yaana.
Different schools have different reasons
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for their classifications, and I shall follow some
of the debates between the Maadhyamaka and
Yogaacaara schools as representative of these
discussions.
The second type of hermeneutical strategy is
what I call adept-based hermeneutics. Unlike those
rooted in the texts themselves, these systems of
interpretation seek to analyze the person who
practices a given text. Of course these two types
overlap somewhat, but we find quite distinct systems
of discourse. in Pali texts, for example, one finds
the language of the four holy persons (ariyaa
puggalaa), one finds the Buddha speaking about his
teaching as relying upon the dispositions of his
audiences, and these dispositions are thoroughly
investigated. As Buddhist thought flowered in India
and Tibet, one finds further adept-based
elaborations such as gotra and dula, the `families'
or psychological types of practitioners, with
differing texts and practices prescribed for
different psychological types, much as a skilled
physician prescribes different medicines for his
patients, as the traditional metaphor goes. Further
elaborations are developed with the rise of tantric
Buddhism, as in the Guhyasamaaja Tantra's
discussions of types of adepts and the Hevajra
Tantra's analysis of archetypal personality types
under the heading of the five Buddha families.
Guiding both these typologies is the principle
of the 'four securities' (catu.hpratisara.na) ,
wherein exegetical values are placed on the teaching
(dharma) and not on the person who teaches (pudgala),
on the spirit (artha) rather than on the letter
(vya~njana), on definitive (niitaartha) rather than
on interpretable (neyaartha) texts, and on intuition
(praj~naa) and not on dualistic consciousness
(vij~naana). This topic has been extensively studied
by Professors Lamotte and Thurman, so I shall not
devote a great deal of this discussion to it but
will apply this principle to these typologies as
appropriate.
Finally, I will return to our original yaana
controversy through the eyes of Tsong kha pa. In his
sNgags rim chen mo Tsong kha pa deconstructs the
referrentiality of yaana discourse, yet maintains
its use on an everyday level, writing sous rature,
if you will. It is this double movement of both a
deconstruction of referential language and a return
to everyday language, laden as it is by
logocentrism, that I find most characteristic of
Buddhist hermeneutical methods derived from the
Maadhyamaka. Noowhere is it more eloquently found
than in the sNgags rim chen mo. By sorting out one
hermeneutical problem it is hoped that a more
general sense of the richness of Buddhist
hermeneutics might at least be indicated.
It is also interesting to note that in recent
turns of thought among the so-called postmodernist
school of French literary criticism, one finds
textual strategies echoing several of the principles
of Buddhist hermeneutics. For example, Jacques
Derrida, perhaps the most influential of the
nouvelles critiques, has developed an understanding
of language as laden with precritical ontological
commitments which lead the reader into the
philosophic traps of seeking an intentionality, an
author, and a systematic coherence which becloud
rather than elucidate the reading of the text.
Similar to the Maadhyamaka contention that
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unarticulated but formal philosophic commitments
underlie even the most everyday uses of language,
Derrida insists on the primacy of writing over
speech (arche-ecriture), demanding a confrontation
with the text unmediated by logocentrism, a notion
parallel to Candrakiirti's negations of svabhaava,
or presence. Candrakiirti could well have written
what Derrida says: "... the problem of language has
never been simply one problem among others.... It
indicates, as if in spite of itself, that a
historico-metaphysical epoch must finally determine
as language the totality of its problematic being"
(Derrida (1976): 6). Language, then, is symptomatic
and not properly propositional.
Derrida maintains that language is not an
evoking of a naive presence, but that it curiously
negates presence in order to re-present. This
continuous representation is a Talmud-like
supplement, ever proliferating. Lacking the anchor
of simple referents, the reader is adrift. Reading
is the symbiosis of the text/host and the
critic/parasite (Miller: 221) in ever-widening
concentric circles, Interpretation is the violent
imposition of authorship, a violation of the text
(Taylor: 64). Presence is the tyranny of the closure
of metaphysics, of logocentrism.
The task of the critic, then, is to deconstruct,
to solicit in its etymological sense of shaking the
whole, of putting into motion (Derrida (1978): 6),
and of erasing. Derrida's erasure is the "erasure of
the present and thus of the subject, of that which
is proper to the subject and of his proper name. The
concept of a... subject necessarily refers to the
concept of substance--and thus presence--out of
which it is born" (Derrida (1978): 229). Again
similar to Candrakiirti, Derrida finds that the
shaking of presence is at the same time the erasure
of personal identity.
Derrida understands his own task of
deconstruction as showing the nothingness we assume
to be presence. By introducing the notion of
differance, Derrida indicates a double movement
which reminds us, at the same time, that this
nothingness is not merely relative to being but
underlies both being and nothingness (Culler: 164)
and that the notions of authorship, presence and the
signified have been erased. This erasure, however,
is not a simple negation leaving us with a stubborn
silence. Having erased, Derrida contitues to write
'under erasure' (sous rature), indicating that there
is no privileged. sacred language born out of the
deconstructionist enterprise. "... contradicting
logic, we must learn to use and erase our language
at the same time" (Spivak: xviii) is a theme in
which we find an echo of Naagaarjuna's dictum that
there could be no expression of the absolute, which
is no-thing, apart from the concealing logocentrism
of language (Candrakiirti: 400-440). It is not
surprising, then, that charges of nihilism have been
leveled against Derrida's deconstruction and
Candrakiirti's prasa^nga, charges which desperately
desire the author/signified (transcendental or
otherwise)/personal identity. Thus, it seems that a
study of Buddhist hermeneutics could well be
informed by issues and terminologies offered by
Derrida and the nouvelles critiques because of
similarities in the sorts of positions to which
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they respond (logocentrism, aatmavaada) , the
critical style in which they read their texts
(solicitation, prasa^nga) , and the sorts of
controversies which they evoke (charges of
nihilism).
