.
p.491
Many scholars have held that the Buddha maintained a
pragmatic theory of truth. Jayatilleke argues
persuasively that this is not the case.(1) Rather, he
claims, the Buddha held something like the naive
version of the correspondence theory of truth. While
we agree with Jayatilleke's conclusion that, as a
matter of historical fact, the Buddha held a
correspondence theory of truth, this does not
completely settle the matter. for there remains a
significant philosophical question: Is the
correspondence theory consistent with the Buddha's
use of the notion of a category mistake? We shall
argue that early Buddhism is inconsistent on this
point, that a strict empiricist such as the Buddha
cannot employ the notion of a category mistake
without allowing for nonepistemic elements (such as
utility, coherence, and economy) in the conception of
truth. It is easily shown that the Buddha does bring
considerations of utility to bear on the question,
whether we should seek to ascertain whether a given
proposition is true or false; in this sense we may
say that early Buddhism includes a strain of
pragmatism. We may then make the following surmise
about the subsequent history of Buddhist philosophy:
that the problem of this inconsistency in early
Buddhism, along with such a pragmatic strain,
constitute important stimuli for the development of
the Maadhyamika dialectic.
Pragmatists have espoused a number of views
concerning the nature of truth. Peirce held a version
of the correspondence theory,(2) and thus need not be
considered here. Dewey saw truth as a kind of
warranted assertibility which grows out of
investigative operations. C. I. Lewis claimed that a
priori truths, such as the propositions of logic and
mathematics, are pragmatically grounded, that is,
true by virtue of their role in furthering human
conduct. (Lewis and Peirce also hold variants on the
ideal verification view of truth.) One element shared
by these views is the rejection of such extra
entities as facts or states of affairs which are
required to satisfy the correspondence theory of
truth. Pragmatists have traditionally preferred to
see truth not as dependent on some immutable
inhabitant of the world, but rather as deriving from
the practice of successful inquiry, especially that
of empirical science.
This attempt at ontological economy, which is one
of the chief attractions of the various pragmatic
theories of truth, is present as well in William
James' view. James held that that statement is true
which "works" or "pays," which has "cash value."
Truth is created not discovered; it is created
through the successful organization and manipulation
of what is given in experience. It might seem that
this agrees with the conceptions of other
pragmatists. The latter were careful, however, to
restrict the predicate 'true' to statements which
were first determined to be empirically verifiable.
Not so for James, who proposed that such statements
as 'God exists' could be shown to be true
p.492
if it could be demo^nstrated that the effects of
holding such a belief were predominantly beneficial.
This example brings out a second difference between
James and the other pragmatists as well: James'
notion of utility is far broader than the equivalent
notions of other pragmatists. Where Dewey, for
instance, thought of the utility of an idea as its
tendency to further the aims of empirical science,
James gives much weight to such subjective states as
personal satisfaction.
The difficulties involved in James' view are
notorious. Yet it is clear that it is just this
theory of truth, rather than the theories of other
pragmatists, which students of Buddhism have in mind
when they assert that the Buddha held a pragmatic
theory of truth. It might be thought that there is
evidence for this in the Nikaaya assertion that a
given theory is to be rejected as false if it is
found to lead to suffering (dukkha).(3) This might be
taken to mean that for the Buddha the truth of a
theory consists exclusively in its tendency, when
believed and acted upon, to produce beneficial
results; or it might be taken as support for the
weaker claim that utility is a criterion for the
truth of an assertion--that we test for truth by
looking to see which beliefs produce beneficial
results.
Jayatilleke presents evidence, in the form of
passages from the Nikaayas, which effectively refutes
both contentions. He cites the following passage as
conclusively establishing that the Buddha held a
version of the correspondence theory of truth:
When in fact there is a next world, the belief occurs
to me that there is no next world, that would be a
false belief. When in fact there is a next world, if
one thinks that there is no next world, that would be
a false conception. When in fact there is a next
world, one asserts the statement that there is no
next world, that would be a false statement.
It is difficult to imagine how this passage might be
construed in any other way than as an endorsement of
the correspondence theory of truth. Another passage
cited by Jayatilleke shows that utility was not
considered by the Buddha to be a criterion of truth.
