The path of no-path: `Sa^nkara and Dogen on the paradox of practice
David Loy
Philosophy East and West
Volume 38, number 2(April 1988)
P.127-146
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press
P.127
If anyone imagines he will get more by inner
thoughts and sweet yearnings and a special grace of
God than he could get beside the fire or with his
flocks or in the stable, he is doing no more than
trying to take God and wrap His head in a cloak and
shove Him under the bench. For whoever seeks God in
some special Way, will gain the Way and lose God who
is hidden in the Way. But whoever seeks God without
any special Way, finds Him as He really is... and He
is life itself.
Eckhart
When we want something, normally we know well enough
what needs to be done to get it. But what if the
object I desire is something that can never become
an object, because it is prior to the subject-object
dichotomy? What if it can never be an effect,
because it is always unconditioned? What means will
enable me to attain an end that is impossible to
grasp? I find myself in a dilemma. If I make no
effort to do anything, it seems that the result will
also be nothing, and there will be no progress
towards the desired goal. But to the extent that I
exert myself to attain it, I do not, for in this
case all effort is self-defeating. This is the
paradox of spiritual practice, for AAtman, Brahman,
nirvaa.na, Buddhanature, and so forth are all
unobjectifiable (because nondual) , unoriginated
(that is, beyond causal and temporal relations), and
hence unobtainlable. How can we escape such a
dilemma?(1)
This article will approach that problem by
considering the views of `Sa^nkara and Dogen on the
relation between practice (samaadhi, yoga, zazen,
and so forth) and enlightenment (mok.sa, nirvaa.na,
satori and so forth). `Sa^nkara and Dogen are
obvious choices because they are profound and
articulate spokesmen for two of the most important
nondualistic traditions, the Advaita Vedaanta of
India and Ch'an/Zen Buddhism. Yet it is odd to
juxtapose them, because at first glance their views
about this relation seem to be diametrically
opposed. Later Advaita came to incorporate yogic
practices which cultivate samaadhi, but `Sa^nkara
(788? -820? A.D) himself does not recognize the
necessity for any practice, except perhaps for those
"of inferior intellect." In contrast, for Dogen
(1200-1253 A.D) , zazen is nothing less than
enlightenment itself. (There is as great a
divergence in style between the Brahmin logician,
coolly refuting the arguments of Advaita's
opponents, and the aristocratic Fujiwara poet,
delighting in evocative imagery and terse paradox.)
But in fact this is another instance(2) where one
extreme turns out to be very similar to its
opposite. That is because both `Sa^nkara and Dogen
are reacting against the same problem, the
thought-constructed dualism between practice as
means and enlightenment as goal. This dualism is
problematical because it delusively objectifies the
nondual Self/Buddhanature into something which,
insofar as it is understood as separate from us, can
never be attained. Both came to the same insight
about tile self-defeating nature of this dilemma and
the necessity to overcome any bifurcation between
practice and enlightenment. The difference between
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`Sa^nkara and Dogen is in how they overcome this
bifurcation. The two main ways are to subsume the
means into the ends, or vice versa. `Sa^nkara, in
denying the need for any practice, exemplifies the
first. Dogen, arguing that zazen is enlightenment,
prefers the second. More important than this
difference, however, is that in both cases we end up
with a nonduality between the two terms, which might
be called "the path of no-path.'' But the emphasis
is certainly different, as we shall see. For
`Sa^nkara, no-path is indeed the path, while for
Dogen no-path is very much the path.
It comes as no surprise that this mutual
understanding about the paradox of practice reflects
other agreements regarding the nature of nondual
experience--namely, that it "transcends" both
temporal and causal relations. `Sa^nkara's account
of both is part of his maayaa doctrine, according to
which all spatiotemporal phenomena are delusively
superimposed upon Brahman, the unconditioned
substratum which persists unchanged through all
experience. As a Buddhist, Dogen accepts no such
substratum ("impermanence itself is the
Buddhanature"), but in his metaphorical way he, too,
negates temporal and causal relations: winter does
not become spring, nor does firewood turn into
ashes.(3) The implications of these critiques are
devastating: all possible means are severed from any
ends. In the thought-constructed everyday world we
can (and to some extent must) ignore this, but the
consequences for spiritual life are inescapable. It
means that no religious practice--be it ritual,
prayer, yoga, zazen, or anything else--can ever
cause or lead to enlightenment, because
enlightenment is now understood as precisely that
experience which cannot be characterized by such
temporal or causal relations. As Naagaarjuna put it,
in perhaps his most important verse: "That which,
taken as causal or dependent, is the process of
being born and passing on, is, taken noncausally and
beyond all dependence, declared to be nirvaa.na."(4)
`Sa^nkara and Gau.dapaada agree: "As long as there
is belief in causality, there will be sa^msaara.
When that belief disappears, sa^msaara becomes
nonexistent."(5)
It becomes clear that time, causality, and our
usual means/ends dichotomy are not three distinct
issues, but three different aspects of the same
problem. Time requires that past cause future, and
causality requires that cause precede effect. Both
are necessary for goal-directed behavior, but
perhaps the emphasis should be reversed: for is it
not our desire-motivated ways of thinking and acting
that require (and therefore thought-construct) an
objective world of supposedly self-existing entities
causally interacting "in" space and time? "...