Returning to our topic, one finds that Western
scholarly treatments of Buddhist hermeneutics are
very few. In fact, the sum total of Western
scholarship that has been directed to this question
consists of essentially three journal articles: a
pioneering study by Professor Lamotte; a very
penetrating study by Professor Thurman, who sees the
hermeneutical enterprise as the essence of the
Buddhist path; and a challenging analysis of tantric
hermeneutics by Professor Steinkellner, revolving
around the ala^mkaaram doctrine. It is hoped that
this present essay may continue the lines of inquiry
taken by my respected colleagues, adding to the
discussion of this very vital theme within the rich
tradition of Buddhist thought.
II. A HERMENEUTICAL PROBLEM: THE YAANA CONTROVERSY
By 'hermeneutics' I mean the systematic
interpretation of texts considered sacred by a given
tradition. As an intellectual discipline,
hermeneutics begins with an awareness of the
difficulties encountered in reading sacred texts;
that is, hermeneutics presupposes hermeneutical
problems. Problems occur in these instances where
differing or even contradictory claims are
canonically given regarding a key Buddhist doctrinal
element, in our present context of a yaana. A
problem entails an estrangement of letter
(vya~njana) and sense (artha)-a confusion resulting,
according to such Hindu grammarians as
Ko.n.dabha.t.ta, when a signifier (vaacaka) has lost
its signified (vaacya) (Spho.tavaada, in Raja:
137)--a problem likened by `Saantirak.sita to a
conversation about the color and shape of the moon
conducted between two people with opthalmic disease
(Tattvasa^mgraha, `sloka 1211, in Raja: 93-94).
Hermeneutical shock is symbolized by fainting:
when the Mahaayaana teachings of the
Saddharmapu.n.dariika were first announced, the
`sraavakas in the audience passed out (26) ;
similarly, when the tantric teachings of the
Guhyasamaaja were promulgated, the bodhisattvas fell
senseless to the ground (21), and the same situation
ensued when the Hevajra teachings were promulgated
(v.II, 37). Hermeneutics, then, begins when the
familiar conventions known as language take on
shades of the uncanny; when the signified seems
randomly selected, rather than evoked in an orderly
manner, as the signifier is spoken. In other words,
when one reaches the navel of the text, one
confronts the Freudian abyss.
As we shall see, how textual claims are
reconciled and adjudicated depends on what
principles our hermeneuticians have in mind, and it
is certainly the case that hermeneutics itself
raises further problems, provokes new controversies
of a more theoretical nature. However, by focusing
on one particular canonical problem, the yaana
controversy, I hope to elucidate some of the
fundamentals of
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Buddhist hermeneutics, and in so doing to point
toward some of its fundamental hermeneutical
problematics.
It could be and has been argued that, in
Buddhism, the problems of hermcneutics are the
problems of life itself (Thurman). Surely it is the
case that any aspect of experience which is
interpreted is done so only through the mediation of
intellective construction (savikalpa-pratyak.sa) ,
and that the actually given is indeterminate and
immediate (nirvikalpa-pratyak.sa). Therefore. any
act of interpretation is a reification (vikalpa),
and it is precisely this tendency towards reifying
which stands in need of analysis and therapy. This
is to say that all interpretation is a form of
subjectivism bordering on solipsism (asmimaana or
aha^mkaara), and that the therapy which Buddhism
offers is one which removes such subjectivizing
tendencies. Such a view has much to offer, but to
accept it would lead to holding all of Buddhism as
precisely a hermeneutic of awareness by virtue of
which subjectivist domination of experience is
overcome, turning hermeneutics into everything, and
thereby reducing discrete fields of inquiry such as
psychology or epistemology into hermeneutics. In
keeping with the field parameters given by the
Buddhist tradition itself, I prefer to use the term
'hermeneutics' specifically in the context of
textual interpretation and of reflection upon the
nature of this interpretation.
If hermeneutics begins with the awareness of a
hermeneutical problem, the central hermeneutical
problem confronting us in what follows is how to
interpret the term 'yaana', of which has been said
remarkably contradictory things, Generally, yaana is
a very common teaching device used for systematizing
various Buddhist practices and doctrines in terms of
two or three, and later of as many as nine, discrete
yaanas. The Western academic tradition has been very
quick, indeed I think overly hasty, in inappropriately
referring yaana discourse to forms of Buddhism found
in geographic areas. Thus, the technical term
`hiinayaana' has been atrociously misused to refer to
southern Buddhism, Mahaayaana to northern Buddhism,
and Vajrayaana to certain trends within Indo-Tibetan
Buddhism involving magic and sexual symbolism. One
might suspect the inappropriateness of such a handy
designation facilely applied to living religious
traditions. What I Propose is a brief history of the
term.
Etymologically, the term derives from the
Sanskrit root yaa, `to go'. giving the sense of
going or proceeding, as well as the means of
carriage or the vehicle, and is very close in many
connotations to maarga, the path. The only
pre-Buddhist reference to the term which I have been
able to locate is found in the Chaandogya Upani.sad
(Radhakrishnan: 426), which gives the sense of a way
or path: pathor devayaanasya pit.ryaanasya ca
vyaavartanaa. Sukumar Dutt (274-275) discerns its
usages in the suutras as a 'way' or 'career' as
distinct from that found in the later `saa.stras as
'vehicle'. This latter sense is conveyed in Kong
sprul's definition of the term (v. II, 495):(2)
"Like a vehicle or conveyance by riding on which one
goes beyond suffering, thus it is known as `yaana'."
Apparently the term, derived from 'to go', carries a
range of meanings from a spiritual career, to a path
or way, to a
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conveyance or vehicle. Oddly, scholarly convention
has been inclined to translate it by this last
alternative only.
Differing senses of a technical term do not in
themselves pose hermeneutical problems. However,
contradictory claims and uncertain signification do
pose such problems, particularly when we find, on
the one hand, a discourse emphasizing radical
distinctions among yaanas, and, on the other hand,
either a discourse claiming, in the extreme, that
there are no yaanas at all, or the more modest claim
that there really is only one yaana.
