Two types of saving knowledge in the Paali suttas
By Donald K. Swearer
Vol.22,1972
p. 355-371
Philosophy East and West
(C) by the University Press of Hawaii
p. 355
Several studies have recently appeared which have
dealt in whole or in part with the epistemology of
Buddhism. They range from Jayatilleke's technical,
philosophical-analytical argument that early Buddhism
was rooted in a broadly based empiricism offering a
middle way between nihilism and realism to Jacobson's
more popularized efforts to use "modern concepts to
elucidate old thoughts."(l) In between these
parameters are a number of more or less specialized
studies from varying perspectives within Buddhism by
Robinson, Wayman, Guenther, and others.(2)
While such problems as the means of knowledge,
the nature of Buddhist logic, the role of analysis,
theories of meaning and truth, and the problem of the
limits of knowledge all emerge from these
discussions, the issue of what Herbert V. Guenther
calls "levels of understanding" holds a particular
interest.(3) Guenther's own exposition of the problem
is based primarily on Tibetan Buddhist yoga texts.
From that perspective he generalizes about Buddhism
as a way to enlightenment or knowledge of reality. He
contends that the Buddhist path involves a
fundamental change of attitude from a "discursive
cognitive situation" to an "intuitive cognitive
situation."(4) This distinction is another way of
describing the differentiation between levels of
understanding made in both Sanskrit and Paali texts
between assumed or indirect meaning (neyaartha/
neyyattha) and real or direct meaning
(niitaartha/niitattha).
Whereas there is a definite delineation between
levels of understanding or modes of knowing in
Buddhism--whether they be two or three--they are not
made essentially distinct. That is, as Guenther puts
it, the relatively real and ultimately real are
indivisible.(5) This highest level of knowledge is
mystical --not in the sense of absorption but in that
it is immediate and nonpropositional. In fact, states
Guenther, it "... is fundamentally empirical and
realistic, taking into account the ineffability of
the immediately given."(6)
Although he writes from the base of Paali or
Theravaada Buddhism rather
--------------------------------
Donold K. Swearer is Associate Professor, Department
of Religion, Swarthmore College.
1. K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963);
Nolan Pliny Jacobson, Buddhism the Religion of
Analysis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966).
2. Cf. Guenther, "Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist
Philosophy," Journal of the American Oriental
Society 86, no. 3 (Jul.-Sept., 1966): 297-305;
Richard H. Robinson, "Mysticism and Logic in
Seng-chao's Thought," Philosophy East and West 8,
nos. 3 and 4 (1958- 1959): 99-120; D. T. Suzuki,
"Reason (vij~naana) and Intuition (praj~naa) in
Buddhist Philosophy, " in Essays in East-West
Philosophy, ed. C. A. Moore (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1951), pp. 17-48; Alex Wayman,
"Notes on the Sanskrit Term, J~naana," Journal of
the American Oriental Society 75, no. 4
(Oct.-Dec., 1955): 253-268.
3. "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," Journal
of the American Oriental Society 78, no.
1(Jan.-Mar., 1958): 19-28.
4. Ibid., p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 26.
p. 356
than the Mahaayaana perspective of Tibetan yoga, K.
N. Jayatilleke's observations about the particular
issue of levels of understanding in Buddhist
epistemology are not as unlike those of Guenther as
one might suppose. While he sees the epistemology of
early Buddhism as fundamentally empirical rather than
intuitive, he stretches the term empirical to include
transempirical states (that is, nirvaa.na) and
extrasensory data. Empirical knowledge, then, in
Jayatilleke's usage is very similar to Guenther's
claim that saving knowledge in Buddhism is "knowledge
by acquaintance" and not "knowledge by
description."(7) Furthermore, just as Guenther
contends that levels of understanding are distinct
but that finally or ultimately there is only one
truth, so Jayatilleke argues that in the Paali texts
the two differing levels of understanding--direct
(niitattha) and indirect (neyyattha)--lead to one
truth. This truth or state of being cannot be
described or understood rationally, but it can be
realized and attained.(8) Thus, like Guenther,
Jayatilleke is claiming that although there are
distinct levels of understanding or modes of knowing
they are ultimately resolved in a nonpropositional
truth which can be realized "intuitively" but not
known discursively.
A more general consideration of this issue, but
one which is germane to a proposal I will make below,
is offered by D.T. Suzuki. Suzuki juxtaposes
discursive and intuitive levels of understanding in
the terms of vij~naana/ni~n~naa.na and
praj~naa/pa~n~naa, He claims that the two are always
contrasted in Buddhist thought: that vij~naana is the
mode of knowledge appropriate to the world of the
senses and the intellect characterized by the duality
between the seer and the seen, and that praj~naa is
the fundamental noetic principle whereby the
synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes
possible.(9) As methods of knowing Suzuki finds
vij~naana and praj~naa standing diametrically
opposed. Vij~naana is the principle of analysis and
conceptualization whereas praj~naa always aims at
synthesis and unity. Yet, despite their differing
functions, Suzuki believes the two complement each
other and that vij~naana cannot function without
being based in praj~naa. P.T. Raju states Suzuki's
point in the following manner, "thought [vij~naana]
cannot work without intuitions [praj~naa] and
intuitions cannot be understood without thought, and
... the distinctions between thought and intuition
cannot be clear-cut."(10)
Building on some of the suggestions from the
studies cited above, I propose to investigate the
problem of the relationship that may obtain between
levels of understanding or modes of knowing in
selected Paali suttas using vi~n~naa.na and pa~n~naa
as the two fundamental types suggested by Guenther
and Jaya-
----------------
7. Ibid., p. 27.
8. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 476.