Here the Buddha tells us that he "does not assert a
statement which he knows to be true, factual, and
useless" (bhuuta.m, taccha.m, anatthasa.mhita.m)
[emphasis mine].(5) It would appear from this
statement that pragmatic considerations govern only
what the Buddha teaches, not what is actually true. A
true statement is one which agrees with reality, and
reality is here conceived as objective and
independent, unrelated to questions of human utility.
This stance accords well with the naive realism of
early Buddhism.
That the claim that early Buddhism embraces at
least a pragmatic criterion of truth is not entirely
devoid of merit may be seen, however, from an
examination of the so-called avyaakata, the
'indeterminate questions'. These are given as ten in
number: Whether the world is eternal or not eternal;
p.493
whether the world is finite or infinite; whether the
soul (jiiva) and body are identical or different; and
whether the enlightened one exists after death, or
does not exist after death, or both exists and does
not exist after death, or neither exists nor does not
exist after death.(6) These are regularly described
in the Nikaayas as 'theories' (di.t.thi) which the
Buddha has 'set aside' (.thapita) and 'rejected'
(patikkhita) .(7) The Buddha gives a number of
different explanations about why he does not
elucidate these questions. Several of these are
decidedly pragmatic in character, for example, "The
theory that the world is eternal, is a jungle, a
wilderness, a twisting, a writhing, and a fetter, and
is coupled with misery, ruin, despair, and agony, and
does not tend to aversion, absence of passion,
cessation, quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and
Nirvana."(8)
Similarly there is this: "Whether the dogma
obtain ... that the world is eternal or that the
world is not eternal, there still remains birth, old
age, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair,
for the extinction of which in the present life I am
prescribing."(9) This is further illustrated by the
famous arrow parable. Suppose a man is wounded by a
poisoned arrow. His friends propose that he be
treated by a physician, but he refuses until it be
determined whether the man who shot him was a
K.satriya or a Brahman, and so on, what his name and
clan are, whether he is tall or short, and so on.
This is just the same as the case of the man who
refuses to enter the path to nirvaa.na until he has
determined whether the world is finite or infinite,
and more. The path to nirvas.na which the Buddha has
taught does not depend on any of these theories.
Such explanations of the avyaakata do show that
early Buddhism is, in some sense, pragmatic.
Metaphysical theories which have no bearing on the
quest for enlightenment and the cessation of
suffering are not to be pursued. This is not
tantamount to an endorsement of either the pragmatic
theory of truth or a pragmatic criterion of truth,
however; utility for the religious life is not here
being equated with truth, nor is such utility being
employed as a test for the truth of the avyaakata
questions.
With the fire parable,(10) however, we encounter
a different type of explanation as to why the Buddha
does not answer these questions. A sama.na or
wandering ascetic by the name of Vaccha is puzzled by
the fact that the Buddha has denied, in turn, each of
these four alternatives--that the enlightened one is
reborn after death, that he is not reborn, that he is
both reborn and not reborn, and that he is neither
reborn nor not reborn. Thus he asks these questions
again, but this time the Buddha replies, "To say that
he is reborn does not fit the case.... To say that he
is not reborn does not fit the case," and so forth.
At this point, Vaccha confesses that he is totally at
a loss about what to think. The Buddha then proposes
this simile: Suppose a fire which had been burning
before you were to go out. If someone were to ask in
p.494
which direction the tire had gone, north, south,
east, or west, what would you reply? "The question
would not fit the case." answers Vaccha. What we have
here is something akin to a category mistake.
Certain types of physical objects are properly
spoken of as 'going in direction---- ', for example,
birds. rocks, and clouds. Thus we may explain the
fact that a bird which was formerly present to the
senses, is so no longer, by saying that the bird 'has
gone north'. Under certain conditions such assertions
are also possible with respect to fires--for example,
in the case of a brush fire which was burning behind
my house thirty minutes ago. This predicate cannot be
applied in the case of extinguished fires, however,
to do so would be to commit a category mistake. If a
physical object is to be spoken of as 'going in
direction ' it is necessary that it be an enduring
physical object. It is of course arguable whether a
fire counts as a physical object at all; but it is
perfectly clear that a fire which has gone out due to
lack of fuel cannot be thought of as an enduring
physical object. That a fire was formerly present to
our senses, but is no longer, might lead us to think
that, as in the case of the bird, we may use the
'going in direction ---' predicate to account for the
facts. But an extinguished fire is simply not
subsumed under the appropriate category for the
application of this predicate.