As an example of the first discourse, we find in
the AAkaa`sagarbha Suutra (`Saantideva: 61) the
claim that the `sraavakayaana is so dangerous to one
practicing the bodhisattvayaana that it must, at all
costs, be strenuously avoided. The La^nkaavataara
Suutra (333) says that radically different doctrines
are taught in the different yaanas, and (212) that
the nirvaa.na of the `sraavakas is really only a
certain stage (rang gis rig pa) in the training of
the bodhisattva. The A.s.tasaahasrikaa (194-195)
says that the true meaning of a bodhisattva's
detachment is his or her detachment from the
`sraavakayaana, and the Pa~ncavi.m`satisaahasrikaa
(365) says that egoism (aha^mkaara) may cause a
bodhisattva to fall to the level of a `sraavaka. The
Saddharmapu.n.dariika (23) affirms that the Buddha's
teaching is divided into three yaanas, maintaining
that this division is simply a pedagogic expedient
(upaaya kau`saliya) . Examples of this yaana
discourse could be extended almost indefinitely, as
virtually all Mahaayaana suutras have something to
say on the subject.
The yaanas which are affirmed in these sutras
are generally three, but occasionally two. The
division into two, hiinayaana and mahaayaana, arose
out of the Paa.taliputra schism. The three yaana
teaching (triyaana or yaanatraya) often speaks of:
(1) The `sravakayaana, literally the 'hearer's
way', by which it is said that the disciples of the
Buddha were able, upon hearing his teachings, to
resolve the multi-lemma of sa^msaara utterly.
Whether this resolution was final or not, complete
or not, or a mistaken assumption, was a question on
the Mahaayaana hermeneutical table. In the pali
texts, it is abundantly clear that the nibbaana of
the saavakas was final, complete in terms of wisdom
and teaching skill, and accurate (Katz: 96-146,
165-202). Some Mahaayaana texts seem to hold that
the nirvaa.na of the `sraavakas was a
self-pacification only, and did not address the
goals of others (Thurman: 37). Other texts posit the
`sraavaka's enlightenment as a temporary resting
place, an intermediate stage before the bodhisattva
practices were begun (Saddharmapu.n.dariika: 94),
while still others seem to hold it as an egoistic
delusion (La^nkaavataara: 11).
(2) The pratyekabuddhayaana, or the way of the
solitary buddhas, originally seems to mean that
there were some who could actualize the resolution
of sa^msaara without having heard the Buddha's
teachings, a way of dealing with saints of 'other
religions' (Kloppenborg) . In any case, the
pratyekabuddha, while attaining to full
enlightenment, is unable or unwilling to teach
others, and not a great deal of interest is invested
in this yaana.
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(3) The bodhisattvayaana, the way of those
dedicated to bodhi, is another name for the
paaramitaayaana, the way of practicing the
'perfections' (paaramitaas) in emulation of the
jaataka tradition of the former lives of the Buddha;
the hetuyaana, or causal way, in the sense that it
is the necessary precedent for Buddhahood (Kong
sprul: v.III, 493), or the Mahaayaana as a whole.
Yaana discourse continued to proliferate. The
Guhyasamaaja Tantra (162-163) offers a fourfold
classification of tantras as: kriyaa (action) ,
caarya (practice), yoga (method for union), and
anuttara (unsurpassed). The Hevajra Tantra (v.I,
63-67) links this fourfold classification with the
four moments of a romantic courtship: glance, smile,
embrace, and sexual union. When the Guhyasamaaja's
fourfold tantric classification was correlated with
the three yaana doctrine, a seven yaana system
ensued, but it was short-lived. The anuttara class
itself was permuted into three (father, mother, and
nondual), and finally the well-known nine yaana
system emerged.
In contrast with this theme of continuing
refinement and distinctions among yaanas was the
negation (or perhaps Derrida's term, soliciting) of
yaana language, often in the very same texts which
asserted it. This negation of yaana discourse could
take two forms: the simple negation which claims
that there are no yaanas or that yaana talk is
predicated upon some basic misunderstandings; or a
negation of yaana discourse which asserts the notion
of 'one yaana', ekayaana, as a principle overarching
all discrepancies among yaanas. As an example of the
first type, we find in the Saddharmapu.n.dariika(90)
the Buddha telling Kaa`syapa that there are no
yaanas but simply people who practice differently,
and in the same text it is also said (65) that since
all yaana talk is due to unreal, reified thought
(vikalpa), such notions are the products of dull
minds. In the La^nkaavataara the Buddha says
(135-136) that there are yaanas only so long as the
mind (citta) remains moving (pravartaka) in
sa^msaara, but, when it comes to know itself, all
thought of a yaana ceases. Similarly, `Saantideva
(95) cites the Sarvadharmavaipulyasa.mgraha Suutra,
which says that the Buddha never taught differences
among yaanas, and that such distinctions are mere
confusions.
The second type of negation of yaana language,
drawing on recourse to the ekayaana idea, is found,
for example, in the La^nkaavataara (133-134), which
says that when the grasping by subjects (graahaka)
for objects (graahya) ceases, then the one yaana is
known as it is (yathaabhuuta) . The
Saddharmapu.n.dariika in several Places asserts the
ekayaana teaching. In one place
(Saddharmapu.n.dariika: 31) it claims that since the
Buddha had only one aim, there could be only one
yaana; and elsewhere (ibid.: 27) this ekayaana is
called the Buddhayaana.
Knowing this unity of teachings was considered
no easy matter. Kong sprul (v.III. 534) says that
such knowledge is possible only upon the attainment
of the seventh stage (bhuumi) of spiritual growth.
The La^nkaavataara (259) speaks of an essence of the
teachings of all the Buddhas
(sarvabuddhapravacanah.rdaya), and the Seventh Dalai
Lama (8a-8b) sees this unity as one of intention
behind all texts: "All the extensive teachings
spoken by the Jiina--for example, the three
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yaanas. the four classes of tantras, are spoken only
as a means solely for training our mental continuums
(sa^mtaana or sems rgyud)."
This problem of continuity and diversity within
the Buddha's teaching causes even the greatest of
all Buddhist philosophers, Naagaarjuna, to pause, In
his Ratnaavaali (251, my translation) he says: "It
is certainly not easy to know what was intended by
the Tathaagata, so therefore guard yourself with
equanimity about the one yaana and the three
yaanas." In the same text (Hopkins: 75) , he
succinctly states the problem which I have been
discussing: "How could what is taught in the two
vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?"