[T]ime is generated by the mind's restlessness. its
stretching out to the future, its projects, and its
negation of 'the present state.'"(6) This is not
just an abstract, merely metaphysical issue. We see
the relevance of philosophy in the fact that the
basic dilemmas of our lives can be expressed in
these categories--equally well in terms of each. Our
desire for immortality(7) clashes with our awareness
of time passing and the inevitability of death. Our
need for freedom and self-expression clashes with
the awareness of being physically and socially
deter-
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mined, More subtle are the effects of the means/ends
dichotomy, but behavior which is strongly
goal-oriented tends to distort our lives into a
jerky pressure/ boredom syndrome: we anxiously
pursue some goal until it is accomplished, whereupon
we become bored and uncomfortable until we have
manufactured another means/ends relationship to
preoccupy us and cover over the meaning-lessness
that threatens our lives.
To resolve any of these problems fully is to
resolve the others as well, but here our concern is
primarily with the third. From this perspective, we
can see that the usual attitude towards spiritual
practices is therefore not a solution to the
problem, but simply another version of the problem
itself. Any method or technique understood to lead
to an enlightenment experience maintains the very
present -> future, cause -> effect dualism that it
strives to escape. Projecting such a
thought-constructed goal into the future sacrifices
the present at its altar and thus loses the now,
which is the only possible locus of liberation. The
crucial insight for both `Sa^nkara and Dogen is that
there is absolutely nothing to attain, which is not
to deny that that is something to be realized
clearly. The difference between attainment and such
realization is that only now can I realize I am that
which I seek. Since it is always now, the
possibility is always there, but that possibility
becomes real-ized only when causal, time-bound,
goal-directed ways of thinking and acting evaporate,
to expose what I have always been: a formless,
qualityless mind which is immutable because it is
"nothing," which is free because it is not going
anywhere, and which does not need to go anywhere
because it does not lack anything.
`Sa^nkara's attitude towards practice will be
discussed first, then Dogen's. Viewed within their
respective contexts, the congruence between their
views becomes evident. We shall also see the point
at which they diverge, which is correlated to the
metaphysical differences between Advaita and
Mahaayaana. The final section will attempt to
resolve some of these differences about the nature
of "formless mind."
I
There is no dissolution, no birth, none in bondage,
none aspiring for wisdom, no seeker of liberation
and none liberated. This is the absolute truth.
Gau.dapaada(8)
For `Sa^nkara, liberation (mok.sa) is realizing the
true nature of the Self (AAtman), which is identical
with the ground of the universe (Brahman). The
distinctive feature of `Sa^nkara's Advaita is the
way it understands the relationship between this
spiritual ground and the concrete phenomenal world
we live in--or understand ourselves to live in. The
Upani.sads present various, and not always
compatible analogies to explain how our
spatiotemporal universe originated, but `Sa^nkara
resolves the issue in one stroke by denying that
there ever was a creation. There is only
AAtman/Brahman, which is and always has been
unconditioned, unoriginated. all-pervasive, devoid
of any modifications,
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self-effulgent, and ever-content. Anything which
seems to be different from this--which includes all
temporal and causal relationships--is maayaa, and
such experience is avidyaa, delusion, because it
involves ignore-ance of Brahman.
As a "preemptive strike" this is a brilliant
solution to the problem of creation, but it creates
its own problems, notably the difficulty of
accounting for the nature of maayaa, which is left
unexplained in a never-never land neither inside (no
delusion in Brahman!) nor outside (nothing outside!)
the Absolute. But it determines what the nature of
liberation must be for `Sa^nkara: since there is
only AAtman/Brahman, nothing needs to be attained or
done. `Sa^nkara devotes much effort to refuting the
Miimaa^msaa view that the purport of the Vedas is to
inculcate dharma, defined in this instance as "that
which, being desirable, is indicated by Vedic
injunction."(9) On the contrary, says `Sa^nkara, no
action is necessary to realize Brahman, and no
action can be enjoined on one who has realized
Brahman, for that realization puts an end to all
activity by revealing the nondual true Self as that
which never acts. At best, Vedic rituals can only
lead to a better realm of sa^msaara, but never to
salvation. `Sa^nkara denies that such statements as
"the Self alone is to be meditated upon"
(B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad I.iv.7) are genuine
injunctions, because "except the knowledge that
arises from that dictum... there is nothing to be
done, either mentally or outwardly."(10)
Actions can produce effects in one of four ways:
something is produced, acquired, modified, or
purified; none of these can apply to Brahman, which
has no origin, cannot be attained, is immutable, and
transcends any possible defect. "Even if Brahman
were different from oneself, there can be no
acquisition of Brahman, since being all-pervasive
like space, It remains ever attained by
everybody."(11) Like the sixth Ch'an patriarch
Hui-neng, `Sa^nkara does not accept even the
metaphor of the Self as a mirror whose inherent
brilliance needs to be cleaned by rubbing, "for no
action can take place without bringing about some
change in its locus," and that would make the Self
subject to impermanence.(12) A better analogy is
found in part three of Gau.dapaada's commentary on
the Maa.n.duukyopani.sad: liberation is like what
happens to the space inside a pot when it is opened
or broken--nothing happens, for the space inside was
never separate from the space outside. `Sa^nkara
uses another well-known analogy to explain his
concept of adhyaasa, the "superimposition'' of
maayaa upon Brahman: our delusion is like seeing a
rope in the grass as a snake, and liberation is
simply realizing that it is a rope.(13) Our bondage
consists of such delusions, with which we "bind
ourselves without a rope," and eliminating them is
what reveals the awareness of Brahman, or (less
dualistically) Brahmanawareness, which has no
degrees, does not come from any other place, and
(unlike the dirty mirror) has never been obscured,
although It has been unnoticed in our preoccupation
with apparently objective phenomena. For such
liberation it is not necessary to get rid of the
body, for the Self has always been bodiless; "the
idea of embodiedness is a result of false
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nescience."(14) This explains jiivanmukti, how
complete liberation is possible even before physical
death: because there is no real embodiedment to
escape, just the delusion of embodiedness.