9. Suzuki,, op. cit., p. 17.,
10. "Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India,"
Philosophy East and West 2, no. 3 (Oct., 1952):
205.
p. 357
tilleke. At the outset it is important to keep in
mind that I am not using them as mutually exclusive
terms, but as broad categories or types of knowledge
which are--as suggested by both Guenther and
Jayatilleke-distinct but related to each other within
the experiential matrix of the soteriological quest.
As vi~n~naa.na and pa~n~naa are being considered
primarily as types of knowledge it should not
surprise the student of the Paali suttas that this
study does not elaborate on the numerous passages
where the distinction between the two words or the
meaning of one or the other is ambiguous. Indeed, in
both classical and Buddhist Sanskrit as well as in
the Paali literature, passages can be found where the
usage of one appears to be interchangeable with the
usage of the other. As I have suggested, however, my
intent is not to offer a historical exegesis of
vi~n~naa.na and pa~n~naa, but an interpretation of
the problem of levels of knowledge in Theravaada
Buddhism focusing on these terms as types.(ll) In
doing so we shall address ourselves to three basic
questions: what meaning(s) do the terms hold as
distinct but related forms of consciousness and modes
of knowledge; what is the nature of the relationship
between the two; and, finally, do they presuppose
each other as integral parts of the Buddhist
salvation quest? These questions are basic to a
consideration of the soteriological nature and
function of knowledge in the Paali suttas of
Theravaada Buddhism.
DISCRIMINATING KNOWLEDGE: VI~N~NAA.NA
In studying the category of discriminating or
analytical knowledge several terms will be discussed
but none is more significant than vi~n~naa.na. The
Paali word like the Sanskrit one etymologically means
to 'distinguish, discern, observe, investigate or
know'. As has been demonstrated by Franklin Edgerton,
there is no clear definition of the meaning of
vij~naana in the writings of classical Sanskrit. In
the Upani.sads for example, vij~naana sometimes
appears as the form of knowledge necessary for the
realization of ultimate reality (cf. Ka.tha IV.15,
Chaandogya VIII.7.1), but it also appears in more
mundane contexts such as the knowledge of snake
charming (cf. Chaandogya VII.5.1).
In the Paali canon, vi~n~naa.na is found to have
several, differing meanings. It stands for "a mental
quality as a constitutent of individuality, the
bearer of (individual) life, life force.., general
consciousness... (and)... may be characterized as the
sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by
'mind'".(12) O. H. de A. Wijesekera summarizes four
basic ways
-------------------
11. Cf. the exceptionally helpful article by O. H. de
A. Wijesekera, "The Concept of Vi~n~naa.na in
Theravaada Buddhism," Journal of the American
Oriental Society 84, no.3 (Jul.-Sept., 1964):
254-259.
12. The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary,
ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (London:
Luzac & Co., 1959), p.618 (hereafter cited as
Pali-English Dictionary).
p. 358
in which vi~n~naana is used in the Paali canon: (a)
cognitive or perceptive consciousness; (b) the
surviving factor in the individual as denoted in
particular by the term, sa.mvattanika vi~n~naa.na
(the vi~n~naa.na that evolved); (c) the medium in
which jhaanic or spiritual progress takes place as
implied by the expression vi~n~naa.na.t.thiti (the
stations of vi~n~naa.na); and (d) the basis of all
consciousness and unconscious psychological
manifestations pertaining to individuals within
sa^msaaric or empirical existence.(13) Each of these
usages clearly applies to the life of the individual
within the phenomenal world; nevertheless, as the
basis of cognition and perceptive consciousness and
as part of the means by which spiritual progress is
gained, vi~n~naa.na becomes an important mode of
knowledge relating to the Theravaadin's quest for
salvation.
For the purposes of this study we shall focus on
two fundamental uses of vi~n~naa.na in the Paali
Nikaayas: vi~n~naa.na as consciousness or mind, and
vi~n~naa.na as a mode of knowing. The fact that
vi~n~naa.na is found to represent both a condition of
consciousness as well as a type of knowledge will
prove to be of the utmost significance.
Vi~n~naa.na as consciousness or mind is nearly
synonymous with two other important terms in the
Paali canon, citta, and mano. Citta refers to the
center of man's emotional and intellectual nature.