It is precisely this hermeneutical problem which
Tsong kha pa addresses in his sNgags rim chen mo.
Before viewing his findings, in order to appreciate
the hermeneutical moves he makes, it will be
necessary for us to survey, by means of a typology,
various hermeneutical systems within Buddhism, a
task to which I now turn.
III. TEXT BASED HERMENEUTICS
How to read a text (or an idea, doctrine, and so
forth), which is to say, how to determine what are
to be the governing principles of text-based
hermeneutics, is the very point of departure of
Buddhism itself. When the Pali texts were canonized,
the redactors placed the Brahmajaala Sutta (Diigha
Nikaaya: sutta 1) at the very beginning, The central
thrust of this sutta can be said to involve the
question of how to interpret the claims made by
other Indian religions. Thus, an ability to
interpret texts, to set the Buddha's teachings off
against those of his coreligionists, was considered
to be paramount.
The Brahmajaala itself is one of the most
intriguing texts of the entire Pali canon. In it,
the Buddha employs a psychologizing hermeneutic to
unearth the structures of thought of other
teachings. Claims as to the eternality or
temporality of the world and the self are examined;
assertions about the destinies of the soul after
death are scrutinized: cosmogonies are found to be
rooted in various forms of psychological malaise:
and so forth. While space does not permit an
extended discussion of how these psychologizing
hermeneutics of the Brahmajaala are employed, my
purpose is served by pointing to the fact that
Buddhism is a hermeneutical enterprise from its very
inception.(3)
While it might seem that hermeneutics did not
play a major role in early Buddhism, since there
were no Buddhist texts prior to the Buddha, this
really is not the case. We find that the Buddha of
the Sutta Pi.taka was well aware of the need for
promulgating interpretative principles to be applied
to his own teachings. As Professor Thurman points
out (22), this raises a very unique case within the
history of religions, wherein the founder of a
religion is himself aware of exegetical and
hermeneutical difficulties regarding his own
doctrines. For example, in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya (v.
IV, 400-401) we find the Buddha discussing his
anattaa (no-self) doctrine with one Vacchagotta.
Seeing Vacchagotta's confusion, the Buddha tells him
that there is indeed a self--a claim manifestly
contrary
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to what he taught in virtually all other instances.
His disciple AAnanda, overhearing this discussion,
becomes understandably perplexed, and the Buddha
tells AAnanda about the necessity of clarity
regarding the levels at which one is speaking. Thus
we get a portrait of the teacher, the Buddha, as one
aware of hermeneutical problems about what he
teaches, aware that there is no uniformity of letter
in what he teaches, but affirming a uniformity of
purpose. His teaching is neither agreement
(sa^mvadati) nor disagreement (vivadati), but is
rather a skillful employment of everyday language
without becoming so infatuated with that language
that its conventions become the speaker's
convictions: ya~n ca loke vutta.m tena voharati
aparaamasan ti (Majjhima Nikaaya: v. I, 500).
Either agreement or disagreement is understood
as mere opinion (di.t.thi), and opinionatedness is
precisely that which prevents one from true seeing
(dar`sana) . By the time of the great pall
commentaries, escape from opinions was itself made
into a hermeneutical principle. The
Atthasaalinii(24) claims that the entire system of
abhidhamma was developed in order to prevent the
mind of the adept from running to metaphysical
extremes: abhidhamme duppa.tipanno dhammacittam
atidhaavanto acinteyyaani pi cinteti, tato
cittavikkhepa.m paapu.naati.
The classification of Buddhist texts as either
definitive (niitaartha) or indeterminate (neyaartha)
was accepted by all Buddhist schools except for the
mahaasa^mgahikas, who held all texts as niitaartha
(Lamotta: 348-349). As might be expected, heated
controversies arose as to which texts were
niitaartha, although all writers held niitaartha
texts as the most reliable and authoritative, As
mentioned above, the Catu.hpratisara.na Suutra
(ibid.: 342) cautions that one should rely on
niitaartha suutras over neyaartha ones; similarly,
the Bodhisattvabhuumi (ibid,: 355) says that the
bodhisattva relies on niitaartha suutras so as not
to digress from Buddhist teaching and discipline.
According to the Ak.sayamatinirde`sa Suutra
(Candrakiirti: 30), those texts which deal with the
path (maargaavataaraaya nirdi.s.ta) are neyaartha
while those which deal with the goal
(phalaavataaraaya nirdi.s.ta) are niitaartha, and
this came to be accepted in principle by all
schools. How to apply this principle, however, was a
matter on which no consensus was ever reached,
According to Candrakiirti, it was just to clear up
this matter that Naagaarjuna wrote his
Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa (Candrakiirti: 28).
From the Maadhyamaka perspective, niitaartha
suutras are those which speak directly about
`suunyataa. `Suunyataa, of course. implies that all
factors of experience (dharmas) have no independent
existence (svabhaava). Although some suutras might
speak about skandhas, dharmas, and the like, these
texts are considered as neyaartha. Niitaartha
suutras, such as those of the praj~naapaaramitaa
genre, deconstruct these doctrines as a means of
establishing the ultimate (paramaartha or don dam)
(Candrakiirti: 30). So, for the Maadhyamaka school,
those texts are niitaartha which adopt the double
movement of a deconstructionist hermeneutical stance
of negation on the ultimate level along with a
reaffirmation of logocentric language on the
relative, pragmatic level.
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Germinal Yogaacaara texts such as the
Sa^mdhinirmocana Suutra held, on the other hand,
that this negative dialectic (prasa^nga) of the
Maadhyamaka, like the naively positivistic
statements of the earlier texts, were neyaartha, and
that only texts which, like itself, spoke about the
ultimate in positive terms could be held as
niitaartha. Other teachings were understood by it as
based on egoism (asmimaana or nga rgyal)
(Sa^mdhinirmocana: 50).
Thus, both the Maadhyamaka and the Yogaacaara
hold in principle, along with the
Ak.sayamatinirde`sa, that niitaartha texts deal with
the ultimate or the goal (artha or don), while
neyaartha suutras deal with the relative (samv.rti
or kun rdzob) or the path (maarga or lam). Precisely
what is considered as ultimate is throughout a
matter of contention.