Nevertheless, most of us do not know this
unattainable Brahman, but instead suffer due to many
delusions. How can we eliminate them and realize the
ever-present Self? This brings us back to the
question of practice. According to Radhakrishnan,
"`Sa^nkara accepts the principle of the yoga
practice, which has for its chief end
samaadhi,...which consists in withdrawing the senses
from everything external and concentrating them on
one's own nature." These and the various outer limbs
of yoga "bring about the rise of true
knowledge."(15) This is accurate as an account of
Gau.dapaada, and in `Sa^nkara's voluminous corpus
there are a few passages which can be used to
support such a view. But Advaitic assimilation of
such practices occurred commonly after `Sa^nkara,
for the main tendency of his thought is to resist
the necessity of any practice or means for the
realization of Brahman. He does not deny that they
can sometimes be of limited value, as in his comment
on Gau.dapaada's approval of yogic practice--"for
those of inferior intellect." Meditative repetition
may be helpful because "people do not always
understand the first time."(16) Karmic factors may
be stronger than the operation of knowledge and
interfere with it; then, he says, "there is need to
regulate the train of remembrance of the knowledge
of the Self by having recourse to means such as
renunciation and dispassion; but it is not something
that is to be enjoined, being a possible
alternative."(17)
It is clear that the limited value of such
practices lies in their tendency to re-collect the
mind from its preoccupation with various sense and
thought objects, to help it focus itself. But
liberation is that unconditioned and unconditionable
moment when the mind becomes aware of itself(18) as
formless, qualityless, nongraspable consciousness,
which is what it has always been. At that instant,
it is not the case that bonds are broken, but that
one realizes there never were any bonds to be
broken. Such liberation can be eternal only because
it never had a beginning.(19) This implies--the
logic is inescapable--that from the liberated point
of view there is not even such a thing as
liberation. As Gau.dapaada concludes his commentary
on the Maa.n.duukyopani.sad, "All dharmas [here,
selves] are ever free from bondage and pure by
nature. They are ever illumined and liberated from
the very beginning."(20) `Sa^nkara agrees:
... Brahman cannot logically be a goal to be
attained. The supreme Brahman can never become a
goal which pervades everything, which is inside
everything, which is the Self of all.... For one
cannot reach where one already is. The well-known
fact in the world is that one thing is reached by
something else.(21)
Recently it has been argued that according to
`Sa^nkara the authoritative and valid means for
knowledge of Brahman is `sruti, the Vedic
scriptures. Contrary to usual belief, the
affirmations of `sruti do not need to be confirmed
by a special and direct experience (anubhava), for
such statement are not provisional but
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sufficient in themselves. `Sruti is necessary
because it provides us with knowledge of something
which is imperceptible and unapproachable through
any other means. `Sruti can be adequate because the
problem is one of incomplete and erroneous knowledge
of an ever-available, self-manifesting AAtman. The
task of `sruti, then, is not the production or even
the revelation of an unknown entity, but the
imparting of correct knowledge about a Self which is
always experienced but misunderstood.(22)
Certainly there are many statements by `Sa^nkara
that `sruti is the authoritative source of
Brahman-knowledge. For example, Brahmasuutrabhaa.sya
I.i.3. claims that Brahman is the source of the
scriptures, and then in the next verse `Sa^nkara
reverses this to claim that "the scriptures are the
valid means of knowing the real nature of this
Brahman."(23) But we may still wonder how this means
of knowledge functions, In his commentary on
B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad IV.iv.20, `Sa^nkara
denies that the Self is known by any other means
than `sruti, but he explains that there is no need
to establish an identity with the Self, for that
identity is already the case. Hence, he says, the
point of the scriptures is not to enjoin identity,
but to stop false identification with things that
are not the Self. Scripture seems necessary as a
"pointer" to imperceptible and formless Brahman
because nothing in the sensory world is able to
point to it. But `sruti has its limitations. If it
contradicts reason (for example, "fire is cold"),
then reason must be our guide, for it is closer to
our experience, he says.(24) And of course there is
the danger of identifying with some concept of
Brahman--of grasping the pointing finger and missing
the moon.
What is decisive is that, according to
`Sa^nkara, the veil of ignorance is destroyed by the
buddhi (what we usually understand by "mind'') in a
"mental modification"' (brahmaatmakaarav.rtti) which
realizes the identity between self and Brahman and
then disappears by "consuming" itself. "It is to the
buddhi and not to the Self, which is immutable, that
the knowledge 'I am Brahman' belongs."(25) We shall
return later to consider one of the implications of
this statement: that not only no action but also no
knowledge can properly be said to belong to Brahman.
