Then only will you see it, when you cannot speak of it: for the knowledge of it is deep silence, and suppression of all the senses.Hermes Trismegistus, Lib. X.5. To convey an adequate idea of early Buddhist doctrine presents almost insuperable difficulties. The Buddha already describes the Eternal Law (dhamma sanantana, akalika) which he had by no means excogitated by a process of ratiocination, but with which he identifies himself, and which had been taught by his predecessors in ages past as it would be taught by his successors in ages to come as a matter profound and difficult of comprehension by otherwise trained and other minded hearers; it is a doctrine for those whose wants are few, not for those whose wants are many. In his own lifetime the Buddha repeatedly found it necessary to correct the misinterpretations of his teaching to explain, for example, in what precise sense his was and was not a doctrine of "excision": was, in the sense of "cutting out" self love in reference to the corporeal and evil or that which is eternally sorrow in nature; and was not, in the sense of the annihilation of any reality. His was, indeed, a doctrine of Self naughting (neti-neti; not this not that) common to most all Indian philosophy,  whoever would be free must have literally denied himself; for what remains, the terms of logic either or are inadequate; but it would be altogether inappropriate to say of the despirated Arahant, liberated by his super gnosis (nan’a), that "he neither knows nor sees" (D., III. 68).
     If misunderstanding was possible in the Buddha's own time when, as he says, the Ancient Way that he reopens had been long neglected and a false doctrine had arisen, how much more is misinterpretation inevitable in our day of progress, self expression and the endless pursuits of higher materialistic standards of living? It has been almost completely forgotten, except by professional theologians, that an ultimate reality can be correctly described only by a series of negations of all that it is not. In any case, as Miss Horner remarked as recently as 1938, "the study of early Buddhism is admittedly still in its infancy" (Bk. of the Discipline, I, VI). If the reader thinks of Buddhism, quite rightly, as a way of "escape," he has still to ask himself from what, of what, and to what "there is in the world a way of escape" (S., 1. 128).
     The difficulties have been intensified by the misinterpretations of Buddhism that are still to be found even in the works of narrow-minded western scholarship which is wholly devoid of the ancient Indian mind and metaphor. For example, one of the most notable scholars fails completely to distinguish the "becoming" of which the cessation coincides with the realization of immortality from the "making become" of our immortal part. Actually, "becoming" corresponds to what is now called "progress," regardless of the fact that change may be for better or for worse: and we are reminded that now, as then, "there are Gods and man who delight in becoming, and when they hear of putting a stop to becoming their minds do not respond" (Vism., 594). Another greatly regarded ‘scholar’ (among many) asserts that early Buddhism "denied a God, denied a Soul, denied Eternity," and it is almost universally claimed that the Buddha taught that there is no Self, thus ignoring that what is actually denied is the reality of the mutable corporeal/psycho-physical "individuality," and that what is said of the Self and of the Truth finder (or Thus come, the Tathatta’) and Perfect Man after death, is that none of the terms "becomes" or "does not become," "becomes and does not become," or "neither becomes nor does not become," apply to it or to Him who is without profane means of description by common explanation (S., IV. 384 f., 401 40=; Ud., 67, etc.). Again, it is still often asserted that Buddhism is a `'pessimistic" doctrine, notwithstanding that its goal of freedom from all the mental suffering that man is heir to is one attainable here and now: in any case, over looking that a doctrine can be judged only in terms of its truth or falsity, and not by whether we like it or not!
     The Buddha is primarily concerned with the problem of evil (rupa) as suffering or pain (dukkha); the problem, that is to say, of the corruptibility of all things born and with discernable manifestation, composite and mutable, their liability to suffering, disease, inveteration, and death. That this liability a fact (The whole human race is so miserable and above all so blind that it is not conscious of its own miseries; Comenius, Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of the Heart, C. XXVIII). It was precisely because of this blindness that the Buddha hesitated to preach the Dhamma to the few men whose eyes are filled with very little dust.) that it has a cause, that its cause can be suppressed, and that there is a Way or Walk or Faring by which this cause can be suppressed these are the "Four Ariyan Truths" that are the beginning of wisdom. "Both now and heretofore I teach just this, ill and the end of the source of ill' (M., I. 140). Accordingly, Buddhism can be and often is reduced to the simple formulae of "contingent manifestation" (paticcasamuppdda): "this being so, that becomes; this not being so, that does not become." From the beginningless operation of mediate causes there is no escaping any of their composite effects; escape is possible only from the field in which the causal efficacy of past actions (kamma) operates, and only for that which was never an integral part of the field.
Buddhist doctrine is reducible to a statement of the law of causality because of the pertinence of this law to the problem of mutability and corruptibility; if the cause of misery can be suppressed there will be no further need to bother with its symptoms. In the cycle or vortex of becoming (bhava cakka, samsara) the instability, inveteration and death of whatever has had a beginning is inevitable; life or becoming is a function of sensibility, sensibility of wanting (tanha, thirst), and wanting a function of ignorance (avijja=moha, agnosis, delusion). Ignorance or agnosis, the ultimate origin of all suffering and bondage, all pathological states of subjection to pleasure and pain, is of the true nature of things "as become, or as they are" (yatha bhu’tam), and in particular of their inconstancy (aniccam). Every thing becomes, every thing flows like a river; there is no thing of which it can be said that it is (sabbe samkhara anicca). All that becomes is mortal; to have put a stop to becoming, no longer to be moved, is to be immortal. This intimately concerns ourselves; the most dangerous aspect of ignorance the "original sin " is that which leads us to believe that we "ourselves" are this or that and that we can survive from moment to moment, day to day or life to life as an identity.
     Buddhism, then, knows of no "reincarnation" in the popular and animistic sense of the word: though many are "still under the delusion that Buddhism teaches the transmigration of souls in the animistic sense" (SBE, XXXVI, 142; Dialogues, II, 43). Just as for Plato, St. Augustine, and Meister Eckhart, so here, all change is a sequence of death and rebirth in continuity without identity, and there is no constant entity (satto) that can be thought of as passing over from one embodiment to another (Mil., 72) as a man might leave one house or village and enter another (Pv., IV. 3); rather the citta (consciousness) reanimates a new “individuality” starting with vinnana (sentience). Indeed, like that of "self," the very notion of an "entity as applied to anything existent is merely conventional (S., I. 135), and there is nothing of the sort to be found in the world (Mil., 268). That which perishes and again arises "not without otherness" is an individuality (nama rupu) (Mil., 98) or discriminating consciousness (vinnana) that inherits the former's "works" (M., I. 390; A., lII. 73). If the Buddha says that there are, assuredly, personal agents (attakara, Self-moving; A., Ill. 337 338), this does not, as Mrs. Rhys Davids supposed, "wipe out the doctrine of anatta altogether" (GS., III. xin). The Buddhist point of view is exactly the same as the Brahmanical: "I am not the doer of anything, it is the senses that move amongst their objects,' such is the view of the bridled man, a knower of the Suchness" (BG., V. 8 9, xviii. 1617). The individual is, indeed, responsible for and will inherit the consequences of his actions for so long as he thinks of "himself" as the agent; and no one is more reprehensible than the man who says "I am not the doer" while he is still actually involved in activity (Ud., 45; Dh., 306; So., 661), and argues that it does not matter what he does, be it good or evil (D., I. 53). But to think that I am or another is the doer, or that I or another will reap as I have sown is to miss the point (Ud., 70): there is no "I" that acts or inherits (S., ii. 252) ; or to speak more strictly, the question of the real existence of a personal agent is one that cannot be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No," but only according to the Middle Way, in terms of causal origination (S., 11. 19 20). But all these composite "entities" that originate causally are the very things that are repeatedly analyzed and found to be "not my Self" ; in this ultimate sense (paramatthikena) a man is not the agent. It is only when this has been realized and verified that a man can dare deny that his actions are his own; until then there are things he ought and things he ought not to do (Vin., I. 233; A., 1. 62; D., 1. 115). The identity philosophy of Buddhism is paralleled in that of Plotinus, which is seemingly so hard for the many to grasp.