The Buddha is suggesting that similar
considerations apply to the case of the arahat after
death. While the framework of ancient Indian thought
allows us to ask of any deceased individual whether
he or she is to be reborn, the question is
meaningless with respect to the arhat. Vaccha was
confused by the Buddha's rejection of each of the
four logically possible alternatives; it would seem
that by necessity one of these must be true. Once we
see, however, that such predicates as 'reborn' simply
do not apply to the arhat and that the deceased arhat
is subsumed under a different category, the seeming
oddity of the position vanishes.(11)
The same line of thought is to be found in the
following. The Buddha is teaching that formulation of
pa.ticcasamuppaada (dependent coorigination) known as
the bhavacakka or 'wheel of becoming': On ignorance
depends karman, on karman depends consciousness... on
rebirth depends old age and death. He is then asked,
What are old age and death, and what is it that has
old age and death? The Buddha replies:
The question is not rightly put.... O priest, to
say,'What are old age and death, and what is it that
has old age and death?' and to say, 'Old age and
death are one thing, but it is another thing which
has old age and death', is to say the same thing in
different ways. If, O priest, the theory obtain that
the soul and the body are identical, then there is no
religious life; or if, O priest, the theory obtain
that the soul is one thing and the body another, then
there is no religious life. Both these extremes, O
priest, have been avoided by the Tathaagata, and it
is a middle doctrine he teaches:'On birth depends old
age and death'.(12)
p.495
Two points require explanation here. First. by
the second sentence the Buddha merely means to make
explicit a presupposition involved in the original
question. To ask, `What is it that has old age and
death'!' is it assume that there is a soul or self
(jiiva--anima is a fairly close Western equivalent)
which has old age and death as characteristics.
Second, if this point is accepted, then we must
assume that the self is either identical with the
body or different from the body. These positions were
held, respectively, by the Materialist and the
Saa^mkhya schools of Indian philosophy. But on either
assumption, according to the Buddha, the quest for
nirvaa.na becomes impossible. If the self and the
body are identical, then the self dies with the body
and there is no karmic retribution in the next life;
thus it becomes impossible to follow the path to
nirvaa.na over a succession of lifetimes, timespan
that is often required according to Buddhist
doctrine. It is not clear why the Saa^mkhya position
should be thought to make nirvaa.na unattainable, but
the Buddha might very well want to argue thus: If
self and body are separate, then the self or soul
would seem to be intrinsically unknowable(13); in
this case the reason why suffering attaches to the
self cannot be known, and thus its cure cannot be
found.
Having explained these points, let us return to
the Buddha's original response, 'The question is not
rightly put' (No kallo pannho). What is meant by
this? Both the grammatical structures and the usage
patterns of paali and English make it natural to think
of such terms as 'old age' and 'death' as denoting
qualities which inhere in a substance or subject. We
may think of this tendency as deriving from the
commonsense categorical framework ordinarily assumed
by the speakers of these languages. Here the Buddha
is, in effect, challenging that categorical
framework. We should not think of a discrete enduring
entity, the individual person, which suffers old age
and death; instead we should think of old age and
death as states or conditions which arise dependent
on other states and conditions and which, together
with these antecedent states and conditions,
constitute without residue the individual on which
they are predicated. This is tantamount to the claim
that the notion of an individual (at least in the
sense of 'individual person'(14)) should be subsumed
not under the category of substance but under the
category of logical fiction. If this claim is
accepted, then the question, 'What is it that has old
age and death?' is indeed 'not rightly put'--for it
depends on a category mistake.
We have seen two cases in which the Buddha makes
use of the notion of a category mistake. On what
grounds may such claims be made? The second example
is misleading, in that the Buddha appears to be
basing his assertion on purely pragmatic
considerations: The religious life cannot be lived
unless we accept this alternative categorcial
framework. Much empirical evidence is elsewhere
adduced, however, in favor of the claim being made
here: nowhere
p.496
in our experience do we discover anything other- than
transitory states and conditions, and so on, thus we
have no grounds for asserting the existence of a self
or person which is the bearer of such personal
attributes as old age and death. It is true
nonetheless that such evidence cannot be used in
support of the proposed change in category
subsumption. This is true for the reason that there
is no empirical evidence in favor of the notion that
personal identity is maintained through causal
relations of the sort described in the doctrine of
pa.ticcasamuppaada. Thus there might well be
significance in the fact that the Buddha here adduces
only pragmatic grounds in justification of his claim.