But what we notice now is that realization therefore
cannot be understood as a matter of supplementing
incomplete and erroneous knowledge of..., of
imparting correct knowledge about..., or even
believing in..., for all such thought processes are
necessarily indirect. That vidyaa knowledge is due
to the cessation of a-vidyaa nescience means that
the usual relationship must be reversed: ignorance
here is not a lack to be filled up with something,
but an identification with objectifications,
including all concepts, even scriptural ones, which
needs to be ended, for that preoccupation with
thought objects is precisely what constitutes
ignore-ance of the unobjectifiable Self.
`Sa^nkara's views about causality allow us to
make the same point in another way. We use the
category of cause-and-effect to try to explain the
relationships among various phenomena, but the true
cause of all effects is Brahman, their
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immutable substratum. The notion that one thing or
event can cause another is delusive, for all
supposedly objective phenomena are due to the
superimposition of names-and-forms upon Brahman, the
nameless, formless substance-ground. The Self, which
may be considered the cause of everything, can never
be the effect of anything, and therefore no
pramaa.na(mode of knowledge) can ever present It to
me. This implies that there can be no means--not
even `sruti--to realize Brahman, for any means would
constitute a cause and make Brahman into an effect.
The realization of Brahman, therefore, could be
dependent only upon itself, and that is precisely
what `Sa^nkara claims: since "the validity of the
knowledge of an existing thing is determined by the
thing itself...the knowledge of Brahman must also be
determined by the thing itself, since it is
concerned with an existing entity."(26)
To summarize, `Sa^nkara's view of liberation is
determined by the fact that for him there is always
and everywhere only the Self/Brahman, and therefore
there can be nothing to attain, because there is no
bondage. Nothing needs to be done, since all
goal-directed action is dualistic by definition. No
spiritual practices are necessary or even
recommended except for those "of inferior
intellect'' whose strong karmic tendencies interfere
with the mind's ability to focus. To "know" the Self
is not a matter of gaining some particular knowledge
about something, but simply eliminating delusive
identifications with sense objects and thought
forms. The point of `Sa^nkara's "superimposition"
doctrine is that mental superimpositions objectify
not only the spatiotemporal world but also and
foremost myself as a thing "in" that world and
therefore limited by it. Ending these
identifications is what `sruti enjoins us to do.
Their cessation does not result in my being able to
identify and grasp my true Self; rather, when my
mind is no longer fascinated by phenomena and
desists from all attempts to grasp itself
reflexively, the lack of a "pull" or "thrust"
outside itself allows the awareness to arise of "my"
consciousness as "something" formless,
attributeless, and unoriginated.(27)
But, we may wonder, what could distinguish such
an unreflected, ungraspable something from a
nothing?--not a nihilistic lack, of course, but a
`suunyataa pregnant with infinite possibility. And
that brings us to Mahaayaana and Dogen.
II
There is no ignorance, no end of ignorance, and so
forth, until we come to, there is no decay and
death, no end of decay and death; There is no
suffering, no cause of suffering, no end of
suffering, and no path; there is no wisdom, no
attainment and no non-attainment.
Heart Suutra
Spiritual teachers, like everyone else, can only
extrapolate from their own experience. Little is
known about the life of `Sa^nkara, but the
extraordinary productivity of his brief life
(believed to have been only 32 years) suggests that
his own experience might be comparable to other
precocious sages like the
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sixth Ch'an patriarch or the modern Advaitin Ramana
Maharshi. Liberation for them seems to have occurred
almost unbeckoned; perhaps it was the comparative
spontaneity of `Sa^nkara's enlightenment that led to
his impatience with all the self-defeating means to
which we become attached. "Come on," we can hear him
saying, "don't get caught up in meditative
techniques. Just stop identifying with all your
projections and realize!"
Dogen seems equally austere, but nevertheless
closer to us, for he, like `Saakyamuni Buddha,
sought many years before he forgot himself and his
bodymind "fell away." Consequently, we find no
disparagement of practice in Dogen. On the contrary,
zazen (he emphasizes that other techniques such as
nembutsu, suutra reading, penances and rituals, and
so forth are unnecessary) is elevated to the status
of enlightenment itself--without, however, denying
the importance of his own experience under Ju-ching
in China, The heart of his teaching is this shusho
itto (or ichinyo), "the oneness of practice and
enlightenment." Whereas `Sa^nkara resolves the
delusive dualism between means and ends by denying
the need for any practice, Dogen resolves the same
dualism by incorporating enlightenment into
practice. In both cases, subsuming one term of the
means -> ends dualism into the other avoids the
self-defeating consequence of any duality between
them, because without a means we cannot objectify
the end (as 'Sa^nkara emphasizes), and if there is
no end then the means becomes more than a means (as
Dogen emphasizes).
`Sa^nkara allows us no comfortable refuge in any
technique (or, for that matter, guru) where we can
feel secure, having delegated to it our
responsibility to realize and having
thought-projected the wonderful,
resolving-all-problems event of enlightenment
sometime into the future. For `Sa^nkara, practice
becomes sharply concentrated into the simple need to
realize, which can happen only now, which does
happen when we cease objectifying liberation into an
effect that will occur. Since there is only the
Self, liberation is actually not an event at all,
but eternal, and that eternity is realized at the
cessation of striving for any event, whereupon the
Self can naturally come to rest in awareness of its
own nature.
