

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA

The Religion of Reason and Meditation

GEORGE GRIMM

Edited by
M. Keller-Grimm
Max Hoppe

*"Among beings there are some whose eyes are not quite
covered with dust: they will perceive the truth"*

Original title:
Die Lehre des Buddha, die Religion der Vernunft
und der Meditation
Translated by Bhikkhu Sīlācāra

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

First Edition : Berlin, 1958
Reprint : Delhi, 1973, 1982, 1994

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED

ISBN: 81-208-1194-1

Also available at:

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007
120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004
16 St. Mark's Road, Bangalore 560 001
Ashok Rajpath, Puna 800 004
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PRINTED IN INDIA

BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS,
A-45 NARAINA, PHASE I, NEW DELHI 110 028
AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PVT. LTD.,
BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI 110 007

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PREFACE

The present main work appeared in German language in fourteen impressions during the author's lifetime. The fourteenth impression was translated into English by Bhikkhu Silācāra* in 1926. As appendix were added "The Doctrine of the Buddha as the Flower of Indian Thought," "The Metaphysics of the Buddha" and "Right Cognition." In the meantime also the fifteenth and sixteenth thousand have appeared in the German impression. The author finds the connecting bridge to true Indian spirit as is once more expressed in a most excellent manner in the appendix in the chapter "The Doctrine of the Buddha as the Flower of Indian Thought." This most comprehensive spirit already during the lifetime of Dr. George Grimm enabled a community of faithful followers to gather round him. After his decease on 26th August 1945 at Utting am Ammersee—he was born on 25th February 1868 at Rollhofen near Lauf an der Pegnitz in Middle Franconia—this community grew to considerable numbers; but his friends and admirers extend far beyond this narrower circle (cf. biographical notes at the end of the book). For this reason a second English edition has become necessary, which is herewith presented.

Besides his other literary activities, George Grimm had long been preparing a further new edition of his chief work, *The Doctrine of the Buddha, the Religion of Reason*. The unfavourable times after 1933 prevented the fulfilment of this plan during his lifetime. A new and detailed introduction to this enlarged work that was enriched by much profound knowledge existed in two versions. The later version was selected which, from the author's mature mind in the last years of his life, selects the most appropriate words for the spirit of the teaching. Such spirit is always guided by the words of the Buddha and speaks from the work. The following chapters were almost entirely rewritten: "Sankhārā," "Concentration," and "Contemplative Visions, the Steep Ascent to Nibbāna;" additional chapters were: "Taking the Refuge with the Three Jewels," and "The Reach in the Doctrine of the Buddha of Atakkāvacara, the Idea of Not-Within-The-Realm-Of-Logical-Thought." In accordance with one of George Grimm's

* Bhikkhu Silācāra, known as Buddhist author and translator of the Pāli-Canon, died eighty years old on 27th January 1951.

last wishes, the title of the work was lengthened to *The Doctrine of the Buddha, the Religion of Reason and Meditation*.

Here it is appropriate to refer to a few passages from the most recent publications of well known authors, from which the *fundamental idea* of the teaching also clearly emerges, since the words of the Buddha, taken as they are given, simply call for this interpretation. Only a few pregnant passages are reproduced here, for these references are naturally by no means exhaustive, and indeed cannot possibly be within these narrow limits. Above all, the remarks of the Indianist, *Erich Frauwallner*, in his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* (History of Indian Philosophy), Vol. I, (Otto Müller Verlag Salzburg, 1953) are worthy of note: "... The statement has already been made that Buddhism denies the existence of a soul, and that therefore salvation, extinction (Sanskrit: *nirvāṇam*, Pāli: *nibbānam*), is an ending in nothing. And such a statement has provoked lively discussions and a whole field of literature ... In my view, things would never have seemed so difficult if, from the very beginning, it had been considered on the basis of the old canonical texts. If one had not at first become acquainted with the fantastically embellished legends of a later period, one would hardly have thought, as previously happened, of doubting the historicity of the person of the Buddha, and of seeing a myth of nature in the accounts of his life. In the same way, the question how primitive Buddhism viewed the problem of the soul and of the true nature of salvation would from the very beginning have appeared in a different light, if one had not first become acquainted with late Mahāyāna texts, for the understanding of which there lacked at that time every assumption, and which were bound almost of necessity to lead to misinterpretations. But after these had been arrived at, it was difficult to alter prejudices once formed." Thus Frauwallner also describes it as "a crude and untenable anachronism" when doctrines of later dogmatics, in particular the Dharma doctrine, are already ascribed to the Buddha, above all by Russian scholars.

Frauwallner cleverly brings us nearer to the ancient Indian spirit from which the teaching originated when he states: "And how is it with regard to the question of salvation? Attempts were made in the first place to read the answer to this question from the word with which Buddhism describes salvation, namely from the word extinction (*nirvāṇam*, P. *nibbānam*). This word signifies the extinction of a flame, and salvation is expressly compared to such an extinction. It was then said that just as a flame disappears with extinction and no longer exists, so too is the released one brought to nought with redemption. But this train of thought rests on absolutely false assumptions, and makes the serious mistake of introducing strange and unfamiliar notions into the Indian world of thought. As we have seen already in the section on epic philosophy in the discussion between Bhṛigu and Bharadvāja, the kindling and extinction of a flame do not mean for the Indian of antiquity an arising and passing away, but the fire already existing becomes visible and again invisible thereby, and this is the reason why that description is used for the fate of the soul after death.

In this respect, the statement of the text is perfectly plain and unambiguous, where it says: 'The soul (jīvaḥ) that has entered the body perishes not when the body perishes, but it is like a fire after the firewood is burnt away. Just as the fire is no longer perceivable when no more firewood is added to it, but is, on account of its entering the ether, without fixed abode and therefore difficult to grasp, so does the soul, when it has quitted the body, find itself in a state resembling the ether, but is not perceived because of its fineness; of this there can be no doubt.' Thus with extinction the fire does not pass away, but merely becomes inconceivable. And the same conception underlies the Buddha's comparison of salvation with the extinction of a fire. Just as the path of the extinguished fire cannot be known, as he says, for example, in a passage, so is it not possible to indicate the path of the completely redeemed who have penetrated beyond the fetters and flood of desires, and have attained eternal and unchangeable bliss. This one passage here can suffice ... Moreover, there are other statements and modes of expression which clearly show that extinction was not understood to be annihilation. One speaks of a sphere of extinction (*nirvāṇadhātuk*) into which the redeemed one enters, of a city of extinction (*nirvāṇapuram*). And it is just as unambiguous when the Buddha speaks in the following way of that abode of extinction: 'There is, monks, an unborn, unoriginated, unmade, and unformed. If there were not, monks, this unborn, unoriginated, unmade, and unformed, there would be no way out for the born, the originated, the made, and the formed'. Thus the attempt to read from the expression of extinction (*nirvāṇam*) the concept of annihilation ultimately rests on a misunderstanding" (see 225—227)*.

A few statements still merit our special attention. Thus: "The ordinary man can easily be led astray into regarding his earthly personality as his true self (*ātman*, P. *attā*). This leads him to attach a particular value to this self and to everything connected therewith. In this way craving and thirst awake. He clings to it, he grasps it (*upādānam*), as Buddhism says, and thus creates conditions which fetter him to this existence, and lead him from rebirth to rebirth to a new becoming (*bhavaḥ*). If, on the other hand, he recognizes that all this is not his true self, and in reality does not touch him, then craving is extinguished, he turns away from everything earthly, the fetters binding him to existence are broken, and he attains salvation.

These conceptions are ultimately connected with views with which we are already familiar from the philosophy of the Upanishads. There knowledge of the *Ātmā*, of the Self, and hence of the true I or self, is regarded as decisive for obtaining salvation. For the man who recognizes this true self, will turn away from everything else, and thus become detached from everything earthly. Thus as Yajñavalkya strikingly states in his last discourse with his spouse Maitreyī, it is only the I, the ego, the *Ātmā*, which endows all things with value, and there-

* Cf. George Grimm, "Die Botschaft des Buddha, der Schlüssel zur Unsterblichkeit (The Message of the Buddha, the Key to Immortality)", Baum-Verlag, Pfullingen, Württemberg (Germany).

fore for it only right aspiration has to be considered. What is different from it is sorrowful (*tato 'nyad ārtam*). In both cases, we come across the same ideas, only in Buddhism they are differently expressed and, so to speak negatively formulated. Here it does not say that we should know the true self, but that we must not regard as the self (*ātmanā, P. attā*) that which is not the self. For otherwise craving clings to this false self, and thus brings about an entanglement in the cycle of beings. And salvation takes place not through our becoming conscious of the true self, but through our recognizing as not-self (*anattā, P. anattā*) all that is falsely regarded as the self, and so detaching desire therefrom." (See 192—193).

"Further, ancient Buddhist tradition reports that the Buddha addressed, shortly after the Sermon of Benares, a second discourse to his first five followers which is also preserved and is called the discourse of the characteristics of the not-self. In it he first of all broadly explains that the five groups of grasping* are not to be considered as the self. He then puts to his disciples the question: 'What think you, monks, is corporeality changeable or unchangeable?' 'Changeable, Lord' is the reply. 'But that which is changeable, is it suffering or joy?' 'Suffering, Lord.' 'Now that which is variable, full of sorrow, and subject to change, can we say, if we consider it: this is mine, this am I, this is my Self?' 'This we cannot say, Lord.' The same questions are put and then answered in reference to the other four groups. And then the Buddha adds: 'Therefore, monks, whatever there has been, will be, and is of corporeality, sensation, consciousness, forms, and knowledge, no matter whether in us or in the world outside, whether coarse or fine, low or high, far or near; all this corporeality, sensation, consciousness, these forms, and this knowledge are not mine, are not-I, are not my Self; so must every one really see it who possesses right knowledge. Therefore, monks, the man who sees it is a noble hearer with experience who turns away from corporeality, sensation, consciousness, forms, and knowledge. By thus turning from them, he becomes free from craving. Through the cessation of craving he obtains salvation. In the redeemed one there originates the knowledge of his redemption: 'Rebirth is abolished, the holy course of life is complete, duty is fulfilled, and there is no more return into this world,' thus he knows.' Here, then, is the thought of the false ego-conception, from which we must be freed in order to do away with craving, and thus to detach ourselves from entanglement in the cycle of births, clearly expressed and broadly explained. And above all, it is Yājñavalkya's statement, namely that everything different from the Ātmā, the true self, is sorrowful, which is here the basis. Only it appears differently expressed in keeping with the whole arrangement of the teaching, indeed in the form that all that is sorrowful cannot be the self or I." (See 194—195).