The Paali Text Society's dictionary states that such
English expressions as "heart and soul" best capture
the meaning of citta and that it refers especially to
the conative and emotional side of thought.(l4) As
Mrs. Rhys Davids writes, "In citta we... usually have
man as affective and affected, as experiencing."(15)
mano, on the other hand, is said to represent the
intellective function of consciousness, especially as
it is expressed in valuing, measuring, purposing, and
intending.(16) Vi~n~naa.na complements citta and mano
by referring to perceptive and sensory activity.(17)
Despite these distinctions, however, in Sa^myutta
Nikaaya (II. 95), vi~n~naa.na, citta, and mano are
equated and stand in opposition to kaaya or body.(18)
Let us assume then, without further elaboration, that
in the Paali suttas the terms citta, mano, and
vi~n~naa.na were used either synonymously or as
essentially related aspects of the same empirical
consciousness.
Two important characteristics of the empirical
consciousness in early Buddhism demand our attention.
The first is its impermanont nature, and the second
may be characterized as the surviving factor in the
individual within
-----------------------------
13. Wijesekera, op. cit., p. 295.
14. Pali-English Dictionary, p. 266.
15. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian
Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism
(London: Luzac & Co., 1935), p. 237 (hereafter
cited as C. A. F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of
Indian Psychology).
16. Ibid.
17. Pali-English Dictionary, p. 618. Cf. also C. A.
F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology,
p. 245ff.
18. Ibid.
p. 359
sa^msaaric or empirical existence. The impermanont
nature of consciousness may be illustrated by this
famous passage from the Sa^myutta Nikaaya: "But this,
brethren, that we call thought, that we call mind,
that we call consciousness, that arises as one thing,
ceases as another, whether by night or by day. Just
as a monkey, brethren, faring through the woods,
through the great forest catches hold of a bough,
letting it go seizes another, even so that which we
call thought, mind, consciousness, that arises as one
thing, ceases as another, both by night and by
day."(19)
Elsewhere in the suttas it is made abundantly
clear that the impermanonce of the empirical
consciousness is a result of its connection with the
senses. That is, empirical consciousness appears to
be dependent upon conditions created by the
attachment of the senses to sense objects. As
Majjhima Nikaaya I.259 puts it, "apart from condition
there is no origination of consciousness."(20) The
same sutta goes on to say that visual consciousness
arises because of eye and material shapes; auditory
consciousness arises because of ear and sounds;
olfactory consciousness arises because of nose and
smells; gustatory consciousness arises because of
tongue and tastes; tactile consciousness arises
because of body and touches; mental consciousness
arises because of mind and mental objects.(21) The
consequences of the fact that vi~n~naa.na arises
through contact between the sense organs and sense
objects are significant. It raises the question of
whether cognitive consciousness originates de novo
from an empirical situation or simply begins to
function when contact is made between the organ and
the object of sense. Wijesekera supports the latter
interpretation, insisting that the former would
equate Buddhism with materialism in its theory of
perception.(22) For our purposes, the most
significant point stems from the fact that
vi~n~naa.na functions only in relationship to objects
of sense, hence, creating the possibility--if not the
necessity--of consciousness being tied to the mundane
or phenomenal world.
The dimension of this potential attachment to
mundane objects is illustrated by the following
passage from the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta of the Majjhima
Nikaaya:
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because
of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three
is sensory impingement (phassa); feelings (vedanaa)
are because of sensory impingement; what one feels
one perceives (sa~njaanaati); what one perceives one
reasons about (vitakketi); what one
---------------------------
19. The Book of Kindred Sayings (Samyutta Nikaaya) 5
vols., trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids and F. L.
Woodward (London: Oxford University Press,
1917-1930), 2:66 (hereafter cited as The Book of
Kindred Sayings).
20. The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima Nikaaya) 3
vols., trans. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac & Co.,
1954-1959), 1:314 (hereafter cited as The Middle
Length Sayings).
21. The Majjhima Nikaaya 3 vols., ed. V. Trenckner,
R. Chalmers, and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London:
Luzac & Co., 1888-1899), 1:295 (hereafter cited
as Majjhima Nikaaya).
22. Wijesekera, op. cit., p. 255.
p. 360
reasons about obsesses (papa~nceti) one; what
obsesses one is the origin of the number of
perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in
regard to material shapes cognizable by the eye,
past, future, present.(23)
Here we find a direct connection between vi~n~naa.na
and papa~nca, or consciousness and obsession,
illusion, obstacle, impediment resulting from the
perceptions (sa~n~naa) which are rooted in contact
(phassa) between sense organ and object.(24)
The empirical world presupposed by these texts
might well be described as an arena of sensory
presentations in which external objects are dependent
upon a cognizing consciousness and vice versa. The
empirical world of things and objects is not
conceived of as independent of their cognition, just
as cognition is not seen isolated from the objects
which are cognized. Mrs. Rhys Davids emphasizes this
point in regard to the nature of the mind or
consciousness by claiming that early Buddhism was not
concerned with the "mind" but with "minding," that
is, with mind in relationship to the objects of
sensation and perception.(25) This conception of the
phenomenal world as a dynamic process of the
interaction of sense objects, sense organs, and sense
consciousness factors is further illustrated by the
development of the classification of the eighteen
dhatus in later Paali literature. The dhatus, or
fundamental bases of existence, include the six sense
organs, their objects of contact, and the six forms
of resultant consciousness (vi~n~naa.na).