     There is nothing in the doctrine of causality (hetuvada) or in that of the causal effect of actions (kamma) that in any way necessarily implies a "reincarnation" of souls. The doctrine of causality is common to Buddhism and Christianity, and in both is effectively the statement of a belief in the orderly sequence of events. The "reincarnation" that the Buddhist would dispense with permanently is not a matter of any one eventful death and rebirth to be expected hereafter, but the whole vertiginous process of repeatedly dying and being born again that is equally the definition or temporal existence here as a "man" and of aeviternal existence there as a "God" (one amongst others). The accomplished Arahant knows better than to ask, "What was I in the past? What am I now? What shall I be hereafter?" (S., 11. 26 27). He can say "I" for everyday practical purposes without in any way intending what the notion of I or myself implies to an animist (D., I. 202; S., I. 14 15). Time implies motion, and motion change of place; in other words duration involves mutation, or becoming. Hence it is not immortality in time or any where, but apart from time and place, that the Buddhist envisages. Stated, in the pragmatic terms of everyday discourse, of which the application is only to things that have a beginning, development and, end (D., II. 63), it can be said of the Ego, "Once it was and then was not, once was not and then it was," but in terms of truth, "It was not, will not be, nor can it now be found; it neither is nor shall be `mine"'(Ud., 66; Th., I. 180). The Buddhist vortex or wheel of becoming is nothing but St James'; the Ego is an unreality for the Buddhist, just. as it had been for Plato and Plutarch, by the very fact of its mutability. The squirrel cage revolves, but "that's not me," and there is a way of escape from the round. The evil for which the Buddha sought a remedy is that of the wretchedness involved in the corruptibility of all things born, composite and inconstant. Misery, mutability, un Self ishness (In all traditional philosophies, in which it is axiomatic that "there are two in us;" it is unavoidable to distinguish "Self" from "self" or Ego, le moi from le soi, the savant from the connoisseur. In the present context Selflessness coincides with self ishness; to have said "unselfishness" would have been to say the opposite of what is meant, it is only of the Self that an ontological un selfishness, and therefore an ethical un selfishness can be predicated.
     For the present we are discussing only the Ego, or self; the problem of the Self in Buddhism will be dealt with later (dukkha, anicca, anatta) are the characteristics of all composite things, all that is not my Self; and of all these things the Ego, I, self (aham, atta’) is the pertinent species, since it is with man's last end that we are concerned. It is axiomatic that all existences ("Existence," as distinguished from "being," esse from essentia.; S., II. 101, etc.) are maintained by food, solid and mental, as fire is fed by fuel ; and in this sense the world is on fire and we are on fire. The fires of the Ego consciousness, or self ishness, are those of appetite (raga=kama, tanha, lobha), resentment or irascibility (doss=kadha), and delusion or ignorance (moha =avijja). These fires can only be quenched by their opposites (A., IV. 445; Dh., 5. 223), by the practice of corresponding virtues and the acquisition of knowledge/gnosis (vijja), or, in other words, only cease to "draw," and so go out, or rather in, when their fuel is withheld. It is this "going out" that is called a "despiration/purification" (nibbana, Skr. nirvana), and is naturally linked with the notion of a "cooling off" (compare the vernacular, Why so hot, my little man?). Nirvana to use the word in its more familiar form is a Buddhist key word, than which is, perhaps, no other has been so much misunderstood (Extinction" (as of a fire) is not illegitimate; but "annihilation" is misleading. In India, the "going out" of a fire is always thought of as a "going home."). Nirvana is a death of becoming (bhava nirodha nibbanam; “Nirvana is the subjugation of becoming [always other and other]”), a being finished (both is the meaning of "ended" and of "perfected"). Nirvana is neither a place nor an effect, nor in time, nor attainable by any means; it is a process alone, but it is and it can be "seen." The "means" that are actually resorted to are not in themselves means to Nirvana (purification), but means to the removal of all that obscures the "vision" of Nirvana: as when a lamp is brought into a dark room one sees what is already there. Nirvana is spoken of as the path, not its ends but rather its means; in the absolute sense Nirvana is crossing to the other shore of refuge (saranamattano; refuge in the Self), but is not confused with the other shore except in much later erroneous Chinese doctrine which hold Nirvana to be literally the other shore of salvation.
     We can now understand why the Self (atta’) must be tamed, conquered, curbed, and given its quietus. The Arahant or Perfect Man is one whose Self has been tamed (atta’ danto), whose Self has been cast off (atta’jaho); his burden has been laid down (ohita bltkro), what there was to be done has been done (katamkaraaiyam). All of the epithets that are applied to the Buddha himself, who has no longer a personal name (Even "Gotama" is not a personal, but only a family name; Ananda, too is a Gotamid) are applicable to him; he is "released" (vimutto), he is "despirated/purified" (nibbuto), there is no more becoming for him, he has earned his rest from labor in yoking to security (yoga kkhemam), he is awake (buddho, an epithet applicable to any Arahant, not only to the Buddha; synonymous With Suddha, or Pure), he is immovable (anejo), he is an "Ariyan," no longer a disciple (sekho) but a Master (asekho), and fixed in the Self/Soul as ultimate (Theragatha Att. 1.51 parinibbuto t.hitattoti “Parinirvana is to be fixed in the Soul”), Atta’sarana anan’n’asarana."Soul as a refuge with none other as refuge” DN 2.100.
     Selfishness (mamattam, "possessiveness"; maccheram, "bad behavior," "law of the sharks") is a moral evil, and therefore the taming of the self requires a unific-moral discipline. But selfishness is supported by "Self ishness" (asmi mana, anattani atta ditthi), and mere commandments will hardly suffice unless and until the erroneous view that "this is me (corporeal)" has been shattered. For the self is always self assertive, and it is only when the true nature of the inconstant self has been realized that a man will set out in earnest to overcome his own worst enemy and make him a servant and ally. The first step is to acknowledge the predicament, the second to unmask the self whose sole liability it is, the third to act accordingly; but this is not easy, and a man is not very willing to mortify himself until he has known these appetitive congeries for what they are, and until he has learnt to distinguish his Self and its true interest from the mirror-image deemed falsely as Self, his self and its interests. The primary source of evil is ignorance/agnosis, and it is, in fact, by the truth that the self must be tamed (S., I. 169). Only "The truth shall make you free!" The remedy for self love (atta ka’ma) is Self love (attakama) and it is precisely in this sense, in the words of St Thomas Aquinas, that "a man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than any other person, more than his neighbor” (Sum. Theol., II. ii. 26.4). In Buddhist terms "let no man worsen welfare of himself for other's weal however great; if welt he knows the Self's true interest, let him pursue that end" (Dh., 166). In other words, man's first duty is to work out his own salvation,  from himself.
