Wittgenstein and Naagaarjuna's paradox
By Tyson Anderson
Philosophy East and West
Volume 35, no.2
April, 1985
P.157-169
(C) by University of Hawaii Press
P.157
Several recent writers have claimed that some of
Naagaarjuna's ideas are in agreement with those of
the later Wittgenstein and that Naagaarjuna can be
seen as taking up a Wittgensteinian position against
his opponents. I believe that such views are
mistaken and that it is, if anything, the Tractarian
nature of his philosophy which explains
"Naagaarjuna's paradox," namely, the fact that his
effort to destroy all views had the opposite result
of creating scholasticisms both ancient and modern
which obscure the religious truth which was his
principal concern.
Before considering some recent works in detail,
it is perhaps worth remarking that their thesis of
affinity is counterintuitive on the face of it.
First, because it would be truly surprising, in view
of the cultural and historical conditioning of
thought, that two thinkers so widely separated in
culture and time should turn out to have identical
ideas.(1) Second, Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations, compressed though it is,(2) is in
part a sustained attack on the idea of writing
philosophy as brief dicta with minimal examples,
which is exemplified in Naagaarjuna and in
Wittgenstein's earlier Tractatus.
Edward Conze has indeed protested against
"Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy,"(3) but
one writer, Chris Gudmunsen, advises us to advance
beyond this "orthodoxy," and he boldly argues that
"only a Wittgensteinian interpretation will suffice
for certain central Buddhist Concepts."(4) Buddhism,
we are told, has "less to fear" from philosophy than
Christianity has, since Buddhism has been "much more
overtly philosophical," and the Maadhyamika school
"has least of all to fear, since it represents
philosophical Buddhism par excellence."(5) One can
only wonder at such remarks when one recalls how
critical Wittgenstein was of much of the philosophy
that preceded him, including his own earlier work.
From this point of view, one's initial hypothesis
might be that the more a religion was indebted to a
particular philosophy, the more it had to lose as
previous philosophical concepts and methods were
discarded. Catholicism's indebtedness to Thomistic
philosophy has not made it markedly adaptable to
shifting cultural emphases since the thirteenth
century.
I
Frederick J. Streng thinks that "Naagaarjuna's use
of words for articulating Ultimate Truth would find
champions in contemporary philosophers of the
language analysis school such as Ludwig Wittgenstein
or P. F. Strawson."(6) According to Streng,
Naagaarjuna and Wittgenstein agree in holding that
metaphysical propositions do not provide the
knowledge that is claimed by systematic
metaphysicians. Words and expression-patterns are
simply practical tools of human life, which in
themselves do not carry intrinsic meaning and do not
necessarily have meaning by referring to something
outside the language system.... The importance of
this understanding of the nature of meaning is
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that it removes the necessity for finding a
presupposed referent of a symbol or a "name,'' and
it denies that a single ontological system based on
the logical principle of the excluded middle is a
necessary requirement for an integrated world
view.(7)
But this is very nearly the opposite of what
Wittgenstein says. When Wittgenstein tells us that
"the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is
part of an activity, or of a form of life,"(8) he at
once offers examples such as: giving orders, and
obeying them; describing the appearance of an
object, or giving its measurements; reporting an
event; forming and testing a hypothesis; asking;
praying; and many others. Now the whole point of
this is that language is to be viewed in terms of
what is "outside the language system," that is, our
lives and activities. Since words can be viewed as
tools, words that did not refer to something
"outside the linguistic system" would be like tools
which could neither be handled by anybody nor
applied to any objects. Take a scientist's
measurements of the sun, the prayers of Jesus, and
the discourses of the Buddha about suffering and
nirvaa.na: what sense do these activities have if
they are not about something "outside the language
system"?(9)
What is a "presupposed referent"? Streng tells
us in regard to the "'mythical' (i.e., sacramental,
magical)" structure of religious apprehension and
the "intuitive [i.e., mystical] structure of
religious apprehension" that "each assumes that
there is an objective referent for the concepts used
to express Ultimate Truth."(10) Let us apply this
remark to some religious language. A historian tells
us that John Wesley aroused resentment among some of
the colonists when he refused to give communion to a
woman with whom he had an unfortunate love affair,
and that later in London, while hearing Luther's
Commentary on Romans being read, Wesley "felt my
heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in
Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an
assurance was given me that he had taken away my
sins, even mine."(11) Now, are there any "objective
referents" here? If the term means anything there
must be several, some of which are: John Wesley, a
woman, communion, sin, Christ, and a heart
"strangely warmed." Indeed, the historian's language
would be unintelligible were the reader not to
understand what he was referring to in his
description of Wesley's life. There is certainly
nothing in Wittgenstein that would prohibit one from
trying to discover what a given statement is
referring to. Of course, it may be the case that
some of Naagaaduna's opponents thought that for a
word to have any meaning then the thing it refers to
must exist, but, as the ancients themselves pointed
out, "rabbit horns and tortoise hairs... have names
but do not have actuals."(12)
As for the law of excluded middle, Wittgenstein
did not attack it. He did say that we were sometimes
tempted to invoke it when it conceals more than it
reveals, such as when we might say: "Either it's
five o'clock on the sun or it's not," or "Either the
stove's in pain or it's not."(13) The primary issue
in these examples is what it could possibly mean to
say that it's five o'clock on the sun or the stove
is in
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pain. The exact meaning of Streng's sentence about
the excluded middle is unclear, but he does go on to
say that Wittgenstein's position "also denies that
the metaphysical problem of relating the 'one'
essence to the 'many' forms is important for
learning about the nature of reality."(14) The
philosopher Plotinus believed that he had an
experience of union with the One and he was
concerned about how to describe the relation of the
One to the many. Are we to suppose that Wittgenstein
would have said that such concerns were not
important "for learning about the nature of
reality"? To my knowledge, the later Wittgenstein
nowhere says or suggests anything of the sort.
Augustine was heavily influenced by Plotinus and
neo-Platonism is his theology, and Wittgenstein told
Malcom that he had prefaced the investigations with
a quotation from Augustine because the conception
expressed there "must be important if so great a
mind held it."(15) Wittgenstein believed that he had
developed a new perspective on philosophy, but he
did not thereby suggest that either his own earlier
work or the work of the great philosophers before
him was unimportant "for learning about the nature
of reality." I do not believe. furthermore, that he
ever addressed the issue of necessary requirements
"for an integrated world view." I suppose he might
have said that a world view should make sense, but
the variety of ways in which that is possible just
about excludes any meaningful general discussion of
"necessary requirements" (or even unnecessary
requirements).
Streng believes that Wittgenstein, like
Naagaarjuna, would not accept the views of the
function of words found in the mythical and
intuitive structures of religious apprehension. In
the mythical structure, "because certain words have
the power to bring forth the ultimately real, they
are regarded as having exclusive intrinsic value
over against other words."(16) If a Hindu believes
that chanting "Om" is a particularly revealing and
meaningful practice which is far superior to
chanting "Wesley"or "peanut butter, " what
philosophical basis would Wittgenstein have for
rejecting this idea? Wittgenstein was concerned
about the use of language, and chants have a clear
use in religious life. So the meaning of such
practices is not an issue. Of course, Wittgenstein
may not personally believe the Hindu or any other
religious view, but that is a far different matter
from his taking issue with the notion that "the
stove is in pain" is a meaningful statement. A
similar objection can be made regarding Wittgenstein
and the intuitive structure which holds that "no
expression is adequate to bear the fullness of
reality which must be finally known by a
non-symbolical means: intuition."(17) Wittgenstein
has no philosophical basis for denying such a
belief. It may not be a belief that he personally
holds, but on the other hand he was an admirer of
Augustine, George Fox, Tolstoy, and Kierkegaard, and
it is highly unlikely that any of them would take
issue with the intuitive structure as stated above.
There are indeed philosophers-logical positivists
and certain anthropologists, among others--who have
taken it upon themselves to relieve their
"inferiors" of the notion that their religious
beliefs make sense, but Wittgenstein was about as
far
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removed from such views as one can get. The
swollen-headedness and vanity of such a position was
appalling to him. Note his remarks on Sir James
Frazer's Golden Bough:
What narrowness of spiritual life in Frazer! Hence:
how impossible for him to comprehend a life
different from the English life of his time.
Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically
an English parson of our time, with all his
stupidity and vapidness.(18)
Streng holds that there is a third structure of
religious apprehension, the dialectical, which is
Naagaarjuna's: he "denies that all words gain their
meaning by referring to something outside of the
language system...; the relationship between words
in a statement... [is] only of practical value and
not indicative of ontological status."(19) But if
this is Naagaarjuna's view it is not Wittgenstein's,
as we can see from the preceding remarks. Streng is
mistaken both in attributing the "dialectical"
position to Wittgenstein and in saying that he would
deny the mythical and intuitive structures of
meaning. Naagaarjuna may be correct in his religious
beliefs; Wittgenstein would have regarded himself as
being in not much of a position to say anything
about that. But if Naagaarjuna held the
philosophical ideas which Streng attributes to him,
Wittgenstein would have contradicted him.
II
Chris Gudmunsen makes several comparisons between
Wittgenstein and Naagaarjuna; I will focus on what
he calls "the basic criticism"(20) According to
Gudmunsen, while the Abhidharmists wanted to "get
the dharmas in view, " the Praj~naapaaramitaa
literature asserted that there was "no way of
'correctly' identifying and naming necessarily
private dharmas."(21) The Mahaayaanists held that
each dharma "is nothing in and by itself..., and so
is ultimately nonexistent."(22) Previously Gudmunsen
had quoted Wittgenstein's remark that "if we
construe the grammar of the expression of sensation
on the model of 'object and designation', the object
drops out of consideration as irrelevant."(23) He
then says that the dharma "has 'dropped out' and, as
with Wittgenstein, we are left with a name referring
apparently to nothing."(24) Naagaarjuna expressed
this idea by saying all dharmas are "empty." They
are, in Wittgenstein's terms, "illustrated turns of
speech."(25) But this does not mean that the word
"hope" stands for nothing either in Wittgenstein or
the Maadhyamika, for as Wittgenstein says:
And yet you again reach the conclusion that the
sensation itself is a nothing--Not at all. It is not
a something, but not a nothing either! The
conclusion was only that a nothing would serve as
well as a something about which nothing could be
said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries
to force itself on us here.(26)
But it is a mistake to compare Wittgenstein's
criticism of "private" sensations and objects to
Naagaarjuna's and the Mahaayaana criticism of dharma
theory. What are the dharmas? There are three
classifications shared by all the Buddhist schools:
the five skandhas, the twelve sense-fields, and the
eighteen elements.(27)
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The skandhas, as an example, are form, feelings,
perceptions, impulses, and consciousness. While
there is a strong analytic element in dharma
analysis, Conze warns us that
the rational approach is only provisional and
preparatory, and must be followed by a spiritual
intuition, the direct and unconceptual character of
which is stressed by words as "to see," "to taste,"
"to touch with the body"!... Ready-made conceptions
are of no avail here, and what lies beyond the
perceptible world of appearances also transcends the
realm of logical thought.(28)
The final home of dharma analysis is meditation and
the purpose is soteriological: the removal of
ignorance which "clouds the mirror of original
wisdom."(29)
Now Wittgenstein in the Investigations had no
such concern. He was interested in our tendency to
think, for example, that "only I can know whether I
am really in pain; another person can only surmise
it,"(30) so that one might have a "private" language
the words of which "are to refer to what can only be
known to the person speaking."(31) Now our idea of a
"word" is of something that can be used rightly or
wrongly, but what would it be to remember a
"private" word right? "In the present case I have no
criterion of correctness. One would like to say:
whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And
that only means that here we can't talk about
'right'."(32) A "private" word is no word at all.
Having a "private" object is like everyone's having
a "beetle" in a box which only he can inspect.
Everyone could have something different in his box
or the thing might constantly be changing. "The
thing in the box has no place in the language-game
at all; not even, as a something: for the box
might even he empty."(33)
Wittgenstein, then, was concerned with the
concepts of language and meaning and the
philosophical problems connected with references to
our psychic life. He particularly wanted to expunge
the "privacy" view which can be so tempting when we
begin to think philosophically about these things.
But he had no intention of questioning everyday
expressions and discussions about our feelings,
thoughts, hopes, and so forth. The meditative
context of the discussion about dharmas is
especially something he was not concerned with. It
is a characteristic of language that it can be
learned. Now some things are harder to learn than
others, and the meditative significance of terms is
an instance of this. But being difficult to learn
does not make something "private"; it only means
that one will usually need the guidance of a
teacher. But Wittgenstein's "private" terms could
not be learned at all. There is no sense at all to a
discussion of the "private" objects that such words
would refer to.