From the perspective of the Sa^mdhinirmocana,
the imputed ultimate of the Maadhyamaka is merely
another polarity in the vacillation between
affirmation and negation. Thus it propounds the
well-known "three wheels theory," which holds that
the first turning of the wheel is the Buddha's
`hiinayaana' teachings, consisting of naively
positivistic statements. The second turning is the
Maadhyamaka, which negates the first turning on an
ultimate level, both of which it considers neyaartha
because they are extremes; that is, their positions
are defined by each other. The third turning, that
which proclaims what was really intended in each of
the first two, is the only set of doctrines to be
considered as niitaartha and is best exemplified by
the Sa^mdhinirmocana and related texts. This real
intention, or sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa, speaks of the
ultimate as nondual, of one taste, and of having
been affirmed by the Buddha (Sa^mdhinirmocana:
52).(4)
As syncretic movements between the Maadhyamaka
and the Yogaacaara emerged, resolutions of this
niitaartha/neyaartha controversy continued to
proliferate. Kon mchog 'jigs med dbang po summarizes
the position of the
YogaacaaraSvaatantrika-Maadhyamaka school as
holding: (1) that neyaartha suutras are concerned
with the basic or the relative (samv.rti), while
niitaartha suutras are concerned with the ultimate;
and (2) that of the three wheels as propounded by
the Sa^mdhinirmocana, the first is neyaartha and the
last two contain both niitaartha and neyaartha. Of
the Prasa^ngika-Maadhyamaka school, he says they are
in agreement with point (1) above, but that they see
the three wheels theory differently. According to
them, the first and the third wheel are neyaartha,
while only the second is niitaartha because its
teachings are corroborated in the
Praj~naapaaramitaah.rdaya Suutra (Iida: 36,48).
Questions about implicit intentions in the
Buddha's teachings, a notion used to promulgate the
three wheel theory as well as to locate a text in
terms of niitaartha/neyaartha distinctions, bring us
to the question of what is meant by sa^mhaa-bhaa.saa
or 'intentional language'. According to Professor
Bharati, this technical term has been misspelled in
several texts as sa^mdhyaa-bhaa.saa, which would
give us 'twilight language', a reading which some
scholars still hold. Understanding how the term
sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa is used does not depend on its
translation as 'intentional' or 'twilight' language,
however. While the 'inten-
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tional' reading seems etymologically closer to the
original, `twilight' is nevertheless suggestive when
it is understood as opposed to literal senses.
In the poetics text, the Dhvanyaaloka of
AAnandavardhana, a clear distinction is drawn
between literal (vaacya) and metaphorical
(pratiiyamaana) usages of language'. the latter being
"something like charm in girls which is distinct
from the beauty of the various parts of the body''
(Raja: 283-284). That this distinction is quite
familiar within Buddhist texts is clear from the
La^nkaavataara (196), where it is said that any
attempt at conveying the sense (artha) of a text by
means of literal exegesis is like feeding uncooked
rice to children. The tantric author Naaropa, in his
Sekkode`sa.tiikaa, distinguishes between outer
(baahya) and inner (aadhyaatmika) readings, and
affirms that his system is based on the latter
(Naaropa: 5). Thus, the distinction between outer,
literal readings, on the one hand, and inner,
metaphorical ones on the other, is clearly drawn.
What is not so clear in Western scholarship is how
to fit the niitaartha/neyaartha distinction into
this scheme. Both Lamotte (355) and V. Bhattacharya
((1928): 295) take sa^mdhaabhaa.saa as neyaartha;
however, Tsong kha pa (Elder: 236) , in his
commentary on the J~naanavajrasamuccaya, tells us
that one who is proficient in the most advanced
tantras (anuttara) employs discourse that is
niitaartha and sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa. This leads me to
suspect that Lamotte and Bhattacharya are a bit too
hasty, and in fact Tsong kha pa goes on to
distinguish between dgongs skad (sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa)
and dgongsbshad (sa^mdhaa-bhaa.siita?), the former
the standard linguistic convention and the latter a
principle for interpreting the convention (Broido).
Thus it is a characteristic development of tantric
hermeneutical methods to take the same linguistic
unit and to subject it to varying interpretations.
Thus the mystery of sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa begins to
dissolve, and future tantric hermeneutical
researches would Reed to consider Tsong kha pa's
proposals. At times, sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa statements
need interpretative keys. At other times, such as in
the famous Hevajra dialogue (v. II, 61, my
translation) between Vajragarbha and the Buddha, the
matter is considered definitive. There Vajragarbha
asks the Buddha: "What could be said about
intentional language as used by the yoginiis,
unknown by the `sraavakas? Please make this clear,
Bhagavan." The Buddha replies with a very formalized
list of correspondences between intentional and
literal discourses. Here it seems that no great
mystery is involved, as the intentional language is
treated as a rather clear cipher. Thus, following
Tsong kha pa, those passages written in
sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa may be definitive, interpretable,
or both, and no clear equivalencies between
niitaartha and neyaartha, on the one hand, and
sa^mdhaa-bhaa.saa, on the other, may be drawn.
Steinkellner (453) discusses the Guhyasamaaja's
discerning of four types of meanings in texts: the
literal meaning (ak.saartha or tshig gi don), the
common meaning (samastaa^nga or spyi'i don), the
hidden or pregnant meaning (garbhii or sbas pa), and
the ultimate meaning (kolika or mthar thug pa).
Another fourfold meaning classification, and one
quite possibly related to this from the
Guhyasamaaja, originates with sGam po pa and was
developed by kLong chen pa.