     The procedure, in often repeated expositions of the "un Self ishness" (anatta) of all phenomena, is analytical. The repudiation is of what would nowadays be described as "animism": the psycho physical, behaving mechanism is not a "Self," and is devoid (sun’n’a) of any Self like property. The “individuality” or self consciousness or self existence (atta sambhava) is a composite of five associated grounds (dhatu) or stems (khandha), viz., the visible body (rupa, kaya), and invisible sensation (vedana, pleasant, unpleasant or neutral), recognition, or awareness (sanna), constructions or character (samkhara; here with reference to mental images, experiences, phantasms, notions, postulates, complexes, opinions, prejudices, convictions, ideologies, etc. In a more general sense samkhara defines all things that can be referred to by name or sensibly perceived, all nama rupa, all "things," ourselves included) and discrimination, discretion, judgment, or valuation (vinnana; 'The five khandhas are nearly the same as the five "powers of the soul" as defined by Aristotle (De an., 11, 111) and St Th. Aquinas (Sum. Theol., 1, 18. 1), viz. the vegetative (nutritive), sensitive, appetitive, motive, intellectual [diagnostic, critical]),' in short, a composite of body and discriminating consciousness/sentience (sa vinnana kaya), the psycho physical existent. The causal origination, variability, and mortality of all these factors is demonstrated; they are not "ours," because we cannot say "let them, or let me, be thus or thus" (S., 111. 66 67): on the contrary, "we" are what they "become," "a biological entity, impelled by inherited impulses (L. Paul, The Annihilation of Man, 1945, p. 156.) The demonstration always concludes with the words: "That's not mine, I'm not that, that's not my Self/Soul." To have done with them for good and all, to put away the notions "I am So and so," "I am the agent," "I am," will prove to be "for your advantage and your happiness" (S., III. 34). The Buddha, or any Arahant is a "No-body"; one cannot properly ask his name, for is is that he is, suchness, thatness, the unnamed proclamation, i.e. Tathatta’. Otherwise stated, any thing or individuality is characterized by "name and shape" (nama rupa), Aristotle, Met., VIII. 1.6); "name" referring to all the invisible, and "shape" or "body" (rupa being interchangeable with kaya) to all the visible and sensible constituents of individuality. This is as much as to say that "time and space" are the primary forms of our understanding of things that become; for while the shape or body of anything is evanescent, its name survives, and by its name we still hold on to it. It is by his "names," those of the "Law" and "Truth," that the Wake survives in the world, although, like the rivers when they reach the Sea, his liberation is from name and shape, and whoever has "gone home" is no longer in any category, no longer this or that, or here or there (Sn., 1074).
     All this is nothing peculiarly Buddhist, but the burden of a worldwide philosophy, for which salvation is essentially from ones-Self. Denegat seipsum ! Si quis . . . non odit animam suam, non potest meus dtscipulus esse! "The soul is the greatest of your enemies. "(AI Ghazali,Al Risalatal Laduniyya, ch. II.) "Were it not for the shackle, who would say `I am I’?"( Rumi, Mathnawi, I. 2449.) "Self is the root, the tree, and branches of all the evils of our fallen state" (W. Law, Hobhouse, p. 219.); "it is impossible to lay hold twice of the essence of anything moral . . . at one and the same moment it arrives and is dissolved" (Timaeus, 28 A, cf. Cratylus, 440: Plutarch, Moralia, 92 B. For the Buddhist doctrine of the "moment" (khana) in which things originate, mature, and cease, cf. Vis., I, 239, and the fuller development in the Mahayana.) such citations could be multiplied indefinitely. It is less often realized that many modern naturalists and psychologists have reached the same conclusions. "The naturalist maintains that the states and events called mental exist only when certain organizations of physical things also occur…[and] are not exhibited by those things unless they are so organized…The structured object is simply manifesting the behavior of its constituents…[it] is not an additional thing which . . .controls…the behavior of its organized parts." The naturalist's and the Buddhist interpretation of the behavior of the "structured object" are so far identical= but whereas the former identifies himself with the behaving object (Such an identification reverts to the animistic proposition, "I think, therefore I am," and involves the unintelligible concept of a single agent that can will opposite things at one and the same time. The logical positivist ought to deny the possibility of any "self control," perhaps he does) the Buddhist insists that there is no object that can properly be called "my Self", for it is not object nor objectified; unfortunately leading many to the erroneous conclusion that Buddhism negates Self/Soul. The psychologists, on the other hand, prescinding from the Ego, still, like the Buddhist, leave room for something other than the Ego and that can experience an "infinite happiness." "When we see that all is fluid . . . it will appear that individuality and falsity are one and the same," the direct implication being, as in the anatta doctrine, that "we" are other than our individuality. "In the traditionally use customarily” emphasized individuality of each one of us, `myself'…we have the very mother of illusions… [and] the tragedy of this delusion of individuality is that it leads to isolation, fear, paranoid suspicion, and wholly unnecessary hatreds;" "any person would be infinitely happier if he could accept the loss of his `individual self'," as the Buddha puts it, he does not worry about what is unreal. "In the epoch of scientific rationalism; what was the psyche? It had become synonymous with consciousness…there was no psyche outside the ego…When the fate of Europe carried it into a four years' war of stupendous horror…no one realized that European man was possessed by something that robbed him of his free choice;" but over and above this Ego there is Self "around which it revolves, very much as the earth rotates about the sun," although "in this relation there is nothing knowable in the intellectual sense, because we can say nothing of the contents of the Self." (The naturalists and psychologists cited are Dewey, Hook and Nagel, Charles Peirce, H.S. Sullivan, E.E. Hadley, and C.G. Jung. It will be seen that the latter, who speaks of the "absolute necessity of a step beyond science," is a metaphysician in spite of himself. The citations are not made by way of proving the truth of the Buddhist analysis, but to help the reader to understand it; the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. (The italics are mine).)
     What has Buddhism to say of the Self? "That's not my Self" (na me so atta); this, and the term "non Self ishness" (anatta) predicated of the world and all "things" (sabbe dhamma anatta; Identical with the Brahmanical "of those who are mortal, there is no Self", (anatma hi martyah, SB., II. 2. 2. 3). KN Jatakapali 1441 Akkhakandam: “Atta’ ca me so saranam gati ca” “The Soul is the refuge that I have gone unto”. For anatta is not said of the Self/Soul but what it is not. There is never a ‘doctrine of no-Soul’, but a doctrine of what the Soul is not (form is anatta, feelings are anatta, etc.).
     They have formed the basis of the mistaken view that Buddhism "denies [not merely the self but also] the Self." But a moment's consideration of the logic of the words will show that they assume the reality of a Self that is not any one or all of the "things" that are denied of it. As St Thomas Aquinas says, "primary and simple things are defined by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as that which has no parts;" and Dante remarks that there are "certain things which our intellect cannot behold…we cannot understand what they are except by denying things of them." This was the position of the older Indian philosophy in which Buddhism originated: whatever can be said of the Self is "Not so." To acknowledge "nothing true can be said of God" is certainly not to deny his essence! For it is that: “Atta hi attano natha, atta hi attano gati” KN 2.380:"Soul is the support of the Soul, the Soul returns to the Soul”; KN 2.160:"Atta hi attano natho, ko hi natho paro  siya?", Soul is the support of the Soul. What else could it be?