In the case of the fire parable we seem to have
an instance of argument by analogy: like fire,
samsaric existence continues in dependence on causes
and conditions. If these causes and conditions are
removed, both will cease. In both cases, this is
known as 'extinction' (nirvaa.na). Now when a fire
has gone out through exhaustion of its fuel, we do
not ask where it has gone; to do so would be to
commit a category mistake. So when the arhat reaches
'final extinction' (parinirvaa.na) through extinction
of the conditions for samsaric existence, it would
likewise be a category mistake to ask whether he is
reborn, and so on.
The relative weakness of this argument is
instructive. It is extremely difficult to imagine
strictly empirical evidence for the change in
category subsumption being proposed here. It is easy
to understand why the Buddha would insist that the
arhat not be thought of as being reborn, and so on:
any talk of parinirvaa.na as a 'state' into which the
arhat passes upon death would give rise to the
notions of ego and enjoyment, notions which must be
abandoned if nirvaa.na is to be attained, If the
Buddha claims that 'rebirth' and so on do not apply
to the arhat after death, however, then it must be
pointed out that there is no possible experience
which could verify this claim.
This brings us to an important point about the
notion of a category mistake. A consistent empiricist
who presupposes the naive form of the correspondence
theory of truth cannot always effectively argue that
such a mistake has been committed, This is so because
the claim involved in such an assertion is that
experience should be construed in one way rather than
another. There exist many cases, however, in which
each of two or more ways of construing the data is
equally adequate to what is given in experience. In
such cases we regularly appeal to such things as
utility, coherence, and parsimony in order to decide
between competing theories. This route is not open to
the empiricist who maintains a strict form of the
correspondence theory of truth however. To assert
that a category mistake has been made is to say this:
term x, ordinarily subsumed under category c, is
rather to be subsumed under category d. And if truth
is correspondent to states of affairs, then there
must exist facts to which this statement either
corresponds or fails to correspond. Now a consistent
empiricist cannot allow that knowledge of facts or
states of affairs is to be had by any other means
than experience, Thus
p.497
in those cases in which experience is silent as to
which style of category subsumption is to
preferred, (15) our empiricist must likewise be
silent.
If we are to accommodate the existence of cases
such as these, we shall have to revise our notion of
truth along the following lines: Once a categorical
framework is in place, we may speak of truth as
correspondence to facts-since the categorical
framework tells us in effect what is to count as a
fact. When an alteration in the categorical framework
is proposed, however, there are no longer any 'facts'
to which to appeal; thus our decision must be based
on grounds other than correspondence, such as
utility, coherence, and economy. And this is, of
course, tantamount to accepting nonepistemic elements
in our conception of truth.
It is difficult to determine if there is any
awareness within early Buddhism of the difficulties
which arise in connection with the notion of a
category mistake. It is true that pragmatic
considerations are sometimes advanced as grounds for
accepting one style of category subsumption over
another. But this need not be interpreted as
acceptance of a pragmatic theory of truth, that truth
is what 'works'. We have already seen evidence of a
marked pragmatism of another sort in early
Buddhism--the tendency to avoid speculation
concerning issues not directly related to the project
of enlightenment. This latter attitude is perfectly
consistent with the native form of the correspondence
theory of truth. And that this is the limit of the
Buddha's socalled pragmatism would seem to be borne
out by the passage already cited, in which he
proclaims that he does not assert a statement which
he knows to be true, factual, and useless."
We may then surmise that the Buddha's use of
pragmatic criteria in his rejection of the question,
What is it that has old age and death?, represents no
more than an instance of this tendency to avoid
fruitless speculation. There is evidence for this
supposition in the fact that the Buddha refers to
this and similar questions as 'twistings' (visuuka)
and 'writhings' (vipphandita)(16)--terms which he
also applies to the avyaakata.(17) This suggests that
the Buddha has failed to notice one important respect
in which these questions and the avyaakata are
dissimilar, namely, that the former are dismissed as
pseudoproblems while the latter are not. (It is said
that upon the dissolution of ignorance, questions of
the former sort 'become nonexistent'; we should not
expect the same thing to be said of the
avyaakata--only interest in the latter should be
dissolved in enlightenment.) If this is indeed what
the Buddha has done, then this and similar instances
cannot count as evidence for pragmatic elements in
the early Buddhist theory of truth.
