

A. The excellent eightfold Path in General

That most men live their lives as carelessly as they do, has its ground in this, that they do not rightly know the condition in which they find themselves. Either they persuade themselves that they have emerged out of absolute nothingness into this world, and at their death, will again disappear, equally without leaving a trace; or they regard themselves as productions of a creator who will take them after their death into his heavenly kingdom, having no doubt about it that the hell which of course exists along with it, is destined only for others. Hence the result that for unbeliever as well as for believer it seems the highest wisdom to make themselves as comfortable as possible on this earth; for the former, because it were the height of foolishness not to make the utmost possible use of this so fleeting existence; for the latter, however, because his stay in this world is a gift from his god, which not to enjoy thankfully were the height of ingratitude. If only they would look into their real position and thereby recognize with sufficient clearness, that since beginningless time, aimlessly and without plan, they wander through the world in all its heights and depths, now as gods, then as men, now as beasts, then as devils, and that this wandering without end or aim, under perpetual self-delusion, will go on to all eternity; if, further, they would recognize the possibility of escaping forever from this circle of suffering, and of withdrawing to a place wholly devoid of suffering, to "a hiding-place, an island," then they would surely seize the proffered hand that will lead them to that place devoid of suffering, with the same eagerness that a drowning man seizes the hand that is ready to pull him to the shore. In such a situation, however, we are at present, if we have at all understood what has been said in our past pages, on which account the last of the four excellent truths, that which deals with the path leading to the removal of suffering, must appear to us as the most sublime revelation ever given to this world, and particularly as the highest of the four excellent truths themselves. For the three others with which we are now acquainted, despite their sublimity, without this fourth would be a gift of the Danaides of the worst kind, since, enlightened precisely through them as to the whole horror of the situation in which we find ourselves, they would only make us all the more unhappy. The last of the four excellent truths thus constitutes the cap-stone and crown of the mighty structure of the Budd-

now in me, thus earnest, strenuous and resolute, a Consideration of Craving arose, I forthwith said to myself: 'Behold, this thought of Craving seeks foothold in my mind, and verily it will lead to my own hurt, will lead to the hurt of others, will lead to the hurt both of myself and of others. It is destructive of wisdom, leagued with pain, not conducive to deliverance.' And so reflecting, that unwholesome thought died away from within me."²⁷⁷

If, further, I bring a sensual man to such deep penetration of the human organism, that he comes to see in every woman only a "skeleton covered with skin that is filled with filth and pus,"²⁷⁸ then his passion beyond question will vanish, as surely as a hungry person will lose all appetite, if, when he removes the cover from an inviting dish, instead of the dainty food expected, he finds snake car- rion.²⁷⁹ This direct vivid knowledge thus provides the motive force, which, so far as it is correct, that is, as far as it points out to us that all real and possible objects of our thirst must ultimately always bring us suffering, manifests itself in this manner, that in exactly the same degree that this knowledge enters, thirst disap- pears, so that when it has become complete and all-embracing, all thirst thereby is destroyed. Correct ocularly evident knowledge therefore finally turns, to use the words of Schopenhauer, into the *quiescing* of all willing, or, to use those of the Buddha, "holy wisdom, *able* wisdom, *powerful* wisdom."²⁸⁰ Thus this correct view is the very first element of the path constructed by the Buddha for the annihilation of suffering. He himself calls it *sammā-ditthi*, *Right View*: we must win the right *view* of things, we must not take them as they appear to the super- ficial observer, but must penetrate them to the very bottom, see them as they really are, namely as transitory, pain-producing and precisely on this account, fundamentally unsuitable for us. To bring about this correct view, therefore, the way has been laid down.*

2. Next, it is clear that it can only be reached by continual and deep medi- tation: "Two occasioning causes, friend, give rise to Right Seeing—the voice of another, and deep reflection."²⁸¹ But this deep reflection does not without further ado lead to the goal. The "ignorant worldling" may look at the things that give him pleasure, especially at the elements of his personality, as intensely as he likes, he will always come to the conclusion: "I cannot find anything hor- rible in them."²⁸² For the mind must be in a quite definite condition, if it is to perform the task the Buddha suggests to it. He calls this mental condition *samādhi*, literally, "bringing together," a conception which is defined more closely in the 43rd Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya as "oneness of the mind."²⁸³ "The coming of the mind to oneness (*citt' ekaggatā*), this friend Visākha, is *samādhi*."²⁸⁴ To understand what is meant by this, we must first see, why the normal mode of meditation, be it as deep as it may, cannot lead us to the

* In the Anguttara Nikāya X No. 104, *View* is represented as the basis of action. From an evil view, evil action results; from a right view, right action, in the same way that the seed of the gall-tree changes all the juices drawn out of the earth into bitterness, the seed of the sugar-cane, all juices into sweetness. In No. 121 of the same work, Right View is also compared to the dawn which precedes the sun of Right Action.

he's teaching. He himself takes this point of view, when he designates a possible dissension as to the content of the path as the gravest misfortune that could happen to his disciples. "It would matter little, Ananda, if there were dissension as to the necessities of life, or about the rules of the Order; but as to the Path, Ananda, as to the Way, if dissension should arise among the monks in regard to this, then such dissension would cause misfortune and loss to many, ruin to many, and suffering to gods and men."²⁷⁵ And his monks have ex- pressed their feeling of the decisive importance of the last of the four excellent truths by praising the master especially as "the discoverer of the undiscovered path, the creator of the uncreated path, the explainer of the unexplained path, the knower of the path, the acquainted with the path, the expert in the path."²⁷⁶

1. The outlines of this way are already given together with the three other virtues. Every kind of *thirst* for the world, as being the real and deepest source of all suffering, must be brought to disappearing without residue. But this thirst is rooted in ignorance, hence it can only be removed by the entry of knowledge. Therefore, before we know the way itself, so much is clear, that it must issue in the killing within us through *knowledge*, of all thirst for the world. From what has gone before it follows further on, that this knowledge, in correspondence with the nature of the ignorance from which this thirst proceeds, must be twofold. On one side, we must see clearly that our entire personality in all its constituent parts, and therewith, the whole world, at bottom is something alien to us, to which we cling merely because we think we must possess these things that are fundamentally alien to us, in order to be happy. Then, next, we must see the components of our personality, like everything in the world, as a possession that brings *suffering* to us, and thereby recognize as delusion the belief that this personality, and there- with our stay in the world, are necessary to our happiness. If we have attained real insight in these two directions, then we no longer *can* have any desire, any thirst for personality and the world, just as little as we can have desire to receive every day a hundred lashes with a whip. For "we are beings craving weal and shunning woe." Of course, this knowledge, as we already know, must be real and not merely abstract. That this latter is not enough, we may experience in ourselves every day, when, in a *general* and therefore *abstract* manner, we recognize some passion to be clearly injurious to ourselves, but nevertheless are unable to sum- mon up the resolution to fight it. Mere abstract knowledge therefore provides no motive force, on which account morally it is entirely valueless. A positive ground for the determining of our actions is only provided by *direct actual* knowl- edge, wherein the object desired, as also the consequences of its possession are vividly presented before our bodily or our mental eye. If I know how to lay before a certain person the pleasant consequences of a deed suggested to him so con- vincingly and vividly that he is able to form for himself a concrete representation of the same, then he will invariably commit the deed, if he is in a position to do so, and if there are no serious reasons against it. In the same manner, desires arisen within him will speedily vanish again, if the injurious consequences their satisfaction will have for him or for others are vividly present to him. "And when

goal, *samādhi* consisting precisely in elimination of the sources of error adhering in the former.

Within us lives the thirst for the world, which is a thirst for forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tangibles, and ideas. Our body endowed with the six senses represents nothing else but an apparatus for the satisfaction of this thirst, as it is also its handiwork. The average man, during his whole life, holds it as self-evident that the apparatus of the six senses is to be used exclusively for this purpose, being caught in the delusion that in this his thirst, his own innermost essence is asserting itself. And so he uses his sense organs, especially in their quality as organs of knowledge, exclusively for the satisfying of this thirst, that is, for the discovery of the objects corresponding to it, forms, sounds, and so forth, and further, the devising of the means of obtaining them, and avoiding those repulsive to him. This single end above all else is served by that central faculty of knowledge, intellect. This is used merely for the satisfaction of our inclinations, be they refined or vulgar, and thereby of our thirst, in the completest possible manner. Everything we look at, is looked at exclusively from this point of view. "Intellect is the servant of (instinctive) will," Schopenhauer says. Of course, from this point of view also we might come to abandon something in itself corresponding to our thirst, having regard to the predominating suffering which we recognize follows upon its possession, but this always and only, because such satisfaction of thirst is not the best possible. Therefore we generally select for its satisfaction only such objects as promise to provide this satisfaction in the highest possible degree, causing to us the greatest pleasure with the smallest possible accompaniment of pain. Since thus all the faculty of knowledge in the average man stands exclusively at the service of his thirst, the justification of which seems to him as unquestionable as his own existence with which he considers it to be identical, therefore he will never understand the dictum that *all* things are to be renounced, because they are all transitory and therefore ultimately bringing about suffering. To renounce everything, for him would be synonymous with renouncing every satisfaction of his will altogether; and this again would mean to him to remain incessantly and totally unsatisfied in his whole being, thus to hunger and thirst incessantly in every direction as long as he existed, hence, through countless ages, since "to the will to life, life is assured." But this represents such a horrible, nay, such an impossible supposition, that on no account can it enter into the question for him. Let the objects of his thirst, singly and collectively, be ever so perishable, and on this account, from their seizing let what may of new suffering ever and again break forth for him, nevertheless, they ever and again bring him at least a passing appeasement of his tormenting desires and thereby at least a temporary tranquilization of his being; in the same way, a man dying of hunger will finally take disgusting food, and a person dying of thirst drink filthy water. Still less will a man who shares this view understand the suggestion to give up his body endowed with the six senses; to him that would be identical with this other, to give up himself, which he immediately recognizes as impossible. Thus the doctrine of the Buddha becomes to him a book with seven seals.

As we see, the mistake a man makes in looking at things in this way consists in his identifying his essence with his thirst for the world. The direct consequence of this is, that his *faculty of knowledge or cognition* is always under the influence of this thirst; therefore it is unable to act purely independent of the inclinations, in which this thirst manifests itself: "The eye, ye friends, and forms, both are present; and through their being present, knowledge is chained to them by the craving of will. The ear, ye friends, and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and sapids, the body and the touchable, the organ of thought and things, — both are present; and through their being present, knowledge is chained to them by the craving of will," thus it is said in the 133rd Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya, which passage is thus paraphrased in the 138th Discourse of the same collection: "If, ye friends, with the eye a monk has perceived a form, cognition follows the trace of the form, is enticed by the attractive trace of the form, is caught by the attractive trace of the form, is entangled by the attractive trace of the form . . . If with the ear he has heard a sound, if with the nose he has smelt an odour, if with the tongue he has tasted a sapid, if with the body he has touched a tangible, if with the organ of thought he has recognized a thing, then cognition follows the trace of this thing, is enticed by the attractive trace of the thing, is caught by the attractive trace of the thing." From this the correct point of view may be gained, namely, that we detach our cognition from the service of our inclinations, that is, of our thirst; that we refuse to allow it to be taken captive, and thus in advance, darkened, blinded by the attractive traces of forms, sounds, odours, and so on, but with this our cognitive faculty, confront in a manner entirely objective all these influences of the senses; in short, that we maintain an attitude of *pure* cognizing. How this is possible, will be seen from the following.