If, as the suttas assume, empirical realities are
dynamic and fluid fields of distinct forms of
consciousness interacting with sensory objects, it
follows that impermanonce will be one of the
characteristic traits of the phenomenal world. Since
objects and consciousness are symbiotically related
in a state of constant interdependence, it is
impossible to discover any degree of permanonce
within the sensory realm. As E. R. Sarachchandra
writes: "We perceive forms with our eyes, hear sounds
with our ears and get attached to them. But the
things we get thus attached to are constantly
changing... (and) the world of constant change has no
permanont reality."(26) The "obsessed" (papa~nca)
consciousness is bound to objects of sensory
perception, mistaking empirical objects as permanont
entities when, in fact, they are only objects of
consciousness changing from moment to moment as our
perceptions of them change.
If the phenomenal world is viewed as partially or
largely shaped by consciousness (vi~n~naa.na), then,
on one level, consciousness functions as the medium
in which empirical existence takes place. In this
capacity vi~n~naa.na has
--------------------------------
23. Majjhima Nikaaya, 1:111-112.
24. Pali-English Dictionary, p. 412.
25. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, op. cit., p. 234f.
26. Buddhist Psychology of Perception (Colombo: The
University of Ceylon Press, 1958),P.11.
p. 361
the power to effect the origination or cessation of
the World.(27) Another consequence is that
vi~n~naa.na becomes the sine qua non for the birth,
growth, and development of conscious existence within
the phenomenal World.(28) In a dialogue between
AAnanda and the Buddha in the Mahaanidaana Suttanta
of the Diigha Nikaaya, for example, the Buddha states
that vi~n~naa.na is the cause of name and form (naama
ruupa), that if consciousness (vi~n~naa.na) were not
to descend into the mother's womb there would be no
birth, and that without consciousness there would be
no further evolution of life.(29) This nearly
quasi-substantive conception of vi~n~naa.na is, in
the opinion of Wijesekera, also expressed in the
terms, sa.mvattanika-vi~n~naa.na
(rebirth-consciousness ) , and vi~n~naa.na-sota
(stream of consciousness) or bhava-sota (stream of
becoming).(30)
Vi~n~naa.na as mind or consciousness, in brief,
is an expression of a mode of becoming, a condition
characterized by diversity and impermanonce. In this
usage vi~n~naa.na does not mean full cognition but is
"...a sort of anoetic sentience that occurs before
the object is completely apprehended."(31) At this
level, vi~n~naa.na represents no formal power or
control in and of itself, but rather the formless
weakness and pain (dukkha) of disordered chaos. It is
consciousness which arises when sense objects
stimulate sense organs. Perhaps it could be said that
at this stage vi~n~naa.na is merely reactive
consciousness or awareness. It is, therefore, a state
of nonfreedom, of dependence upon phenomenal
diversity and bondage to the objects of sense. It is,
as it were, a universal human condition from which
man must extract himself.
The condition of bondage to plurality and
impermanonce is, indeed, the profane in its most
radical connotation. The Theravaadin's quest for
salvation is to escape from this condition, to negate
its threat of confusion and disorder. But where are
the possibilities for creating a sacred cosmos from
this chaos? Do they lie within man's own
consciousness or is the source only to be found in
some outside force? These questions bring us to a
second basic use of vi~n~naa.na in the Paali
Nikaayas, namely, vi~n~naa.na as a mode of knowledge.
Clues as to the nature of this knowledge are
found throughout the suttas. For example in the
Dhaatu Vibhaanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya,
vi~n~naa.na as the sixth dhaatu beyond the five bases
or elements of earth, water, fire, air and space is
characterized as a knowledge which is able to
distinguish between pleasure and pain, one of the
fundamental dualities of the phenomenal world.(32)
Sukha and dukkha refer not simply to pleasure and
pain as psychological
-----------------
27. Ibid.
28. Wijesekera, op. cit., p. 255.
29. The Diigha Nikaaya, 3 vols., ed. T. W. Rhys Davids
and J. Estlin Carpenter (London: Luzac & Co.,
1903-1911) , 2: 62 (hereafter cited as Digha
Nikaaya).