Dogen reaches a similar position by a different
route. It is not that he denies enlightenment, but
that he transforms zazen so that it is no longer
approached as a means, and therefore is no longer
self-stultifying. The type of zazen he recommends is
shikan-taza, "just sitting," which is characterized
by awareness that is without any striving for a
goal. The mind dwells serenely in its formlessness,
and since it is precisely this formless, goalless
character of the mind that needs to be realized,
such practice is not to be distinguished from its
goal.
Although arising within Chinese Mahaayaana
philosophy, the problem that came to obsess the
young Dogen evokes `Sa^nkara's Advaita as much as
any Buddhist school: If, according to both exoteric
and esoteric schools of Buddhism, man is already
endowed with the Buddhanature by birth, why do we
need to seek enlightenment and engage in spiritual
practices? If we are all originally
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enlightened (hongaku), why do we need to acquire
enlightenment (shikaku)? This question eventually
took him to China, where he came to do zazen at
T'ien-t'ung monastery under Ju-ching. One morning
during zazen, Ju-ching exclaimed to a sleeping monk:
"In zazen it is necessary to cast off the body and
mind!" Dogen said that at that moment his body and
mind indeed fell away, and his search was ended.
Yet, significantly, thereafter he did not stop doing
zazen, but like Ju-ching he continued zazen for the
rest of his life.
Dogen gives the answer to his question in
Bendowa, his first work in Japanese and one of his
most important writings. Replying to the question of
why someone who has realized the Buddha's Dharma
should need to do zazen, he says:
In the Buddha Dharma, practice and realization are
identical. Because one's present practice is
practice in realization, one's initial negotiation
of the Way in itself is the whole of original
realization. Thus, even while one is directed to
practice, he is told not to anticipate realization
apart from practice, because practice points
directly to original realization. As it is already
realization in practice, realization is endless; as
it is practice in realization, practice is
beginningless. Thus `Saakyamuni and Mahaakaa`syapa
were both taken and used by practice within
realization. Bodhidharma and patriarch Hui-neng
likewise were drawn in and turned by practice in
realization. The way of maintaining the Buddha
Dharma has always been like this.(28)
The first thing to notice about this seminal passage
is a profound agreement with `Sa^nkara: the need for
practice is not due to any lack or defect in
"original enlightenment," for there is absolutely
nothing that needs to be attained, produced, or
uncovered. In the Shobogenzo, Dogen tirelessly
emphasizes this point, "As for the Buddha Way, when
one first arouses the thought (of enlightenment,
which initiates one's practice) , it is
enlightenment, when one first achieves perfect
enlightenment. it is enlightenment. First, last, and
in between are all enlightenment" (Sesshin Sessho).
If the first thought of enlightenment is understood
as a seed, then full enlightenment is the fruit, but
Dogen denies this relationship: "There is no time of
the past or present when the truth is not realized.
Therefore. although the unenlightened standpoint may
be presupposed, root, stem, branch, and leaf must
simultaneously realize Buddhanature as the very same
whole being" (Bussho, "Buddhanature"). In the same
fascicle, Dogen reinterprets the Nirvaana Suutra. It
is not that all sentient beings have the
Buddhanature, for that is still dualistic: they and
even nonsentient beings are the Buddhanature It is
not that enlightenment will occur "when the time
comes," for "there is no time right now that is not
a time that has come.'' Just as there is nothing but
AAtman/Brahman for `Sa^nkara, there is nothing but
Buddhanature for Dogen. "My" Buddhanature is not
something hidden that awaits polishing, nor a
potential which will manifest itself sometime in the
future: "There is no Buddhanature that is not
Buddhanature fully manifested here and now."(29)
And, just as with `Sa^nkara, such a view
implies/is implied by Dogen's under-
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standing of time and causality. Time is not
something that passes, for each nondual "being-time"
(uji) is without exception the whole of time. Thus
spring does not become summer; there is the
being-time of spring and the being-time of summer,
each complete in itself. Likewise, firewood does not
turn into ashes; fire is not a cause and ashes the
effect. "Cause is not before and effect is not
after; the cause is perfect and the effect is
perfect" (Shoaku-Makusa).(30) Just as each is whole,
lacking nothing, so practice should not be
understood as a means to anything else.
Up to this point, then, we see a remarkable
similarity between Dogen and `Sa^nkara regarding the
nondual, all-encompassing nature of the
Self/Buddhanature and the delusiveness of causal and
temporal relations. They agree that we are all
"originally enlightened" (Dogen), that liberation is
eternal (Sa^nkara). But of course this does not
resolve Dogen's puzzle about the relation between
original and acquired enlightenment. On the
contrary, it merely makes the problem more acute,
and we can almost hear `Sa^nkara asking the
question: "Yes, of course; but then why do we need
to practice? If Buddhanature is not something that
needs to be acquired, transformed, produced, or
purified, because it is already completely
manifested, then what is the point of zazen?"