Frauwallner points out that the argument of the discourse on the characteristics of the not-self which the Buddha delivered at Benares to his first five

* within which Personality is exhausted without remainder, as we shall see later on.

followers, recurs in numerous passages of the Canon. "But with this argument the Buddha has achieved what he wants. The false belief that sees the self in the earthly personality is thus rejected. At the same time, however, every statement concerning the existence or non-existence of the self is avoided.

Mistaken attempts have certainly been made to read from the above mentioned argument a denial of the self on the part of the Buddha. But this, of course, goes too far; for the unbiased judge all that is said is that the five groups are not the self or I; and this too is the only purpose that is served by that argument. Every attempt to discover more in it, would go beyond this purpose and miss the point. Indeed, from the statement that everything perishable and sorrowful cannot be the self, one might sooner draw the deduction that the self is therefore imperishable and free from suffering, and that any one arguing in this way presupposes the existence of such a soul. Moreover, in connexion with the above argument, the texts of the Buddhist Canon never say that a self does not exist, but at most that it is not conceivable. Again, attempts have been made to interpret this by saying that the Buddha chose this method of expression in order not to alarm the weaker of his disciples through a denial of the self and through the resultant annihilation with salvation. But such trains of thought are quite alien to the Buddha's proclamation. He does not go in search of followers, least of all in such crooked ways. Finally, the Buddha himself guards against such an interpretation of his words. In one of the discourses in which he has shown again in the usual way that the five groups are not the I or self, he then breaks out in the following words: 'And I, O monks, who speak thus, and teach thus, am accused wrongly, vainly, falsely, and inappropriately by some ascetics and Brahmins: 'A denier is the ascetic Gautama, he teaches the destruction, annihilation, and perishing of the being that now exists (*satah satthasaya*).' These ascetics wrongly, vainly, falsely, and inappropriately accuse me of being what I am not, O monks, and of saying what I do not say: 'A denier is the ascetic Gautama, he teaches the destruction, annihilation, and perishing of the being, that now exists.' Only one thing, monks, do I teach, now as before, namely suffering and the abolition of suffering.'

To sum up, we can say, therefore, that the Buddha declines to answer the question concerning the existence of a self, because he regards it as one of those questions that lead to fruitless discussions and explanations, and divert us from the real goal of salvation. But a denial of the soul is not expressed; rather is it described merely as inconceivable, wherever an express statement occurs." (See 224—225.)*

Gustav Mensching writes about the problem of the self (*attā*) in his *Buddhistische Geisteswelt* (The spiritual World of Buddhism)** which embraces the whole

* *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* (History of Indian Philosophy), Vol. I, by Erich Frauwallner, Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg, 1953.

** *Buddhistische Geisteswelt*. Vom historischen Buddha zum Lamaismus. Texte ausgewählt und eingeleitet von Gustav Mensching (The Spiritual World of Buddhism. From the historical Buddha to Lamaism. Texts selected and introduced by Gustav Mensching). Holle Verlag, Darmstadt-Baden-Baden-Genf, 1955.

VIII, 10: just as the path of the extinct fire cannot be known, so too is it impossible to indicate the path of the wholly redeemed ... The point here is to show that the Buddha unquestionably assumed an ultimate self about which he did not speak for reasons previously mentioned. But, as I already wrote in my above-mentioned review of H. v. Glasenapp's work on 'Vedānta und Buddhismus' (Vedānta and Buddhism), even the formula of 'entering' into nirvāna, to be met frequently, is wholly without meaning, if within the individual there is nothing that enters. It is also difficult to see how a being, when recollecting his previous births (pubbenivāsānussatīnāne), can conceive all these dharmacombinations as his births. It is well known that in the Questions of the Greek King Menandros (Indian: Milinda), who reigned in Northern India in the first century B. C., the question is also discussed in the Milindapanha whether the person reborn, who, of course, is not the same individual as the deceased, therefore escapes the fruits of his deeds. The question is answered in the negative with the argument that the existence of the new individual is conditioned by that of the deceased, just as the fire, carelessly kindled by me in my own house and spreading to my neighbour's house, is, of course, not the same fire that I kindled, but is yet conditioned by the one kindled by me, so that I am also responsible for it. But this causal connexion, as we shall see, refers only to phenomenal reality, and, as already stated, one cannot see how I can consider and recall as *my* forms of existence phenomenal causality and its results in the form of successive individual existences, without the assumption of a self in the background."

We must therefore always clearly bear in mind that the Buddha taught in ancient India which was imbued with a profoundly metaphysical spirit. "Here religions, outwardly most different, join hands in the incessant demand to *despise as perishable everything earthly, and to keep one's eyes firmly on the imperishable*, whether this be called Brahman, Nirvāna, or anything else." * And although there were materialists, in such a bright light there could also be no lack of corners with the greatest darkness, but they were the outsiders, characterized as deniers, as gainsayers. We meet this genuinely Indian spirit in the *Mahāvagga* I, 14, a work of the *Vināya-Piṭaka*, where we are told how thirty Brahmins youths ask the Buddha whether he has seen a woman who ran away from them after she had robbed one of them. The Buddha solemnly replies by asking them: "What is better, young men, to look for the woman or to look for your own self?" The ancient Indian spirit renders the youths equally susceptible to the Master's question; they abandon everything and accept him as their teacher. We found already indicated how the Buddha answered this question from practical experience and in his own quite special way. In the present work this answer in all its fullness and extent becomes for the attentive reader a guide that promises him victory.

* *Die Fragen des Königs Menandros* (The Questions of King Menandros). First rendered into German from the Pali by Otto Schröder. Verlag Paul Rastz, Berlin SW., 1905.

province of Buddhism: "Research in the West is not wholly in agreement on what was meant in the original teaching of the Buddha. Is each and every self denied, or does the Buddha wish to deprive of the real self only the world of phenomena, and hence that which has concrete existence, and thus all knowledge and denominability? I for my part regard the latter view as being very much to the point, and believe that the texts also support this conception. By illusion of personality is clearly understood the complex of the five groups of clinging which is comprised in the individual. Apart from these factors that constitute personality, there is no personality. But the man who is unredeemed erroneously identifies with the self certain of these factors of existence. The famous sermon of the not-self says in effect that the Buddha makes it clear that none of the finite and fleeting elements of existence is 'my self.' Thus there is stated perfectly clearly the existence of an ultimate absolute behind the fleeting factors. The refusal of a statement concerning the existence or non-existence of a self proper means that the categories of 'being' and 'not-being,' which spring from, and refer only to, the finite world, do not apply to the absolute. A distinction is drawn between three kinds of the (finite) self as possible (but erroneous) views, namely the material self, the spiritual self, and the self consisting only of consciousness. Man must be delivered from all three forms of the so-called self. Even consciousness is, as we see, a group of existence-factors, and consequently is not maintained in the cycle of rebirths; it arises and passes away in accordance with the law of dependent origination. The pernicious character of finite individual existence is in particular characterized by the assumption of ten fetters, the first five of which lead to a lower rebirth, and the sixth to the tenth, in so far as the first five are broken, lead to a higher existence which, of course, is also in need of salvation." (See 51—52).

In a note to these remarks Mensching states: "M. v. Glasenapp defends the other point of view, e. g., in *Vedānta und Buddhismus* (Vedānta and Buddhism) (Mainzer Akademieschrift 1950) and in many other passages. The author has already dealt, critically and in detail in the *Theol. Literaturzeitung* (1953, 331 seq.), with the interpretation of the anatā-dogma by H. v. Glasenapp, and has taken up the viewpoint that the denial of the 'self' can refer only to the empirical personality within the phenomenal world. At the time I wrote: 'If, therefore, it is said of all dharmas and dharmacomplexes that they are anatā, then, in my opinion, this can only mean that they really are not or have not that which in the empirical world is described as I or self.' I am glad to find precisely the same point of view defended in a work by Erich Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Vol. I, 1953, (History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 1953) which has in the meantime appeared." Mensching then returns to Frauwallner's previously mentioned remarks on anatā. In reference to Samyutta-Nikāya II, 86, where mention is made of the extinction of an oil-lamp whose fuel was used up, he gives in detail Frauwallner's statements concerning the concept of extinction in the ancient Indian's world of religious ideas. He then goes on to say: "Now the Buddha says exactly the same thing, e. g. Udāna

For the Buddha the questions arise from what is given, and an answer is always coupled with realization. It points always in the direction where freedom alone becomes possible, in the direction that lies in a detachment from the personality and its world. George Grimm points out that the Buddha's simple ideas, which could be understood even by a cowherd and appear again and again as the foundation of the teaching, can be presented in a syllogism which he calls the "Great Syllogism", as the reader will discover in the introduction. This train of thought, as known to us in the quotations, is as follows: "What is known as perishable, and for that very reason as sorrowful for me, has therefore to be considered really wisely: 'This belongs to me not, this I am not, this is not my Self.' Now, with all that is ever seen, thought, known, and investigated in the mind (so it says in the 35th Sutta of the Majjhima-Nikāya), I observe an arising and passing away, and accordingly recognize it as transient and the bringer of suffering. And this applies to everything knowable in reality: 'This belongs to me not, this I am not, this is not my Self.'*" This very embodiment in a syllogism certainly seems to many to be doubtful and questionable, since to them it appears to demand "illegitimately" a scientific acknowledgment of the correctness of the Buddha's teaching. Those who think thus can set their minds at rest, for it is a syllogism whose major premiss shines only for *religious* minds, who alone clearly feel the inconstant, inadequate, and insecure element in our unfortunate situation, and who in addition surmise that at bottom they are free from all that. It concerns only rare religious minds who want to *know* where others merely believe. Whether they then see through *everything* knowable in and around themselves, and discover that everything is feeble and unstable, and, on account of its sorrow-bearing nature, is not the self or I, depends on their power of knowledge, in so far as it can give them, with the present fruit of their deeds, the possibility of knowing with sufficient keenness, in order to grasp completely the *sublime truth of suffering*. The syllogism makes it specially clear that the contemplator starts from that which is given, which is always his personality and the world that is known thereby. In so far as it is seen through as "not the self," it is given up; and this is always seen in practical life. This syllogism certainly has an *assumption*, namely a religious person who aspires to knowledge. He is so deeply affected by the transitoriness of everything earthly, that his heart would break and he would be in despair, if this severe shock did not bring him the great positive principle of his life, namely the experience with the holy. And this experience, which is renewed and deepened again and again in meditations, always determines more and more his thoughts, and thus his words and actions.