30. Wijesekera, op. cit., pp. 255-256.
31. Sarachchandra, op. cit., p. 4.
32. Majjhima Nikaaya, 2:242.
p. 362
components of existence in the sensory world, but to
its ontological character as well. Vi~n~naa.na,
therefore, as knowledge of the distinction between
pleasure and pain or happiness and suffering, appears
to be a discriminating mode of knowledge in regard to
the true nature of reality. An identical use of
vi~n~naa.na is found in the Mahaavedalla Sutta of the
Majjhima Nikaaya where it is said that by vi~n~naa.na
one discriminates the pleasurable from the painful
and the neutral.(33)In the same sutta, the text goes
on to say that vi~n~naa.na is called knowledge
because one discriminates by means of it (vijaanaati
ti...tasmaa vi~n~naa.nan ti vuccati).(34) Furthermore
in the Viima^msaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya it
is said that "the Tathaagata should be examined in
order to know (vi~n~naa.naaya) whether he is
perfectly enlightened or not."(35) Vi~n~naa.na in
these instances must be seen as a mode of knowledge
or a cognitive state which, by its power of
discrimination, has within itself the possibility of
becoming more than mere sensory awareness. It has, in
other words, at least some power of
self-transcendence.
Vi~n~naa.na in the Paali Nikaayas, in brief,
presents two different possibilities which fit well
into our interpretative schema. It can mean, on the
one hand, man's empirical consciousness which by
nature is bound to the objects of sense. This level
may be considered as the profane, when that which is
most essential to human existence (that is, vi~n~naa.na)
is bound by its attachment to sensory objects and
totally without self-controlling power. On the other
hand, vi~n~naa.na as a mode of knowledge implies that
it has the power of transcending involvement in the
sensory world; thus, in the Kevaddha Sutta of the
Diigha Nikaaya it is asked:
Where do earth, water, fire and wind,
And long and short, and fine and coarse,
Pure and impure, no footing find?
Where is it that both name and form
Die out, leaving no trace behind?
On that the answer is:
The intellect (vi~n~naa.na) of Arahatship...(36)
It rests within vi~n~naa.na itself to progress
toward the ultimate. This progress is a result of
knowledge attained through a discriminating
understanding of the impermanont nature of the
phenomenal world.
--------------
33. Ibid., 1:292. Cf. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 434f.
34. Majjhima Nikaaya, 1:292.
35. Ibid, 1:3l8f.
36. The Dialogues of the Buddha (Diikha Nikaaya) 3
vols., trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and C. A. F. Rhys
Davids, Sacred Books of the Buddhists (London:
Luzac & Co., 1899-1921), 1:283.
p. 363
This progression is marked in particular by a
scheme of spiritual training or meditation known as
jhaana or samaapatti, the context in which the
question of saving knowledge arises. Without
digressing into this arena, it will be merely noted
that the acquisition of spiritual states is a
refinement of consciousness (vi~n~naa.na). Such a
progressive refinement is indicated by the so-called
seven stations of consciousness. These describe the
movement of vi~n~naa.na from consciousness of matter,
to the dying out of the consciousness of
sense-reaction, to the turning away from
consciousness of the manifold, to the consciousness
of infinite space, to the consciousness of infinite
consciousness. (37) Here is represented a freeing of
vi~n~naa.na from attachment to the mundane to a more
universal awareness of the nature of itself and of
reality. Such liberation is denoted even more
forcefully by other terms in the Paali Nikaayas which
must be briefly mentioned.
Vi~n~naa.na is able to rise above its bondage to
the world of sense objects through the power
engendered by objective analysis. This form of
transcending knowledge, is illustrated by a cluster
of related words denoting reflective cogitation,
contemplative observation and rational
discrimination. Among them are included such terms
as, viima.msaa, anupassanaa, pa.tisa.nkhaa, pa.tisa~n-
cikkhati, and peccavekkhati.(38)
Viima.msaa denotes consideration, examination and
investigation.(39) In its use in the suttas it is
frequently associated with the attainment of higher
powers, praiseworthy concentration, and even insight
into the nature of ultimate reality itself. Thus in
Diigha Nikaaya III.222, viima.msaa-samaadhi is one of
the four stages to iddhi or supranatural powers; in
the A^nguttara Nikaaya viima.msaa is described in "The
Book of the Tens" as one of the conditions of the
higher life of the Buddhist saint;(40) and in
A^nguttara I.297, insight into the nature of the
ultimate appears to be contingent on a detached
examination (viima.msaa) of "...resentment,
infatuation, wrath, enmity, hypocrisy, delusion,
treachery, stubborness, impetuosity, pride...
(etc.)"(41)
Anupassanaa, denoting contemplation, observation,
looking at, is also essential to the development of
true wisdom.(42) For example, through anupassanaa the
bhikkhu analyzes his body into such components as
feelings and mind, and understands their impermanont
nature.(43) Furthermore, it is said to lead to a
--------------------
37. Diigha Nikaaya, 3:253; 2:68.
38. Important terms omitted from this list are
vicaara and vitakka. They are, in my opinion,
more appropriately discussed in relationship to
jhaana.
39. Pali-English Dictionary, p. 644.
40. The Book of Gradual Sayings (Anguttara Nikaaya) 5
vols., trans. F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare
(London: Oxford University Press, 1932-1936),
5:65 (hereafter cited as The Book of Gradual
Sayings).