Every act of cognition rests upon an act of willing, that is, upon an activity of the senses, since, as we know, only through such a thing is it aroused.* Indeed, all willing at first is nothing but a will to *cognize*, and only after this, a will to *possess*. In the first place, we want to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, to touch, to think, that is, to *cognize*, with the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the organ of touch, the organ of thought, what corresponds to our inclinations, to our thirst, and then to possess it, by finding out with the help of our faculty of cognition the means of obtaining it, and thus compelling the world to grant us our wishes. Thus the cognitive faculty as consciousness, is not only the medium by means of which alone we are connected with the world — "here in consciousness stands the All" — but it is also the light which shows us our way through the world, in the gleam of which we control it, *make it serve* our purposes. "By what, Lord, is the world controlled, to what is the world bound, to the power of what is the world subjected?" — "Very good, friend, very good! Noble is your profound thought, good your penetration, excellent your question! You therefore wish to know: 'By what is the world controlled, to what is the world bound, to the power of

* Compare the chapter on personality.

what is the world subjected?"—"Yes, Lord."—"By cognition, friend, is the world controlled, to cognition is the world bound, to the power of cognition is the world subjected."²⁸⁴ To this power of cognition the world is particularly subject in so far as, by its light, and with its help, in face of the fact, made known to us precisely through it, that despite all our foresight we ever and always find ourselves surrounded by suffering, there arises in us the will to cognize the causes of this suffering, and then, by the removal of these causes, to this extent shape the world to our will. But *this* will, as far as all suffering conditioned by nature, especially death, is concerned, generally remains entirely unsatisfied. Therefore at last the insight arises, that the problem of suffering in its whole extent is not to be solved in the way generally taken. From this insight there finally springs up an entirely new kind of willing—as we see, every kind of willing is the fruit and consequence of a preceding right or wrong cognition—this namely, to seek for the deepest and last cause of all suffering no longer outside but inside ourselves; that means, to ascertain whether this last cause may not be contained in our *former* willing itself, which in its totality exhibits itself as the thirst for the world that fills us. *This* will for cognition, which very soon takes possession of the whole apparatus of cognition, is thus quite unique. It is not, like our previous will for cognition, acting *in the service* of thirst, by seeking to satisfy it, but it opposes itself to it, by making it its task to analyse it in all its innumerable manifestations of desire and disinclination of painful and pleasant emotions, as they incessantly whirl through our mind, and to penetrate into its causality. Hence, it itself no longer stands in any kind of immediate relation to things, since its object of investigation is just the thirst for them, so that it takes up an attitude of entire disinterestedness towards them, of absolute objectivity. But just for this reason, the cognition acting in *this* manner is entirely pure, *harmonious in itself*, no longer a cognition darkened by anxiety for the satisfaction of our inclinations. *This* is what the Buddha means, when he says: "But how, ye monks, is cognition designated as being outwardly not dispersed, not scattered? If, ye monks, a monk with the eye has cognized a form, cognizing does not follow the trace of the form, is not enticed by the attractive trace of the form, is not caught by the attractive trace of the form, is not entangled by the attractive trace of the form. If with the ear he has heard a sound, if with the nose he has smelt an odour, if with the tongue he has tasted a sapid, if with the body he has touched a tangible thing, if with the organ of thought he has cognized a thing, cognizing does not follow the trace of the thing, is not enticed by the attractive trace of the thing, is not caught by the attractive trace of the thing, is not entangled by the attractive trace of the thing. Outwardly, it is said, cognition is not dispersed, not scattered."^{285, 286}

This cognizing activity, withdrawn from the service of thirst, is, so to say, posted at the extreme end of the world, that is supported for us by our thirst for it. Only thus, looking down upon it as from afar, have we got the right distance for the cognizing, not only as before, of the relations of the world to the thirst for it that animates us, but also of the relations of this thirst and of its

"handiwork," the body endowed with six senses, to ourselves. It is to this relation the Buddha refers, when he says: "How, if now I dwell with mind broad and deep, having overcome the world, [to which, of course also the corporeal organism belongs] standing above it in mind?"²⁸⁷ Further, it is very vividly expressed in the Anguttara Nikāya, that the noble disciple who thus recognizes is compared to a fighting man *who hits from afar*: "Just as, Sālha, the fighting one hits from afar, in the same way, Sālha, the noble disciple possesses right concentration. And whatsoever there is of body, whatsoever there is of sensation, whatsoever there is of perception, whatsoever there is of mentation, whatsoever there is of consciousness [cognition] in the past, in the future and at the present moment, our own or a stranger's, gross or subtle, mean or exalted, remote or close at hand, —all this, Sālha, the rightly concentrated noble disciple according to reality, in perfect wisdom recognizes thus: "This belongs not to me, this am I not, this is not my self."²⁸⁸

Because thus from this standpoint we clearly see that our personality, and with it, our thirst for the world which is realized therein, has not the least to do with our true essence, the problem no longer consists in the question as to how in this thirst we can satisfy our essence, but in this: whether the satisfaction of our essence might not be attained precisely by freeing ourselves from this thirst. Adopting this point of view, we will look at things now, only from this side. We no longer look at them, identifying ourselves with our thirst for the world, to see if they are suitable objects for the satisfaction of the same, but only as to whether these words of the Buddha do not much more apply to them: "Nothing is worth adhering to,"²⁸⁹ and thereby, whether also every desire, every kind of thirst for such things is not itself foolish. The result of this cognizing activity cannot long remain in doubt. Everything in the world and of the world, the components of our own personality included, is subject to incessant change, a ceaseless change felt by us, if we chain ourselves to the world, equally unceasingly in the form of birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair so that we are never able to free ourselves completely from painful sensations; whereas, if we let go *everything*, renounce *everything* in the world, and thereby the world itself, we enter the sublimest, profoundest, holiest peace, which is no more disturbed by sensation of any kind. In the face of such cognition, thirst for the world *can* no longer exist, in it is realized the entire truth of the words of the Master: "To the power of cognition is the world subjected." For it kills thirst for the world, thereby annihilating the world itself for me. Cognition thereby becomes a paricide, since it was just this thirst which aroused it by the activity of the organs of sense. But simultaneously with its creator, it itself dies; for it was only supported by the will to cognize this thirst, a will that is now satisfied, makes its presence known no more, whereby also cognizing itself goes to rest, just as the flame goes out when the wick is burnt up.—Nibbāna is realized!*

* Cognition dies simultaneously with its creator, thirst. The latter, however, works on for some time still in the vital process of the six-senses-machine it has set going, even after

According to this, *Samādhi*, or the unity of mind, shows itself to be cognition entirely uninfluenced by the motions of our inclinations or of our thirst, and thereby quite pure, or, as we might call it, *concentrated*. Thus the best translation of *Samādhi* is *concentration*, in the sense of *concentration of the mind* [*cetosamādhi*]. Only we must accustom ourselves to associate with this word the conception of a concentrated mind or concentrated thought, in the same way that we speak of a concentrated liquid.

We designate this concentrated form of cognition, from which, by analogy with a chemical process of analysis, all motions of thirst are eliminated, as the mode of contemplation pertaining to *genius*. But here it is to be noted that this mode, if it is to coincide with Right Concentration in the sense described above, must be used for the purpose given, that is, for the cognition of the objectionableness of all thirst. Otherwise, it is a wrong kind of concentration, under which heading falls every mode of contemplation peculiar to genius which, though in itself free from thirst, nevertheless indirectly serves this thirst, inasmuch as it has not thirst itself for its object, but some problem serving for its satisfaction under condition of a merely temporary elimination of its disturbing influence on thinking. Wrong concentration, in the Buddha's sense of the word, is therefore practised by all those men of genius to whom the state of pure cognition only serves for the solution of problems of one kind or another *within* the world.*

Right Concentration consists in liberating cognition, or consciousness, or mind, or thinking—all synonymous expressions**—from the service of thirst. Therefore it always includes, as far as it is attained, a *freeing* in itself of our cognitive activity. For the slavery of the sixfold cognitive activity just consists in

having itself perished, namely, until this six-senses-machine has broken up at the death of the saint, in the same way that the potter's wheel still for a time keeps on turning, after the force that had set it in motion has ceased to operate. Equally as long, naturally, is *cognition* still demanded. But after having brought about the annihilation of thirst, it sees all its work done, and only waits for its complete dying away, upon the coming to a complete standstill of its last after-effects.

* As we see, according to the Buddha, the possibility of cognition free from thirst, *not free from will*—there being no cognition really free from will, since every kind of cognition presupposes a corresponding kind of will for its support—or the possibility of the mode of cognition of genius, is a self-evident consequence of the fact that we are not will, but merely have a will which in itself is composed of innumerable single motions of willing. These motions of willing, led, and ever and again aroused anew, by the cognition accompanying them, incessantly heave up and down in us chiefly in the form of activities of the mind, on which account the Buddha compared man to an ant's hill in which the same restless motion prevails. But as they all have as little to do with our true essence as the air with the space it fills, we may, in principle let any kind of willing arise within us, even motions of willing of contradictory contents, though this in practice is made difficult by the fact that most of these motions, in the course of time, have assumed the form of thirst, that is of iron-like habits. Therefore we may especially let a kind of will arise within us that is directed towards the cognizing of the totality of these motions of inclination, by putting cognition at the service of this new kind of willing.

** "What is called *Citta* (mind), *Mana* (thinking), *Vinnāna* (consciousness or cognition)" we read in the *Dighanikāya*, I 13.

this, that ever and again it must become active in the service of our inclinations or of our thirst for the world. Accordingly, it is only a self-evident consequence, that the Buddha calls the higher degrees of *cetosamādhi* or mental concentration, also mental *liberations* or mental *deliverances*. In so far as this independence of our cognitive faculty in the service of our inclinations has become a fact, we ourselves also have become delivered. For, as we know, we are bound up with the world and tied to it only by means of the element of consciousness or cognition. Therefore when we liberate *entirely* our cognitive activity from the service of our inclinations, or from the thirst-dwelling within us, which happens, if, by means of this same cognitive activity *every* inclination, and therewith all thirst, in particular for further cognitive activity itself, is brought to perfect silence, then, because nothing more impels us to further cognitive activity, we can in absolute freedom also cease from this itself, and thereby bring about the complete extinction of the element of cognition—(consciousness)—*. Along with this, however, *everything* vanishes for us, our sense-endowed body also, since everything was only made accessible to us with and in this "element of cognition—(consciousness)—". "An invisible, infinite, all-penetrating consciousness (cognition): there earth, water, fire, and air no more find ground; there long and short, great and small, beautiful and ugly, there the body endowed with senses (*nāma-rūpa*) entirely cease. By the annihilation of consciousness (cognition), then all this ceases."²⁰⁰ If these profound words of the Master have thus become perfectly clear for us, we now will also understand why, with the advent of the perfect deliverance of the mind (*cetovimutti*), our own eternal deliverance also is realized. With the extinguishing of all thirst, through all eternity no more occasion exists for our ever again developing any mental or cognitive activity, and thereby allowing the element of consciousness to arise once more, in order further in its light to enjoy the delusive spectacle of the world. For this very reason, in death we build up no more new *apparatus* for the activity of mind in the way of grasping a new germ. And thus with the final liberation of our cognitive activity or our mind from the service of thirst, such as comes about with the annihilation of the latter, already *eternal* peace makes its entrance into us, being crowned by our *last* death which follows upon this, since this to us signifies nothing more than the final throwing away of the *apparatus* of cognition, which has now become quite superfluous to us.** Thereby we also understand those other words of the Master: "More and more, ye monks, let the monk exercise himself, so that, as he exercises himself, cognition does not become dispersed and dissipated

* We shall be glad to do this, because in the light of this pure cognitive activity, we already have cognized everything as transitory, leading to suffering, and therefore unsuitable to us.