Immediately after discussing the oneness of
practice and enlightenment in the Bendowa (quoted
above), Dogen considers what he calls the "Senika
heresy,'' according to which the way to escape
birth-and-death is to realize that your mind-nature
is eternal and immutable, for the body is only its
temporary form. "Those who fail to grasp this are
ever caught up in birth and death. Therefore, one
must simply know without delay the significance of
the mindnature's immutability. What can come of
spending one's whole life sitting quietly, doing
nothing?"(31)
Although presented as the view of a heretical
Buddhist school, a better description of `Sa^nkara's
Advaita would be hard to find. Dogen criticizes it
in the strongest possible terms. The gist of his
reply is that "the Buddha Dharma from the first
preaches that body and mind are not two, that
substance and form are not two." Therefore, we
should not speak of the body perishing and the mind
abiding. This does not diminish or limit the
Buddha-nature-without-a-second, for Dogen concludes
by emphasizing that the Buddhist teaching is that
"all dharmas-the myriad forms dense and close of the
universe--are simply this one Mind, including all,
excluding none."(32)
The difference from `Sa^nkara becomes clearer if
we remember Dogen's own enlightenment experience.
When Ju-ching said "body and mind must fall away"
(Japanese, shinjin-datsuraku), Dogen's did. This may
appear contrary to the Advaitic claim that there is
no need to escape the body, since the Self has never
really been embodied. But this was not a complete
falling-away in the sense that Advaita criticizes as
unnecessary, for that would mean physical death. In
contrast, what Dogen experienced thereafter was not
an immutable
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Self voided of any attributes, but "the fallen-away
body and mind" (datsurakushinjin): body and mind now
empty, but not further negated or devalued as
avidyaa. Many fascicles of the Shobogenzo emphasize
that enlightenment is as much physical as mental.
for with it the duality between them is overcome:
"Your whole body is Mind in its totality"
(Ikka-Myoju, "One Bright Jewell".
This attitude towards the body shows the "other
half" of his teaching, which is incompatible with
Sa^nkara. We find it embodied in those paradoxes
wherein Dogen affirms both of two apparently
contradictory aspects, juxtaposing nondual
Buddhanature with the relative, dualistic aspect of
things. For example, the passage quoted earlier
about causation ("Cause is not before and effect is
not after....") continues: "Though effect is
occasioned by cause, they are not before and after,
because the before and after are nondual in the
Way." In other words--there really is no other way
around it, and it is the type of paradoxical
expression Dogen loved--there is no cause and
effect, and yet there is. Each has its own "dharma
position" and lacks nothing; but nonetheless there
is the being-time of fire and only then the
being-time of ashes.(33)
Relating this to the issue of practice and
enlightenment, we find many prominent passages in
Dogen which emphasize the importance of attaining
enlightenment, even though these seem to contradict
what is said--often in the same place--about the
unattainability of Buddhanature. The Bendowa was
cited earlier to present Dogen's view that practice
and realization are identical, but there he also
distinguishes them: "The dharma is amply present in
every person, but unless one practices, it is not
manifested; unless there is realization, it is not
attained." He goes on to quote a Ch'an patriarch:
"It is not that there is no practice or realization,
only that you should not defile them." In Bussho,
just after emphasizing that everything is the
Buddhanature, he continues: "The Buddhanature is not
incorporated prior to attaining Buddhahood; it is
incorporated upon the attainment of Buddhahood."
Lest we miss the point, he immediately repeats: "The
Buddhanature is always manifested simultaneously
with the attainment of Buddhahood."(34) The
Buddhanature may be as complete in the seed as in
the fruit, but we should not confound the two. While
the seed lacks nothing, it is only the fruit that
realizes that the seed lacks nothing--and yet that
realization adds nothing. So there is the being-time
of the initial thought of enlightenment, which is
the complete self-manifestation of Buddhanature,
lacking nothing; there is the being-time of
practice, which completely manifests Buddhanature,
lacking nothing; and only then is there the moment
that body and mind drop away completely, which
moment also completely manifests the Buddhanature,
but no more and no less than the moment just
"before" it. Each stage is zenki, "the total dynamic
working" of Buddhanature, and as such is not
dependent upon any other stage; nonetheless, to
ignore all causal and temporal relationships is to
replace one form of blindness with another.
How are we to understand the relationship
between these two aspects, or
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"truths"? They are only different "angles" on the
same thing. Nirvaa.na is no more than the true
nature of sa^msaara. The Shoji "Birth and Death"
fascicle expresses this paradox most succinctly:
"Just understand that birth and death is itself
nirvaa.na, and you will neither hate the one as
being birth and death, nor cherish the other as
being nirvaa.na. Only then can you be free from
birth and death."(35) If there is no self-existing
being who is born, then there is only the act of
birth; but if there is only the act of birth, then
there is no real birth. Instead, that activity
itself becomes the complete, lacking-nothing
manifestation of Buddhanature. This crystallizes the
difference between Advaita and Mahaayaana: for
Vedaanta, birth and all other phenomena are negated
as delusive maayaa, but for Dogen they are affirmed
after being qualified as "empty" (`suunya). After we
discard the delusive aspect, which is the notion
that something is born, the pure act of birth
remains as "the present manifestation of the total
dynamic working" of Buddhanature.