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This method involves organizing Buddhist doctrines
around four points (chos bzhi). By the fifteenth
century when kLong chen pa wrote his Chos bzhi'i rin
po che'i 'phreng ba, these four points come to be
equated with four discernible levels of spiritual
practices. These four points of practice are: (1) a
basic life orientation of cultivating a sense of
disgust for sa^msaara and a yearning for nirvaa.na;
(2) the cultivation of the virtues understood as
essential for spiritual progress; (3) the
cultivation of specific virtues as antidotes for
specific mental defilements; and (4) the
transmutation of defilements into wisdom, a
characteristic tantric metaphor for returning the
mind to its original spontaneity, the basis of the
rdzogs chen system. In each of these four points, or
levels of spiritual practice, differing textual
claims are employed, thus reducing truth claim
controversies or hermeneutical problems to issues of
levels of practice, a hermeneutical principle very
close to that found in the Sa^myutta passages cited
above. Once hermeneutical problems become problems
of levels of spiritual practice, as kLong chen pa
suggests, then the road is paved--conceptually if
not historically--for a hermeneutic based not on
textuality but on the mind of the adept. It is to
this theme that I now call your attention.
IV. ADEPT-BASED HERMENEUTICS
Probably what is best known about the Buddha's
pedagogic method is its emphasis on the one who is
taught over and above what is taught. Following the
Brahmajaala's principle of psychoanalyzing
metaphysical statements, from the Buddhist
perspective metaphysical claims are cognitive and
emotional obscurations, stemming from a fundamental
lack of ease (du.hkha). To combat the malaise of
reification (kalpanaa), the Buddha offers a therapy
which is not based on naive counter-claiming (that
is, combating falsehood with 'truth') but on
silencing the very passion for claiming itself
(d.r.s.tit.r.s.naa). A doctrine is not something
that can be independently or objectively
established, but is rather something which is useful
in quelling the psychosis of metaphysics.
Understanding a claim or a text, then, entails
understanding the one who claims or the one to whom
claims are addressed. To do hermeneutics means to
shake a text to its foundations, to solicit it to
reveal its psychological matrix. To facilitate the
Buddhist hermeneutical enterprise, various theories
and systems about the nature and types of
practitioners were employed, and a survey of some of
these systems will be the topic for this section.
It was well known in Indian linguistic thought
that a signifier might evoke various signifieds
depending on the mind and intentionality of the one
who hears or reads it. Maadhvaacaarya, discussing
Buddhism in his Sarvadar`sanasa^mgraha (Bhattacharya
(1934): 27), says: "It is a common experience that
the same word conveys different meanings to
different persons. For example... the sentence 'the
sun is set' may imply to a thief that it is time for
committing a theft; to a brahmin, that it is time
for saying his evening prayers; and to an amorous
man, that it is time for meeting his sweetheart. But
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what was meant by the speaker himself?... The
problem is the same in the teachings of the Buddha."
While for Maadhvacarya this free play of the
signifier represented a weakness and a lack of
consistency in Buddhism, nevertheless according to
Buddhist texts any consistency could be found in
principle but not in the letter of the text. The
Saddharmapu.n.dariika(86) has the Buddha saying that
he teaches according to the abilities and talents of
his auditors, and that he adapts his teachings by
the principle of the freed signifier, or 'permutable
meanings' (anyamanehi arthehi). A similar point is
made in the La^nkaavataara (204) to the effect that
while a good physician employs the same therapeutic
principle in all cases, specific cures might vary
due to differences in diseases. Thus, from a
Buddhist point of view the weakness of inconsistency
is not involved, but rather the skillful employment
of a nondogmatic therapy.
The same point is made in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya
(v. IV, 314). When the Buddha was asked how it was
that he taught different portions of the Dhamma to
different disciples, he explained that one makes the
greatest effort where one expects the fullest
result, just as a farmer tends his best fields and
only then turns his attention to the poorer ones.
Thus, a skilled farmer needs to know which fields
have the greatest potential; similarly, a Buddhist
hermeneutician needs to know the psyche of the adept
in order to make sense of what is prescribed in his
case. "Let us never forget," cautions Lamotte (357),
"that the omniscient Buddha is less a master of
philosophy than a physician for universal suffering;
he imparted to each the teaching that he needed."
In the Sutta Pi.taka several typologies of
adepts are offered. Probably the most basic typology
is found in the A^nguttara Nikaaya (v. III, 356)
where two groups are mentioned, the dhammayogaa and
the jhaaniiyaa. In general terms, the first group of
adepts was the more intellectual and the second was
more inclined towards transic meditations.
Apparently, even during the Buddha's lifetime there
were some tensions between these two types (and they
probably continue to this day), so the Buddha
admonishes each to see the rarity and value of the
other. In the Kii.taagiri Sutta (Majjhima Nikaaya
(v. I, 477)), these two types are called the
Pa~n~naavimutto, those freed by insight, and the
cetovimutto, those freed through the affective mind.
The Kii.taagiri goes on to mention five other types
of disciples--the kaayasakkhii, di.t.thipatto,
saddhaavimutto, dhammaanusaarii, and
saddhaanusaarii, all of whom are still in the course
of their training (sekhaa). Since I have discussed
this typology in some detail elsewhere (Katz:
78-95), I will here focus on the most elementary
typology which corresponds to the Jungian
distinction of intellectual and intuitive persons.
While it has been a fashion to see the latter as
superior to the former (Sangharakshita: 161), the
Buddha found the matter much less categorical,
saying that such judgments are no easy matter
(A^nguttara Nikaaya: v. I, 120) . that full
enlightenment is accessible to both types (Sa^myutta
Nikaaya: v. I, 191), and that the distinction refers
to the sort of meditative teachings one gives to
each type (Katz: 78-82). Here we have a clear sense
that different
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personality types require different therapeutic
methods which are to be employed without positing a
superior and inferior. This distinction again
becomes important in Tsong kha pa's hermeneutics, as
we shall see.
Discussion about three types of adepts are found
from the early texts right through late tantric
works. In the A^nguttara Nikaaya (v. I, 123-124),
the Buddha speaks of three sorts of disciples: the
arukuupamacitta, one with a mind like an open sore
which festers at the slightest stimulation; the
vijjuupamacitta, one with a mind like lightning who
is capable of seeing things as they are in a flash;
and the vajiruupamacitta, one with a mind like a
diamond who has destroyed the aasavaa, and who has
attained full enlightenment. Indrabhuuti, in his
J~naanasiddhi (95-96) also speaks of three types of
disciples-the inferior (m.rdu) , the middling
(madhya), and the superior (adhimaatra)--for whom
differing teachings are required. Of these types,
Atii`sa in his Bodhipathapradiipa, say that the
first merely pursues worldly pleasures, that the
second strives after his own welfare (rang zhi), and
that the last pursues the goals of others (Wayman:
7-9) . According to Professor Wayman, various
meditational manuals (blo sbyong) were prepared for
each of these types, so the hermeneutics of the
adept rather than the text is understood the basis
for the entire lam rim genre of Tibetan literature.