** For the rest, *cetovimutti*, if used in the latter sense, in the Canon is always more closely defined as *paññāvimutti*, deliverance *through wisdom*, in order to distinguish it from the above-mentioned merely partial and temporary deliverances of mind. For the eternal deliverance of our mind, or of our consciousness from us, and thereby our own eternal deliverance, after what we have explained in regard to right, direct, actual cognition, can only take place in consequence of holy wisdom.

within himself, but is unshakable because of his having turned away. If cognition is not dispersed and dissipated, then, unshakable because of his having turned away, an arising and a going on of birth and old age, death and suffering, in future will no more be found."²⁹

3. As we perceive from the foregoing, *Sammā-samādhī* or Right Concentration is nothing more than pure cognition in itself, free from thirst and therefore not dimmed by any other disturbing motion of mind. Right Concentration of itself, therefore, is only to be understood as a purely *formal* condition of cognitive activity, whereby to be sure, its content is already thus much determined, in that it is specially occupied with thirst and its objects, and more closely, with their unsuitability for us. For the rest, however, in order really to understand this unsuitability we, of course, need yet closer lines of guidance for this cognitive activity. If a specialist shows a layman a complicated mechanism for him to examine and appraise by himself, if his naked eye is not sufficient, he must not only allow him to equip himself with a powerful lens—to which in our case, concentration of mind, or concentrated thinking would correspond—but must also direct his attention to the smallest details of all parts of the mechanism, and to the manner of their mutual interworking. Thus it is also of decisive importance for the success of the concentrated activity of cognition, as prescribed on the way to the annihilation of suffering, that its materials are laid before it in a perspicacious manner, and under a correct light, in order that they may be contemplated accordingly. It is therefore only self-evident, that this material content of Right Concentration is thought of as a fundamental condition of success, in a separate link of the path that otherwise would be quite incomplete. This link, because of its quality as embracing everything towards *which* Right Concentration should be directed, is called *sammā-sai*, Right Recollectedness. The materials embraced under this heading consist, of course, in the first three excellent truths already dealt with, inasmuch as Right Concentration ought to lead us to the penetration of the same. The Buddha has put together their chief contents in a manner most serviceable for direct meditation, in one of the most important Discourses of the whole Canon, which on this account bears the title of "The Four Foundations of Recollectedness," *cattāri satipaṭṭhānā*, where the material for concentrated thinking is not only schematically enumerated, but at the same time brought into the form of concentrated meditation itself. The Discourse, with the wording of parts of which we are already acquainted,* is based upon the fundamental cognition that our whole thirst for the world is summed up in our personality, in and by which, as we know, we alone experience the world, for which very reason, in penetrating the components of our personality and seeing them as *anattā* and full of suffering, our thirst for the world is itself extinguished. According to this, the Buddha dissolves the "heap of productions" forming our personality into its several items, showing in the most vivid manner imaginable, how everything in it and about it, the noblest emotions included, nay, even the

* See above.

penetration of the four holy truths itself, are nothing but transient processes, which we behold running their course, with which, for this very reason, we cannot possibly be identical. He divides this meditation into four parts, dealing with the body, with sensation, with thoughts, and with another group of processes which he simply calls "objects" (*dhammā*). * Because thus, in these "Four Foundations of Recollectedness" are embraced the most important and essential parts of all objects of meditation, to the question of the adherent Visākha, "What, Venerable One, are the mental images that pertain to Concentration?" in accord with the definition which Right Recollectedness receives elsewhere, the nun Dhammadinna makes answer: "The Four Foundations of Recollectedness are the mental images that pertain to Concentration."³⁰

4. After this, the situation, regarded from the highest standpoint, presents itself thus:

By allowing to arise within us the will to penetrate the machinery of our personality as a heap of painful productions, kept going by our thirst for the world, we retire to this pure will for cognition as to the point from which we may lift our personality, and therewith the world, off their hinges. From this point, representing, so to say, an island in the ocean of thirst wherein we swim, we observe the machinery of our personality in all its component parts, and its causal conditionedness so long and with such undivided attention, that we come to penetrate it as through and through, entirely different from ourselves, full of suffering, and on that account, also unsuited to us; and therewith recognize the thirst for it as a dimming of the heavenly clearness of our essence, whereupon it is extinguished. Along with it, the island also to which we had retired, may then vanish too!

Here, to be sure, the question arises as to how it is possible to scale this height of pure cognition, how with such wholly alienated eye, continuously and entirely concentrated, look upon our pseudo-self until it is vividly realised as such. This is a question which he alone knows how to appraise in all its difficulty who once has tried to contemplate himself, undisturbed only for a few minutes. Again and ever again consciousness is taken captive by the motions of willing which rest-

* As for instance, "the appearing of the six inner and outer realms."

** For every one who wishes to obtain an insight into the practice of meditation, the study, word by word, of the Discourse on "The Four Foundations of Recollectedness" is indispensable.—Right Concentration and Right Recollectedness, after what we have seen, in practice always constitute an indivisible whole of which the former represents the form, but Right Recollectedness its material content. As long as Right Recollectedness is present, we are also rightly concentrated; and reverse-wise, as long as we are rightly concentrated, we are rightly recollected. From this it becomes clear why Right Recollectedness is so frequently spoken of in place of Right Concentration, as, for instance, in the 32d Discourse of the Majj. Nik.: "But now hear from me, what sort of monk adds to the glory of Gosinga Wood. The monk, Sāriputta, having returned from his begging-round and partaken of his meal, sits down with crossed legs under him, body held upright and brings himself to a state of recollectedness: 'I will not rise from this spot,' he resolves within himself, until, freed from clinging, my mind has attained to deliverance from being influenced by (desire for) Becoming (existence)."³¹

lessly rise within us, and by the thoughts that incessantly run through our mind so that before we know, we have always lost ourselves in them again. How then shall be possible this quiet, and in addition, intense contemplation undisturbed by any other motion of the mind, such as is included in Right Concentration? It is clear that with this we come to the really practical part of the problem. The Buddha, in his High Path, solves it in the simplest manner imaginable. The Key-word to the riddle is *gradual* progress. What cannot be attained all at once, may be reached little by little, as the top of a high mountain, from which an enchanting view offers itself, must be gained only by gradually climbing upwards: —“Just as, O Gotama, in this terrace of Migāra’s mother gradual onsetting, gradual progress, gradual ascension may be noticed, that is, in devoutness; certainly also, towards, certainly also, O Gotama, among our Brahmins gradual onsetting, gradual progress, gradual ascension may be noticed, that is, in archery; certainly also, O Gotama, among us accountants, living by accountancy, gradual onsetting, gradual progress, gradual ascension may be noticed, that is, in counting. For, O Gotama, when we take pupils, we first make them count one, the unity, two, the duality, three, the trinity . . . and thus, O Gotama, we make them count up to a hundred. Now, is it possible, O Gotama, also to show in this Doctrine and Order, in about the same manner, *gradual* onsetting, *gradual* progress, *gradual* ascension?” — “It is possible, O Brahmin, also in this Doctrine and Order to show *gradual* onsetting, *gradual* progress, *gradual* ascension.”²⁸⁴ — “Just as, ye monks, the great ocean gradually becomes deeper, gradually steepens, gradually becomes hollowed out, and there is no abrupt fall, in exactly the same way, ye monks, in this Doctrine, in this Discipline, the training is *gradual*, the working is *gradual*, the path is *gradual*, and there is no sudden advance into full knowledge.”²⁸⁵ Withal the inner structure of this training for winning direct insight into truth shows itself to be so very adequate, that it caused Ānanda, the disciple who was always with the Master, to exclaim: “Astonishing it is, Lord, extraordinary it is, Lord: stage by stage, I see, the Exalted One has set before us escape from the realm of the flood.”²⁸⁶

If we look closer at these stages, they show themselves to be a *methodically arranged exercise* of Right Concentration. According to the Buddha, exercise makes everything possible; it is even almighty. Especially may it liberate our cognition from serfdom to the motions of the mind dwelling within us, which, after all, is only natural, for it was only *habit* that put it in the fetters of these motions. When they appeared within us for the first time, we adhered to them with our cognition, without knowing their pernicious consequences, and continued so doing until they were able to gain such strength that they could appear as *characteristic* motions of ours, to serve which therefore became for our cognizing faculty an understood thing. Now exercise is, so to say, habit reversed; it means the *disaccustoming* of our cognitive activity from the service of those motions, in such a way that they themselves become the object of our cognizing faculty, and in this manner are more and more recognized as pernicious for us, and especially

hindering to our further moral progress, with the result that our cognitive activity becomes, in the same measure that this happens, more and more independent of them, less and less yields to them, until at last, precisely for lack of food, they undergo complete decay. Through the freedom from them which thus supervenes, our cognizing faculty becomes capable of devoting itself ever more exclusively and undisturbedly to penetrating with its vision our whole personality, which activity itself again is more and more strengthened by continuous exercise, thereby generating an ever stronger and purer cognition in the said direction. After this, we cannot wonder that the whole way to deliverance is really nothing but a continuous, methodically progressive exercise of concentrated thinking, with the object of bringing about thereby Right Views, and thus freeing our cognizing, and thereby ourselves, at first for a time, and then enduringly, from the service of our accustomed motions of mind. Accordingly, the Buddha directly signalizes methodically followed exercise—in concentration—as the *formal content of his doctrine*. “Now, Bhaddāli, by means of the simile of the young horse, I will expound to you *the Doctrine*. Hearken, and give good heed to what I shall say! Just as an expert horse-tamer, Bhaddāli, if he has received a beautiful and noble horse, first has it perform exercises with the bit. In performing exercises with the bit, it shows all kinds of unsubduedness, of uncurbedness, of untamedness, because it never has performed such exercises before. But after having repeated the exercises, after having gradually repeated them, it becomes content therewith. As soon, Bhaddāli, as the beautiful and noble horse has become content therewith, by repeated exercise, by gradual exercise, then the horse-tamer causes it to perform other exercises, and puts it into harness. And while performing exercises in harness, it shows, just in the same way, all kinds of unsubduedness, of uncurbedness, of untamedness, because it never has performed such exercises before. But after having repeated the exercises, after having gradually repeated them, it becomes content therewith. As soon, Bhaddāli, as the beautiful, noble horse by repeated exercise, by gradual exercise has become contented, the horse-tamer causes it to perform other exercises, to pace and gallop, to race and jump, teaches it royal walk and royal bearing, makes it the swiftest and fleetest and most reliable of horses. And whilst thus performing exercises, it shows all kinds of unsubduedness, of uncurbedness, of untamedness, because of its never having performed such exercises before. But by repeated exercise, by gradual exercise, it becomes content therewith. As soon, Bhaddāli, as the beautiful and noble horse by repeated exercise, by gradual exercise, has become contented, the horse-tamer gives to it the final combing and currying. These, Bhaddāli, are the ten qualities that make a beautiful and noble horse appear suitable to the king, useful to the king, and therefore as belonging to the king.” In the same way also the Buddha offers every one who submits to his guidance, by the methodical exercise of concentration, therefore by pure thinking, to free him from all his passions, and to make him “the holiest place in the world.”²⁸⁷ That the Buddha in the passage given, by exercise really means exercise of *concentration*, follows from the whole construction of the way