The presentation of the ancient doctrine was simple; it gave a clear prescription for deliverance and detachment. This may also be what Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan tries to express when he writes: "Historical Buddhism means the

* *Die Botschaft des Buddha, der Schlüssel zur Unsterblichkeit*. By George Grimm. Baum-Verlag, Pfullingen/Württ. (Germany) 1953.

spread of the Upanishad doctrines among the peoples. It thus helped to create a heritage which is living to the present day" (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 471). Of course, only an exceedingly great man, indeed the greatest, could express knowledge in a form so universally intelligible, knowledge that is recognized only by sages in their heart of hearts (*paccaṭam vedītabbo viññāhī*) (Sam. Nīk. I. V).

It is evident that a teaching, which sages in their heart of hearts acknowledge, is particularly shaky when it is subjected to the interpretation of scribes and scholars who lack that which the teaching first brings to life, namely the inner experience. Thus from the great idea of detachment comes the small one of denial. A diffuse and lengthy erudition does less and less justice to the profound thoughts of the teaching. This applies to the commentary literature since the time of Buddhaghosa (fifth century A. D.) rather than to the *Abhidhamma*. Through valuable ideas in the sphere of the analysis of consciousness, the *Abhidhamma* often had a very stimulating effect, although in the schools of Mahāyāna fruitful ideas came to light just because the spirit of meditation stimulated them there. Although the really religious minds are led again and again on to the right path by their own genuine efforts at liberation, the degeneration and decline of the teaching through scribes and scholars is nevertheless a great misfortune for the many who want to hear. The scholars have the say, and their words befog that which originally was clearly said.*

An example of this degeneration and decline in its formal expression is found stated by Herbert Günther in *Das Seelenproblem im älteren Buddhismus* (Rascher Verlag, Zürich). "In all cases where in Pāli *anattan* is used as predicate, and this is the majority of all authoritative passages, the translation is, as one might expect, 'is not the I,' 'is not the Self,' but there also occur other renderings, such as 'is without self,' and 'unsubstantial.' The last two translations are for

*) A. P. Buddhadatta, the well-known Sinhalese Pāli scholar and head of the Aggārāma at Ambalangoda in Ceylon (appointed as the Agga-Mahāpandita at the Council of Rangoon) wrote on 4th March 1947 concerning the English edition of George Grimm's main work in a letter to his daughter:

"I read that book carefully and found, as you have stated in your letter itself 'that he was the recoverer of the old genuine doctrine of the Buddha, which has been submerged'. When we read our Pāli texts and the commentaries, we get the idea that Buddhism is a kind of Nihilism. But it refuses to accept nihilism or eternalism. Thus I was puzzled for a long time to understand the true meaning of Buddhism though I was born a Buddhist. Many people do not go so far in these matters. At last I understood that Buddha's teaching was not so difficult to understand by the masses as they are now represented in the Canonical books; but was easily understood by the common people at that time. Those people who came to the Buddha were not all great thinkers; many of them had only a general knowledge of things. But they were able to realize the truth, as it was preached by the Buddha. This was through the way pointed out by Dr. Grimm. They could easily understand when the Buddha preached that 'your body, mind, etc. are not you or yours; the eye, ear, tongue, etc. are not yours; therefore cling not to them, give them up; when you have no clinging whatever, then you would be free from all suffering', and so on. When one truly goes by this path he will be freed and will realize the Truth."

the Pali Canon groundless, and cannot in any circumstances be upheld." (p. 14-15). He then demonstrates this by a careful philological interpretation of the textual passages in question. In another passage he states that the interpretation *attavirahata* "without ātman" cannot apply to older Buddhism, but comes from a late period when *attān* (Sanskrit: *ātman*) = *svabhāva* means "substantiality," and hence *anattān* = *nirkevalbhāva* = unsubstantial. Karl Seidenstücker, the Indianist, in his essay on Early Buddhism* refers to the 'peculiar interpretation of the anattā doctrine in the sense of denying the real essence outside that which in man is transient and mortal. This tendency occurs the more plainly, the more recent the writings, until in the *Abhidhamma*, and especially in exegetic literature and in commentaries (approximately a thousand years after the Buddha), it is presented to us, so to speak, in pure culture." This mental tendency is detrimental to all real meditation, and from it absolutely no bridge can be made to the unbounded, that is to say to an awakening of kindness to all that lives and breathes, of sympathy for all tortured creatures, of mutual joy, and of sublime equanimity. Edward Conze says**: "The meditation on Dharmas dissolves other people, as well as oneself, into a conglomeration of impersonal and instantaneous dharmas. It reduces our manhood into five heaps, or pieces, plus a label. If there is nothing in the world except bundles of Dharmas—as cold and as impersonal as atoms—instantaneously perishing all the time, there is nothing which friendliness and compassion could work on. One cannot wish well to a Dharma which is gone by the time one has come to wish it well, nor can one pity a Dharma—say a 'mind-object'—or a 'sight-organ,' or a 'sound-consciousness.' In those Buddhist circles where the method of Dharmas was practised to a greater extent than the Unlimited, it led to a certain dryness of mind, to aloofness, and to lack of human warmth. . . . Here we must add that it so happened because in respect of the dharmas (Pāli: *dhammā*), the meaning of the words had been lost which, with a contemplation of the objects of reflectiveness in the ancient suttas, constantly calls them to mind: "And independently he dwells without support, and clings to nothing in the world (*avāsito ca viharati, na ca kiñci loke upādīyati*). It was not imagined that: "This belongs to me not, this I am not, this is not my Self," as proclaimed again and again by the Buddha, applied also to the dharmas.

Conze comes to speak of the prophecies which prestage the disappearance of the true teaching, in spite of the outward existence of Buddhism; the oldest of these give five hundred years for the duration of the teaching. Then in another passage we read: ". . . In the beginning of the Order, we hear of many who became Arhats, some of them with astonishing ease. Fewer and fewer cases are recorded in later writings. In the end, as shown by the prophecies quoted above, the conviction spread that the time for Arhats was over. The cream had been taken off the milk. The scholars ousted the saints, and erudition took the

* *Yāna*, Journal for Early Buddhism and religious culture. Pt. 1. X. year Jan./Feb. 1957.

** Buddhism: Its Essence and Development, p. 129.

place of attainment. One of the Scriptures of the Sarvastivādins relates the terrible and sad story of the death of the last Arhat by the hands of one of the scholars. The story well illustrates the mood of the times." (Loc. cit., p. 115-116.)

Radhakrishnan reflects on the doctrine* which directs his attention to the sutta of the burden and of the bearer of the burden (Sam. Nik. XXII, 22): "Nirvāna is not a lapse into a void, but only a negation of the flux and a positive return of the self to itself. The logical conclusion from this would be that something is, though it is not the empirical self. This is also in agreement with Buddha's statement that the self is neither the same as nor entirely different from the skandhas. It is not a mere composite of mind and body, nor is it the eternal substance, exempt from the vicissitudes of change. The discussion of the burden and its bearer makes out that the skandhas which are the burden and the pudgala which is the bearer are distinct entities. If they were identical, there is no need to distinguish between them. 'O, ye mendicants, I am going to point out to you the burden as well as the carrier of the burden: the five states are the burden and the pudgala is the carrier of the burden; he who holds that there is no soul is a man with false notions.' To be born is to take up the burden; to lay it down is to attain bliss or nirvāna."

Already in the Canon, therefore, we find the discourse of the burden and of the bearer of the burden. Heinrich Gomperz writes of the Vaibhāshikas (literally opponents): "Possibly it is the same school that was described also as that of the I-teachers (Pāli: Puggala-vādins, 'personalists,' De La Vallée-Pousain *Buddhisme*, p. 163), because it assumed an imperishable I or self, without, however expressing itself concerning the relation of the self to the five parts that constitute man. Badly informed as we are of their teaching, they may have remained close enough to the original viewpoint of the Buddha."**

What we know of them is summarised as follows by De La Vallée-Pousain in his work *Nirvāna*: "When the Buddha refuses to endorse the identity of, or the difference between, the principles of life and of the body, he does so (according to the explanation of the Pudgala-vādins) because the pudgala, the life-principle or life-essence (*satva, kathāgata*), is in reality neither identical with, nor different from, the elements (*skandhas*). In comparison with the elements, the pudgala is beyond description (*avācya*); the pudgala is not perceived independently of the elements, and hence it is not different from the elements. It does not have the nature of the elements, for in that case it would be subject to birth and death; hence it is not identical with the elements. In just the same way, it is also impossible to say that it is perishable or imperishable. The pudgala is a thing-in-itself (*dṛavya*); it is defined as the doer of deeds, and as the one who reaps the fruits. Related to it are rebirth and nirvāna, the state of captivity and the

* S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 386-387.

** Heinrich Gomperz, *Die indische Theosophie vom geschichtlichen Standpunkt gemeinverständlich dargestellt*. Verlag Eugen Diederichs, 1925.

state of freedom". We also find the interpretation of their teaching defined as follows: "The pudgala is something absolutely incomprehensible; thus it is no dharma since it does not have merely a momentary existence; but, on the other hand, it is also not an immaterial *mental* substance existing through itself, like the individual atman of the Brahmins."

According to the testimony of the wellknown Chinese pilgrim, Hsuen Tsiang, who travelled through India from 619 to 645 A. D., the viharas of the Pudgala-vādins were in their heyday at that time. They enjoyed the special favour of the zealous follower of Asoka, the great Indian Emperor Harsha (606—647). Their main centres, which were in western India, were, on account of that position, the earliest destroyed by Moslem attacks and vandalism.

We have no objective description of their exposition of the Buddha's teaching. They had remained independent thinkers, and the dogmatists had found them to be troublesome opponents. And yet the justification of their attitude is seen through existing statements; even in the 22nd dialogue of the *Majj. Nik.* it says: "Already in this visible phenomenon I declare the Tatbhāgata to be inaccessible and ungraspable." De La Vallée-Poussin also recognizes that for them the problem of nirvāna is simple and logical. In his work *Nirvāna* we read: "Their numerical and pedagogical importance was not properly appreciated by Indianists who are fond of describing them as 'heretics.' Their prestige was noteworthy."

Edward Conze tries to understand their obvious request: "They spoke of an indefinable principle called the *pudgala*, the person, who is neither different nor not different from the five Skandhas. It persists through the several lives of a being until he reaches Nirvana. It has a sort of middle position between our true and our empirical self. On the one hand, it accounts for our sense of personal identity (like the "empirical self"), and on the other, it lasts into Nirvana (like the "true self"). Among all controversial issues, this one was considered as the most critical of all. Throughout the centuries the orthodox never wearied of piling argument upon argument to defeat this admission of a *Self* by the Pudgalavadins. But the more tenaciously and persistently one tries to keep something out of one's mind, or out of a system of thought, the more surely it will come in. The orthodox, in the end, were forced to admit the notion of a permanent ego, not openly, but in various disguises, hidden in particularly obscure and abstruse concepts, like the *Subconscious life-continuum* (bhavanga) of the Theravadins, the *continued existence of a very subtle Consciousness* of the Sautrantikas, the *Root-Consciousness* of Mahasanghikas, etc. The *Store-Consciousness* of the Yogacarins is conceived in the same spirit. As soon as the advice to disregard the individual self had hardened into the proposition that *'there is no self'*, such concessions to common-sense became quite inevitable." (Buddhism: its Essence and Development, pp. 169—170).