Another important principle for adept based
hermeneutics is the doctrine of the five buddha
families (rgyal ba rigs inga) and its correlation
with the five kula or gotra. The gotra idea is
introduced in the La^nkaavataara where it is equated
with five yaanas (Kunst: 314). The five buddha
families doctrine is found in germinal tantras such
as the Guhyasamaaja (1-11) and the Hevajra (v. II,
17), where they are said to share characteristics
with the five elements and the five skandhas. It
remained for Indrabhuuti(41), however, to make an
explicit psychological typology out of the
Guhyasamaaja's five buddha families, and he
discusses the characteristics of each of the
psychological types. He also reinterprets the notion
of wisdom, j~naana, in terms of the five aspects of
wisdom which are correlated with the families as the
major theme of his J~naanasiddhi (33-40). Just as
the Buddha did not assert a superiority of one type
of practitioner over the other, Indrabhuuti does not
prefer one of the five psychological types over
another; rather, he follows the Hevajra's dictum (v.
II, 99) that the yogi has no special liking for one
or another type, and that this fivefold division
exists on a relative level only. So important was
this psychological typology that. Dombii Heruka
(Saadhanamaalaa: lx-lxi) says that this kula
doctrine is one of the most important aspects of
Buddhist tantra.
Since claims have no sui generis authority but
need a reduction to their psychological matrices for
analysis, the interpretation of claims, and
especially of hermeneutical problems, presupposes a
jump to the levels of the mind of the practitioner
for successful Buddhist exegesis and interpretation.
It is this dominant theme which I call adept-based
hermeneutics, a stance affirmed within
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Buddhist hermeneutical literature from its inception
right to the present. These issues have been
discussed at length by tantric authors like Long
chen pa, Indrabhuuti, and Tsong kha pa, and future
work in Buddhist hermeneutics needs to take them
into very careful consideration.
V. TSONG KHA PA AND THE YAANA CONTROVERSY
Having sketched some of the principle coordinates of
text and adept-based hermeneutics, we may now return
to our yaana controversy and Tsong kha pa's
resolution of it as formulated in his sNgags rim
chen mo. It can be seen that he employs several
hermeneutical strategies in this work, namely: (1) a
solicitation of yaana language as referential,
affirming a uniform but empty 'inner horizon' of
`suunyataa; (2) following the traditional medical
model for Buddhist teachings, a return to an
everyday use of yaana language rooted in adept-based
hermeneutical principles; and (3) a provisional
separation of wisdom and method, the former being
`suunyataa and the latter involving the Mahaayaana
trikaaya doctrine understood through the definitive
tantric practice of deity yoga (lha'i rnal 'byor),
both as a method and as the actualization of Buddha
intentionality.
Distinctions among yaanas cannot be asserted,
Tsong kha pa writes, on superficial grounds (1977:
100-101):
Individual vehicles {yaanas} are posited (1) if
there is a great difference of superiority or
inferiority between them in the sense that a vehicle
is a fruit or goal toward which one is progressing;
or (2) if there are different stages of paths that
live a different body to a vehicle in the sense that
a vehicle is a cause by which one progresses.
However, if the bodies of the paths have no great
difference in type, then a series of vehicles cannot
be assigned merely because the paths have many
internal devices or the persons who progress along
them differ in superiority or inferiority.
Following up on his first point, Tsong kha pa
then deconstructs claims which would suggests a
differentiation of yaanas. Accepting the position of
many praj~naapaaramitaa suutras(5) that there is
indeed a uniform 'inner horizon' of enlightenment,
which he calls the cognizing of `suunyataa, he
dismisses the construction of yaana discourse on the
basis of wisdom. "Without cognizing the mode of
subsistence of phenomena,'' he writes ((1977): 115).
"one cannot extinguish all afflictions and cross to
the other side of the ocean of cyclic existence.
Therefore, the wisdom cognizing the profound
(emptiness) is even common to the two lower types of
superiors [`sraavakas and pratyekabuddhas]."
To reaffirm yaana discourse, even on a relative
level, after such a thorough deconstruction, is his
next task, and a rather difficult one. He poses an
enigma (Tsong kha pa (1977): 103): "There is no
contradiction in the fact that for a Mahaayaanist,
Hiinayaana is an obstacle to full enlightenment, but
for one in the Hiinaayana lineage, it is a method for
full enlightenment." As a method for a certain
personality type, the so-called 'hiinayaana'
teachings lead to full enlightenment; but for
another personality type, these teachings are an
obstacle. Citing AAryadeva's
Caryaamelaapakapradiipa, Tsong kha pa relies on
adept-based theories
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to say that "the vehicles are divided through
arranging practices into three types [i.e., the
three yaanas] from the viewpoint of the three types
of trainee's interests" ((1977): 91), and these
three types are the same as found in Indrabhuut's
J~naanasiddhi (95-96).
Thus, Tsong kha pa has established his
provisional distinction for discussing the Buddhist
path: (1) an 'inner horizon' of wisdom, and (2) an
'outer horizon' of method which is based on
typologies of adepts. Wisdom in tantric Buddhism is
often symbolized by the mother and method by the
father, so Tsong kha pa employs these symbols in an
extended metaphor ((1977): 99):
Hiinayaana and Mahaayaana are not differentiated
through their view (of emptiness) [the Inner
horizon']: the Superior Naagaarjuna and his sons
assert that the two vehicles are discriminated by
way of acts of skillful method.... For instance. a
mother is a common cause of her children, but the
fathers are the cause of discriminating their
children's lineage (Tibetan, Mongolian, Indian and
so forth) . In the same way, the mother--the
perfection of wisdom--is the common cause of all
four sons [`sraavakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas
and samyaksam-buddhas], but the cause of their being
divided into the individual lineages of Mahaayaana
and Hiinayaana are methods, such as the generation
of an aspiration to highest enlightenment for the
sake of all sentient beings.