of deliverance; besides this, it is expressly stated in the 125th Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya which has concentration of mind for its immediate theme, by means of the kindred simile of the elephant, and also confirmed by the following passages: "More and more, ye monks, let the monk *exercise* himself, so that, as he exercises himself, cognition does not become dispersed and dissipated within himself, but is unshakable, because of his having turned away."

"Nothing know I, ye monks, that without exercise would be more inflexible than the thinking.

"Nothing know I, ye monks, that by being exercised would become more flexible than the thinking.

"Nothing know I, ye monks, that without exercise leads to such distress as the thinking.

"Nothing know I, ye monks, that by being exercised leads to such prosperity as the thinking.

"Nothing know I, ye monks, that without exercise, without being developed, generates such suffering as the thinking.

"Nothing know I, ye monks, that by being exercised and developed, generates such bliss as the thinking."²⁸⁵

In the high path itself, this methodical exercise of Right Concentration of the mind, or of thinking independent of our inclinations, appears as Right Effort, *sammā-vāyāma*.

5-8. In cultivating Right Concentration, two main stages may be distinguished, first, the "separating" of our cognizing "from the enemy," meaning, from the motions of thirst dwelling within us in such a way that one gradually becomes "*disaccustomed* to the body and wishes,"²⁸⁶ and then, when our cognizing, in the form of pure thinking, is thus enabled more and more to penetrate with its vision, undisturbed and continuously, the whole machinery of our personality, in which all our thirst for the world is summed up, as the second main stage, just this penetration itself, and therewith, the radical complete annihilation of every kind of thirst, "so that it can never sprout again, never more can raise its head."²⁸⁷ This second part constitutes concentration of mind in its narrower sense, to which the first only supplies the necessary antecedent condition, on which account we may call it *preparatory* concentration. Now our thirst for the world acts in a threefold manner, first, in the form of all those inner motions, the results of which appear as our present resolutions; second, in what we say; and third, in what we do; in short, in the form of our thoughts, words, and deeds. In these three directions therefore concentration must be continually cultivated. This means, it must have Right Resolution, *sammā-saṅkappa*, Right speaking, *sammā-vācā*, and Right Acting, *sammā-kammaṭṭhā*, for its goal, which is only possible if a right mode of life, *sammā-ājīva*, is present. Corresponding to the two principal stages of Right Concentration, these their four fields of action also are of a double kind. At the stage of preparatory concentration, Right Speaking means "to avoid lies, to avoid calumny, to avoid harsh words, to avoid gossip;" right acting means "to avoid killing living beings, to avoid tak-

ing things not given, to avoid unchastity;" but Right Resolution means the disposition of mind directed towards realizing those fundamental principles: we have always to "think of detachment, never to cherish anger, never to foster rage," while the right mode of life is that which enables us to live according to these principles.²⁸⁸ At the stage of real concentrative activity, however, correspondent with their task of killing out all thirst without leaving a remainder, Right Speaking, Right Acting, Right Mode of life, mean: "what turns off, turns away, turns aside, averts from the four kinds of evil talk, the three kinds of evil action, and a wrong mode of life," that means, the eradication of the *inclinations* towards them, in which direction, of course, here again, Right Resolution comes into play.²⁸⁹

With this, we now know all the eight members of the path leading to the annihilation of suffering, which the last of the four excellent truths has for its object: "This, ye monks, is the most excellent truth of the path to the annihilation of suffering. It is this high eightfold path, that is called: Right View, Right Resolution, Right Speaking, Right Acting, Right Mode of Life, Right Effort, Right Recollectedness, Right Concentration."²⁹⁰

If we look it over once more, we see that its eight members are not joined to one another like beads on a string, but coalesce into an organic unity. The way of deliverance consists in a constant effort after continued *concentration* of the mind, for the purpose of incessant objective meditation of all our *thoughts, words, and actions*, as also of our whole *conduct of life* in general, by following the directions given by the Buddha in right *recollectedness* in order thus to win right *view*, in the end, in the form of holy wisdom.*

"High, Right Concentration, ye monks, I will show you, together with its conditions, together with its requisites. What now, ye monks, is Right Concentration, together with its conditions, with its requisites? It is high Right View, Right Resolution, Right Speaking, Right Acting, Right Mode of life, Right Effort, Right Recollectedness: a unity of thinking, accompanied by these seven members, this is called Right Concentration together with its conditions, together with its requisites."²⁹¹ It would not be in the spirit of the Buddha, if we

* If right view or right direct cognition is thus the goal of all moral striving, nevertheless, after what has gone before, it must on the other hand *precede* all striving of this kind, since it only furnishes the motive, and therefore only makes effort for right concentration possible, on behalf of an ever greater deepening of itself, as is set forth in more detail in the 117th Discourse of the Majjh. Nik. As hinted above, it is the same, as if some one, using a traveller's hand-book, were pressing along the highroad towards a distant goal. At first, he only sees the road that is before him, but takes it, in the consciousness that he is on the right way. The farther he goes, the more of the various places he has to pass, according to his hand-book, come into view, which gives him an ever higher degree of certainty, until at last the goal itself rises above the horizon.

** Majjh. Nik. 117th Discourse.—That Right Effort in particular goes along with Right Concentration, which itself again is inseparably bound up with Right Recollectedness, becomes clear from the fact that in the 44th Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya, Right Effort, Right Recollectedness, and Right Concentration, taken together, are called "part of Concentration."

did not also pass in review before us in direct, vivid form, this organic unity into which the eight members of the Path merge, thus, as they present themselves in practice. For this purpose, we need only turn to the 61st Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya, in which the Buddha expounds to his son Rāhula this practical formation of the Way:—

“What do you think, Rāhula: what is a mirror for?”

“To look at oneself, Lord.”

“Even so, Rāhula, we ought to look and look at ourselves, before we do deeds, look and look before we speak words, look and look before we cherish thoughts.”

“Whatever deed, Rāhula, you wish to do, at this same deed you ought to look thus: ‘How if this deed I wish to do should be grievous to myself, or grievous to another, or grievous to both? This would be an unwholesome deed, that produces suffering, breeds suffering.’ If, Rāhula, in looking at this you observe: ‘This deed I wish to do might be grievous to myself, might be grievous to another, might be grievous to both; it is an unwholesome deed, that produces suffering, breeds suffering,’—then, Rāhula, you certainly have to abstain from such a deed. But if you notice, Rāhula, while looking at it: ‘This deed I wish to do can neither be grievous to me nor grievous to another nor grievous to both; it is a wholesome deed, producing welfare, breeding welfare,’—then, Rāhula, you ought to do such a deed.

“And while doing a deed, Rāhula, you ought to look thus at this same deed: ‘Because I am doing this deed, is it grievous to myself, or is it grievous to another, or is it grievous to both? Is it an unwholesome deed, producing suffering, breeding suffering?’ If, Rāhula, while looking at it you observe: ‘This deed I am doing is grievous to myself or grievous to another, or grievous to both; it is an unwholesome deed, producing suffering, breeding suffering,’—then, Rāhula, you ought to abstain from such a deed. But if you notice, Rāhula, while looking at it: ‘This deed I am doing is neither grievous to me, nor grievous to another, nor grievous to both; it is a wholesome deed, producing welfare, breeding welfare,’—then, Rāhula, you ought to promote such a deed.

“And if, Rāhula, you have done a deed, you ought thus to look at this same deed: ‘Because I have done this deed, is it grievous to myself, or grievous to another, or grievous to both? Is it an unwholesome deed, producing suffering, breeding suffering?’ If, Rāhula, you notice while looking at it: ‘This deed I have done is grievous to myself, or grievous to another, or grievous to both; it is an unwholesome deed, producing suffering, breeding suffering,’—then, Rāhula, you ought to communicate, to discover, to expose such a deed to the Master, or to experienced brethren of the Order; and after having communicated, discovered and exposed it, you ought in future to guard yourself against it.* But if you notice, Rāhula, while looking at it: ‘This deed I have done is neither grievous to myself, nor

* Compare also Majj. Nik. 65th Discourse: “It is a progress, Bhaddali, in the order of the Holy One, to look upon a transgression as a transgression, to confess it properly, and in future to be on one’s guard against it.”

grievous to another, nor grievous to both; it is a wholesome deed, producing welfare, breeding welfare,’—then, Rāhula, you ought day and night to cultivate this blissful, joyous exercise in doing good.”

The Buddha then proceeds to say the same as regards every word that is said, every thought that is entertained.