All these discussions spring from a request, lying deep within us, which cannot be ignored with impunity. *Conze* sees it behind the genuine Buddhist disciple's striving for detachment, and expresses it in the following words: "It is assumed

first of all that there is an ultimate reality, and secondly that there is a point in ourselves at which we touch that ultimate reality" (Loc. cit. p. 110.). Mrs. *Rhys Davids*, the well known Pāli scholar and translator, has of all English Buddhists given to this problem the consideration it merits. But *in addition to this*, the present work takes the Pāli Canon simply as it is given; and it will be clear to the attentive reader how auspicious it is to be introduced to the doctrine of the greatest of gods and men by a *congenial* mind.

Karl Eugen Neumann, who through his translations became a very special pioneer of Buddhism in German-speaking countries, read the book in its first edition. It first appeared in 1915, the year in which Neumann died. He wrote to the author: "The work is undoubtedly by far the most important exposition of Buddhism that has appeared since Oldenberg's book. Nevertheless, it is incomparably deeper and more comprehensive, and is in every respect a profound and exhaustive study. From a first cursory perusal, two explanations in particular have struck me as being quite outstanding, namely *anattā* as Not-I, and *āśaso* as influences."

Friedrich Zimmermann (1851—1917) became a grateful reader of the *Lehre des Buddha*, as is seen from his letters to the author. Under the name of Subhadra Bhikṣu, he became known as the author of *Buddhistischer Katechismus zur Einführung in die Lehre des Buddha Gōtama* which first appeared in 1888, and then ran to fourteen impressions, and was translated into seventeen languages. The following statements are of interest: "I was particularly satisfied with your treatment of the difficult theme of personality and *anattā*. So much preposterous nonsense about this teaching has been brought to light in Buddhist periodicals, that I began to doubt whether any of our German 'Buddhists' really understood the subject. It seemed as though everyone wanted to show off his profundity of thought, in order to plunge the reader into confusion and misunderstanding, and to bring into discredit the principal teaching of the Master. For at bottom, all these pensive pronouncements say in effect that the Buddha taught the absurdity that there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in and behind the personality; on the contrary, that the subject of knowing does not exist at all, and that in modern language the Buddha simply stated: 'Brothers, I proclaim to you that I am not; I am nothing but an illusion.' Here it was not even explained who then really had this illusion, so that it was again left hanging in the air without any support."

I have often reproached myself that my dislike of all polemical writing and my positive nervousness of it deterred me from taking action against this nonsense and from putting an end to it by a precise presentation of the truth. Now I am highly delighted that you have done this, and indeed so thoroughly and comprehensively that the unreflecting followers of nihilism will not be able to advance against it."

The Indianist, *Dr. Karl Seidenstücker*, best known for his *Pāli-Buddhismus in Übersetzungen*, stated: "... Apart from questions of quite minor importance, I must say that I have not yet found anywhere so profound and striking a present-

tation of the Buddha's teaching. Above all, I am pleased with the assertion and emphasis of the transcendental subject; this was first and foremost the one thing that was necessary . . . " Later Seidenstücker became a close collaborator of George Grimm.

The reader will easily be able to convince himself that the Buddha brought the mind of ancient India to the highest perfection. He also has sought for the *Ātman*, as all great minds have sought it. "Know thyself!" ran the inscription on the temple of the Pythia. And Herakleitos, in the search for his I, had come so far that he was able to assert that the boundaries of the soul could not be found, even if all roads were run through. Further, like all India, the Buddha also had sought for the *Attā* in the *indirect* way, by taking away from the *Attā* everything that is not the *Attā*. But he followed this way so radically and with so much success, that everything cognizable, especially also the mental, especially also *thinking*, revealed itself to him as *Anattā* and thereby as something that had to be overcome by us. And for this reason he says: You teach the *Attā*, but I teach what the *Attā* is *not*. You know the *Attā*, but I only know what the *Attā* is *not*. Therefore you are always talking about the *Attā*, whereas I have the *Anattā*-method, the *anattā-vāda*. And this I have because only thus is the *Attā*, that is, myself, able to become free from suffering and happy. "But, monks, cleave ye to any I-doctrine (*attā-vāda*), whereby no sorrow more can come to him who cleaves, neither lamentation nor suffering, neither grief nor despair? Know ye of any such I-doctrine?" — "Indeed, we do not, Lord." — "Well said, monks. Neither do I know of any such I-doctrine."*

And so the Buddha has *not* become unfaithful to Indian thought; on the contrary, his teaching is the *efflorescence* thereof. He is 'the true Brahman' who has wholly realized the ideal of the Upanishads. And for this very reason, India will once more welcome him as her greatest son, as soon as she has again recognized this."

* These sentences and the notes appertaining thereto are taken from the Appendix of this work "The Flower of Indian Thought." "From this explanation it will probably become clear without further ado that our modern form of saying "the I is transcendent" is not the mode of expression used by the *Attā-vāda*, for whom the I is not absolutely transcendent, inasmuch as it is ultimately found in pure cognition; but it is really the language of the *Anattā-vāda*, since the statement "the I is transcendent" means: "the I is beyond all cognition, it absolutely cannot be found out." How stupid, how incredibly stupid it is to accuse him who teaches the transcendence of the I, of adhering to the *Attā-vāda*, will certainly become clear to the greatest simpleton, when he learns that the Buddha even verbally teaches about the I, what is involved in the conception of transcendence: "I am not any-where whatsoever, to any one whatsoever, in anything whatsoever." "But since the I and anything belonging to the I is not to be found (*anupalabhamāne*) . . ." "Even in this present life is the Accomplished One not to be found out (*amanuvejja*)." "Because no kind of cognition penetrates to the I, nothing whatsoever, absolutely nothing, can be told about it; the rest is—silence! And it is only this *silence* about the I, no more, that the Buddha teaches. "This is the *true* ātman teaching, the *true* attā-vāda" (Cf. Sam. Nik., XLV, 4).

Meanwhile, on the occasion of great declarations, the Buddha has in fact been extolled by Indians in authority as India's greatest son. Of course, we shall not be able to set much store by public demonstrations at which the spirit of the teaching is easily falsified, since no teaching, like the original one of the Buddha, appeals so intimately to the individual, and can become alive solely as a result of *you and me*. Naturally, this applies far less to the later forms of Buddhism which have become popular. It was very fortunate for their religious element that scholastic subtleties never gained importance in wider circles. But the transforming power of the teaching was still great for a long time, and it certainly is still, where it is able to appeal again and again to the individual man's conscience.

What the currents of thought that had received their impulse from the Buddha were able to achieve, had become clear in India, in the very country of their origin, although there they lost the name of their founder. Buddhism had already fulfilled a great mission, when the last remains of the forms that were signalized by this name vanished from India almost without a trace at the beginning of the thirteenth century, not at least because, having become withered and impotent internally, they were no longer able to hold their own among Indians with their powerful, decidedly metaphysical abilities. The teaching had entered deep into Hinduism and had there remained alive. Even in its later development, its spirit had had an extremely stimulating effect; its benevolent attitude, with a foundation of incomparable excellence, had gained a profound and wide influence, and had contributed quite specially to the spreading of a gentleness which extends even to the animal world. The dividing barriers of caste were initially overcome by it from within, since in his moral worth or worthlessness the individual alone had the final say. Although the Brahminic reaction since Kumārla (first half of the eighth century A. D.), and possibly also in its opposition to Buddhism, led to a further development of the caste system and to its final rigidity, the strong spirit of gentleness, tolerance, and conciliatory disposition was preserved, in so far as in Hinduism the religious aspiration of the individual with its development of kindness positively retained its significance. And this spirit is again acknowledged by Radhakrishnan, India's philosophical Vice-chancellor, when he says: "Buddhism succeeded so well because it was a religion of love, giving voice to all the inarticulate forces which were working against the established order and the ceremonial religion, addressing itself to the poor, the lowly, and the disinherited" (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 475). And another notable Indian exclaims: "It is indeed remarkable that, in this country of the most varied sects and confessions of faith, when we gained our independence, we resolved to take our refuge in the wheel of the doctrine set in motion for the first time by Gotama the Buddha on the sacred soil of Sarnath near Kāshi (Benares)."

This, gentle reader, is the spirit which the book wishes to convey to you. But it calls upon you to read with attention, and indeed with devotion. Only then will you become conscious of this spirit, which in addition enables you to attain

something even higher, whereby the entire world and with it all sufferings are overcome. It will give to each that which he is able to derive from it in accordance with his talents and abilities. It offers itself as the companion for silent hours; and what has been read summons us to meditation. We must thoroughly chew the nourishment received, so that it may be well digested; and this gives us a simile for proper reading. But with proper reading the impulse for our meditation will grow from the book, for without such meditation we cannot obtain any living knowledge. With such use it will become the friend and counsellor, and it may be that it will be the *one* book that replaces all libraries. But soon (it is already on the way) the reader will come to know the truth of the words: "Every doctrine of which you can say that it leads to freedom from passion and not to passion; to independence and not to obligation; to a reduction and not to an increase of worldly gain; to frugality and not to covetousness; to satisfaction and not to dissatisfaction; to solitude and not to sociability; to performance and not to indolence; to pleasure in good and not to pleasure in evil; of such a doctrine you can say positively that this is *the* rule, this is *the* teaching, this is the Master's message."*

For the valuable assistance in the translation of the revised and the new chapters the editors owe greatest thanks to Mr. E. F. J. Payne, translator of the works of Arthur Schopenhauer into English.
Utting, 3rd December 1957.

Max Hoppe

* Quoted from *Buddhism* by Edward Conze.

INTRODUCTION

I

Who was the Buddha?