Further support for my contention is found in the
fact that nowhere in the early Buddhist literature,
nor in the contemporary non-Buddhist Indian
philosophical literature, does there appear to be any
discussion of alternative conceptions of truth. Now
the correspondence theory would seem to come closest
to the commonsense conception of truth. And it is a
good rule to
p.498
follow in historical reconstruction that, in the
absence of an articulated problematic, endorsements
of what would seem to be the commonsense attitude
toward a philosophical issue should be taken at face
value. (This principle could also be used in support
of the claim that, metaphysically, early Buddhism
represents a form of native realism.) Thus it would
seem we should conclude that the Buddha was not aware
of the problems involved in, on the one hand,
maintaining a strict empiricism and a naive form of
the correspondence theory of truth, and, on the other
hand, utilizing the notion of a category mistake.
I have not discussed this matter solely with an
eye toward establishing a precise philosophical
reconstruction, however. The issues involved here are
of great importance for the subsequent history of
Buddhist philosophy. We have concluded that early
Buddhism is empiricist, that it holds a form of the
correspondence theory of truth, and that it employs
the device of the category mistake. The Abhidharma
schools such as Theravaada and Sarvaastivaada follow
the lead of early Buddhism on these points. Indeed it
is possible to view the dharma theories of these
schools as alternative categorical frameworks which
are designed to replace that framework which is
presupposed by common sense. Here again, however, the
chief justification advanced in favor of these
alternative modes of categorizing experience is that
they correspond to the nature of reality.
It is just this aspect of orthodox Buddhist
thought which Naagaarjuna singles out for criticism
in his dialectical refutations. What the Maadhyamika
critique comes to is the assertion that such notions
as alternative categorical frameworks and revisions
in category subsumption require the incorporation of
nonepistemic elements such as utility into our
conception of truth. In other words. Naagaarjuna
exploits the tension between empiricism and the
correspondence theory on the one hand, and the use of
a notion of categories on the other hand. He sees the
theories of early Buddhism and Abhidharma as
empirically unverifiable and thus confirmable only on
pragmatic grounds; but this gives those theories
precisely the same status as that commonsense
conception of the nature of the world which they were
meant to replace. The final point I wish to make is
that the possibility of viewing early Buddhism in
this manner was probably suggested to Naagaarjuna by
the presence of pragmatic elements in early
Buddhism. Thus while the Buddha may not have solved
the problem which he set for himself by employing the
notion of a category mistake, he did provide the
elements which led to its ultimate solution.
p.499
NOTES
1. K. N. Jayatilleke. Early Buddhist theory of
Knowledge (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1963), pp. 351-359.
2. Collected papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, eds.
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), 2.652.
3. A^ngutara-nikaaya (hereafter cited as A), ed. R.
Morris (London: Pali Text Society. 1955). 2.191.
4. Majjhima-nikaaya (hereafter cited as M), ed. V.
Trenckner (London: Pali Text Society, 1948, 1.
402-403.
5. M 1.395.
6. M 1.426, M 1. 483, and so on.
7. M 1.426. 8. M 1.485. 9. M 1.429. 10. M 1.486-488.
11. It should be pointed out that the Buddha is not
saying that the state of the arahat after death
is indescribable or ineffable. This possibility
is represented by the fourth of the four
alternatives, which the Buddha rejected.
12. Sa.myutta-nikaaya (hereafter cited as S), ed. M.
Leon Feer (London: pall Text Society, 1960),
2.61.
13. This is the Saa^mkhya notion of puru.sa or self
as pure subjectivity. The conclusion that
puru.sa is intrinsically unknowable appears to
have resulted from a line of thought not unlike
the progressive refinement which the notion of
self undergoes in Descartes, Locke, and
Berkeley.
14. It is the chief purpose of early Buddhism to
make this point with respect to the individual
person. Only in Abhidharma is the point made
with respect to all commonsense 'things'.
15. Confer Quine's essay "Ontological Relativity" in
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1969) , pp.
26-68, for examples of such cases. 16. S 2.61.
17. M 1. 485.