     When the question is pressed, Is there a Self, the Buddha refuses to answer "Yes" or "No”; to say "Yes" would involve the "consubstantialist" error, to say "No" the "anti-foundationalist" error (S., IV. 400 401; “If, on the one hand Ananda, when I was asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer ‘how is Soul’, I had responded: ‘this is the Soul’, then so I would have been aligning fully with resurrectionist Brahmins and ascetics. And if, when I was asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer ‘how is there no Soul’, I had responded: ‘there is no Soul’, then so I would have been aligning fully with anti-foundationalist Brahmins and ascetics.) And similarly, when the postmortem destiny of a Buddha, Arahant, or Very Man arises, he says that none of the terms "becomes" (hoti) or "does not become" or "neither becomes nor does not become" or "both becomes and does not become" apply. Any one of these propositions would involve an identification of the Buddha with some or all of the five factors of personality; all becoming implies modality, but a Buddha is not in any mode. It should be emphasized that the question is always asked in terms of becoming, not in terms of being. The logic of language only applies to phenomenal things (D., II. 63), and the Arahant is uncontaminated by any of these "things": there are no word ways for one whose self is no more; one "gone home" is no longer in any category (Sn., 1074, 1076). Nevertheless it is also said that the Buddha "is (atthi), though he cannot be seen "here or there," and denied that an Arahant "is not" after death. If, indeed, absolutely nothing remains when the self is no more, we could not but ask, Of what is an immortality predicated? Any reduction of a reality to the nothingness of "the son of a barren woman" would be meaningless and unintelligible; and, in fact, the Buddha in repudiating the "annihilationist" doctrines that were attributed to him by some contemporary heretics expressly denies that he ever taught the destruction of anything real (sato sattassa) (M., I. 137, 140). There is, he says, "an unborn, un become, unmade (akatam; The "unmade world" (Brahmaloka) of the Upanishads), incomposite (asamkhatam; Incomposite;' i.e. without origination, growth or mutation, A., I. 152; Nirvana, Mil., 270 ; Dhamma, S , IV, 359. On the other hand, even the highest Contemplative "states" are composite, and it is even from these exalted conditions that there is a "final escape".), and were there not, there would be no escape from the born, the become, the made and the composite (world)" (Ud., 80): "knower of what was never made (akatannu) art thou, O Brahman, having known the waning away of all composite things."
     The Buddha expressly "holds nothing back," making no distinction of a within from a without, his is "not a closed fist" (D., II. 100); but the Eternal Law, and Nirvana, and namely the Self are "incomposite," and for this transcendent Worth (param'attha) all words are inadequate all alta fantasia qui manco possa (Paradiso, XXXIII. 142) in which the disciple must have Faith (saddha) until he can contact it, until Faith is replaced by Knowledge/gnosis; "he whose mind has been fired by the desire of the Untold (anakkhata), he is one freed from all loves, a swimmer against the current" (Dh.. 218), "the Buddhas do but tell the Way" (Dh., 276). If there is a salvation by faith (Sn., 1146), it is because "Faith is most conducive to knowledge" (S., IV. 298): Crede ut intelligas. Faith implies authority: and the Buddha's authority (mahapadesa), which rests upon his own immediate experience, is that of his words as spoken or as reported by competent Mendicants; in the latter case not merely rightly grasped, but checked for their consistency with the texts of the Canon and the Rule. In this initial dependence in what has not yet been "seen" there is nothing uniquely Buddhist or credulous. The Buddha's doctrine is always about what he claims to have personally seen and verified, and what he tells his disciples can be seen and verified by them if they will follow him in Brahma faring. "The Buddhas do but tell the Way, it is for you to swelter at the task" (Dh., 276); the "End remains untold" (Sn., 1074); it has no sign (S., 1. 188; Sn., 342), and is a gnosis that cannot be communicated (A., III, 444); and those whose reliance is only on what can be told are still under the yoke of death (S., I. II).
     In the discussion of Faith it is too often overlooked that the greater part of our knowledge of "things," even of those by which our worldly actions are regulated, is "authoritative"; most, indeed, even of our daily activities would come to an end if we did not believe the words of those who have seen what we have not yet seen, but might see if we would do what they have done, or go where they have been; in the same way those of the Buddhist neophyte would come to an end if he did not "believe" in a goal not yet attained. Actually, he believes that the Buddha is telling him the truth, and acts accordingly (D., II. 93). Only the Perfect Man is "faithless," in the sense that in his case knowledge of the Unmade has taken the place of Faith (Dh., 97), for which there is no more need.
     For the Buddhist, Dhamma, the Lex Aeterna (A Law above our minds, which is called the Truth," St Augustine, De ver. relig. XXX, cf. St Thomas Aquinas, Sum, Theol„ It. i, 91. 2.) synonymous with the Truth (S., 1. 169), is the ultimate authority and "King of kings" (A., I. 109, Ill. 149). It is with this ultimate, timeless and temporal, transcendent and immanent authority that the Buddha identifies himself, that Self in which he has taken refuge: "he who sees the Dhamma sees me, and he who sees me sees the Dhamma" (S., III. 120; It., 91 ; Mil., 73). One of the most impressive of the Buddhist books is called the Dhammapada, "Footprints of the Law"; it is a chart and guide book for those who "walk in the Way of the Law" (dhamtnacariyam caranti), which is also the "Way of Brahma" or "Brahma faring" (brahmacariyam), and "that old road that was followed by the formerly All awakened." The Buddhist words for "Way" (magga) and for "seeking" (gavesana; cf, the story of Gavesin, p. 41.) a with the Self as object (Vin., I. 23; Vis., 393), bout imply the following of tracks or footprints (As in Plato, passim. Meister Eckhart's "soul following the spoor of her quarry, Christ.") But these tracks end when the shore of the Great Sea is reached; until then the Mendicant is a disciple (sekho), thereafter an expert (asekho),  "no longer under a pedagogue" (Gal., 111. 25). The Way prescribed is one of self naughting, virtue and contemplation, walking alone with Brahma; but when the end of the "long road" has been reached, whether here or hereafter, there remains only the "plunge" into the Immortal, into Nirvana (amatogadham, nibbdn'ogadham), into that fathomless Ocean that is an image at once of Nirvana, Dhamma, and the Buddha himself (M., I. 488; S., IV. 179, 180, 376, V, 47; Mil., 319, 346). This is an old simile, common to the Upanishads and Buddhism: when the rivers reach the Sea, their name and shape is lost, and one only speaks of "the Sea." This last end is already prefigured in the adoption of the monastic vocation; like the rivers when they reach the Sea, so men of whatever caste becoming Mendicants are no longer called by their former names or lineage, but are simply of the lineage of those who have sought and found the Truth (Vin., II. 239; A., IV. 202; Ud., 55).
     "The dewdrop slips into the shining sea." Yes, but this is not an exclusively Buddhist formula; we find it in Rumi (Attham gato is a good example of the numerous etymological ambiguities that are met with in Pali, Where attham=Skr. astam, the sense is that of "gone home," but where attham=artham, that of "having attained one's purpose, or goal." Such an ambiguity is far from inconvenient, since the "return home" and the "attainment of the end" have a common reference); (Nicholson, Diwan, XII. XV; Mathnawi, passim), in Dante (sua voluntate . . . e quel mare tutto si more [Paradiso, ILI. 84]), in Meister Eckhart (also sieh wandelte der tropfe in daz mer "the sea of God's unfathomable nature . . . plunge in, this is the drowning"), Angelus Silesius (Wenn du das Trapffein wist im grossen Meere nennen, Den wist du meme SeeP inn grossen Gott erkennen [Cher. Wandersmann, II. 25]) and in China, where the Tao is the ocean to which all things return (Tao to Ching xxxii). Of all those who reach it can only be said that their life is hidden, enigmatic. The Buddha visibly present in the flesh is even now "unattainable" (anupalabhyamano) and "past finding out" (ananuvejjo); no one thus "gone home" can be referred to any category (sankham na upeti [Sn., 1074]). For "no one who sees me in any shape sees me"; "name and aspect are none of mine"; he only who sees the Eternal Law sees the Buddha, and that as effectively to day as when he still wore the personality (persona "mask," "disguise") that at death "he burst like a coat of mail" (A., IV. 312).