None of these objections to "private" objects
has any bearing on dharmas. Gudmunsen does cite an
ancient objection by Haribhadra that one "cannot
distinguish the various objects to which the
different words refer."(34) But the Abhidharmists
had listed from between seventy-five to one-hundred
dharmas, depending on the school,(35) and it is not
surprising, therefore, that a student might indeed
have difficulty distinguishing all of these dharmas.
This difficulty, however, does not apply to the
skandhas or the sense-fields such as eye, ear, nose,
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and so forth; these could be distinguished well
enough; none of them is a "private" object which
"only I could know." What was the main objection to
dharma analysis? According to Sangharakshita, the
Abhidharma may be viewed as ''reducing the
Scriptures to a gigantic card-index file system, and
substituting for penetrating Insight a retentive
memory,"(36) with the contemporary result that there
is "almost a total neglect of the practice of
Meditation which is so striking a feature of modern
Theravada Buddhism."(37) He adds that "theoretical
knowledge... has been in some instances mistaken for
Wisdom."(38) Conze tells us that the Mahaayaana in
reaction to the Abhidharma regards
the separateness of these dharmas as merely a
provisional construction, urges us on to see
everywhere just one emptiness and condemns all forms
of multiplicity as arch enemies of the higher
spiritual vision and insight.... Once we jump out of
our intellectual habits, emptiness is revealed as
the concrete fullness...; no longer a dead
nothingness beyond, but the lifegiving womb of the
Tathaagata within us.(39)
Gudmunsen thinks that "the private object, for
both Wittgenstein and the Mahaayaana, drops out of
consideration as irrelevant, leaving a name which
doesn't refer to anything."(40) But the principal
Mahaayaana contention was that dharmas were "empty"
or of merely a provisional character, not that the
terms of dharma analysis do not refer to anything.
On this point Gudmunsen's comparison of Wittgenstein
and Naagaarjuna is mistaken.
III
Ives Waldo has compared Naagaarjuna and Wittgenstein
in two articles.(41) In the first he says that
Naagaarjuna's criticism of the idea of svabhaava
(own-being) in the Muulamaadhyamikakaarikaas ("MK")
"directly parallels Wittgenstein's argument that a
private language (an empiricist language) is
impossible. Having no logical links (criteria) to
anything outside their defining situation, its words
must be empty of significance or use."(42) Waldo
goes on to explain:
The necessary existence of such relational
conditions (pratyaya) refutes both the theory of
svabhaava and the possibility that significant
events might arise with no relational conditions at
all. Significance lies not in the substantial,
experientially given, and certain; but in that which
is relational, metaperceptual, and hypothetical. A
man born blind who later gains his sight finds no
significance in his visual field.(43)
But this gives rise to a dilemma. If "significance
and existence must be understood in terms of
pratyaya, which entails the arising of being and
significance from another (parabhaava)," then "how
can there be other-being without there being
eventually some other which has own-being?"(44) If,
like the Praasa^nghikas, "we take this dilemma at
face value, we will be forced to conclude that
language is radically arbitrary and incoherent."(45)
The Svaatantrikas, on the other hand, wanted to
stress the validity of the lower truth. Yet
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Bhaavaviveka describes the lower truth as involving
the incoherent svabhaava concept and the higher as
indescribable. On this basis he cannot coherently
differentiate the sense in which he means these
terms from the usage of the Praasanghikas....
The answer to the dilemma is that what
constitutes an element of a relational system is
itself a part of that system, not something existing
prior to it. The system provides criteria whereby
its elements are to be identified.(46)
Waldo footnotes the next to the last remark with a
reference to Wittgenstein's Investigations.
In his second article Waldo says that he had not
previously gotten to the heart of the matter in his
discussion of co-conditionality.
Pratiityasamutpaada involves self-reference. But
what relationship is it exactly, and what are its
implications? Insofar as ordinary language can tell
us, the job has already been done by the followers
of Hwa Yen and Tantric schools. The logical
obscurity of the results, the Hall of Mirrors simile
and the like, are legendary. Ordinary language is
out of its depths here.... This leaves us no choice
but to employ formalism.(47)
Waldo's choice of formalism is G. Spencer Brown's.