From this also it again becomes clear, how all members of the Way meet as in their focus in Right Concentration, that is, in unbroken, meditative contemplation of all motions of will arising within us. Every good, that is, renouncing, thought, every good word, that is, proceeding from selfmastery, every good deed, presupposes it, since they are all conditioned by Right View. But this Right View, on its side, is only possible as the fruit of that pure cognizing, standing behind the motions of thirst and showing itself in the form of meditative contemplation. In so far as it penetrates the perniciousness of these motions, it does not allow them to become prominent, because of which, thoughts, words and deeds born of this state of mind must be free from thirst, and therefore good. Because thus, concentration of thinking is the indispensable presupposition of everything good, even the most insignificant good thought, it becomes clear precisely from this, that it must become a *constant*, that is to say, in the form of an unbroken *thoughtfulness*, it must more and more become the dominant factor of the whole life, if real moral progress is at all to be possible. As true as it is, on one hand, that the killing out of the motions of our passions is only possible by direct cognition of their perniciousness, just as certain is it on the other hand, that this direct cognition must always be a *present* one. For certainly each of us has had moments when the perniciousness of some passion has come before his eyes with terrifying clearness, so that he has not been able to understand how he could ever have given himself over to it. And yet, in spite of this right direct cognition, ever and again we fall back into the same old fault. The reason of this is that it always immediately vanishes again. At most, we retain a weak reflex of it in memory; but this reflex is much too weak to be of any lasting effect. If direct cognition is to be effective, it must be present at every moment, in everything we think, speak, or do. But this again presupposes that that meditative contemplation resulting from concentration of mind, is always at its post as constant organ of control, and confronts all motions of volition arising within us, as reservedly and acutely observant, as a sentinel at the gate a stranger who wants to enter. And as the watchman only gives free passage after having recognized the stranger as beyond suspicion, so meditation only gives passage to any motion of mind when it has recognized it to be harmless. Only in this manner is the purifying, and ultimate annihilation, of our character, in the complete extinguishing of our thirst for the world, possible: “For whosoever, Rāhula, of ascetics and Brahmans in times bygone has purified his deeds, purified his words, purified his thoughts, each of them has thus and thus meditating and meditating purified his deeds, meditating and meditating purified his words, meditating and meditating purified his thoughts. And whosoever, Rāhula, of ascetics or Brahmans in times to come will purify his deeds, purify his words, purify his thoughts, each of

them thus and thus meditating and meditating will purify his deeds, meditating and meditating will purify his words, meditating and meditating will purify his thoughts. And whosoever, Râhula, of ascetics or Brahmins in present times purifies his deeds, purifies his words, purifies his thoughts, each of them thus and thus meditating and meditating purifies his deeds, meditating and meditating purifies his words, meditating and meditating purifies his thoughts. Therefore, Râhula, take notice of this: meditating and meditating we will purify our deeds; meditating and meditating we will purify our words; meditating and meditating we will purify our thoughts. Thus, Râhula, you ought to exercise yourself."**304

It cannot be otherwise. For we know from the foregoing, that our thirst for the world ever and again wells up anew out of our thoughtless taking part in the activities of the senses, wherein precisely ignorance consists. As soon as we behold a form with the eye, hear a sound with the ear, smell an odour with the nose, taste a sapid with the tongue, touch something touchable with the body, encounter a thing with the organ of thought, immediately "being void of Recollectedness as respects corporeality" we are "enamoured of the pleasing things and shun the unpleasing." Thirst, therefore, can only be annihilated on the opposite track. In every activity of sense, by means of concentrated thinking we must penetrate the objects of the same and see them as transient, indeed, at bottom, repulsive, and therewith also, every rising motion of willing in relation to them, as harmful to us, and thus no longer act *unknowingly*, but *knowingly*.

Thus the way of salvation shown by the Buddha reveals itself as the way of *cognition*, that is, of cognition of the perniciousness of thirst for the world that dwells within us. It is fundamentally nothing but an exhortation to *constant*, *right*, and, as far as possible, *acute* intuitive thinking. Thinking is *right*, if everything in the world, the five groups of our personality included, is scrutinized in respect of the three characteristics, *ñi lakkaṅhāni*: transitory (*anicca*), painful (*dukkha*), and therefore unsuitable to us (*anattā*). This way alone can lead us to the goal, all the more exclusively in that all suffering has its ground in our thirst for the five groups of our personality, and thereby, for the world, and that this thirst is conditioned by our ignorance as to its pernicious consequences.

But with this the two other, still much frequented, ways to salvation are equally obviously shown to be by-ways, namely, the way of trying to effect one's salvation by means of religious ceremonies and usages, and the way of self-morification, as practised so much in India, and often also in Christianity during its better days. "I do not, ye monks, grant holy life to a monk, to a wearer of the robe just because he wears the robe, nor to an unclad one, because he is unclad, nor to a man smeared with dirt, because he is smeared with dirt, nor to one who sprinkles himself with water, because he sprinkles himself with water,

* Why should not I enter upon this, at all times accessible path to the *Shaming of character*? In time might it not equally well be that, as result of a given perception, instead of, as now, always vulgar movements arising with me, there should be aroused only noble movements such as detachment, mildness, patience, nay, at last, none at all!

nor to a hermit in the forest, because he lives in the forest, nor to a fasting one, because he fasts, nor to a man well versed in sayings, because he is well acquainted with sayings* . . . If through the wearing of the robe, through nakedness, through being besmeared with dirt, through sprinkling with water, through living as a hermit in the forest, through fasting, through acquaintance with sayings, the greed of the greedy, the hate of the hateful, the anger of the angry, the hostility of the hostile could vanish, then the relatives and friends of a newborn babe would bring the robe to him, would prescribe to him nakedness, smearing with dirt, sprinkling with water, hermitage in the forest, fasting and acquaintance with the sayings, and with this they would endow him saying: 'Come, you lucky child, be a wearer of the robe, be unclad, be smeared with dirt, be sprinkled with water, become a hermit in the forest, fast and become acquainted with sayings, then, if you are greedy, your greed will vanish, if you are full of hatred, your hate, if you are angry, your anger, if you are hostile, your hostility.' But, ye monks, I see here many a wearer of the robe, many an unclad one, many a man smeared with dirt, many sprinkled with water, many a hermit in the forest, many a fasting one, many a man acquainted with sayings, who is greedy, hateful, angry, hostile, and so I do not grant holy life to any one of them for such a reason."**305

But whoso treads the path shown by the Buddha, walks upon a high way. For "on his track we become seeing and knowing."**306 And where knowledge is, there one can no longer do homage to passion. For no one knowingly can plunge himself into an ocean of pain. He alone can do so who does not "see the upshot," that is, the unknowing man. That is why in the moral teachings of the Buddha there are, at bottom, no good and bad men in our sense of the words, but only wise men and fools. Therefore in it there is also no contempt for the wicked, but only boundless compassion for them, who, even as ourselves, "cherish the desire, the wish, the intention: 'Oh, might the undesired, the unwished for, the unpleasing decrease, and the desired, the wished for, the pleasing increase.' But for them 'the undesired, the unwished for, the unpleasing increases, and the desired, the wished for, the pleasing decreases.' And why so? Because even thus it must happen, if a man is ignorant."**307

B. The several Steps of the Path

I. The Going into Homelessness

The more exalted anything is, all the less is it generally understood, because it exceeds the mental capacity of the average man; and all the more is it exposed to misinterpretations. Indeed, because the cause cannot be removed, it is also quite

* Knowledge of the holy scriptures of the Brahmins is meant, Christians would say "well versed in the Bible."

** We do many things which we would not wish a being beloved by us to do. Why is this? As soon as we use our cognizing apparatus in our own interest, our cognizing activity

impossible to meet these misinterpretations successfully. Hence it has always been the fate of the highest verities not only to be misunderstood, but also, in so far as in their practical effectuation they attract the attention of the average man, to be ridiculed. It is therefore nothing astonishing that the doctrine of the Buddha also, the highest truth ever communicated to mankind, has frequently met this fate, especially in the countries of the West. This has been the case to a quite particular degree, from the fact that in its full, practical realization, it issues in monachism, an institution against which the ordinary man of the world instinctively revolts, because, if it were concordant with truth, it would mean the severest condemnation imaginable of his own way of living, which is entirely given up to the pleasures of the senses. There are even in Europe "Buddhists," in all seriousness believing themselves to be such, who consider this institution of the Buddha superfluous! Of course they thereby only prove the truth of the old Indian proverb: "Even in the ocean, more than its own measure a jug cannot hold." But to us it will have become clear merely from what we have heard up till now about the way of salvation taught by the Buddha, that it cannot possibly be trodden in its entirety in the world. It demands nothing more and nothing less than the cultivation of the deepest contemplation and ceaseless watchfulness with regard to every single act, even the most insignificant, in the activity of the senses, so as at once to recognize as such every motion of thirst for the world in all its perniciousness, and thus allow no kind of grasping any more to arise. But how should such unceasing control of all and every impression of the senses be possible within the world? It is impossible, because in the world these impressions are far too numerous for us to be able to maintain complete watchfulness over every single one of them. In the world, it is only on the rarest occasions, and then only for a brief period that we attain thoughtfulness, to say nothing of unbroken watchfulness. "If I really understand the doctrine expounded by the Exalted One, it is not possible, living the household life, to carry out point by point, the perfectly purified, perfectly stainless holy life," says Raithapāla to the Master, after having heard him.²⁷ Not even the fundamental precepts can be constantly kept. "Who lives at home, is much busied, much occupied, much concerned, much harassed, not always wholly and entirely given to truthfulness, not always wholly and entirely restrained, chaste, devout, detached."²⁸ Certainly, also in the world, we may restrict our relations to it as much as possible; for instance, we may enter no profession, found no family, but these relations will never allow of being cut off entirely. For to live in the world just means to maintain relations with the world. So far, however, as these relations extend, to that extent we are occupied with worldly things; to this extent, therefore, we are cultivated into the service of the inclinations that fill us. These falsify cognition, hence we then act in a state of ignorance. But if the welfare of a beloved being is at stake, then our own inclinations are silent; we remain *freely cognizing*, and accordingly see much more keenly and clearly. If therefore we wish to know how to behave in any particular case, we need only ask how we would wish the loved being to behave. What we then and thus cognize, represents the high-water mark of our capacity for cognition.

vating and strengthening the fetters that chain us to the world. In so far, therefore, the ties cannot be definitively severed; and hence, to this extent, complete deliverance is impossible. For, wholly delivered he only is who "has cut through every tie."^{29a} On this point there can be no reasonable doubt. And thus it is really only a self-evident thing when the Buddha expressly asserts the impossibility of reaching Nibbāna while living the ordinary life of the world. "Is there, O Gotama, any householdier, who, not having left off household ties, upon the dissolution of the body, makes an end of suffering?" "There is no householdier whatever, O Vaccha, who, not having left off household ties, upon the dissolution of the body, makes an end of suffering!"^{29b}

Precisely in consequence of this his point of view, the Buddha has founded the *Saṅgha*, as the Society of all those who have left home for the life of homelessness, in order, under his guidance to strive as noble disciples towards the great goal of complete departure out of the world. In this Saṅgha of the selected ones, therefore, not less than in the Buddha and in his Doctrine itself, as in the Three Jewels, *Tiratana*, must those take their refuge who wish to tread the most direct road to deliverance, as it is expressed in the formula of confession which up to the present day constitutes the actual confession of faith of all Buddhists.

"To the Buddha I will hold in clear faith. He, the Exalted One, is the highest, holy Buddha, the knowing one, the learned, the Blessed One, who knows the worlds, who tames man like a bull, the teacher of gods and men, the exalted Buddha.

"To the Doctrine—Dhamma—I will hold in clear faith: well expounded by the Exalted One is the Doctrine. It has visibly appeared; it is independent of time; it is called, 'Come and see'; it is a guide; in his own interior it is experienced by the wise.