     The equation between Dante's mare with the Buddhist "Sea," implied above, many seem to import a theistic sense into the supposedly "atheistic" Buddhist doctrines; but it need only be pointed out that no real distinction can be drawn between the immutable Will of God and the Lex Aeterna, his Justice of Wisdom, that Nature which is also his Essence and to act against which would be to deny himself. The Law, Dhamma, had always been a nomen Dei, and is still in Buddhism synonymous with Brahma. If the Buddha identifies himself with the Eternal Law, this means that he cannot Fin; he is no longer `'under the Law", but being himself the Law can only act accordingly, and we find amongst the interpretations of the epithet "Thus come" or "Truth finder" that "as he says, so he does." But for those who are still Wayfarers and learners, sin (adhamma) is precisely an offence against that Natural Law which represents the share of the Eternal Law that determines the individual's responsibilities and functions. In other words, the Eternal Law has its immanent correlative in every man's "own law" (sa dhamma [Sit., 1020]), by which his natural inclinations and proper functions (attano kamma) are determined ; and it is only greed or ambition that leads to the disparagement of the nativity by which a man is normally "protected" (Sn., 314, 315). I mention this only because of currency of the erroneous opinion that the Buddha "attacked" the caste system. What he actually did was to distinguish the Brahman by mere birth from the true Brahman by gnosis, and to point out that the religious vocation is open to a man of any birth (A., III. 214 ; S., I. 167) : there was nothing new in that. Caste is a social institution, and the Buddha was speaking mainly for those whose preoccupations are no longer social; for the householder it is observed that, his entelechy consists in the perfection of his work (A., 111. 363), and only those occupations that injure others are condemned. The duties of a Ruler are often enumerated. The Buddha himself was a Royalty inasmuch as he laid down a Law, and was a Brahman by character (Mil., 225 227). Brahmans are only disparaged in so far as they do not live up to their ancient norm. In many contexts "Brahman" is synonymous with "Arahant."
     It has been asserted that Buddhism knows only of the personal God Brahma’ and nothing of the Godhead Brahma: this would have been strange indeed in India of the fifth century BC, in one who had studied under Brahman masters, and in scriptural contexts that are so often reminiscent of the Brahmanas and Upanishads. Actually, there can be no doubt that in the grammatically ambiguous expression brahma bhu’to which describes the condition of those who are wholly liberated, it is Brahma and not Brahma’ that must be read; it is Brahma that one who is "wholly awake" has "become." For (1) the comparatively limited knowledge of a Brahma’ is repeatedly emphasized, (2) Brahma’s are, accordingly, the Buddha's pupils, not he theirs S., I. 141 145; Mil., 75 76), (3) the Buddha had already been, in previous births, a Brahma’ and Maha’ Brahma’ (A., IV. 88 90), hence it would be meaningless, in the equation brahma bhu’to=buddho (A., V. 226 ; D., Ill. 84 ; It., 57, etc.), thereby assuming that brahma (neuter)=Brahma’, and (4) the Buddha is explicitly "much more than a Maha’ Brahma’ (DhA., II. 60). It is true that the Buddha is often addressed by Brahmans as Brahma’ (Sn., 293, 479, 508), but here Brahma is not the name of the God, but (as in Skr.) the designation of a true and learned Brahman (in Vedic ritual, the Brahma is the most learned of the four Brahman officiants, and their standard in all matters or doubt; hence Brahma, as from one Brahman to another, is the most respectful possible form of address.) and tantamount to Arahant (Sit., 518, 519). As for the "Gods" (deva), e.g. Indras, Brahmas and many other and lesser divinities or angels, not only are these at least as real as men, not only do the Buddha himself and other Arahants visit their worlds and converse with them, and not only is the Buddha the "teacher of Gods and men" (S., III. 86), but in response to questions he explicitly ridicules the notion that "there is no other world" (as maintained by the "Nothing morists," whom we should now call Positivists [M., I. 403]) and the preposterous view that "there are no Gods" (M., IL 212). Finally, inasmuch as the same things are said of the Self and of the Buddha, e.g. that definitions of either in terms of either or are invalid, not only is "Buddha" explained as "one whose Self is awake (Buddh'atta buddho, his., 209, cf, BU., IV. 4. 13 pratibuddho atma. The "awakened Self" will be the "Self made become" (bha’vit' atta’, passim), i e. the "unborn Self (ajata'atta) that neither ages nor dies," DhA., 1. 228, cf. BG., 11. 20);  (Vis., 209 : cf. BU., IV. 4.13), but there can hardly be any doubt that the commentator is right in asserting that in such contexts the Truth finder or Thus come "is the Self" (Ud.. 67 with UdA., 340). That the Buddha is not only a transcendent principle Eternal Law and Truth but also universally immanent as the "Man in this than" is implied by the epithet "All within" (Vessantara=Visvantara [M., I. 386; It., 321' applied to him, and by the words, "Whoever would nurse me; let him nurse the sick" (Vin., I. 302), this last a striking parallel to Christ's "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren ye have done it unto me."
     In the whole of the Buddhist canonical literature it is nowhere stated that "there is no Self," no reality distinguishable from the empirical self that is repeatedly subjected to destructive analysis. On the contrary, the Self is both explicitly and implicitly asserted; notably in the recurrent phrase according to which this, that or the other "is not my Self." We cannot ignore the axiom, Nil agil in seipsuin: Plato's "when there are two opposite impulses in a man at the same time about the same thing, we say that there must be two in, him" (Rep., 604B). This will apply, for example, when the conditions, are described in which Self is the friend or the foe of self (S., I. 57,71 72 as in (BG., VI. 5 7), and whenever a relation between two selves is asserted. The Buddhist is expected to "honor what is more than self" (A., I. 126), and this "more" can only be the "Self that's Lord of self, and the goal of self" (Dh., 380). It is of the Self and certainly not of himself that the Buddha is speaking when he says "I have taken refuge in the Self" (D., 2.120), and similarly when he asks others to "seek for the Self" (Vin., 1. 23; Vis., 393), and to "make the Self your refuge and your lamp" (D., II. 100; S., V. 163; cf. S., III. 143). Distinction is also made of the "Great Self" (mah'atta’, "Mahatma," "the magnanimous") from the "little self" (app'atumo, "the pusillanimous"), and of the "Fair Self" from the "Foul self," the former blaming the latter when wrong is done (A., I. 57, 149, V. 88). In short, it is quite certain that the Buddha neither "denied a God, denied a Soul, [nor] denied Eternity."
     In numerous contexts, the Buddha and other Arahants or Perfect Men are described as "having made the Self become" (bha’vit'atto); "made become," i.e. "as a mother fosters her only son," for this causative form of the verb "become" (the want of which in English is a serious inconvenience) means to "foster," "care for," "cultivate," "serve" or "provide for". This "making become" of the Self is an indispensable part of the Buddhist pilgrim's progress, and certainly no less so than is the corresponding negative task of putting a stop to all "becoming." To have completed either task is to have completed the other, and to have reached the goal: and "so," as Wordsworth says, "build we up the being that we are." But the modern scholar must be careful to distinguish the "becoming" that is a mere metabolism, an undirected process of automatic growth or "progress," from the "making become" that is a selective cultivation. It is only the empirical self, composite of body and consciousness (vinnana) that "becomes." Apart from the bodily constitution, consciousness cannot arise; our "former habitations," i.e. past lives, are composites of this sort, but "not mine," "not my Self" (S., III. 86); and of the Mendicant in whom the conditions that lead to the renewed becoming of a consciousness have been suppressed it is said that he is one whose Self is liberated, existent, altogether content, and that he knows that for him there is no mare birth, no more becoming (S., III. 55). It is very implicit in Sutta that the disciple is to become the more of That, his Self, his Soul, not to make it wane or fall away. Thou art That, namely in having made become that which is fixation for Supreme Ones, Tathagatas.