Very similarly, the La^nkaavataara(149) makes a
distinction between the 'realization' itself' and
the teaching about it, the former a uniform 'inner
horizon' of `suunyataa and the latter simply a
methodical distinction. Taking this methodical
distinction as something real, according to the
Saddharmapundariika (65), is simply prapa~nca or the
'outer horizon' of the psychohistorical context in
which a doctrine is taught. It should be emphasized
that this 'inner horizon' of `suunyataa is a
deconstruction of referentiality and its bases, that
is, of the egoistic tendencies (vaasanaa) towards
reification (vikalpa).
As I have indicated, Tsong kha pa's
deconstruction of yaana language is not based on a
nihilism: hence, the double hermeneutical movement
which negates only to reestablish on an everyday
level. Since yaanas cannot be established on the
basis of wisdom or goal, their distinction is a
pragmatic, pedagogic one. It is as though Tsong kha
pa, having negated yaanas, continues to use the term
`under erasure'. So pervasive is the Maadhyamaka
dialectic throughout his writings that each time the
negated term reappears, it is as though crossed
over: yaana becomes as a methodical instrument.
Distinctions of Mahaayaana and Vajrayaana are
similarly deconstructed and reconstructed sous
rature. Clearly, as he says ((1977): 115-116), "the
division of the Mahaayaana into two is not made on
account of wisdom cognizing the profound emptiness
but on account of method" and, citing the
AAtmasaadhanaavataara of J~naanapaada (ibid.: 132),
"the vast deity yoga constitutes the difference in
method between the [paaramitaayaana, or the
perfection path of the bodhisattva, and the
mantrayaana, or the path for tantric adepts]."
As mentioned above, the deity yoga practices are
a uniquely tantric application of the Mahayana
notion of a kaaya. Incidentally, this discussion
bears
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heavily on the early Buddhist distinction of the of
cetovimutta and the pa~n~naavimutta, the former
being one who, having practiced the jhaana
meditations, attains the supernormal powers (iddhi)
which are essential for discovering and
un-obstructedly teaching the Dhamma, and the latter
being the one who by sheer insight attains
enlightenment. Although both share the same wisdom
(a~n~naa), only the latter can truly emulate the
Buddha in pedagogic skill (Katz: 83-95).
The trikaaya doctrine, as used in tantric
Buddhism, is itself often a hermeneutical tool.
Professor Guenther quotes from the dGongs pa zad
thal (Guenther: 300): "The dharmakaaya promulgates
that which is ineffable; the sambhogakaaya, the si
self-existing letters (o.m ma.ni padme huum); and
the nirmaa.nakaaya, the innumerable suutras and
tantras." This is to say that from the highest
perspective, there is `suunyataa as teaching; from
the middle level there is the realm of symbolic
strategies; and on the ordinary level there are the
letters (vya~njana). The letters become associated
with their sense (artha) only when deconstructed,
when they are understood as empty. This is why Kong
prul (v. III, 534) tells us that only a seventh
level bodhisattva can appreciate this uniform, empty
inner horizon. The three kaayas, according to
tantric exegesis, cohere only when understood in
their utter interpenetration, when they are not
reified by notions such as independent existence
(svabhaava) ; thus, the tantric doctrine of a
'fourth' kaaya, svabhaavavikaaya, indicating not a
fourth but the interpenetration of the three.
According to paaramitaayaana texts such as the
Bodhisattvabhuumi, the last several stages of a
bodhisattva's career are spent in attaining the
various teaching powers of a Buddha, symbolized
through such kaaya (or intentionality) discourse
(Asa^nga: 165a-165b). In Vajrayaana Buddhism, these
powers are actualized through the deity yoga
practices, which are considered as the very essence
of tantra (Tsong kha pa(1977): 119). Thus, the
Vajrayaana is understood as simply a short way (myur
lam) for doing what takes aeons according to the
paaramitaayaana traditions (blo bzang bskal bzang
rgya mtsho: 8b-9a).
The deity yoga practices involve the selection
of a tutelary (yi dam), a selection which is based
on the abilities (dbang po), psyche (bsam pa), and
sensitivities (khams) of the adept, according to the
Seventh Dalai Lama (8b). Understood as embodying the
three kaayas, this yi dam is a symbol of Buddhahood
which collapses the ultimate and relative levels
into each other, a practice thereby existentially
demonstrating the highest wisdom according to
Buddhism, since the distinction of relative and
ultimate, like all distinctions, is a reification
for one who adheres to it but a skillful method for
one who employs it without entanglements. As Tsong
kha pa says ((1977): 127-128), "One should know that
joining such method and wisdom non-dualistically is
the chief meaning of the method and wisdom set forth
in the Mantra Vehicle."
Thus, by analyzing such text-based distinctions
as niitaartha and neyaartha, ultimate and relative,
by employing adept-based considerations, and by
filtering Mahaayaana doctrines such as trikaaya
through tantric practices, Tsong kha pa exemplifies
a hermeneutic rather characteristic of later
Buddhism. Thoroughly
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basing his system on the Maadhyamaka, he is able to
deconstruct all referential tendencies underlying
the use of language, allowing for the free play of
the signifier in a skillful, pedagogic proliferation
of methods.
NOTES
1. From a lecture by the Ven. Tenzin Gyatsho, H.
H. the XIVth Dalai Lama, at Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, August 3, 1981.
2. gang la nyon pa ste de la brten nas mya ngan
las 'das par 'gro bas theg pa 'am bnyon pa dang 'dra
ba'i cha nas theg pa zhes khyang bya'o.
3. A recent translation of the Brahmajaala by
Bhikkhu Bodhi is prefaced with philosophic skill,
and the reader is recommended there.
4. don dam de ni tha dad ma yin te/kun to ro
gcig mtshan nyid sangs rgyas gsung//
5. For examples, see A.s.tasaahasrikaa: 21, 137,
140, etcetera, and Conze: 237, 388, etcetera.
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