"To the Order—Saṅgha—I will hold in clear faith. In right conduct lives the community of the Buddha's disciples, in true conduct lives the community of the Buddha's disciples; in straightforward conduct lives the community of the Buddha's disciples; in correct conduct lives the community of the Buddha's disciples; the four pairs,* the eight classes of men:† this is the community of the disciples of the Exalted One, worthy of sacrifices, worthy of donations, worthy of gifts, worthy of raising the hands to in veneration, the highest state in the world in which man may do good."³¹

After this, the utter folly will probably be apparent of all those who think they must advocate a Dhamma without a Saṅgha. For they take away the blade from the knife; or, what is the same thing, they would have us believe that a bath might become dry before he has got out of the water. Such a standpoint, of course, they can only adopt because they are unable to grasp the kernel of the Buddha's doctrine, and with it, their own eternal destiny. That is to say, they are unable to comprehend that "the whole world is really a burning house, from which we cannot save ourselves quickly enough."³² For if they did understand

* The four kinds of saints—see below!—as well as those who are on the way to it.³⁰

this, then it would be simply impossible that, instead of speaking contemptuously of "fight from the world," they should not draw a breath of relief every time they saw yet another person flee out of this burning house, and only regret that they themselves cannot find the courage to do the same.

From the foregoing it will probably also be clear what is to be thought about those complaints which culminate in the objection, that, according to this, all men ought to become monks and nuns, and that the world will thus be in danger of dying out.* Such complaints amount just to this, that one would regard it as a calamity if all men were to be cured of their bodily ailments because then there would be no more hospitals. Certainly, the world would cease to exist, if all beings could be brought to realize their eternal destiny; but thereby it would only be *Suffering* that would reach its definitive end. However, those who are so intensely concerned about the continuation of the world may console themselves, since this will not happen, and probably never will happen. For there will always be those who far from leaving the world themselves, will even throw stones at those who set them the example.**

Assuredly, certain scruples are difficult to set aside, even for earnest strivers, namely, as regards the so-called collision of duties brought about by the way into homelessness — *pabbajjā* — as it affects one's own relatives, especially wife and children. Though the Buddha does not permit it to any one who has not got the permission of his parents — "the Perfect Ones do not accept a son without the permission of his parents," he tells Raṭṭhapāla who was asking to be accepted into the community of the monks²¹² — nevertheless he is not opposed to a man's leaving wife and children, in order to effect his eternal salvation. This standpoint comes out most clearly in the following narrative.

"Once upon a time, the Exalted One was staying at Sāvattī, in the Jeta forest grove of Anāthapindika. At the same time, the reverend Saṅgāmañji had come to Sāvattī, in order to see the Exalted One. Now the former wife of the reverend Saṅgāmañji had heard that the reverend Saṅgāmañji was said to have arrived in Sāvattī. Thereupon she took up her child and went to the Jeta forest. Now at this same time the reverend Saṅgāmañji was seated at the foot of a tree, in order to spend the afternoon there, sunk in meditation. Now the former wife

* Such complaints were already current in the Buddha's own day. "But at this time well-known young people from the noble families of Magadhā under the guidance of the Exalted One led the life of purity. Thereby the people were perturbed, became ill-disposed, and grumbled: 'The ascetic Gotama has come to make us childless; the ascetic Gotama has come to make women widowed; the ascetic Gotama has come to cause families to die out.'"²¹¹

** The question as to whether all beings will reach deliverance, was not answered by the Buddha, because it is without value for the practical work of the deliverance of the individual. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* it is said: "As the guardian of the gate of a fortress does not know how many persons enter the gate, but knows that nobody can enter otherwise than through the gate, in the same way it does not concern the Perfected One, whether the whole world or a half or a third part of it has won to freedom on this Way (taught by him), or gets there, or will get there."

of the reverend Saṅgāmañji went where the reverend Saṅgāmañji was staying, and spoke thus to the reverend Saṅgāmañji: 'Look here, O ascetic, at your little son and support me!' At these words, the reverend Saṅgāmañji remained silent. For a second time, the former wife of the reverend Saṅgāmañji addressed the reverend Saṅgāmañji thus: 'Look here, O ascetic, at your little son and support me!' And for the second time the reverend Saṅgāmañji remained silent. Now for the third time the former wife of the reverend Saṅgāmañji addressed the reverend Saṅgāmañji thus: 'Look here, O ascetic, at your little son and support me!' And for the third time the reverend Saṅgāmañji remained silent. Thereupon the former wife of the reverend Saṅgāmañji laid down the child before the reverend Saṅgāmañji and went off, saying: 'This is your son, O ascetic, support him!' But the reverend Saṅgāmañji neither looked at the child, nor did he speak a word. As the former wife of the reverend Saṅgāmañji now turned round from afar, she saw how the reverend Saṅgāmañji neither regarded the child nor said anything. Thereupon she thought: 'Not even for his child does this ascetic care.' And so she turned back, took the child and went off.

"But the Exalted One, with the divine eye, the purified, the supramundane, saw this meeting between the reverend Saṅgāmañji and his wife. And the Exalted One perceived the meaning (of this meeting) and on this occasion uttered the following verse:

'The coming does not make him glad,
The going does not make him sad;
The monk, from longings all released,
Him do I call a Brāhmaṇa.'²¹⁴

There are many who are honest friends of the doctrine of the Master, but nevertheless are unable to understand this standpoint. And yet it is perfectly clear, if only it is envisaged from the heights of pure cognition.

If the Buddha is right in this, that the eternal destiny of every being lies in his outgrowing the world, and at last leaving it entirely, then from the nature of this destiny also must be taken the criterion for the evaluation of every action from a moral point of view, since good, or moral, in the highest sense can only be what serves for the reaching of this ultimate goal; bad or immoral, however, being everything that hinders this or directly makes it impossible. If this indubitably correct principle is taken as basis, then he is certainly not acting immorally who for the sake of his eternal welfare leaves the world and therewith also, wife and child. What he does is good for him, for it lies in the line of his eternal

* To the same effect is the following saying of the Christ (Matth. X, 34--37): "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. And he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me." Of course the first part of the passage also refers exclusively to the conflict between the "rights" of the relatives and the moral obligations to which the adherent of the Christ is subjected.

destiny; it is even extraordinarily good, for it lies upon the nearest way to it. But if, on his side, it is something extraordinarily good that he wishes to do, then just because of this, every obstruction of this step, from whatever side it may come, appears as something immoral,—this word used, of course, from the highest standpoint now adopted by us. In short: it is not he who wishes to become a saint who acts immorally; but those who act immorally are his wife and his children who out of selfishness wish to hinder him from achieving this his eternal salvation. In order clearly to recognize this distribution of the guilt, the following points ought to be considered. He also is moved by love of wife and child, perhaps more than those who condemn him, for he is unquestionably a noble man. But with the severest mental struggles he opposes this love as well as every other inclination leading back to the world, and presses forward to do the most difficult thing a man can ever do, to take up the struggle against himself to its full extent, a struggle, compared with which, every other is mere child's play,* for he aims to learn to renounce the satisfaction of every motion of will, yes, in time to become entirely free from willing. But all that the others want is not to lose their supporter. They are unable to master their inclination towards him who is leaving them, which presents itself in the guise of love; in a word, they are the slaves of the thirst that dwells within them. Who now is great, and who small? But is the great to abandon his goal for the sake of the small? May a warrior going to battle allow himself to be kept back by the complaints of wife and children? Would not the whole world cry out at him: "Weakening!"?

From this, it obviously follows that it is not advisable to neglect to do something morally good out of regard for the lack of understanding of others. For it is nothing else but lack of understanding that here stands obstructively in the way. During their endless pilgrimage through the world, some few persons have found themselves together for a brief time in one family, to be separated again very soon in death, and then, each for himself, to continue the pilgrimage alone, perhaps on through a terrible future. Looked at from this point of view, is it not unreasonable if one of them wishes to hinder another from putting an end to this unhappy wandering through the worlds only in order that he may enjoy this present fleeting existence as free from care and pain as possible, unconcerned about his own fate or about the future fate of the other? Is not this at bottom really irresponsible? Who is here the egoist,—he who wishes radically to annihilate everything that makes him something positive, that is, an ego existing in the world; or the other who, not satisfied merely with the affirmation of his own ego, desires also to force the other into his service?

Since, therefore, the going into homelessness is moral, every impediment to the same is an immorality; hence none can claim treaty-rights as impediments against it. For every claim to such a restriction by treaty-right of the other party

* "Not who ten hundred thousand men
Has vanquished on the battlefield,
But he who vanquishes himself,
The greatest hero true is he." Says the Dhammapada.

would itself mean an immorality, inasmuch as the character of the action that is immoral in itself cannot be altered by a claim to its being reserved to the person against whom it is to be committed, moreover under conditions quite different from those at present prevailing. In the same way that public law takes precedence of private law, and thus a private claim must give way to a public one, in the selfsame way, every claim derived from a contract or from some other legal ordinance must give way to the demands of ethics, if law is not to become an instrument for the triumph of immorality.*

By this, however, we do not mean that the claim to go into homelessness is one that is free of all conditions. Rather does it find its limits in the very moral demands out of which precisely it arises. Whoever aims to effect his own eternal welfare, may not endanger the true welfare of others.** Of course, the sorrow he causes to those belonging to him without further ado may be excluded as regards him who leaves home; for it is not he who is the cause of this, but their own ignorance simply; accordingly, he has not to bear the consequences of the same. For the rest, however, it is, of course, only a question of the *true* welfare of those belonging to him, not what these themselves hold to be their welfare. Hence it is of no great moment if now they should lose that care-free, perhaps comfortable life they have hitherto been leading. For such a life, regarded from the highest standpoint, is more to be regarded as a misfortune than a blessing, since, as a rule, it only strengthens attachment to this world, and thereby, future suffering. "If, householder, you will do what I advise, then you will put this heap of gold and jewels on car's and have them taken out of town and thrown into the middle of the Ganges. And why so? Surely, householder, you will experience through them woe and sorrow, grief and pain and despair," Ratthapāla tells his father who tries to persuade him to renounce monkhood, by calling his attention to his great wealth.³⁵ It does not matter even that those left behind lose their supporter, if only they are just able to support themselves, be it only

* The possibility of a conflict between right and morality arises from their having in themselves nothing to do with each other. According to Schopenhauer the State also is not a means to morality. Of course, every law-giver will try to bring right into harmony with morality, since the state is not allowed to be an ethical wrong in itself, if it wishes to consist of just men. Therefore under *normal* circumstances, right and morality will be generally identical. But even here exceptions may occur; as for example, in the case of laws issued against any religion. Contradictions between formal right and morality are especially inevitable, when the morality of an individual outgrows the moral conceptions to which law pays heed. A soldier arrives at the moral conviction that killing in every form is reprehensible, also in war; a husband in time finds himself no longer able to reconcile the performance of his marital duties with his more purified moral feelings, whereas the wife continues to claim her "rights." Lastly, as in our case, a man discovers that worldly life is in itself detrimental to his eternal welfare, but his relatives do not wish to let him go, making appeal to his so-called "duties." In every case of this kind, before the judgment seat of the conscience of the individual, "right" must retire in favour of the demands of morality, though the state "rightly" takes the opposite view of things.