    Merely to have reached the Brahma’ worlds or to have become a Brahma’ there is not the last end; to have become a Brahma’, or even the Maha’ Brahma’ of the aeon, is indeed a tremendous achievement, but it is not the same as to have become Brahma, or totally despirated Buddha and Arahant. The distinction of Brahma’ from Brahma, expressed in Christian terms, is that of God from Godhead, and it will help to make the matter clearer in the Buddhist contexts if I quote analogous statements from two of the greatest and most intellectual of the Christian "mystics":
    "You must," says Meister Eckhart, "learn what God and Godhead are. God works, the Godhead does no work. God becomes and unbecomes (wirt and entwirt), and is an image of all becoming (werdenne); but the Father's nature does not become (unwerdentlich ist), and the Son is one with Him in this unbecoming (entwerdenne). The temporal becoming ends in the eternal un becoming" (Pfeiffer, 516 and 497). So "it is more necessary that the soul lose God than that she losecreatures" (Evans, I. 274), if she is to reach that state in which we shall be "as free as when we were not, free as the Godhead in its non existence." "Why do they not speak about the Godhead? Because all that is there is one and the same, and there is nothing to be said . . . When I go back into the ground, into the depths, into the well spring of the Godhead, no one will ask me whence I came or whither I went" (Pfeiffer, 180 181). "Our essence is not annihilated there, for although we shall have there neither cognizance, nor love, nor beatitude, but there it becomes like unto a desert in which God alone reigns."( [[Meister Eckhart's "non existence," "well spring;' "desert" correspond to the Buddhist Sea (as discussed above) in which all differentiation is lost (cf. Nicolas of Cusa's definition of theosis as ablatlo omnis alteritatis et diversitatis) and to Rumi s "Sea" of Love or Non existence, the lover becoming there the Beloved (Matbnawi, 1. 504, 1109; 11. 688 690, 1103; 111. 4723; Vl. 2771 et passim, with Nicholson's notes).]] ) Accordingly, the unknown author of The Book of Privy Counseling and The Cloud of Unknowing makes a difference between those who are called to salvation and those who are called to perfection, and citing Mary's choice of "that best part, the which shall not be taken away from her" (Book of Privy Counseling, f. 105 a), remarks of the contemplative life that "if it begin here, it shall last without end," adding that in that other life "there shall be no need to use works of mercy, nor to weep for our wretchedness" (Cloud of Unknowing, ch. 21).
     Parallels such as these are sometimes even more conducive to an understanding of the content of Buddhism than are the direct citations from the Buddhist canon; for they enable the reader to proceed from a known to lesser known phraseology. It need hardly be said that for a European reader or scholar who proposes to study any Oriental religion seriously a considerable knowledge of Christian doctrine and thinking, and of its Greek background, is almost indispensable. The two selves are in dramatic contrast whenever one reproaches the other. "Self upbraids the self (atta pi atta’nam upavadati) when what should not be done is done (A., I. 57 58): for example, when the Bodhisatta begs his food for the first time, he cannot stomach the unappetizing scraps he receives, but "he blames himself," and he does not allow himself to weaken (J., 1. 66). The Self knows what is truth and what is falsity, and the Foul self cannot hide its evil deed from the Fair (A., 1. 149). The Self is, then, our conscience, inwit and synteresis; the Socratic Daimon "who cares for nothing but the Truth" and "always holds me back from what I want to do." It is a matter of universal experience that, as Plato says, "there is a something in the soul that bids men drink, and a something that forbids, that hungers and thirsts, and another one that keeps account," and it is for us to decide "which shall rule, the better or the worse." Self is the Agathos Daimon, whom it is for "me" to obey. This leads us to consider the doctrine of the "Daimon's purity" (yakkhassa suddhi). Ignoring that there can be a multiplicity of Genii, just as in other traditions there can be a multiplicity of "spirits other than the Spirit," it must be premised that the Daimon (yaksa) had been originally and was still for the Upanishads, Brahma that Brahma, who is at once transcendent and, as the "Self of the self," immanent.
     The Sakyas themselves had been worshippers of a Yakkha Sakyavardhana, who can probably be equated with this "ever productive" Nature. In Buddhism, the Buddha, who is so often described as "Brahma become" (brahma bhu’ta), is also called a Yakkha, the Daimon whose "purity," was mentioned above. The Buddha is "uncontaminated" (anepalitto), wholly despirated, goalattained (attha gato, as predicted by his given name of Siddhartha), pure (suddho), immovable (anejo), and undesirous (Sri., 478, cf. M., I. 386, buddhassa . . . ahuneyyassa yakkhassa): "such is the Daimon's purity, he the Truth finder has a right to the oblation," he is the ahuneyya Daimon, "to whom the sacrificial offering should be made" (S., I. 141; M., I. 386; Su., 478). Whereas all existences are maintained by and delight in "food" (physical or mental), (D., III. 211), the question is asked, "What is that Daimon's name, who takes no pleasure in food?" (S., I. 32; cf. Sn., 508). How vividly this recalls the question, "Won't you tell me who he is?" and Socrates' reply, "You would not know him if I told you his name!" and the fact that in the Indian and some other traditions, "Who?" is the most appropriate name of the god who is "the Self of all existences," but has neither come from anywhere or ever become anyone. This "Self of all beings" is the Sun-not "the sun that all men see, but the Sun whom few know with the mind" and whom the Vedas describe as "uncontaminated" (arepasa, i.e., anupalitto). This is only one of the many reasons for identifying the brahma bhu’ta Buddha, who is also called "the Eye in the World" and "whose name is Truth," with this "Light of lights" and "Sun of men."
     Our immediate concern is with the word "uncontaminated." Whether explicitly or implicitly, and equally in Buddhist and pre-Buddhist contexts (where also the Sun is "the one lotus of the sky") the analogical reference is to the purity of the lotus, which is "not wetted by the water" on which it floats. In the same way, the Buddha is "uncontaminated by human affairs" (Sri., 456; cf. S., IV. 180): uncontaminated by the world (A., III. 347) and all things in it (A., IV. 71). What this implies will throw some light for us upon the nature of the goal that the Buddha and other Perfect Men had pursued and reached. It is too often assumed that the notion of a goal "beyond good and evil" is of modern origin. It appears, however, not only in Indian but also in Islamic and Christian contexts, and is intrinsic to the normal differentiation of the active from the contemplative life, virtue being essential to the former and only dispositive to the latter, of which the perfection is man's ultimate goal that of the beatific contemplation of Truth. The notion recurs again and again in Buddhist contexts: that by which the Perfect Man is uncontaminated is not merely evil or vice, but also good or virtue. This is stated explicitly in many contexts, e.g.: "uncontaminated whether by virtue or by vice, self cast away, for such there's no more action needed here" (Sn., 790); "one who hath here escaped attachment whether to virtue or vice, one sorrowless, to whom no dust adheres, one pure, him I call a very Brahman" (Dh., 412), i.e., Arahant. But even more notably in the parable of the raft: "abandon right and a fortiori wrong; one who has reached the farther shore has no more need of rafts" (M., I. 135), for which there are exact parallels in St, Augustine's "let him no longer use the Law as a means of arrival when he has arrived" (De spir. et lit., 16) and Meister Eckhart's "having gotten to the other side I do not want a ship"; and as the latter also says,” Behold the Soul divorced from every aught . . . leaving no trace of either vice or virtue."