The Buddha was born about the middle of the sixth century B. C. in the Indian city of Kapilavatthu as Prince Siddhattha, son of King Suddhodana from the family of the Gotamides, and was therefore an Indian. What this means will be clear from what follows.*

From time immemorial, India formed her own world. She is shut off in the north-west by the Indo-Persian mountain frontier, in the north-east by the Himalayas having the highest mountains in the world, in the south-west by the Arabian Sea, and in the south-east by the Indian Ocean. Although her being thus cut off was not so great as to make commercial relations very difficult with neighbouring nations, such as had existed from the remotest times, it was nevertheless enough to protect her, at any rate during the time of her development, from invasion by foreign armies, and from the inundation and drying up of her culture through foreign influences. When later the storms of the Greek, Scythian, and Mohammedan invasions broke over India, the Indian world of thought was already consolidated, had become scholastically finished, and therefore could no longer be influenced. On the contrary, as regards a subjugated India, the foreign conquerors became just as intellectually dependent as did the Roman Empire with regard to conquered Greece. The culture of India is, therefore, thoroughly original. Its development was favoured by the climate of the country which freed men from the ordinary cares of life, and thus gave them leisure to devote themselves to the great problems raised by existence. The northern part of India is subtropical, but the greater part is tropical; and Indian poetry of all kinds, such as the epic, the lyric, and the drama, reflects the charm and magic of the tropical world.

The dominant race in India belongs to the Indo-European group of nations which settled in seven principal branches as Indians and Iranians in Central and Southern Asia, as Greeks, and Italians in the South, and as Slavs, Teutons, and Celts in the northern countries of Europe. It was quite obvious, and had been

* The historical foundations for the following remarks are for the most part based on Paul Deussen's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. I.

known from very early times, that the languages of Greece and Rome were more closely, and all the cultural languages of Europe more distantly, related to one another; and yet no one was able to give a satisfactory account of this relationship. But after Sanskrit, the language of the ancient Indians, had become known towards the end of the last century, it was a discovery, not to be missed, that Indians and Persians in Asia, Greeks and Romans, Celts, Teutons, and Slavs in Europe were the descendants of an original and homogeneous race. On the other hand, it is no longer possible to discover the original abode of this mother-race. The partition of this original race into seven main branches, and the migration of the latter into their present domiciles occurred in prehistoric times.

The Indo-Europeans who had settled in India, at all times called themselves Aryans, and still so called themselves even in the Buddha's time. The Buddha himself says in the *Digha-Nikāya* XVI, 1, 28: "As far as Aryans dwell, and as far as commerce extends that is fostered by merchants, this defended city of Pataliputta will shine as the first."

The original meaning of the word "arya" is "devout," "pious," and so "the Aryans" are "those belonging to the pious," in which sense the word *arya* was also originally understood as the name of a people. This alone indicates the original nature of the culture that was created by the Aryan Indians.

"Pious" is a *religious* concept, and means having a religious view of life and the world. But a view of the world is religious, when a man feels in his conscience obliged also to pay heed to the securing of his great future after death, and considers himself "bound" (*religatur*) to this obligation, no matter whether he believes in a personal god or not. This is the proper meaning of the concept religion, however surprising this definition may appear to modern man who in this sense is quite arreligious. On account of this obligation of his conscience, a religious man in particular sees himself compelled no longer to arrange his conduct exclusively for the unrestrained satisfaction of the desire for sensual pleasure, but to ponder over the consequences that could result for the coming life from such a brutal egoism. Thus a religious view of life inevitably leads to the ennoblement of man's conduct of life, and, if such a view inspires a whole people, it improves their conduct too. If this restraint that binds one's conscience is lacking, then at best we may get civilization, a refinement of the love of pleasure, for the satisfaction of which men do not shrink even from the most brutal measures.

From the very beginning, the Aryan Indians have been religiously minded in this sense, and have remained so even to the present time; indeed, it can be said that they were and are generally the most religious people on earth. They therefore succeeded in producing a noble and sublime *culture* which saved them in particular from a "civilization of factory chimneys," according to Nietzsche "the most pitiable of all civilizations."*

* What a sin there is against the generations to come in the unlimited exploitation of the treasures of the earth which is carried on for the purpose of an ever greater satisfaction of the craving for enjoyment!

The religious character of Arya-Indian culture is also specially clear from the following words of Deussen: "In India there is no real historiography as in Greece and Rome, and historians of the ordinary category (like those who could not forgive a Plato for not being a Demosthenes) charitably shrug their shoulders that so highly gifted a people has not succeeded in producing a permanent organism of State, not to speak of a public oratory, indeed has not even managed to write down its history. They should rather try to understand that the Indians were too superior, after the manner of the Egyptians, to take a delight in lists of kings, that is, to count shadows as Plato would say; they should endeavour to see that the Aryan genius disdained to take temporal things and their order and arrangement too seriously, since it sought the eternal with all the energy of its powers, and expressed this in a very rich literature that was poetical, religious and philosophical."

How the religious frame of mind controlled from the earliest times the life of the Aryan Indian is shown in abundance by the Hymns of the *Rig-veda** which originated in the third millennium B. C., and are attributed to wise seers or rishis who "investigated with insight in their thinking." (123). Thus they were *philosophers* and not theologians; and accordingly their world-view was philosophical. But every philosophical view of the world is based on two elements, namely a looking out into the external world, and a looking into one's own self, into the depths of one's own personality. Here looking inwards is the essential thing; the man who still identifies himself wholly with his personality arrives at quite a different view of the world from that of the man who recognizes his personality more and more as a mere "attribute" that is not essential to him. Now the rishis had already arrived at the latter knowledge. With it they knew themselves in their very core to be untouched by the decay of their body, and hence to be immortal, so that for them there arose the problem of the nature and safeguard of their future after death. Naturally, the knowledge that was directed outwards on to a phenomenal world presenting itself to the five external senses revealed to them also the rule of natural forces that shape this entire world. According to the general opinion (Deussen also held this point of view), they in their naivety are then said to have personified as "gods" those forces of nature. Thus, like every polytheism, the Vedic Pantheon is said to have originated. But this is an exceedingly superficial explanation; the Aryan Indian of the *Rig-Veda* did not personify the forces of nature, but, starting from the knowledge that his own substance lies behind his body, he personified the mysterious principle from which every original force of nature springs, and its substance that is not directly accessible to knowledge. These he characterized as gods, because, like his own substance, he clearly recognized that these too were untouched by the change in their phenomenal forms, and were therefore

* The *Veda*, "the (sacred) knowledge," is the oldest monument preserved of Indian and Indo-European literature. It is more than six times as extensive as the Bible. Originally, in accordance with ancient Indian usage, its texts were passed on by word of mouth, and only later were they recorded in writing.

eternal. Now, since he was face to face with many forces of nature, and consequently with many substances, there were for him just as many gods. Consequently, in their totality, they represent the foundation of the world which was later called Brahman. Two thousand years later, the Buddha declared the sun and moon to be gods in this sense, and he spoke also of "tree deities," "who live in the trees" (Majjh. Nik., 45). Everything that produces life is for the Indian divine, a god.

From his own inner being the ancient Aryan deduced the true kernel of all the forces of nature. How correct this is, is seen from the fact that only in ourselves can we descend into the ground of the world in which we too are rooted; for everything manifesting itself to our external senses always reveals to us only its outer shell. Moreover, this is confirmed by Kant's words: "The mere concept of the I or self, which is unalterable and cannot be further described at all, expresses substantiality. Substance is the first subject of all inherent accidents. But this I or self is an absolute subject to which all accidents and predicates can belong, and which cannot possibly be a predicate of another thing. Moreover, the concept we have generally of all substances *has been borrowed by us from this I or self*. This is the original concept of substance." (570)

When we read the Rig-Veda, it is at once obvious to us that its polytheism is of the kind we have just described. But who could not admire such a polytheism? Yet this is not all. The ancient Aryan Indian had already in the second half of the Rig-Veda period advanced to the idea of unity, as is expressed by the Rishi Dirghatamas in the lapidary words: "Diverse names the poets give to that which is only one" (106). This "epoch-making" knowledge is stated in more detail in the well known hymn of creation: "At that time there was neither non-existence nor existence.—No atmosphere, no skies above.—In whose care was the world, who encompassed it?—Where was the deep abyss, where the waters of the ocean?—At that time there was neither death nor immortality.—No night or day was manifest.—In the primordial state no wind did blow.—There was the One beside which there was no Other.—Yet who has succeeded in the search?—Who has perceived whence comes creation?—From it the gods in this world have sprung.—Who therefore states whence they have come?"

At this stage the answer was that there was put on the throne a single supreme God who was called Prajapati, i. e., "Lord of Creation." However, he too was still a person, but differed from the personal God of the West in that he did not place a world outside himself; on the contrary, he transforms himself wholly or partially (that is, without detriment to his continued personal existence) into nature and her phenomena, "he over whom nothing higher exists and who has entered into all beings, Prajapati, favouring himself with children." (191)

With this view of the world were determined man's goal and the morality contributing to its realization. What else could this goal have been but the attainment of the "community, the world-community, the complete community with the gods," and thus the arrival at "the true eternal home," at the "fields of

pasture which can no longer be taken away, and where the weak are no longer under tribute to the strong?" (288). Accordingly, the morality of the Rig-Veda teaches the "Divine Path," the path to the gods. But at first this path was the prayer to the gods for acceptance into their community:

Where one walks for jubilation,

Where the third and highest heaven vaults,

Where regions are filled with light,

There let me immortal be.

Where bliss and rapture are found,

Where joy upon joy dwells,

Where craving's yearning is allayed,

There let me immortal be.

But the gods receive into their community only those who are kindly disposed, and who at their death leave behind what is imperfect. Therefore, here on earth, one must show oneself to be a good man, that is to say, one must be *kind*:

"To give to the poor curtails not one's wealth;

Who gives not, has no one to feel pity for him;

The man who is well stocked with food, and when one in need

Approaches him to beg for alms, he hardens his heart

To one who always paid him honour,

Finds none who will feel pity for him.

He findeth joy who also to the poor communicates." (93)

This shows that, even in those times thousands of years ago, the Aryan Indians had become aware of kindness, the great and fundamental law of morality.