After an explanation of Brown's symbolism he goes on
to say that Naagaarjuna can be understood as saying
that
the status of an individuality or of predication is
relative, first, to our linguistic system and
second, to our practical objectives in a given case
of using that system.....An artist may find it more
convenient to speak at length of what looks
"apple-y" than about apples. Philosophers often turn
common predicates into substantives, like
"redness."(48)
Waldo compares his results with Wittgenstein:
For Wittgenstein, a word or a perception of
something has significance when logically connected
into the criterial network of the language game. The
private language argument explores the possibility
that there might be elements identified
independently of and prior to this network, like
Naagaarjuna's svbhaavas. But this possibility is
rejected. The rejection of atomic elements in the
language system means that the elements must support
each other mutually. This is exactly the sort of
conceptual connection that Naagaarjuna calls
interdependent arising. The various elements of our
criterial network support each other relatively, but
every justification of knowledge consists only of
another element within our own epistemic system.
There is no external or independent justification
because the speaker and the external environment are
both constructs within the system.(49)
I don't know if Naagaarjuna survives this
comparison intact, but Wittgenstein does not. This
is a serious distortion of his views. The later
Wittgenstein has no interest in a "linguistic
system" or the notion that it might be necessary to
"employ formalism" in order to reveal the system
that is already there. Perhaps these remarks could
be made about the Tractatus. Wittgenstein once
thought that "if all objects are given, then at the
same time all possible states of affairs are also
given," and that "if elementary propositions are
given, then at the same time
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all elementary propositions are given."(50)
"Language disguises thought."(51) but the
philosopher can by analysis reveal the logic of
language. The meaning involved would be clear and
indisputable since "a proposition has only one
complete analysis."(52) Although the Vienna Circle
understood the Tractatus to be a development of
British empiricism,(53) it nowhere says either that
the "objects" can be experienced or that
"verification" is required. A proposition is
"understood by anyone who understands its
constituents,"(54) that is, he must know what the
names stand for; nothing is said about "experience"
of objects.
In the Investigations, moreover, Wittgenstein
says nothing about the "elements" of a language game
being in a "criterial network." On the contrary, he
is concerned to criticize the search for "elements"
as a kind of sickness:
"A name signifies only what is an element of reality
..."--But what is that?-Why, it swam before our
minds as we said the sentence! This was the very
expression of a quite particular image: of a picture
which we want to use. For certainly experience does
not show us these elements....
When I say: "My broom is in the corner,"--is
this really a statement about the broomstick and the
brush...? If we were to ask anyone if he meant this
he would probably say that he had not thought
specially of the broomstick or specially of the
brush at all. And that would be the right
answer.(55)
Wittgenstein situates language in our lives, so a
philosopher might say that Wittgenstein had two
"elements" in his language games: language and life.
But what would be the use of such a remark unless it
were to make a joke? (Compare: "I have only one
thing to do: live"!)
In the "private language" discussion,
Wittgenstein is not concerned with "elements"--which
he has already considered--but with the
philosophical notion that our language has meaning
because we bear in mind or mean words in a certain
way.(56) For then I could use words in a way that
only I could understand, since the meaning is given
by what I bear in mind and I can bear in mind
whatever I please. Thus, I might take a seat in a
restaurant and say "I would like a hamburger" all
the while bearing in mind "Don't bring me anything."
But by this sort of "meaning" I could say anything
or nothing since there would be no incorrect or
correct use, and this is absurd.
Wittgenstein does not say that "the speaker and
the external environment are both constructs within
the system." What would it mean. within the point of
view of the Investigations, that the speaker is a
"construct"? Perhaps a Tractarian meaning could be
given to such a statement since there Wittgenstein
was interested in simple elements, the "objects,"
which "make up the substance of the world,"(57) Is a
broom a "construct" of a handle and a brush, a man a
"construct" of flesh and bones? There is no absolute
answer to such questions.(58)
Wittgenstein does not say that "a perception of
something has significance when logically connected
with the criterial network of the language game." A
cat sees a mouse. This is significant, I suppose,
for the cat and the mouse, but this perception has
its significance whether or not the cat and the
mouse--or anyone at all. for that matter--are
playing a language game. He does not say that a cat
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and a mouse are "metaperceptual" and "hypothetical."
Moreover, the man born blind who gains his sight is
irrelevant to Wittgenstein's concerns. A cat or a
man would, I imagine, have to learn how to see. But
this has no immediate bearing on our problem. If a
cat learns to see a mouse, this is significant
whether or not any language games are played. A man
in a highly primitive situation might learn to see a
banana, and this would be significant whether or not
he or anyone whom he knew could speak a word.