    "Purity" is not attainable by belief, audition, knowledge, morals or works, nor without them (Sn , 839); in other words, moral training is absolutely indispensable, but does not by itself involve perfection. Rules of conduct are laid down for householders and for Mendicants; those for the latter are naturally more stringent, but in no way extreme; self torture is strongly deprecated. Those of the Mendicants who offended (and it is admitted that there were some who joined the order for quite unworthy reasons) could be cited and censured in public monastic assembly, or, in case of serious offences, unfrocked. On, the other band Mendicants were not, and are not nowadays, bound by any irrevocable vows, and are free to return to the household life if they wish; this is regarded simply as a failure or weakness and an occasion of reproach.
    The practice of moral virtues whether by a householder or Mendicant disciple leads to rebirth in a lower or higher heaven, as the case may be. The former earns merit by moral conduct and above all by generosity; in this connection it may be noted that the Buddha instructs a householder, who has been converted and has become a lay adherent, not to abandon his former practice of supporting the members of a rival order of Mendicants, although from the Buddhist standpoint these were heretics. The Mendicant, who had no possessions apart from his robes, begging bowl, jug, and staff, could not in the same way be generous with his goods, but might be a teacher of others, and there is no gift more worthy than that of the Eternal Law; he no longer recognized family ties, as bonds implying duties, nor might he concern himself with politics or participate in the pleasures, trials, or affairs of men living in the world, but he was not only expected to return love for hate if anyone abused him verbally or physically, and also to practice the Brahma’ bidings or Divine "States" (brahmavihara) of Love, Pity, Tenderness, and Impartiality (metta, karuna, mudita, upekkha). The first of these consists in the deliberate radiation of well wishing Love towards all living things whatever, "with heart of Love he abides irradiating one, a second, third, and fourth quarter; and so the whole wide world, above, below, athwart, and everywhere, he continues to irradiate with heart of Love abounding, measureless, guileless," and thinking, "May all be happy" (Sn., 143f). Here the reference of "all" is by no means only to human beings, but absolutely universal. Impartiality, on the other hand, is a subjective state of patience or detachment, as of one who looks upon whatever pleasant or unpleasant things befall himself as one might look on at a play, present at but not involved in the hero's predicaments. The "heart's liberation" thus brought about tends to an ultimate rebirth in the Brahma’ worlds and to companionship and coincidence with Brahma’; inasmuch as the disposition of the Mendicant who develops these friendly and unacquisitive states of mind is the same as that of Brahma. It will not be overlooked that the procedure so far is strictly ethical and that it presupposes the virtue of Innocence (ahititsa, M., I. 44; S., I. 163; Sn., 309, 368, 515, etc.), a term that has become again very familiar in modern times as the principle of "non violence"' advocated by Gandhi as a rule of conduct under all circumstances,   "put up thy sword." The training of the will is logically prior to the training of the intellect.
     But these ethical procedures, in which the notion of oneself and others is still involved, are only a part of the Mendicant's "Walking with Godhead" (brahma cariyam) or "Walking with the Law" (dhamma cariyam), and not the end of the road; there is "still more to be done." We are told that, like Mendicants who are not yet "absolutely freed" but flatter themselves that their work is done (A., V. 336; cf. M., I. 477), the Gods are often subject to the mistaken impression that their condition is unchangeable and everlasting, and that for them there is nothing more to be achieved (A., IV. 336, 355, 378; S., I. 142). Even a Brahma, the highest of the Gods, imagines that there is no "further escape" (uttarim nissaranam) from the glorious state that is already theirs (M., I. 326; A., IV. 76; S., I, 142). We find, accordingly, the Buddha reproaching Sariputta for having instructed a Brahman questioner in no more than the way "to the lower  Brahma worlds where there is still more to be achieved" (M., lI. 195   96). It is always assumed that those who have not effected their Total, Despiration (Parinirvana) here, if they have gone so far as to be "non  returners," can attain to their perfection and make their final escape from whatever may be their position in yonder world; it is for that that the Buddha is the teacher not only of men but also of the Gods.
    What, then, is the remaining task to be accomplished by some Mendicants and those who have attained to an aeviternal life in the Empyrean heavens but are not yet Arahants "whose work is done"? There is no further question of a higher status to be acquired by good works,  the fruit of works has already been earned; it is a matter now entirely of the life of Contemplation (jhana). Jha’na (Skr. dhayna, Chinese ch'an, Japanese zen) corresponds almost exactly to the second term of the series "Consideration, Contemplation, and Rapture" in Western practice; samadhi, literally "com posure," or "synthesis," as of radii at the center of their circle,( In the architectural symbolism often employed the concentration of t he Powers of the soul at their source effected in samadhi is illustrated by the synthesis of the radiating rafters in the roof plate of a domed building ; and this (perforated) roof plate itself is the "sundoor" by which one escapes from what ever conditioned world is represented by the interior space or cavity (the Platonic "cave") of the building itself.) corresponding to "Rapture" and implying the consummation of Jhana at any stage. Jhana implies the active and intentional realization of states of being other than that in which the contemplative is normally existent at the time; and its force is entirely betrayed by those scholars who have called it "musing,” or, still more ineptly, reverie." Contemplation is a strenuous mental discipline, demanding along training, and not a kind of day dreaming; "there is no suggestion of trance, but, rather of enhanced vitality" (PTS. Pali Dictionary, s.v. jhana). The expert can pass from one to another of the hierarchy of "states" at will, and back again (D., II. 71, 156); and this positive command and control of contemplative "states" sharply distinguishes the Indian Yoga from all merely passive and adventitious, "mystic" experience. The contemplative "states" are a kind of ladder by which one can ascend from lower to higher states of being or levels of reference; but the final goal of Liberation lies beyond them all. The first four Jhanas are sometimes practiced by laymen as well as by Mendicants.
    The Jhanas are typically four (available to laymen as well as to Mendicants), or if taken together with the four A’ruppa Jhanas (formless or altogether immaterial states) a set of eight stages of liberation (vim okkha [D., II. 69 71, 112, 156, et passim]). In the first, making the mind "one pointed," attention is directed to some specific support of contemplation naturally suited to the pupil's disposition and constitution, and often chosen for him by the Master whose disciple he is. In the second Jhana the practitioner still sees the external form, but is unaware of his own; the experience is ecstatic. In the third, the ecstasy passes, and there remains only awareness of the endlessness of the power of discrimination (vinnana). In the sixth the sense that "there is nothing" (n'atthi kin’ci) prevails. In the seventh there is no further discrimination, and the condition is one neither with nor with out consciousness (sanna). In the eighth there is an arrest of all consciousness and sensation (D., II. 69 71, 112, 156). And once a Mendicant has mastered these eight degrees of liberation in sequence, in reverse sequence, and in both sequences successively, so that he can submerge himself in or emerge from any of them at will and for as long as he will; and when also by the eradication of the fluxions he enters into that Freedom of the Will (cittavimutti) and into that Intellectual Freedom by wisdom (pannavimutti) which he of himself has come to know and realize here and now, then such a Mendicant is said to be "Free in both ways"; nor is there any other or higher Freedom in both ways than this (D., II. 71; cf. Sn., 734, 753).