41. Ibid., 1:297.
42. Pali-English Dictionary, p. 39.
43. The Book of Kindred Sayings, 5:261.
p. 364
"... vision of things not taught before...," to
knowledge, insight, wisdom and light.(44) A related
term, samanupassanaa, is seen to be integral to the
means by which the hindrances (nivaara.na) blinding
the individual to higher realities are overcome.(45)
An important stage in the development of
vi~n~naa.na beyond bare sensory consciousness is the
simple act of being objectively aware of particular
human acts and activities, especially those conducive
to the pleasure of the senses. Thus the Majjhima
Nikaaya admonishes the monk to reflect carefully
(pa.tisa^nkhaa) while eating, and to think over
(pa.tisa~ncikkhati) the householder life.(46)
Reflective thought is like a mirror which catches the
image of every act and thought of the person; hence,
the Buddha admonishes Raahula to reflect
(paccavekkhati) again and again in doing every act,
speaking every word, and thinking every thought.(47)
The consequences of analytical and reflective
thought, on the one hand, are ethical. By the power
of discrimination (baala pa.ti sa^nkhaana) one
abandons"... immorality of deed in body, speech and
thought... and conducts himself in utter purity."(48)
Pa.tisa^nkhaana, however, also leads to bhaavanaa,
"cultivation," "making-become," which is conducive to
yet higher goals of mindfulness and detachment.(49)
Analytical or discriminative knowledge, therefore,
represents not only self-conscious awareness or even
rational understanding but is also the power by which
the individual becomes "other" than he is. In
discriminating, analytical thought inherent in
consciousness (vi~n~naa.na) itself, there rests the
power of changing the very structure of life. Through
the attainment of knowledge, the individual is able
to control his environment rather than be controlled
by it. Vi~n~naa.na comes to mean not merely a sensory
consciousness dispersed among the multifarious and
impermanont object-realities of the empirical world,
but a consciousness which has analyzed and understood
that world to the point of controlling and, hence,
transcending it.
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE: PA~N~NAA
We have seen that vi~n~naa.na characterizes
mundane existence both as the ground of sentient
existence and as the means of enabling the individual
to gain power
--------------------------
44. Ibid., 5:157.
45. Diigha Nikaaya, 1:73.
46. Majjhima Nikaaya, 1:273.
47. Ibid., 1:415.
48. The Book of Gradual Sayings, 1:47.
49. Ibid., 1:48. Mrs. Rhys Davids has discussed the
word bhaavana, in several of her writings. See
her Sakya or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1931), p. 93f.
Although she has been justly criticized for
interpreting this and similar terms to mean
becoming more of a "self, " the notion of
bhaavanaa as "making-become" or becoming other
than what one presently is,,represents a helpful
interpretation. That is early Buddhism clearly
implies that right knowledge brings about a
change of one's being.
p. 365
over himself and his world. As a mode of knowledge,
vi~n~naa.na functions soterio logically as a means to
a higher reality. This reality, on one level of
discourse, can be identified as nibbaana. As a polar
term to vi~n~naa.na, however, it may also be
discussed as intuitive knowledge or pa~n~naa. In our
usage, pa~n~naa represents both the nature of
consciousness vis-a-vis the ultimately real as well
as the mode of knowing ultimate reality. Vi~n~naa.na
and pa~n~naa are both forms of consciousness and
modes of knowledge, although they differ in function
and type. The function of vi~n~naa.na as a mode of
knowledge is primarily to help control the
consciousness through analytical and discriminating
understanding of the empirical world. This control
function is not an end in itself, but rather points
beyond itself to a higher end or goal. Pa~n~naa, on
the other hand, does not function as a control but
rather as a release, a freeing of the consciousness
to a knowledge of the Ultimate itself, a knowledge
defying the categories of rational discrimination. In
this sense pa~n~naa may be classified as a
nonrational, intuitive or a synthetic type of
knowledge in contrast to vi~n~naa.na as a rational
and analytical type.
In the Nikaayas the condition of mundane
existence is loss of freedom because consciousness
(vi~n~naa.na) is bound to empirical objects through
sensory perceptions (sa~n~naa). It has been shown,
furthermore, that vi~n~naa.na has the power within
itself to rise above mere sensation to higher
cognitive states. By means of rational analysis,
vi~n~naa.na perceives the implicit dualities and
conflicts typical of the empirical world. It thereby
progresses to higher and higher levels of
understanding which, however, are still qualified by
an inevitable attachment to the senses. Eventually a
point is reached where this attachment is broken, and
there emerges a new way of knowing and being.