Waldo has, I believe, Tractarian desires for a
sublime logic for which ordinary language is
inadequate and for which language therefore requires
us to "employ formalism," all of which is quite
foreign to Wittgenstein's thought in the
Investigations.
In philosophy we often compare the use of words with
games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot
say that someone who is using language must be
playing such a game....
All this, however, can only appear in the right
light when one has attained greater clarity about
the concepts of understanding, meaning, and
thinking. For it will then also become clear what
can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if
anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it
he is operating a calculus according to definite
rules.(59)
And:
Every sentence in our language "is in order as it
is." That is to say, we are not striving after an
ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not
yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect
language awaited construction by us....
Here it is difficult as it were to keep our
heads up--to see that we must stick to the subjects
of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and
imagine that we have to describe extreme
subleties.... We feel as if we had to repair a torn
spider's web with our fingers.(60)
Furthermore, if one is going to formalize a
philosophical discussion, there has to be agreement
both on the symbolism and on what is to be
formalized. But the satisfaction of the latter
condition makes otiose the project of formalization.
Waldo's comparison of Wittgenstein and Naagaarjuna
is unsuccessful both in detail and in overall
approach.
IV
I wish to conclude with some remarks about what I
call "Naagaarjuna's paradox," namely, the fact that
the results of his efforts--more Buddhist
scholasticism--were contrary to his purpose, which I
take to be reducing, if not eliminating, the arid
scholasticism of dharmapravicaya.(61) In order to
understand the paradox, we need first of all to have
a clear idea of Naagaarjuna's overall teaching in
the Kaarikaas. For our purposes, I think this
teaching may be represented by the following theses.
1. It is dependent co-arising that we term
emptiness; this is a designation overlaid [on
emptiness]; it alone is the Middle Path. (MK 24:
18)(62)
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2. "Not caused by something else," "peaceful," "not
elaborated by discursive thought, "
"Indeterminate, " "undifferentiated": such are
the characteristics of true reality (tattva).
(MK 18:9)
3. The self-existence of the "fully completed"
[being] is the self-existence of the world. The
"fully completed" [being] is without
self-existence and the world is without
self-existence. (MK 22: 16)
4. To him, possessing compassion, who taught the
real dharma For the destruction of all views--to
him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence. (MK
27:30)
5. When the sphere of thought has ceased, the
nameable ceases; Dharma-nature is like nirvana,
unarising and unceasing. (MK 18:7)
Before commenting briefly on how I understand
these theses, it is necessary to note that a
substantial shift in content has taken place in the
transition from the consideration of "private
language" arguments to reflections on the teachings
of a great Buddhist aacaarya, for that is how
tradition has conceived Naagaarjuna.(63) To have a
firm grasp of the realities indicated by terms such
as "sensation," "mental states," "language," and
"game" is one thing; to thoroughly understand the
realities signified by "nirvaa.na," "bodhi," and
"tathaagata" is quite another matter. A blind man
can, indeed, comment on the judgments of a sighted
person; but he is foolish if he does not even
attempt to note his necessary limitations. "The crab
digs its hole to the size of its shell."(64) It is
well to have a healthy respect for the "emptiness"
of our own judgments in this kind of a case if
nowhere else.
I understand, then, Naagaarjuna to be saying
that there is the basic fact of relativity or
dependent co-arising which we, at least initially,
experience as "a single mass of sorrows" (MK 26: 9).
But reality is in fact peaceful and
undifferentiated, even "blissful."(65) Peaceful
reality and the mass of sorrows are not different.
Absurdities follow whenever the attempt is made to
describe reality with any sort of dualistic
concept--whether philosophical or ordinary--and
therefore such attempts are rejected in principle as
being both logically contradictory and ultimately
useless for the great work of liberation, Liberation
can occur when "the sphere of thought has ceased" in
meditation(66) and the Dharma-nature is understood
as reality--the reality of oneself and everything
else. By this account, concepts themselves--both
ordinary ones and their philosophical
elaborations--"cover" reality(67) and are powerless
to liberate. As for the paradoxical nature of this
teaching which destroys all views, one needs to note
that there are "two truths" (MK 24:8), the higher
and the lower, and one needs to keep in mind which
level is under discussion.