     It must, however, be very clearly understood that the attainment of such a complete command of the hierarchy of the states of existence, or successive heavens, is not an end in itself, but a means to final Liberation from all "states"; all are contingent, all originate and pass away. and no one who knows their true nature, who understands their pleasures and pains, and who knows the way of escape (nissaranam) from them, would delight in them or wish to remain permanently in any of them, even the highest (D., II. 79). Whatever one's position in the hierarchy of the worlds may be, there is always a still farther shore to be reached, and it is only for one completely liberated that there is nothing more to be done; from the point of view of the summum bonum it is little better to have reached a heaven than to be still on earth; the great work is still unaccomplished. To make this clear the Buddha propounds the great doctrine of the Middle Way, (majjhima tathagato dhammam deseti). This very important doctrine, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic as much as it is Brahmanical and Buddhist, has as many applications as there arc alternatives, of which the choice between this and some other world, thought of as contrasted "shores," is only one case; the true "world ender" (lok'anta gu) is not attached to existence in this or any outer world, however exalted; for all beings (sand), then and Gods alike, are in Death's bonds (S., I. 97, 105).
     There are always two extremes (ants), and it is as against the extremist (ante g gahika) who attaches an absolute value to either that the Buddha propounds his Mean; the true "Walking with God" (brahmacariya) is Middle Way. Already as a Bodhisatta, having been reared in luxury, and thereafter having mortified his flesh to the very point of death, the Buddha had discovered that neither of these extremes would lead him to the knowledge that he sought, and that he attained to by following the Middle Way (center, Soul, pith; Vin., I. 10). In the same way, Purity cannot be attained by virtue, nor without it (Sn., 839); purity is not only from vice but also from virtue. In the same way as regards all "theories" (ditthi), affirmations and denials: "is" (the consubstantialist error) and "is not" (the Anti-Foundationalist error) are neither of them true descriptions of an ultimate reality (S., II. 19 20, 117), just as for Boethius, faith is a "mean between contrary heresies " This does not mean that the Middle Way has any dimension; in terms of space, the goal is neither here nor beyond nor in between (Ud. 8), and it is "not by paces" but within you that World's End must be reached (S., I. 61 62; A., II. 48 49; S., IV. 94). In the same way and this is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the atomic principle as regards time. The existence origin and dissolution of all things is momentary (khanika [Yis., I. 230, 239; Dpvs., I. 16]); as it had been for Heracleitus (cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 392 Bt:). This in start (khaga), in which things arise, exist, and cease to be simultaneously, is the now without duration that separates past from future and gives to both their meaning; time, in which change supervenes, is nothing but the unbroken succession of flow of such moments, each of which timeless in itself (It is true that "men feel that what cannot be put in terms of time is meaningless;" but "the notion of a static, immutable being ought to be understood rather as signifying a process so intensely vivacious . . . as to comprise beginning and end at one stroke" (W.H. Sheldon in the Modern Schoolman, XXI. 133). "Plus la vie du moi s'identifie avec la vie du non moi [i.e. le soil, plus on vit intensement." (Abdul Hadi in Le Vaile d'Isis, Jan. 1934).' is our Middle Way (A., VI. 137). Life, as we know it empirically, is the field of transient action, and it is precisely such actions that have heritable consequences. Immanent activities, on the other hand, remaining in the agent, do not involve the agent in external events and, for the same reason, are inaccessible to observation. Several Buddhist expressions (e.g. thit'atto “fixed in Soul” [S., III. 55; Sn., 519. cf. 920], to be contrasted with the transience, aniccam, of all that is not Self) imply the immobility of the liberated Self. What this means is that the transcendent, supralogical Life of the liberated Self is Self contained. The moments themselves are one; their apparent succession is conventional.
     The "moment" without duration is, then, our great opportunity,-now the day of salvation," and we find the Buddha praising those of the Mendicants who have "seized their moment," and blaming those who have let it pass them by (S., IV. 126; Sn. 333). The moments, indeed, pass us by; but whoever seizes one of them escapes from their succession; for the despirated Arahant time is no more. In every case the Buddha teaches the Mean by the principle of causality; and whatever the two extremes may be, it is "appetite" or, literally, "thirst" (tanha) that "sews" one W renewed becoming, and it is only as a mentor of the Mean that one is uncontaminated by either extreme (A., III. 399 401; Sn. 1042),  just as for Plato it is only by holding on to the golden thread of the Common Law that the human puppet can avoid the contrary and unregulated pulls that drag us to and fro to good or evil actions determined by our appetites (Laws, 644).
    It is not without good reason that the Mendicant is called a Workman (samana, literally "toiler," and exact semantic equivalent of "ascetic"); he can know no rest until he is one "who has done what there was to be done" (katakaraniyo). He must be one who is the master of his will or thought, not one who is at their mercy; and. the man whom the Buddha commends as an "illuminer" of the forest in which he lives alone, is the Mendicant who, when he returns from his round for alms, assumes his contemplative seat determined never to rise again until he has freed himself from the fluxes. For the winning of what has not yet been won, the reaching of what has not yet been reached, the verification of what has not yet been verified, the Mendicant who has left the world in faith and is still a disciple must exercise manhood or heroism (viriyam, virtus), resolving, like the Bodhisatta himself "Rather let skin, sinews, and bones alone remain, while flesh and blood dry up, than let there be any rest from the exercise of manhood until I shall have won what can be won by human endurance, manhood, and persistent advance" (S., Il. 28; .11., I. 481; A., I. 50; J., I. 71). These are his intentions: "I shall become not of the stuff that any world is made of, I shall eradicate the notion of `I' and `mine,' I shall become fully possessed of the gnosis that cannot be imparted, b shall see clearly the cause and the causal origination of all things."
    We have seen that the Bodhisatta's original and primary purpose (attha) was to effect the conquest of death, and that in fact he conquered Death on the night of the Great Awakening, and thereafter by his teaching of the Eternal Law "opened the gates of immortality" for others. It will be, then, a kind of test and proof of the efficacy of the Mendicant's Walking with Brahma in accordance with his teaching if we ask ourselves how the graduate Arahant looks on at the death of others, or looks forward to his own. As for the death of others, it is a part of his discipline, to be " mindful of death," and this mindfulness of death includes the reflection that all beings whatever, up to and including the Gods of the Brahma world, are ultimately mortal; and bearing this in mind, the graduate Mendicant remains unmoved even by the Buddha's own decease, for he is aware that decay and dissolution are inherent in all component things, and it is only the novices and the inferior deities who weep and wail when " the  Eye in the world" is withdrawn. It had been an old story in India that immortality in the body is impossible; the Arahant, then, is well aware that his own time will come.
     The untaught, average man, when the end is at hand, "mourns, pines, weeps and wails"; but not so the Ariyan disciple in whom the fires of selfhood (corporeal) have been quenched he knows that death is the inevitable end of all born beings, and taking this for granted, only considers, "How shall I best apply my strength to what's at hand?" (A., III. 56) until he dies. Having already died to whatever can die, lie awaits the dissolution of the temporal vehicle with perfect composure and can say: "I hanker not for life, and am not impatient for death. I await the hour, like a servant expecting his wages; I shall lay down this body of mine at last, foreknowing, recollected" (Th., I. 606, 1002). Or even if the Ariyan disciple, whether a Mendicant or still a householder, has not yet "done all that there was to be done," he is assured that having come into being elsewhere according to his deserts, it will still be possible for him to work out his perfection there. The words, "O grave, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting?" might well have been the Buddha's or those of any true Buddhist. For him, there will be no more becoming, no more sorrow; or if there is, it will not be for long, for lie has already gone far on that long road that leads to Nirvana, "and, indeed, he will soon have reached the goal." Apadana Att. 513 “Ones True-Nature is the celestial light, is the Soul as refuge that one goes into; That very realm of celestial light.” AN 3.45 He has made sanctuary within the Soul.