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In the Neo-Vedic period, which lasted from about 1000 to 500 B. C. and ends with the Upanishads, the place of the Rishis of the Rig-Veda was taken by the great men of the Brahman caste, with the formation of the caste system. They regarded themselves as the successors of the Rishis (12), and, like all beings (as is seen in their dread of death), were also agitated by the horror of the transitory nature of their own corporeality. And because they themselves were the source of that horror, they cultivated *inward contemplation*, and so had come to the view that their substance, their true I or self, the Atman, lay behind their corporeality, consequently was not touched by the death of the body, and thus was immortal. They therefore tried to determine the future that awaited them after death, again by inward contemplation, since through this they endeavoured to ascertain the possible states of their substantial I or self beyond the perishable and transient body. For this purpose, they withdrew from the affairs of the world into a solitary place, and sought to put off from themselves what should be laid aside, namely the external world, their

grossly material body and with it the life of the senses, the whole of their faculty of conception until there was left only pure thinking without any objective perception. But in spite of all this (and here was to be found something new and portentous), they saw themselves wholly untouched in their existence even after this extreme detachment from all that which is commonly regarded as man's substance. On the contrary, the consciousness of the positive and actual nature of their self stood out the more brilliantly, the farther the process of detachment was continued. Indeed, this consciousness first dawned on them in all its glory at the highest point where they had left behind them everything knowable, although at this summit their I or self, apart from that awareness of its actual and positive nature, had become incapable of being grasped and defined. "Not knowing inwards, not knowing outwards, not knowing in both directions, neither perceiving nor not perceiving, also not consisting of knowledge through and through, invisible, ungraspable, grounded only in the certainty of its own I or self, beyond the entire extension of the world, full of bliss and without a second. This is the fourth quarter*, this is the self, this we should know.***"

With this the summit of brahmanic wisdom was reached; man's highest possible state appeared to be realized, and the final goal attained. Our I or self, rid of all transient and sorrowful attributes, is eternal, complete in itself, and full of bliss. The supreme God, superior to all the gods, even to Prajapati hitherto the highest god, was discovered in our inner nature, beyond our empirical self, as our real and true self. But as this I or self is also "without personality," as Meister Eckhart would say, expressions such as God and Deity which involved a personal element were no longer suitable for this divine self, and so a special description had to be found for the super-personal, truly divine, truly holy fourth quarter. This was just *the Brahman*, "*the Holy One*."****

That the Brahman is identical with the fourth quarter of our self is clearly expressed particularly in the following passage of the *Paramahansa Upanishad*: "That path of the Paramahansas (of the highest migratory swans) is difficult to find in the world, and not many enter upon it. What is the highest Paramahansa? It is he who no longer asks about cold and heat, pleasure and sorrow

* The state of wakefulness, "knowing outwards," is the first quarter, the state of sleep, "knowing inwards," the second quarter. The state of deep sleep, "knowing neither inwards nor outwards," is the third quarter.

** Māndūkya-Up., 7.

*** The original meaning of Brahman is prayer (See the author's *Wissenshaft des Buddhis-mus*, p. 300 seq.). With the ancient Indians the prayer as a rule consisted in invoking the gods. *Their* prayer was naturally beyond question for the great Brahmins (Brahmans means one who prays). Their prayer was a submission into their own depths, a devotional submission undertaken in a solemn and sacred disposition of the soul. Thus it is really self-evident that these deeply religious men called "the holy," "the Brahman," the most sacred thing that was discovered through *their* prayer. — How wide the meaning is which was included in the concept "Brahman," is indeed clear from the fact that Brahman means also the venerable speech, venerable conduct, and venerable status (of the Brahmins).

honour and dishonour. Pride and selfishness he leaves behind, and since his own body is regarded by him as carrion, he turns away forever from this decayed body, and constantly directs his knowledge to that other thing, takes up his position in it, and knows that it is serene and unchangeable: I myself am that which has no second and which consists entirely of well-being. This is the true yogin, is the one who knows; his consciousness is filled with that of which the sole flavour is perfect well-being. *This Brahman am I*, thus does he know and has attained the goal, has attained the goal."

The detachment from grossly material corporeality and thus the ascent to the highest spirituality naturally occurred very gradually from stage to stage. In this way, the "one who prays" passed on his return into the Brahman, into his "home," through all the forms of "superhuman" existence, such as are first to be presumed in boundless reality; consequently, he *experienced* in himself and in his own body all the kingdoms of gods and heavens. Thus and *only* thus can we convince ourselves here on earth of the actual and positive nature of these higher spheres of existence: "Ask not what is divine; for if you are not so; you know it not even if you hear it, my Christian" (Angelus Silesius).—"Only those believe in the divine who are it themselves" (Hölderlin).—"My friend, if paradise is not first within you, then assuredly believe me that you will never enter it" (Angelus Silesius).—"Let man be noble, charitable and good.—For this alone distinguishes him from all the beings we know.—Hail to the *unknown higher beings* whom we *divine*!—Let man be like them, and may his *example* teach us to believe in them" (Goethe).

With this the first correct light is cast on the doctrine of *metempsychosis* in the cycle of rebirths to which the Aryan Indian has adhered with self-assured conviction from time immemorial—it was already taught in the Rig-Veda. If man's substance is not touched by death, then for the person who does not already in his present existence find his way back into the Holy, the Brahman, there is left absolutely no other possibility except rebirth to a new existence which is more suitable to him, and in which he can strive farther towards his home.

The very core of the doctrine of metempsychosis is expounded with particular clearness in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* 4, 4, 2—6, where it says after the description of the soul's departure from its previous body: "Then the self has particular consciousness, and goes to the body which is related to that consciousness. It is followed by knowledge, work and past experience.—Just as a leech supported on a straw goes to the end of it, takes hold of another support and contracts itself, so does the self throw this body aside—make it senseless—take hold of another support, and contract itself.—Just as a goldsmith takes apart a little quantity of gold and fashions another—a newer and better—form, so does the self throw this body away, or make it senseless, and make another—a newer and better—form, suited to the Manes, or the celestial minstrels, or the gods, or Virāj, or Hiranyagarbha, or other beings.—.... As it does and acts, so it becomes; by doing good it becomes good, and by doing evil it becomes

evil—it becomes virtuous through good acts and vicious through evil acts. Others, however, say, "The self is identified with desire alone. What it desires, it resolves; what it resolves, it works out; and what it works out, it attains."**

From this view of the world the later Aryan Indian derived the following moral principles that were obligatory to all his fellow-countrymen: 1. charity, 2. uprightness, 3. not to injure any living being, 4. truthfulness, 5. self-control. To impress these principles deeply on his mind, he even betokened the rolling of the thunder as follows: "Da! da! da!", that is to say, Damyata! Datta! Dayathvam!—"Restrain yourselves! Give alms! Have compassion!"

This morality was so universally observed that many an Indian prince was able to adopt something of the testimony which King Ashvapati Kaikeya drew up for his subjects: "In my kingdom there is no thief, no miser, no drunkard, no one who would not make sacrifices, no one not versed in the Veda, no rake, no harlot." (Deussen, l. c. p. 328 th seq.) Such morality is brought to maturity by the belief in rebirth, if, as in India, it is associated with an awareness that the nature of the future existence is determined by actions in the present.

Of even greater severity were the demands on those who wanted to escape from the entire cycle of rebirths and hence from the world, and to become submerged in the Holy, the Brahman. Besides acquiring a knowledge of the Veda as the primary object, it was their duty to practise self-castigation (asceticism) and renunciation (nyāsa) as its assumption and sequel. Self-castigation consisted in acquiring all the virtues, and thus in gradually mortifying the life of instinct and impulse; it further consisted in the voluntary acceptance of privations, such as doing penance and fasting, in order to weaken still further the craving for earthly pleasures. *Renunciation* was the radical means; and it was carried out through detachment from wife and family and from all external possessions. Even in the times of the oldest Upanishads, this ascetic life developed into a special vocation that was similar to the status of the head of the family (dharmaskandha). The ascetics traversed the country as wandering mendicants or lived as forest hermits. The highest renunciation was practised by the sannyāsin; he too wandered through the land as the "highest migratory swan" (Paramahansa). His garment consisted of rags or of a mere loin-cloth; or the "space of the world" was his garment. His food was extremely poor, and at the highest stage the clay vessel for receiving it was "his belly or his hand." His occupation was silence and meditation which caused him to regard his body as carrion. His goal was the Brahman.

Such was the nature of the country and the people in India when Siddhattha Gotama, the king's son and the future Buddha, was born there. According to the Indian view, the country and the people generally had to be of such a nature, if there was to be room for a Buddha, and this we can read even from the Buddha's own words: "The Perfect One is an Aryan; therefore his four truths are called Aryan Truths" (Sam. Nik. L. VI, 28).

* From Swami Madhavananda's translation.

II

What is a Buddha?

Calderson, the great Spanish writer, profoundly characterizes the world of life: "All life is but a dream, and every man, I see, dreams all his deeds and nature.—The king dreams he is king, and, deeply sunk in such a dream, commands and rules and governs, and all to him are subject.—And yet his fortune to dust is turned by death which, also as a dream, forever threatens him.—Of their wealth the rich dream, and yet they have no peace.—The poor on earth dream of their bondage and distress.—He dreams who starts to rise, who is afraid and runs, who loves and is afire with hate.—Thus in this wide world *what all are, that they dream*, although not one discerns this.—Indeed, all life is but a dream, and even dreams are just a dream."

Even in the Veda and the Upanishads there is still much dreaming. As with the Christian mystics, everything is seen and presented in semi-darkness, and moreover is woven into an extremely complicated and symbolizing sacrificial cult. Thus we must pursue a laborious path to their comprehension. And this is not all. Even the wisdom of the Veda is not yet perfect wisdom, in spite of its immeasurable greatness that inspires the deepest reverence. For even the Brahman of the Upanishads is not yet man's final goal (purusha-ārtha) which almost all Indian systems have sought from time immemorial, but only the penultimate stage thereto. The unconditional identification of our own primary ground, of our own I or self (Ātman), with the world-Ātman is a mere speculation, wholly after the manner of the Christian mystics, of whom Seneca says: "Behold, the divine essence is a spiritual substance which mortal eye cannot see. A man sees God, however, in his deeds, just as a man perceives a good master in his works. For Paul says that creatures are a mirror (speculum) in which God is reflected." This speculation, which is obtained from mere excursions into the realm of the transcendent, has been revealed as such by the Buddha when he says that the world in itself belongs to the four incomprehensible things, and that to concern ourselves with them entails trouble and distraction (Cf. Die Wissenschaft des Buddhismus, p. 322 seq.). A far greater error in the Veda is its sacrificial cult which in its animal sacrifices is in a high degree positively immoral.

According to the Buddha, only a Buddha is perfectly "awakened" from the dream of life. This is not merely the sense, but the literal meaning of the word Buddha. This follows from the 54th dialogue of the Majjhima Nikāya, where one who has "awakened" from the dream is described as *paṭibuddha*, and in particular from the Samyuttīka Nikāya VI 4, 9, where *suttapabbuddha* ("awakened from the dream of sleep") is used instead of the word Buddha.

But to *what* has a Buddha awakened? To the supreme reality, to reality as it is in truth, to that reality which Schopenhauer divined when he said: "When we wake up from a dream that vividly affects us, it is not so much its disappearance (which convinces us of its emptiness) as the discovery of a second reality

which lays concealed under that (of the dream) so deeply stirring us, and which now emerges. We really all have a lasting divination or presentiment that also under this reality in which we live and are there lies hidden a second and different reality. It is the thing-in-itself, the *Ītaq* (reality proper) to this *Īvaq* (the present life's dream)."