Now, as Waldo has correctly suggested,(68) there
is something Tractarian about all this. According to
the Tractatus one cannot say what the logical form
of all sentences is (since that would require
another sentence and a sentence cannot picture
itself),(69) nor can there be propositions about
ethics, aesthetics, or religion: "Propositions can
express nothing that is higher."(70) It must be
noted that
P.167
"there are, indeed, things that cannot be put into
words. They make themselves manifest. They are what
is mystical."(71) We must go beyond the propositions
of the Tractatus. "What we cannot speak about we
must pass over in silence."(72) Likewise,
Naagaarjuna would have us grasp things which cannot
be attained by conceptualization.
I think we are now in a position to understand
better "Naagaajuna's Paradox." To begin with, the
"two truths" theory is incoherent. For, first, it
can be subjected to a Naagaarjunan critique: Are the
truths the same or different? If they are the same,
they collapse into one another and necessary
distinctions are not made. If they are different, a
dualism is injected which is contrary to tattva as
described. Second, as we all at least must begin
with the lower truth, how are we to understand the
"higher," since the "lower" concepts carry their
"higher" brethren (including the concepts of
"higher" and "lower") on their backs, so to say.
Thomas Aquinas' idea of analogical predication(73)
suggests itself as ready-made for someone looking
for a "middle way" between sameness and difference.
How useful such a theory might be for Naagaarjuna's
purposes is a topic which cannot be dealt with here.
But before one jumps to a conclusion about Christian
superiority in this matter, it is necessary to
remember that Christian exclusivism, combined with
great confidence in the adequacy of theological
propositions to reality, has historically
contributed to substantial Christian violence
against other Christians and non-Christians.
Religiously motivated homicide is much more
difficult to defend on the basis of Buddhist
universalism and appreciation of the "emptiness" of
doctrines.
Lastly, one might observe that, contrary to
Naagaarjuna and the Tractatus, "the higher" is
probably the very last thing about which people
could be expected to remain silent. This is because
of the need to express conceptually one's religious
understanding in a way which meaningfully relates
that understanding to life. As the history of
Buddhism itself suggests, (74) even if the
cultivation of discursive consciousness is not the
way to achieve direct religious insight, the
expression of that insight requires not only silence
but also reasoning, speech, and other significant
gestures and actions.
NOTES
1. "Naagaajuna`s knowledge of logic is about on
the same level as Plato's" (Richard H. Robinson,
"Some Logical Aspects of Naagaarjuna's System,"
Philosophy East and Weat 6, no. 4 (January 1957):
295).
2. "Further compression is impossible" (Norman
Malcolm, Knowledge and Belief (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 96).
3. Edward Conze, Buddhist Studies 1934-1972 (San
Francisco, California: Wheelwright, 1975); hereafter
cited as Conze, Buddhist Srudies. Originally
published in Philosophy East and West 13, no. 1
(January 1963): 105-115.
P.168
4. Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism
(London: Macmillan, 1977), p. viii; hereafter cited
as Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism.
5. Ibid.
6. Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in
Religious Meaning (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon,
1967); hereafter cited as Streng. Emptiness. Streng
uses "Ultimate Truth" instead of "Ultimate Reality"
when discussing Naagaarjuna (ibid., p. 20, note 4).
7. Ibid., pp. 139f. A similar position is
defended by Glyn Richards, "Sunyata: Objective
Referent or Via Negativa? " Religious Studies
14(1978): 251-260. "Language cannot describe the
world" is the succinct way David Loy describes
Streng's position in "How Not to Criticize
Naagaarjuna: A Response to L. Stafford Betty, "
Philosophy East and West 34, no. 4 (October 1984).
I suspect, however, that such unadorned phrasing
might give Streng pause.
8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2d ed.
(New York: Macmillan, 1958), #23, hereafter cited as
Wittgenstein, Investigations.
9. I exclude the possibility that Streng is
saying that if one can talk about something then one
cannot say that one cannot talk about it, and
therefore nothing we can talk about can be "outside
the language system." This is vacuous.
10. Streng. Emptiness, p. 138.
11. Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of
Christianity (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 1025.
12. "Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise," in
Richard H. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika in India and
China (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1967), p. 50; hereafter cited as Robinson,
Early maadhyamika.
13. Wittgenstein, Investigations, #351 and 352.
14. Streng, Emptiness, p. 140.
15. Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A
Memoir (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.
71.
16. Streng, Emptiness, p. 141.
17. Ibid., p. 138.
18. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Remarks on Frazer's
Golden Bough, " trans. Robert Monk, Synthese 17
(1967): p. 238.