But what does this difference between `Sa^nkara
and Dogen imply for the relation between practice
and enlightenment? We find our answer in the story
with which Dogen concludes the Genjo-koan, the first
fascicle of the Shobogenzo and his most important
single work:
As Zen master Pao-ch'e of Ma-ku shan was fanning
himself, a monk came up and said: "The nature of the
wind is constancy. There is no place it does not
reach. Why do you still use a fan?" Pao-ch'e
answered: "You only know the nature of the wind is
constancy. You do not know yet the meaning of it
reaching every place.'' The monk said: "What is the
meaning of 'there is no place it does not reach'?"
The master only fanned himself. The monk bowed
deeply.(36)
The monk's question was Dogen's: If everyone already
possesses the Buddhanature, why is there need for
practice? Pao-ch'e's answer is to the point, but it
is easy to misunderstand. It is not the case that
"without the actual movement of the fan the wind's
constancy is only a latent, empty reality,"(37) for
that amounts to another dualistic view according to
which Buddhanature must be transformed from a state
of latency to actuality. If Buddhanature is fully
manifested here and now, we must overcome any notion
of duality between wind and master and realize that
the master's fanning himself is the wind's
constancy, that his activity is itself the
manifestation of the wind. What did the Bendowa
passage say about `Saakyamuni and Mahaakaa'syapa?
They "both were taken and used by practice within
realization"; Bodhidharma and Hui-neng "likewise
were drawn in and turned by practice in
realization." The passive verbs take on new
significance in the light of Pao-ch'e's fanning.
The heart of that Bendowa passage is the obscure
sentence just before: "As it is always realization
in practice, realization is endless, as it is
practice in realization, practice is beginningless."
This may now be understood as: "Since 'original
realization' is already implied by and embodied in
all our practice, practice is the way that
realization actualizes and manifests itself
endlessly, for our practice is endless. In the same
way, since practice is already inherent in
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realization and 'original realization' has no
beginning, so our practice too has no beginning."
Thus practice is not a means to the attainment of
enlightenment. But that does not mean it is
dispensable, for practice is the natural way in
which one's "original enlightenment" actualizes and
manifests itself. In this way Dogen avoids any
dichotomy between practice and enlightenment, means
and ends. For `Sa^nkara, however, such a view is not
possible, because he does not accept any
manifestations of Brahman: all are negated as
delusive maayaa, which obscures nirgu.na
(transcending all characteristics) Brahman. For the
Buddhist, in contrast, emptiness is not other than
form, and Buddhanature is not to be found elsewhere
than in its manifestation as myriad phenomena.
Therefore, what is to be realized is not something
apart from phenomena--some Absolute that
indifferently transcends them--but their true
nature, which leaves each to function freely as
ippo-gujin, "the total exertion of a single thing"
embodying the whole universe. And for Dogen zazen is
the example par excellence of the ippo-gujin
manifesting man's Buddhanature.
When I do not attempt to get anything from my
zazen, then it can be realized to be the complete,
lacking-nothing manifestation of "my" Buddhanature.
This does not deny the reality of enlightenment from
the relative standpoint. Done in such a
fashion--neither seeking nor anticipating any
effects--zazen in itself gradually transforms my
character, and eventually there is an experience in
which I realize clearly that the true nature of my
mind and the true nature of the universe are
nondual. Zazen cannot be said to cause this
experience; enlightenment is always an accident, as
Chogyam Trungpa has said, but practice undeniably
makes us more accident-prone. Although the mind
thereafter no longer needs to search for itself, the
way in which this no-seeking mind cultivates and
manifests itself is through practice, for this
no-seeking mind can deepen itself endlessly. "We
have already been told: 'It never, never ends.'
Reaching Buddha, it is ever more assiduous"
(Nyoraizenshin).(38) Even the empty sky needs to be
beaten with a stick; even the Buddha is only halfway
there. And since there is therefore no "there," no
final resting point, no-seeking mind is "there" at
every moment and always has been.
III
You cannot think of the Thinker of thinking; you
cannot know the Knower of knowing.... He is never
thought of, but is the Thinker; He is never known,
but is the Knower.
B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad(39)
Another way to approach the crucial difference
between Advaita and Mahaayaana is by considering the
relation between AAtman and `suunyataa. What is the
Buddhist objection to the Self, and what is the
Vedaantic objection to emptiness? The Buddhist
understands that the AAtman is not the subject of the
subject-object dualism; what he finds problematic is
the notion of a substance, whereas for the Advaitin
it is precisely this lack of a substance which
(Buddhist
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denials notwithstanding) seems nihilistic, or, to
say the least, unattractive in comparison with an
eternal, immutable, all-encompassing Absolute.
There is more than one way to respond to this
disagreement. Ontologically, we may ask what could
differentiate an unqualified One-without-a-second
from a qualityless Emptiness, since our notion of a
one seems relative to that of another from which it
is distinguished. As Dasgupta has pointed out, it is
difficult indeed to distinguish pure being from pure
nonbeing.(40) Another approach is phenomenological.
As we have seen, both nondualist systems agree there
is nothing to attain, but what would it mean to
realize that Self/noself-which-cannot-be-attained?
How could a Self come to know itself, and how is
this different from what happens in Buddhism
when...when what? When emptiness realizes itself? We
feel again the force of one of the oldest questions
in Buddhism: Who or what experiences
nirvaa.na/satori?