The AA.na~njasappaaya Sutta of the Majjhima
Nikaaya discusses this progression and change in a
form typical of the suttas. It points out that
perceptions (sa~n~naa) related to sense desires
(kaama) are ruled by Maara, hence, resulting in an
evil and immoral consciousness.(50)This condition can
be changed only when consciousness (citta) is
developed to a level of true permanonce (aa.na~nja)
which is the highest attainment of wisdom
(pa~n~naa).(51) As another passage in the Majjhima
Nikaaya puts it, perfect knowledge (a~n~naa) comes
only through gradual training,(52) attainment, and
progress.(53) One of the most obvious illustrations
of the fact that pa~n~naa results from an extended
period of discipline and gradual training is the
division of the Noble Eightfold Path into the
categories of siila, samaadhi, and pa~n~naa. Wisdom
or true knowledge (pa~n~naa) is fully
--------------------------
50. Majjhima Nikaaya, 3:262.
51. Ibid.
52, A~n~naa generally refers to perfect knowledge,
the knowledge of Arahatship, saving knowledge.
The use of pa~n~naa I am developing in this
article is identical with this meaning of
a~n~naa.
53. Majjhima Nikaaya, 1:479.
p. 366
achieved only at the conclusion of a period of
development, the length of which depends upon the
spiritual ability and the effort of the individual
concerned.
The goal achieved by this progressive realization
is above all a goal characterized by freedom
(vimutti). Again and again the suttas point to the
fact that one who enters the way (magga) to salvation
has entered on the freedom of the consciousness
(cittovimutti) , freedom through intuitive wisdom
(pa~n~naavimutti). (54) Such freedom is likened to
abhi~n~naa, a suprarational knowledge, which is
perfect.(55) The model of the religieux par
excellence is one who is endowed with intuitive
wisdom (pa~n~naa) and freedom (vimutti) or a
"knowledge-vision-freedom''
(vimutti~naa.nadassana).(56)
Freedom by itself is, of course, merely an
abstraction and the Paali suttas are quite concrete
about that from which the individual of intuitive
wisdom is freed. In brief, the man of citto pa~n~naa
vimutti is freed from those attachments to the
objects of the phenomenal world controlling his
consciousness, blinding him to an awareness of his
true nature and the world in which he lives, and
proscribing his ability to transcend himself and his
environment. The word used in the Paali texts for
this binding attachment to the phenomenal world is
aasava, literally an "outpouring." Through ignorance
(avijjaa), sensuous desire (kaama), and the wish for
becoming (bhaava) an individual is literally "poured
out" into the material world. He is defined by all of
the objects and immediate goals of the world of
sensory reality; hence, a condition of freedom
becomes absolutely impossible.
Freedom in any religious tradition, of course, is
more than merely freedom from. It is a freedom to as
well. Early Buddhism is no exception to this rule. In
this case it is a freedom to pa~n~naa, a new insight
(vipassanaa) and seeing knowing (~naa.na-dassana).
The individual who has attained to pa~n~naa, having
overcome the impediments of the senses, is enabled to
know in a new way. It is a knowing no longer tied to
the fields of sense, to sense objects and organs in
the manner of empirical consciousness. Pa~n~naa,
then, represents the new consciousness of "rebirth"
or transformation. It is the noumenal consciousness
empowered to know not only the true nature of
phenomenal reality, but ultimate reality itself.
Because it represents a mode of consciousness like
vi~n~naa.na, pa~n~naa is able to perceive the
ultimately real "face-to-face" just as vi~n~naa.na is
able to perceive the phenomenal world as it really
is. Pa~n~naa, therefore has been called an
extrasensory "seeing" (dassana) or perception.(57) It
is a form of perception in that it knows directly,
but it is extrasensory in that it is not dependent
upon the senses or the objects of sense.
Pa~n~naa as insight (vipassanaa) is the knowledge
of the nature of things, or
--------------
54. Ibid., 1:77.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 432.
p. 367
the knowledge and insight of things as they are
(yathaa bhuuta ~naa.nadassana).(58) If you will, it
is the acknowledgment of the impermanonce (anicca) of
the phenomenal world and its inherent suffering
(dukkha), but from the perspective of the knowledge
of nibbaana rather than from the perspective of the
mundane. It is possible for the empirical
consciousness to arrive at a cognizance of the
impermanonce of the phenomenal world by rational
methods, but until that knowledge is realized from
the perspective of the ultimately real its
consequences are limited. The knowledge of the nature
of things is that aspect of pa~n~naa described in the
two stages of the Noble Eightfold Path as right views
and right intentions. Within the Theravaada tradition
it is most often characterized as the Four Noble
Truths.
Knowledge of the nature of things is not
sufficient for salvation. It must be supplemented by
the knowledge-and-vision of things, that is, absolute
freedom (vimutti-~naa.nadassana). It is the knowledge
attained by the Buddha at his enlightenment when he
is reported to have said, "there arose in me the
knowledge and insight that my salvation is
unshakable, that this is the last birth and that
there is no further birth."(59) "Freedom-knowledge''
complements "nature-of-things knowledge." The latter
is the knowledge of things as they are empirically
seen from the perspective of what they might become,
whereas the former grasps this truth in the light of
the ultimately real (nibbaana) . The insight of
pa~n~naa, therefore, may speak in descriptive terms
of impermanonce, conditionality and so on, but the
"vision" aspect of pa~n~naa makes only such simple
assertions as emptiness (su~n~na) and signlessness
(animittataa).