19. Streng. Emptiness, p. 141.
20. Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p. 33.
21. Ibid., p. 34.
22. Conze, Buddhist Studies, vol. 1,p. 77,
quoted by Gudmunsen, in Wittgenstein and Buddhism,
p. 34.
23. Wittgenstein, Investigation, #293.
24. Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p. 34.
25. Wittgenstein, Investigation, #295 quoted in
Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p. 35.
26. Wittgenstein, Investigations, # 304 quoted
in Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p. 35.
27. Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, 1967), p.
107; hereafter cited as Conze. Buddist Thought in
India.
28. Ibid., p. 29.
29. Ibid., p. 106.
30. Wittgenstein. Investigations, #246.
31. Ibid., # 243.
32. Ibid., # 258; see # 270.
33. Ibid., P 293; see p. 207.
34. Gudmunsen. Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p. 34.
35. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 178.
36. Bhikshu Sangharakshita, A Survey of Buddhism
(Boulder, Colorado: Shambhala, 1980) , p. 212;
hereafter cited as Sangharakshita, Survey of
Buddhism.
37. Ibid., p. 213.
38. Ibid., p. 214.
39. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 202.
40. Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p. 36.
41. Ives Waldo, "Naagaarjuna and Analytic
Philosophy, "Philosophy East and West 25, no. 3
(July
P.169
1975): 281-290 (hereafter cited as Waldo, "NAP");
and "Naagaarjuna and Analytic Philosophy, II,
"Philosophy East and West 28, no. 3 (July 1978):
287-298 (hereafter cited as Waldo, "NAP II").
42. Waldo, "NAP," p. 283.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 284.
46. Ibid., p. 286.
47. Waldo, "NAP II," p. 289.
48. Ibid., pp. 292-293.
49. Ibid., p. 296.
50. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961),
2.0124 and 5.524; hereafter cited as Wittgenstein,
Tractatus.
51. Ibid., 4.002.
52. Ibid., 3.25.
53. John Passmore, "Logical Positivism," in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, vol.
5, p. 52.
54. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.024.
55. Wittgenstein, Investigations, #59 and 60.
56. See ibid., # 33, 56, 81.
57. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 2.021.
58. Wittgenstein, Investigations, #49.
59. Ibid., #81.
60. Ibid., #98 and #106.
61. Conze, Buddhist Studies, vol. 1, p. 144.
62. Trans. Robinson, in Early Maadhyamika, p.
40. The next three theses will be from Streng's
translation in Emptiness and the fifth will be from
Robinson, p. 59. The remaining translations are
Streng's.
63. Sangharakshita, "The Second Founder of
Buddhism," in a Survey of Buddhism, p. 301.
64. Hakuju Ui, quoted by Yoshinori Takeuchi, in
The Heart of Buddhism, trans. James W. Heisig (New
York: Crossroad, 1983), p. 68.
65. From the Vandana, reckoned as the first two
verses of MK by Robinson; see Robinson, Early
Maadhyamika, p. 40.
66. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika, p. 60. Since
Naagaarjuna is counted as a Pure Land Patriarch, the
Nembutsu may serve as well.
67. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p.
244. Also David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy
(Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press,
1976), p. 135.
68. Waldo, "NAP." p. 284, and "NAP II," p. 288.
Waldo attributes this only to the Praasa^nghika
interpretation.
69. See Wittgenstein, Tractatus 2.172 and 2.173.
70. Ibid., 6.42.
71. Ibid., 6.522.
72. Ibid., 7.
73. See L. Stafford Betty, "Naagaarjuna's
Masterpiece-Logical, Mystical, Both, or Neither?"
Philosophy East and West 33, no. I (January 1983):
134. Also, the reborn individual is "neither the
same nor another" (K. N. jayatilleke, The Message of
the Buddha (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. 138). In
"Is Naagaarjuna a Philosopher? Response to Professor
Loy." Philosophy East and West 34, no. 4 (October
1984) . Betty says that Naagaarjuna is not a
philosopher since in the Kaarikaas he does not
explain "how illusion can lead to reality." But this
is like saying that in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein
was not a philosopher since he failed to explain how
one can speak about the unsayable. The Kaarikaas and
the Tractatus may have significant shortcomings, but
then so did Plate.
74. Peter Gregory, "Chinese Buddhist
Hermeneutics: The Case of Hua-yen," Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 51 (1983): 231-250.