** This dictum, as, in general, those that follow, will later on be given its final justification.

with the help of others. For this, regarded from the highest standpoint, is rather a blessing than a misfortune, since it is particularly well adapted to make men think about their true relation to the world. Hence there remain only as cases demanding consideration of him who wishes to become a monk, those where without him even the minimum amount of support necessary to his relatives, or even their eternal salvation, would be jeopardised, as example of the latter, if his children were in danger of being morally neglected. The former standpoint is adopted by Ghaṭikāra the potter, in the 31st Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya, where in reply to the exhortation of his friend Jotipāla to enter the Order of the Master, he says: "Don't you know, dearest Jotipāla, that I have to support my old and blind parents?" But that in no case may a man put in jeopardy the eternal welfare of those he leaves behind through going into homelessness, becomes clear precisely through the story from the Udāna quoted above, where Saṅgāmañji maintains a passive attitude only towards the demand of his former wife that he shall support her and her child. If her eternal welfare had been in question, that pity for all beings, dwelling in him as in every saint, would have determined him to save her. To be sure, this pity, in the case before him, would probably have been confined to the "miracle of instruction" as the only means promising real success.

To bring under one principle, in harmony with the intentions of the Buddha, the cases in which the going into homelessness had better not be undertaken out of regard for others, we may say: Whoever wants to enter the Order of the Master, his relations towards those belonging to him must be of such a kind that his step would be approved by them, if they stood upon the same high moral level as he himself. If, after having carefully examined himself, he finds these relations to be of this sort,—in other words, if their rôles being exchanged, he could say that he, in their place, would consider himself obliged to give his consent, then, if now he actually goes away, he acts in entire harmony with the moral law that is decisive for him, and therefore cannot be doing anything in any way blameworthy. For the real cause of all the suffering entailed upon those belonging to him through the step he takes, lies not in him but in their own lack of understanding or defective cognition. Thus, rightly regarded, the blame is not his but their own, and by them must be borne. If they were on the same level as he, instead of their making the event a source of suffering, it would be followed by the most wholesome consequences for them also. "If, Digha, the family whence have come these three well-born ones who have left home behind and vowed themselves to the homeless life shall think upon them with hearts full of faith, long will it make for the welfare and happiness of that family," it is said in the 31st Discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya, with reference to three youths who had followed the Buddha. The question, therefore, is, whether, for example, the wife, instead of complaining, should speak to her departing husband, if she was abreast of the situation, with the necessary changes, in the same manner as did the wife in the Anguttara-Nikāya to her husband who was seriously ill: "Don't die with sorrowful thoughts; such a death the Exalted one

does not praise. Are you afraid that, after your death, I may not be able to support our children? But I am a clever cotton-spinner, and I shall have no difficulty in keeping up our household. Or do you think that after your death I shall leave off longing for a sight of the Buddha and his monks? That peace shall be wanting to my soul? That I shall not stand firm without wavering, in knowing the Doctrine of the Master and in trusting it? But if ever any uncertainty should come upon me, why, then he is staying near us, the exalted, holy Buddha, and I can go to him and put my question to him."²⁷

If thus there may be external circumstances detaining one from going into homelessness, * the chief hindrance generally lies in the man himself. The man must be ripe for this, that is to say, his entire willing must already be so ennobled that nothing within this world is able any longer entirely to satisfy him, so that the eternal, as soon as in any comprehensible fashion it enters his range of vision, powerfully attracts him and causes all his earthly possessions to appear to him as empty and insipid, no further able seriously to fetter him. "Just as if, Udāyī, there was a householder or the son of a householder, rich, greatly endowed with money and valuables, in possession of many heaps of gold, in possession of many masses of corn, in possession of many fields and meadows, in possession of many houses and farms, in possession of many multitudes of women, in possession of many a crowd of servants, in possession of many a crowd of hand-maids. And he should see in a grove a monk, with clean-washed hands and feet, cheerful of countenance, after having taken his meal, sitting there in the cool shadow, giving himself to exalted heedfulness. And he would feel thus: 'Blissful, truly, is holy life! Free from suffering, truly, is holy life! O, that I were such a man who, with hair and beard shorn, clad in yellow garment, might go forth from home into homelessness!' And he should be able to leave the many heaps of gold, the many masses of corn, the many fields and meadows, the many houses and farms, the many multitudes of women, the many crowds of servants, the many crowds of hand-maids, and to go with hair and beard shorn, clad in yellow garment, from home into homelessness . . . These for him are no strong fetters, but weak fetters, rotten fetters, fetters unable to hold."²⁸

But on this height stand only the very tiniest minority of men. The immense majority still cleave so tightly to the world, that the message of a supramundane happiness and peace is at best only able to arouse in them, even if they live in the most miserable circumstances, a feeble and indefinite feeling of the unworthiness of their present situation, which of course can furnish no motive to corre-

* From being received into the Saṅgha is also excluded: 1. one who suffers from certain diseases, 2. one who is in the King's service, 3. one who is not free, 4. one who has not yet paid his debts. We see that all these exceptions are based upon purely utilitarian grounds. The three latter exceptions evidently had in view the avoiding of conflicts with the power of the state. To similar considerations,—we must bear in mind the extensive power of parents over their children in ancient India—the unconditioned respecting of the guardianship of parents over their children is evidently also due, as expressed in making the consent of parents necessary for entrance into the Order, even a parental prohibition dictated only by ill-will being effective.

sponding action. "As if, Udāyi, there was a man, poor and neither free nor independent, and owning but a single hut, decayed and dilapidated, open to the crows, not at all beautiful, a single resting-place, decayed and dilapidated, not at all beautiful, a single bushel of corn-seed, not at all beautiful, a single woman, not at all beautiful; and in a grove he would see a monk, with clean-washed hands and feet, cheerful of countenance, after having taken his meal, sitting in the cool shade, giving himself to exalted heedfulness. And he should feel thus: 'Blissful, truly, is holy life! Free from suffering, truly, is holy life! O, that I were such a man who, with hair and beard shorn, clad in yellow garment, might go forth from home into homelessness!' And he should not be able to leave his one single hut, decayed and dilapidated, open to the crows, not at all beautiful, his one single resting-place, decayed and dilapidated, not at all beautiful, his one bushel of corn-seed, not at all beautiful, his one woman, not at all beautiful, and go forth, with hair and beard shorn, clad in yellow garment, from home into homelessness . . . These are strong fetters for him, tight fetters, tough fetters, no rotten fetters, but a heavy clog."²¹⁶

According to this, the Order of the Master comes into question only for very few men, for so very few, that the Buddha, after having come to full awakening, doubted if he ought to communicate to the world the "Marvel" that had unveiled itself before him, since it was a truth "going against the stream, deep, intimate, delicate, hidden, not to be reached only by mere reasoning, imperceptible to those delighting in desires."²¹⁷ But at last, consideration for those few "noble beings who would be lost if they heard not the Doctrine," determined him to found the Saṅgha. So very few minds of the highest order did the Buddha thus find even in his own favoured age when care for their eternal welfare exerted an influence over the actions of men as at no other time.* How many, then, in our "evil age" and moreover, in the Occident, may be ripe to walk the highest path on to its end!

The question therefore arises as to what all those are to do who in consequence of their previous, chiefly their antenatal, action, *Kamma-vipāka*, for external or internal reasons are not ripe for the Saṅgha, in whom, however, on the other hand, more or less a "divination of the truth" has arisen, and thereby "trust in the Perfected One and in his Doctrine has become rooted and sent forth shoots."²¹⁸ To them also, as we know, the Buddha shows the way and precisely in the excellent eightfold path, points out to them also the only possibility of moral progress. Even in the world they may live in accordance with it in the measure of their capacity for doing so, and so far as the conditions under which they have to live, permit, be it that they have to confine themselves merely to creating the conditions for a favourable rebirth,** be it that they

* In the *Dighā Nikāya* XXVI, it is said in one passage that the Buddha was the leader of a body of disciples of a few hundred, whereas the next Buddha will be the leader of a body of disciples numbering several thousand.

** This will probably always remain the standpoint of the multitude, as far as it is at all capable only of this minimum of forethought, to some extent to feel a little anxiety

also may strive towards the great final goal of the complete overcoming of the circle of rebirths. Though they do not reach this, the highest goal of holiness in *this* life—in *this* embodiment Nibbāna according to what we have said above, can only be attained within the Saṅgha—nevertheless they may thus far curb and refine their passions and thereby their thirst for the world, that even in them the inner certainty may arise that at the moment of their approaching death they will never again attach themselves to a germ below the human kingdom; so that with every existence still in store for them, they come nearer to their eternal salvation. They, "having entered the stream, are safe from torment in the lower worlds and sure of the Full Awakening." They may even completely cast off "the Five Fetters of the low earthly life" that ever and again lead back to this our world of the five senses, namely, inclination towards sensual desire, towards ill-will, towards belief in personality, towards faith in the efficaciousness of ritual ceremonies and customs, and towards doubt,* so that after death they will no more return to this world, but in one of the highest worlds of light, attain Nibbāna.**

about the future after death.—To secure a favourable rebirth, according to the Buddha, the following five fundamental ethical precepts must be kept, which therefore apply also to all lay adherents: 1. Not to kill any living creature, whereby it is also forbidden to ill-treat any creature. 2. Not to take things not given to us under any form, thereby neither in form of any imposition in business, or of direct fraud. 3. In the domain of sexual relations, always to keep within the bounds of the allowed, of course also in thoughts. To this it belongs especially not to enter into sexual relations, not only with the wife of another man, but also with no female who is still under the guardianship of her parents or other persons, and therefore not yet independent. 4. Not to tell knowingly an untruth, nor to make use of unpleasant modes of speech against other beings. 5. To avoid intoxicating or narcotic drinks and intoxicants. This minimum of true morality also, of course may only be attained by means of the holy eightfold path. Thus, one must travel it at all events as far as is needed in order to gain such sufficient insight into the perniciousness of our inclinations as will induce us to follow it within the limits of these five injunctions. For the monk, these injunctions are extended further. See below!

* Doubt in regard to the four excellent truths is meant. "Ghastikāra the potter, O Mahārāja, does not doubt suffering, does not doubt the arising of suffering, does not doubt the annihilation of suffering, does not doubt the path leading to the annihilation of suffering," it is said in the 31st Discourse of the *Majjhima-Nikāya*. At this stage therefore, one has already gained such a deep insight into the four excellent truths that the inclination dwelling within us to doubt them, conditioned by ignorance and therefore fundamentally unreasonable,—from the highest standpoint it is equally as unreasonable as the inclination towards any kind of passion—is entirely removed and only the complete realization of the four excellent truths by the annihilation of all thirst for Becoming remains to be carried out.

The Five Fetters of the lower earthly life are dealt with in detail in the 64th Discourse of the *Majjhima Nikāya*.

** There are four classes of saints: He who "if he wanted to do so, might say of himself: 'I have escaped from hell, escaped from the animal world, escaped from the realm of spirits, escaped from the by-way, from the repudiated worlds, I have entered the stream, I am safe from torment in the lower worlds and sure of the Full Awakening.'"** Because such an one has thus entered the stream leading to Nibbāna, therefore he is called "one who has entered the stream"—*Sotāpanna*. The *Sotāpanna* "still seven times among gods and men hastening

The Saṅgha is nothing but an institution for the clearing away, in advance, of all those external hindrances that in the world generally make it impossible to keep closely and steadily to the holy eightfold path. In so far as we know how to avoid as much as possible these hindrances, also in the world, and thus to restrain them, successful progress may also here take place. Yea, it may even happen that one who remains in household life, may progress farther than another who has left it. "The Brahmīns, O Gotama, speak thus: 'Who lives the household life, does apply the right method, a wholesome conduct. Who goes out from home, cannot do so.' Now what does Lord Gotama think about this?"