But a Buddha has not merely awakened to the supreme reality; he also presents his highest knowledge that is superior to that of "all gods and men" most clearly and free from all mythological disguise and mythical clothing. Here, however, it is given in so cogent a form that it presents itself as positively self-evident to the person who is able to follow him. For this reason a Buddha does not demand any belief, but promises knowledge: "Knowing thus and seeing thus, O monks, will you perhaps say: 'To the Master we show reverence, out of reverence for the Master we speak thus?'" — "Certainly not, Lord." — "Then do you say only that which you have thought over for yourselves, which you yourselves have discerned and understood?" — "Certainly, Lord." — "Well invested are you with this Marvel (this is the doctrine of the Buddha), with this clearly visible thing that is at all times accessible and says: 'Come and see! Men of judgment and discretion can fix it in their own interior.'" (Majjh. Nik., 38th Discourse). Where should we find a second founder of a religion who would have said anything like this?

Now when is a truth in itself evident and clearly visible? In other words, what knowledge gives us evident and obvious truth? Very few know this. If we are really clever, we imagine that truth is equivalent to immediate intuitive perception. But intuitive perception is simply the source of truth.*

Truth is knowledge, and all knowledge is a judgment, and every judgment is the work of the power of judgment, and hence an activity of the faculty of reason. But every activity of this faculty consists in the drawing of conclusions with major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. If, for example, I state the truth: "I am mortal," this rests on the drawing of a conclusion, on the syllogism: "All men are mortal (major premise)—I am a man (minor premise)—Therefore I am mortal" (conclusion). This holds good even of such self-evident truths as "The earth exists." Here the underlying syllogism is: "What I perceive exists—I perceive the earth—consequently it exists." If with such sentences man is not aware that he draws conclusions, this only shows how much it is a matter of course for every living being, even the animal, to draw conclusions.

If, however, all knowledge is a judgment, and every judgment rests on the drawing of a conclusion, then it must also be possible to demonstrate all knowl-

* Intuition or immediate perception is a perception of the five external senses, a *sensuous* perception, or an intuitively direct perception by means of the sixth sense, the sense of *intuitive* thought. This latter perception is limited to the intuitive perception of space, of knowledge itself as such, and finally of the state that is wholly devoid of object.

This immediate perception (sensuous or intellectually and intuitively immediate) is still wholly without words or concepts. For this very reason, it cannot as such be communicated by words, but only by shifting it to another kind of perception, possibly by way of the work of art.

edge. For by a proof we understand simply the production of the syllogism on which a stated truth depends, so that a thing is true only in so far as it can be demonstrated.* For this very reason, Kant also says that, if we cannot be clear about the correctness of a sentence, we have but to bring it into the form of a logical syllogism (*logos* means faculty of reason).**

Therefore we must not set up intuitive perception in opposition to the syllogism, but the two must be combined into a unity. The syllogism itself must be *experienced* in its two premises, in its major and minor premises; in other words, intuitive perception must form the granite foundation from which the premises are drawn. Such a syllogism is the product of perfectly correct thinking, and for this very reason affords us infallible certainty and perfect knowledge. At bottom, this is meant when we speak of the sure and unerring certainty of the knowledge of intuitive perception, as we shall do subsequently in this work.

Now the Buddha has obtained his truths precisely through this method of logical inference, and he also teaches them in this form. In the 12th dialogue of the Majjhima Nikāya he himself specially emphasizes this logical character of his teaching: A former monk, a certain Sunakkhatta, had in Vesālī spread the report: "The ascetic Gotama teaches a doctrine which is gained by logical thinking, built up on critical investigation, discovered by himself, and the object of proclaiming his doctrine is simply that, whoever thinks logically, will arrive at a complete destruction of suffering." To this the Buddha replied, when he had been acquainted of it by his disciple Sāriputta: "Angry, o Sāriputta, is Sunakkhatta, in anger has he spoken these words; the foolish man imagines he will censure me, and precisely in this way he praises the Perfected One. Indeed, Sāriputta, it is *praise* of the Perfected One when a man says: 'And the object

* Great is the danger of error, when the concept or judgment cannot be traced back directly to the underlying intuitive knowledge and thus to reality, but only by means of several, or even of a long chain of syllogisms. This is in contrast to those concepts and judgments which in their premises have their *immediate* ground in intuitive perception. And it is this very danger which we have in mind, when we speak of the inferior value of *merely demonstrated* truths.

** The animal too has intuition, intuitive perception, but very little reflection. Action based on mere intuition is equivalent to impulsive conduct. Far superior to this is conduct that is guided by reflection, by a deliberation that tests and compares. When our times here again undertake their "transvaluation of values" by attaching more weight to intuition than to reflection, this too is only a further sign of decadence. Here evolution has led from the one extreme of exclusively admitting the reasoning faculty's activity to an almost total ruling out of intuition, as had been carried out by rationalism, to the other extreme of deifying "pure intuition" as the exclusive source of knowledge. In this way, our entire age moves positively in extremes, and precisely in those that lead to decadence. Reflection "is the second potential of knowledge, and the exercise of it calls for effort and exertion" (Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Representation*, Vol. II, chap. 8), alone a sufficient reason for scrapping it as not modern.

As everywhere, so also here truth lies in the centre; intuition and reflection belong inseparably to each other, since only reflection, based absolutely on intuitive perception and never going beyond this, brings us knowledge and consequently truth.

"That which I see arise and pass away within me, and thus bring me suffering with the appearance of this transitoriness, cannot be I myself. Now, whatever is knowable, I see arise and pass away within me, and, — with the appearance of this transitoriness, — bring me suffering. Therefore nothing knowable is my I or Self."

This means that neither my body nor even my mind is my substantial I or Self; on the contrary, body and mind are only inessential "attributes" of me, of which I can again rid myself, in order then, as a "Perfect One, deep, immeasurable, and unfathomable as the great ocean," to plunge into absolute reality, into Nibbāna, in which everything knowable is extinguished, "in imperishable bliss;" "full of peace is this state, exalted and sublime is this state."

This syllogism is the starting-point for an understanding of the Buddha's teaching, and it finds its crowning touch in the possibilities that are brought about through *meditation*. In the direction of the aim which it indicates, the supreme goal at the same time limns itself, which in a meditative contemplation becomes an ever greater certainty.

Thus here importance is attached only to a logic whose premises are rooted entirely in intuitive reality. The Buddha's whole method of consideration goes back to this. From the very first, this stipulates a very *mindful*, indeed an extremely *slow*, thinking, a *meditative** thinking which becomes contemplation. To begin with, there is a faint dawning, a slight, merely felt *presentation* of the truth. In its gradual progress, this presentation becomes a *belief in the truth*, interspersed with doubts, and finally a complete *logical comprehension*, until at the culminating point it merges into a *palpably intuitive penetration* of its object. Just as the rising sun in all its glow scatters all twilight, so does this penetration dispel forever all doubts. The truth is then directly *experienced* by us precisely by our *thoroughly* penetrating its object with the spiritual eye, just as I *experience* in all its mighty form and structure the mountain mass of Mont Blanc when I directly look at it. And *thus*, in this way, with *such* clearness, must a man *experience* all the elements of his personality as not the I or Self (*anattā*), as essentially foreign to himself. This he must do in order to become an actual "seer of Nibbāna," and thus at the same time one who *experiences* immediately in his own body the absolute bliss of complete *desirelessness* which ensues as a result of this "vision." He will then also be one who actually makes Nibbāna *known*.

The premises of the Buddha's judgments and conclusions are found again at any moment and without any trouble in intuitive perceptive reality, a characteristic that represents, neither more nor less, the formal part of the cognitive activity of *all* men of genius. A classical, formal proof of this is given by the

* Meditation (*meditāri*) = to think, reflect, ruminate, ponder, contemplate) thoughtfulness, contemplation, deliberation. In the doctrine of the Buddha meditation becomes the means of the profoundest knowledge. It produces contemplation, a discerning contemplation.

of expounding his doctrine is simply that, *whoever thinks logically, will arrive at a complete destruction of suffering!*" The teaching of the Buddha is *therefore a religion of reason*; moreover, in the Canon it is characterized directly by the epithet *vibhajjavāda*, a word which is translated in Childers' Pāli Dictionary as "religion of logic or reason."

This scientific character of the Buddha's teaching was generally recognized and acknowledged within his community even centuries after his death. This has found a thoroughly characteristic expression in the account of the Sinhalese Church Chronicles of the first dialogue between Mahinda, the converter of Ceylon, and King Devanampiya Tissa about 250 B. C. The Thera (the most senior) arranges for a formal examination of the King in logic, in order to find out "whether the king possesses a clear understanding." In the vicinity is a mango-tree, and the Thera asks: "What, great king, is the name of this tree?"—"It is called mango, Lord."—"Is there or is there not, great king, yet another mango-tree besides this mango-tree?"—"There are many other mango-trees, Lord."—"Are there yet other trees, great king, besides this mango-tree and those mango-trees?"—"There are, Lord, but they are no mango-trees."—"Is there yet another tree besides the other mango-trees and non-mango-trees?"—"Yes, Lord, this mango-tree here."—"Well done, great king, you are sagacious."—The Thera sets a similar test which the king likewise passes with brilliance: "Besides your relations and those not related to you, is there still any person, great king?"—"Myself, Lord!"—"Well done, great king, a man is neither related nor not related to himself."—"Then the Thera saw", so the narrative runs, "that the king was sagacious, and would be able to understand the teaching, and he preached to him the parable of the elephant's foot."

As in every science, so too in the science of the Buddha, logic is the great instrument for a knowledge of the truth. His precepts and propositions are determined by syllogisms, and indeed by those with none but self-evident and obviously correct premises, as can be ascertained by any one who takes the trouble. For this very reason, their inner evidence is revealed to every one who studies them as thoroughly as does, say, a student of medicine his medical text-books before his examination. Of course, a man must be "intelligent", as intelligent as king Devanampiya Tissa, and must have also the will and energy for such study. Whoever lacks these, lacks the religious sense, that is to say, he does not feel the need to secure his great future after death. He is, therefore no "Aryan," such as is assumed by the Buddha with his teaching.