As Edward Conze points out, the term su~n~na is
not used in the Theravaada tradition as extensively
as anicca or impermanonce;(60) nevertheless, its
limited use serves as an important means by which to
indicate the vision aspect of pa~n~naa. References
occur in the A^nguttara Nikaaya where the Buddha is
made to say that his discourses are "... deep and
deep in meaning, transcendental, dealing with the
Void (su~n~nataa)...";(61) the Culasu~n~nataa Sutta
describes a method for the development of a true,
changeless, and pure emptiness;(62) and the
AAka^nkheyya Sutta refers to the monk who is calmed
(samatha) and who has transcended every perceptual
form as a "cultivator of empty places."(63) As the
last reference indicates, su~n~na returns us to the
notion of pa~n~naa as freedom of the mind or
consciousness (cetovimutti). This freedom may be best
delineated in the suttas in the sequence of
appamaa.naa (immeasurable),
--------------------------
58. For a discussion of vipassanaa by a contemporary
meditation teacher see the detailed presentation
by Ledi Sayadaw, "The Manual of Insight"
[Vipassanaa Diipanii] The Wheel 31/32 (Kandy,
Ceylon: Buddhist Publication Society, 1961).
59. Majjhima Nikaaya, 1:167.
60. Buddhist Thought in India (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1962) p. 59.
61. The Book of Gradual Sayings, 1:68.
62. Majjhima Nikaaya, 3:104.
63. Ibid., 1:33. See also The Middle Length Sayings,
1:41.
p. 368
aaki~nca~n~naa (nothingness), su~n~nataa (emptiness)
and animittataa (signlessness) . (64)
Su~n~nataacetovimutti or "freedom of the mind that is
emptiness" refers to the fact that essential reality
abides beyond the particulars of the phenomenal
world. The above limited references appear to
indicate that salvation-knowledge as su~n~na denotes
not only the negation of form associated with
phenomenal world but also a reality beyond form.
Pa~n~naa perceives this reality as su~n~nataa, not
mere emptiness, but as that ultimately real which
gives meaning to the world of multiplicity.
Along with su~n~na or su~n~nataa, the term
animittataa (signlessness) is an important
nondescriptive indicator of the "freed mind" or
consciousness (cetovimutti).(65) It denotes more
than the inadequacy of the human intelligence to
grasp the ultimately real. It implies, rather, that
human consciousness operating on a higher level (that
is, pa~n~naa) can, indeed, know the ultimately real,
that universal and absolute ground which by
definition transcends the limits of finite knowledge.
Theravaada Buddhism makes the optimistic claim
that a man can know the ultimately real by his own
efforts. To truly know this reality is to know it
directly and to know directly assumes that one
participates in that reality. It is, therefore, of
utmost importance that salvation-knowledge or
pa~n~naa is described as a "seeing-knowing"
(~naa^na-dassana). Since what is "seen" is radically
other than what is ordinarily perceived, the vision
aspect of pa~n~naa must also be radically other than
the modes of knowledge appropriate to the mundane
world. If this claim is accurate, that is, if
pa~n~naa as ~naa^na-dassana is decisively other than
empirical consciousness or vi~n~naa.na, then the
nature of the relationship between these two forms of
knowing becomes a crucial question. Do they in some
way complement each other or are they so radically
different in nature and function that finally there
is no relationship between the two?
Writing in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, La
Vallee Poussin uses a dialogue among the monks,
Savi.t.tha, Musiila, and Naarada in the Sa^myutta
Nikaaya as a typology to represent two differing
approaches to nibbaana, the rational and the
mystical. In the dialogue Savi.t.tha asks Musiila and
Naarada whether "apart from belief, apart from
inclination, apart from hearsay, apart from argument
as to method, apart from reflection on and approval
of an opinion" did they have a knowledge of the
conditioned nature of the phenomenal world and that
the ceasing of it was nibbaana.(66) Musiila replied
that he knew (jaanaati) and saw (passati); hence, for
him the hindrances (aasavas) to the ultimately real
had been stripped away and he had attained to
Arahatship.
-----------------------
64. Majjhima Nikaaya, 1:297.
65. Ibid., 1:296.
66. The Book of Kindred Sayings, 2:81-82.
p. 369
Naarada for his part, stated that he had the right
insight that the "ceasing of becoming" was nibbaana
but that he was not an Arahat for whom the
intoxicants had perished.(67) Louis de la Vallee
Poussin comments:
"Musiila et Naarada... representent asset bien le
'rationalisme' et la 'mystique.' Musiila possede 'la
saintete' parce qu'il 'sait' ou 'connait.' Naarada ne
se considere pas comme un saint parce qu'il n'a pas
touche le Nirvaa.na avec son corps. On peut,