— "For that matter I distinguish, O Brahmin, not do I pronounce a simple judgment. Whether one lives the household life or whether one goes out from home: if he is living wrongly, I do not praise it. For whoso lives the household life, O Brahmin, and whoso goes out from home: if he lives wrongly, on account of his wrong living he cannot apply to the right method, to a wholesome conduct. Whether one lives the household life, O Brahmin, or whether one goes out from home: if he lives rightly, I praise it. For whoso lives the household life, and whoso goes out from home: if he lives rightly, on account of his right life he applies the right method, a wholesome conduct."²²⁵

But of course he who withdraws from household life, other circumstances remaining the same, will make much easier and quicker progress than he who remains in household life. Yea, often his household and business relationships may be of such a kind that only a complete break with them will at all provide him even the possibility of working earnestly for deliverance. But even where they are exceptionally favourable, as remarked above, they can never be of such a kind as to make possible complete deliverance during this present lifetime, and the unshakable certainty of the same. Therefore to those who make

through births, puts an end to suffering." 2. The "Once Returning." *Sakadāgāmi*: "There a man . . . after having considerably weakened desire, hatred and delusion, only returns once more; and having returned once more to the world, he puts an end to suffering. This man is called a 'Once Returning One.'"²²⁶ 3. The "Never Returning One." *Anāgāmi*: "There a man, after having annihilated the five fetters of the low earthly life, reappears among the spirit-born beings, and there he is extinguished, never more does he return to that world. This man is called a 'Never Returning One.'"²²⁷ 4. The Perfect Saint, *Arahā*, who still during this life puts a complete end to suffering: "Such a monk nowhere returns."²²⁸ — Thus it is only the reaching of the last stage that is denied to him who lives the household life. How a man has to live in the world, if he wants to reach the stage of an *Anāgāmi*, is taught by the example of Ghaṭikāra the potter in the 81st Discourse of the *Majjhima Nikāya* quoted above. Meanwhile the reaching of perfect sanctity is not absolutely excluded for him who lives the household life; he may reach it at least in his dying hour. "I tell you, Mahānāma, that there is no difference between a lay disciple whose mind has reached this stage of deliverance (to direct his last wish towards the ceasing of Becoming), and a monk whose mind is freed from all influence, as far as the state of deliverance is concerned."²²⁹ That as a lay disciple he can attain the complete annihilation of will only in his dying hour, follows from this, that, if in days of health he should penetrate to the immediate realization of Nibbāna, just because this presupposes the complete detachment of all earthly things, he would also externally leave the world and thereby in every case reach Nibbāna as a monk.

this highest goal their aim, it only remains to enter the Saṅgha. To these elect ones the Buddha appeals first. Hence, it will be clear without further argument that he makes the going into homelessness the starting-point for the realization of the holy eightfold path, and bases this path in all its parts upon this going, by leaving it to all who are not able or willing to fulfil this fundamental antecedent condition to hold to the several stages of the Path, as far as is possible to them in their individual circumstances. And so he begins his description of the path of Deliverance, as it takes practical shape, with the going into homelessness.

2. Taking Refuge with the three Jewels

According to the Buddhist Canon nobody but a *Buddha* can reveal to the beings the highest, the absolutely appropriate state, and therewith complete happiness for all eternity. The Buddha has revealed it in his DHAMMA, which means "the Marvel". And this Marvel was to be realized by the members of his SANGHA, the community of his disciples. Therefore these three factors are called "The Three Jewels" (*tini lakkhanani*). The Buddha presupposes as a further condition that one will take, above all, his refuge "with these three jewels": Since the Buddha's time this has been done by the threefold solemn declaration: "I take my refuge with the Buddha, I take my refuge with the Marvel (Dhamma), I take my refuge with the Community (Saṅgha)".

Accordingly the Buddha begins the exposition of his way of salvation regularly with the explanation of the first jewel:

"There appears an Accomplished One in the world, a Holy One, a Completely Awakened One, well aware of the right knowledge and of the right way of life, a Path-Finisher, knowing the worlds throughout, a teacher of gods and men, after he has seen and penetrated all of it himself. He promulgates the Marvel making happy in its beginning, making happy in its middle, making happy in the end. He exposes it full of significance and care in the external form. He teaches the perfectly integrate, perfectly pure Holy Way of Life.

This Marvel is heard of by a householder, or by the son of a householder, or by some one else reborn in another state. After having heard of it, he puts his confidence in the Accomplished One. Out of this confidence he considers: Living at home is a prison, a dirty place; but homeless life is the open space. At home it is impossible to perform the perfectly integrate, perfectly pure, holy way of life, resembling a polished pearl. How about leaving home with my hair and beard cut off, dressed with the yellow cloth, and going into homelessness? And after a while he gives up his small or large property, leaves his little or big family, has his hair and beard cut off, and goes from home into homelessness.²³⁰

The word "Dhamma" that signifies the second jewel, has been interpreted above by our word "Marvel". Hitherto it has commonly been translated by "Doctrine", or "Law". However, these translations do not by far cover the

however, such a circumstance as the *causal conditionality*, the *conditioned origin* (paṭiccasamupāda) is difficult to comprehend. And also this state is difficult to understand to him, namely the *ceasing of all Productions* (saṅkhārā), the *absence of all Attributions*, the *disappearance of the Thriving Will*, the *impossibility to be altered any more*, the *cessation of everything that has become*, *Nibbāna*. Therefore the others would not understand me when exposing the Marvel, and it were merely a useless trouble for me, a useless molestation.

Now to reveal what was so difficult to find? No, no. He who is still imbued with greed and hatred, would not comprehend this Marvel (dhamma), the stream-opposing, which is so subtle, so profound, so hard to see, because it is extremely tender. Those who delight in greed, those fully enveloped in darkest night, they see it not.

In this consideration, monks, my mind inclined to seclusion, not to the exposition of the Marvel. Then Brahma Sahampati became apparent before me. He spoke: 'O might the Exalted One expose the Marvel, O might the Path-finisher expose the Marvel! There are a few beings only a little defiled from birth. If they do not hear of the Marvel, also they will perish again. They will comprehend the Marvel!' And I answered, monks, to Brahma Sahampati:

'The gates of immortality are open for those who will hear and turn away from sacrifices—(from the sacrifice cult of the Brahmins)—. While seeing the burden (of exposing the Doctrine), I would not promulgate among men the Marvel, the sublime'"(Majjh. Nik., 26th Dialogue). Still clearer, if possible, the synonymy of the concepts "dhamma" and "nibbāna" is expressed in the following two utterances of the Buddha in the Aṅguttara Nikāya III, 53 and 55:

a) "The clearly visible Marvel (dhamma) so is said, Lord Gotama. But how is it a guide, and can be experienced by the wise in his own interior?"

"If, Brahmīn, one has cancelled Greed—(for the Five Grasping-Groups)—, Hatred, and Delusion—(supposing that the Five Grasping-Groups pertain to us)—, then one thinks no longer what could harm oneself, or another, or both oneself and another; nor does one feel any longer mental distress or mental oppression. Thus—(in seeing all this realized within oneself)—, Brahmīn, is the Marvel (dhamma) clearly visible, always accessible, called 'Come and see', is it a guide, and can be experienced by the wise in his own interior."

b) "The clearly visible Nibbāna, so is said, Lord Gotama. And how is this Nibbāna clearly visible, accessible at any time, is it called 'Come and see', is it a guide, and can be experienced by the wise in his own interior?"

"If, Brahmīn, one has cancelled Greed—(for the Five Grasping-Groups)—, Hatred, and Delusion—(supposing that the Five Grasping-Groups pertain to us)—, then one thinks no longer what could harm oneself, or another, or both oneself and another; nor does one feel any longer mental distress or mental oppression. Thus—(in seeing all this realized within oneself)—is Nibbāna clearly visible, always accessible, called 'Come and see', is it a guide, and can be experienced by the wise in his own interior."

real, primary significance of the dhamma-concept. Because of its importance the foundation of the term chosen shall be elucidated.

The word "Dhamma" in its widest sense is in the Canon identical with our word "thing": positively everything cognizable is a dhamma, just like a thing in our language. This all-comprising content of the word "dhamma" is expressed already by the fact that in the Canon always the dhamma, i. e. the things, are indicated as the possible objects of the sense of thought. There it reads regularly: "The thinking and the things (dhamma)", in the same way like "the eye and the forms, the ear and the sounds". In its narrowest and sublimest meaning "dhamma" is the thing par excellence, by our philosophers called "the thing in itself", as for the Buddha the Nibbāna. It was in this sense, too, that the Indian understood the word dhamma without much ado, if it resulted from the text. We, however, must signify more particularly this "thing" as such, perhaps as "thing in itself", or, more in the spirit of the Buddha, as "the Marvel" (The Science of Buddhism", p. 305). By the way, this "thing in itself" is often explicitly pointed out as such in the Canon, when it is called "saddhamma", i. e. "the best thing", which is also meant, at bottom, by our word "Marvel".

Since the entire doctrine of the Buddha consists merely in the promulgation of this Marvel and of the way to its realization, the word "dhamma", or "the Marvel", comprises also—this is well to be noted!—the entire doctrine of the Buddha within itself, likewise as in India the word "Brahma" does not only mean the Absolute, but includes also "the knowledge" (veda) about it, and therewith the entire Vedic complex of scriptures: "Well exposed by the Exalted One is the Marvel (dhamma), clearly visible, always accessible, it is called: 'Come and see', is a guide, and can be experienced by reasonable men in their own interior." (Sam. Nik. LV, 1; Majjh. Nik., 38th Dialogue)

The following passages will prove the correctness of these explanations: "... Then I wandered, monks, from place to place in the country Magadhā, seeking what is appropriate (kinkusala), the incomparable state of sublimest peace. So I came near Uruvela. There I saw a nice spot of ground, a beautiful forest, and the meadows and fields of a village around. There occurred to me, monks, the thought: 'This suffices for asceticism to a son of good breed. This is sufficient for an ascetic life.' And there I found that incomparable safety from entanglement, free from birth, Nibbāna; found that incomparable security from entanglement, free from old age, illness, death, grief, and defilement, Nibbāna. The concrete certainty (ānañ ca pana me dassanam) arose within me: 'Unshakeable is my liberation, this was my last birth, I have nothing in common with this order of things.'

There occurred to me, monks, the thought: 'Penetrated have I through to this Marvel (ayaṃ dhammo) the profound one, difficult to see, difficult to discover, peaceful, highly exalted, lying beyond the realm of discursive thinking, subtle, not to be experienced but by the wise one. These people, however, are fond of the connection—(to the Five Grasping-Groups)—, are glad of the connection, are well contented with the connection. To people of such kind,