But the following is the most unique and astonishing thing which the Buddha shares with no one else in the world. Unlike any one else, he has not only laid bare the great practical problem of how we can make ourselves perfectly free from sorrow and absolutely full of bliss, but he has referred this essential problem directly to the primary problem of our deepest nature. What is wholly unique is that he has referred it to a single syllogism of such simplicity that, with good will, even an intelligent shepherd can in the end see and experience it in all its overwhelming certainty. This syllogism is as follows:

circumstance that the Buddha's statements are, one and all, interspersed with *parables drawn from reality*. Indeed, these occur in full measure and at times in a striking manner, such as will not be found anywhere else. Yet parables are quite pre-eminently suitable for verifying abstract ideas as the reflected image of intuitive reality, and for this very reason every really inspired mind also feels the need—the more so, the more highly gifted he is—to make his abstract ideas clear through similes and parables. Therefore, Śāriputta, the greatest of the Buddha's disciples, says: "Through parables the meaning of a discourse also becomes clear to many an intelligent man" (Majj. Nik., 43rd Discourse). But the Buddha himself was thoroughly impressed with the discernment that only that abstract knowledge is of value which can always and easily be shown to be based on intuitive reality. He was so penetrated with this idea, that he enjoined, even on those who had barely entered his Order, to make clear to themselves and to others, through parables and thus by going back to the reality of intuitive perception, the knowledge that his teaching had to convey to them. "His speech is weighty and pregnant, embellished occasionally with similes and parables, clear and definite, and appropriate to its subject." This is a stock sentence in the enumeration of the basic duties of the Order. A judgment or proposition, which cannot be illustrated by a simile from reality, has in fact no real value.

Therefore the Buddha's teaching is based on *intuitive thinking*, which for this reason he demands. He also expressly states this character of his teaching in the standing sentence: "This doctrine is profound, hard to see, difficult to perceive, calm, sublime, not in the sphere of the merely abstract thought (atakkāvaca), subtle, to be grasped only by sages." He had every reason also to stress in particular the characteristic of his teaching that it is not accessible to the merely abstract thought. For precisely in his day in India, dialectic, the art of disputation, flourished in the highest degree among the "Samanas and Brahmins". Even in Greece, in the palmy days of the Sophists, it could not have been more in vogue. On the basis of merely abstract concepts and in the guise of logic, it was infallibly demonstrated that "everything is" and also that "nothing is." Likewise it was shown that "all is unity" and also that "all is plurality" (Cf. Franke, Digha Nik., p. 19, Note 3). Here, of course, the false element did not consist in the fact that men worked with the laws of logic,* but in their casting about ready-made concepts (takka) according to the laws of logic after the manner of algebraical equations. This they did without making sure from time

* Logic comes from *λογίζεσθαι*, to count, reckon, calculate; to take into account, consider, reason, infer. This in turn comes from *logos*, word and reason or reflection, which are inseparable. But according to this, *logical thinking* means thinking in conformity with the laws of reason. It indicates that procedure of the faculty of reason, of the logos, which that faculty observes when left to itself and undisturbed, and hence in the solitary thinking of a rational being who is not led astray by anything, and with the material of merely abstract representations, or with that of representations of intuitive perception (Cf. Schopenhauer's Handchriftlicher Nachlaß, p. 3 seqq.).

to time of the reality of these concepts and of their true content by descending to the reality of intuitive perception, and thus without thinking meditatively. "All that is merely imaginable or conceivable, and consequently also what is false, impossible, absurd, and senseless, enters into abstract concepts" (Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, Vol. II, chap. 6). For this very reason they must establish their legitimacy in the individual case first from intuitive reality; in other words, thinking must always remain *intuitive*, and can never lose, even for a moment, the connexion with sensuous experience, if all the judgments obtained with it are not to be "without foundation" (Digha Nik., I, 1, 29; Franke, p. 22, note 1). Just this and only this is what the Buddha means when he says that his teaching is *atakkāvaca*, which therefore means that "my doctrine does not lie in the realm of the merely abstract concept (takka), but is rooted rather in intuitive perception" (Majj. Nik., 48th Discourse). It therefore rests on that thinking which operates not merely with abstract concepts (takka), as empty husks into which anyone puts what he wants, but with representations of *intuitive perception*. For the comprehension of his teaching, therefore, the mere dialectical method is not enough, but beyond it *direct observation* is necessary, which is just *intuitive thinking*.

In the light of this method of the Master, and guided by his own words, there is revealed to us in the present work an understanding of the cycle of rebirths in all its depths and heights; and here *this* understanding at the same time entails a following of the path. A unique mountain path is opened up to our view! He who has awakened will gradually advance upon it, after he has accustomed his spiritual eye to the brilliant light of the religious ideal which, as the *mysterium tremendum*, radiates in his face from the doctrine of the Buddha. But just as we already feel relief, joy, and comfort when we reach even only the first slopes of the mighty mountain mass from the low ground of the mountain valley, so does the Buddha's teaching become easy to understand to everyone of intelligence, if at the same time he is of good will, at any rate to the extent of teaching him to comprehend the cycle of his rebirths with the possibility of controlling it. With this he experiences in his meditations the firm foundation of all genuine religiosity, and in this the inner peace and hence *genuine happiness*, of which our age no longer possesses even a trace, bursting as it does with intellectual arrogance and with all its sciences and technical achievements.

III

The Method of Handing down the "Marvel"

The doctrine of the Buddha is the doctrine of the universally prevalent law of transitoriness. It would not be true, if this law had not been realized in the doctrine itself, whose external fate was somewhat as follows:

After the Buddha had proclaimed his teaching to all the people in Central India throughout half a century, travelling on foot from place to place and sometimes accompanied by a number of monks; and when the monks, in the Vedic

themselves as "I". Like everything else, these forces calling themselves "I" naturally disappear in death. But in continuation of them, there then sprang up in a different germinating material, made ready by the parents in the act of copulation, new forces which are equivalent to those that have perished, and which again form a human being, and in him, thus describing himself, once more say "I". It is exactly the same as if a new candle were kindled from an old one burnt down almost to extinction. This is said to be rebirth as taught by the Buddha. In point of fact this theory, which has no basis in the words of the Buddha himself, is naturally nothing but a special form of the belief in annihilation which the Buddha rejects in a solemn manner. For precisely because the forces springing up in a different germinating material are *new*, they are no longer the old; the forces that had formed the previous human being have perished definitely and forever. If I perish with the disappearance of the forces themselves that formed my essential nature, how then am I concerned with the *new* forces that are said to spring up in a new germinating material after my death, even if such new forces are equivalent to those that have disappeared? What clear thinking mind still speaks here of rebirth,—in the sense in which the Buddha describes it in the parable of the *one wanderer*? "Just as when a man went from his place to another place, and from this again to another, and from this place returned to his own place, the thought then occurred to him: 'I have gone from my place to that place, I have stood there, sat there, spoken there, and been silent there; from that place, spoken there, and been silent there; then I have returned again from this place to my own place'; in the same way do my disciples call to mind many different forms of previous existences" (Majj. Nik. 77th discourse). The interpretation that is not to be read from the words of the Buddha himself is obtained only by the explanation that the discourses of the Buddha must not be taken literally just as they are given. This certainly resulted in the direct opposite to what we previously came to know as the Aryan Indian genius with its powerful Atman doctrine, which revealed itself through the centuries. Thus it cannot be a matter for surprise that *this* Buddhism not only evoked so much contempt from Shankara, the great Vedic commentator (born 788 A.D.), that he called the Buddha (whom he obviously knew only in the form of the Buddhism of the commentaries) an old prattler, but also that the doctrine of the Buddha disappeared entirely from India between 800 and 1000 A.D. (Deussen, l. c. I, 3, p. 180). In fact, *this* Buddhism is no religion for the Indian Arya. *) **)

*) The opposition in which many commentaries stand not only to the teaching of the Buddha himself, but also to the Aryan Indian genius generally, really forces one to the assumption that these commentators were not pure Aryans at all, but Dravidians (the original inhabitants of India) who lived in South India in large numbers in the time of the Buddha, and still do today. The Singhalese also consist of Aryan and Dravidian elements.

**) The Buddhist *lastly* in the countries in which Buddhism continued to exist have, of course, not bothered at all about the theoretical reversal of the Buddha's idea by Buddhist scholars (the misfortune was just that the monks had for the most part become mere schol-

manner, had thoroughly committed to memory his individual discourses and utterances, these, together with the expositions of his great disciples, were passed on from mouth to mouth after the Master's death in 483 B. C. This was done with scrupulous accuracy, since men were conscious of their immense importance. In addition, the sacred texts (suttas) were arranged at various councils into groups (nikāyas), and collected into Pitakas (baskets), in fact into the Suttapitaka, the Basket of the Discourses, and the Vinayapitaka, the Basket of the Rules of the Order. To these two „baskets" the Abhidhammapitaka, the Basket of Scholastic Philosophy, was later added as a further independent development. Thus the Tipitaka (the Three Baskets), as the sum-total of the Buddhist sacred writings, was established for all time. The Tipitaka was first recorded in writing a few decades before our era under King Vattagamini in Ceylon, whither it had been brought by Mahinda, son of the great Buddhist Emperor Asoka (264—227 B.C.).

Therefore only this Tipitaka is concerned for the determination of the Buddha's original doctrine. It seems necessary to state this expressly, since, very soon after his death, a new source for the *explanation* of his doctrine began to flow, namely a literature of commentaries of considerable magnitude. The greatest part of this was brought together into a compilation under the name of *Aṭṭhakathā*, "explanation of the sense". The commentaries were naturally written by monks, Theras (Elders); at the same time, they are said to have represented the point of view of the first three councils (roughly 483, 383, and 245 B.C.). It is said that the *Aṭṭhakathā*, together with the Tipitaka, was brought to Ceylon in 245 B.C. by the monk Mahinda, son of King Asoka, and there translated into Singhalese. Nothing exists either of the original *Aṭṭhakathā* written in Pāli, or of the Mahā-*Aṭṭhakathā* which had been translated into Old Singhalese by Mahinda. On the other hand, the latter was discovered in the fifth century A.D. by the monk Buddhaghosa who had moved from India to Ceylon. According to his statements, he translated back into Pāli its essential parts with the addition of his own interpretations. This *Aṭṭhakathā* of Buddhaghosa is still preserved, and is called the Theravāda interpretation by the monks of to-day in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam.

Perpetuated thus by Buddhaghosa, this literature of commentaries clung to the Three Baskets like a mighty creeper; indeed, it is often regarded in the viharas of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam as a heresy to want to form an opinion of one's own concerning the contents of the Three Baskets, however cogently substantiated such an opinion may be. This, then, is precisely the method of the Catholic Church which for two thousand years has likewise forbidden any individual interpretation of the Bible. For this reason Deussen rightly says in his *Erinnerungen an Indien* that the Buddhism of today is a magnifying mirror of the faults of Catholicism.

Here the tragic feature is that this Theravāda-interpretation of Buddhaghosa and of later commentators no longer does justice to the kernel of the Buddha's teaching. This school explains the fact of rebirth as follows: Man's essential nature consists in bodily and mental forces which, when acting together, style