As soon as we formulate the question in this
way, several things fall into place, because we find
a crucial meeting ground in the agreement that the
Self/emptiness cannot know itself. "It is unknown to
those who know it," proclaims the Kena Upani.sad,
"and known to those who do not know it."(41) This
same paradox appears in other famous Upani.sadic
passages, such as Yaaj~navalkya's discussion with
Maitreyii in the B.rhadaara.nyaka: "When to the
knower of Brahman everything has become the Self,...
then what could one know and through what? Through
what could one know that owing to which all this is
known--through what, O Maitreyii, could one know the
Knower? "(42) The obvious way to resolve this
knowing-which-is-not-knowing paradox is to
distinguish our usual dualistic modes of knowing
from another, more "intuitive" mode. But perhaps we
should beware of the perennial philosophical
tendency to think we have understood something when
we have merely made a new distinction and invented a
name for it. Advaita defines the Self as that which
can never become an object; the sense-of-self is
delusive precisely because it is such an
objectification. That sense is maintained by a
constant stream of internal dialogue in which I talk
to myself, repeating that I am this, that I have
that characteristic, and so forth. But this way of
expressing it is not quite right, for who is talking
to whom? Who identifies or attaches to what? There
are only "mental modifications" (v.rtti), which as
it were interact and have a life of their own. When
these thoughts cease, the self-luminous Self is
realized--yet again, this is not something produced,
modified, purified, or uncovered. Not only do all
analogies fail here, but `Sa^nkara's account of the
Brahmaatmakaarav.rtti (discussed in section I) leads
us to conclude that even "knowing Brahman" is a
metaphor for an experience which is better described
as a coming-to-dwell "in" a formlessness which does
not know itself reflexively, but which is serene and
immutable because it needs nothing.
But could not the experience "of" such a
non-self-reflexive substance be described just as
well as an "emptiness"? It is surely significant
that the same knowing-of-not-knowing paradox is
found in Ch'an. Dogen himself disliked
P.141
the term kensho, "to see into one's nature," because
of its dualistic implications. Many well-known
dialogues make the same point. "What are you looking
for, going here and there?" Lo-han asked Wen-i. "I
don't know, '' he replied, no doubt somewhat
plaintively. "Not knowing is most intimate,"
approved Lo-han, precipitating Wen-i's awakening.
NAN-CHUAN: If you try to turn towards the Way,
it will turn away from you.
CHAO-CHOU: If I do not try to turn towards it,
how can I know the way?
NAN-CHUAN: The Way is not a matter of knowing or
not-knowing. Knowing is delusion; not-knowing is
a blank consciousness. When you have really
reached the true way beyond all doubt, you will
find it as vast and boundless as outer
space...."(43)
So the Self cannot be known, and the Way is not
a matter of knowing or not knowing. In accordance
with its affirmation of "empty'' form, Mahaayaana
does not accept the nirgu.na state of pure
formlessness. Some Ch'an masters, such as Te-shan
(who burned his commentaries on the Diamond Suutra),
are traditionally criticized for being "too empty,"
for emphasizing the emptiness of form over the form
of emptiness. So quietism is not encouraged. But
when we look for another alternative, a "middle way"
between these extremes, we discover another paradox:
if the Way is neither a matter of knowing something,
nor blankly dwelling in not-knowing-anything, then
there is no dualism between delusion and
enlightenment. Commenting on Hsuan-sha's statement
that "all the universe is one bright jewel," Dogen
concludes:
Even if there is perplexed or troubled thinking, it
is not apart from the bright jewel. It is not a deed
or thought produced by something that is not the
bright jewel. Therefore, both coming and going in
the Black Mountain's Cave of Demons [that is, in
delusions] are themselves nothing but the one bright
jewel.(44)
Of course, insofar as everything is the complete
manifestation of Buddhanature, this must be the
case, but the point is more subtle that that. It is
clearer in Yung-Chia's Song of Enlightenment, which
begins:
Have you not seen a man of Tao at his ease
In his non-active (wu-wei) and beyond learning
states
Who neither suppresses thoughts nor seeks the
real? To him
The real nature of ignorance is Buddhataa
And the non-existent body of illusion is
Dharmakaaya.(45)
To reject delusion and accept the truth is just
another form of delusion. Yung-Chia says later, for
such discrimination between rejecting and accepting
is still dualistic; "one who practices in this way
mistakes a thief for his own son." The Way is not a
matter of escaping delusion, because there is
nowhere to escape except to an equally delusive
quietism. It is rather a matter of liberating
delusion. as Dogen might say. The difference is that
with our usual delusion there is the anxious
compulsion to grasp something, a desire which is
just as problematic whether it is a craving for
sense objects or the spritual need To Know The
P.142
Truth What distinuishes "liberated" delusion is the
utter freedom of the mind to "dance" from one
`suunya thing to another, from one set of concepts
to a different and perhaps contradictory set. The
difference is not necessarily in the concepts
themselves--they may be the same--but how
effortlessly the mind is able to play with them
without getting stuck. To the extent that the mind
thinks there is an objectifiable Truth (whether
already grasped or not yet), or to the extent that
it thinks dwelling in blankness-of-mind is the
Truth, this freedom is not realized: the mind trips
over itself, sticks at this, jumps to that, and does
not want to let go because it still understands its
fundamental task as finding and dwelling in a secure
"home" for itself.
Should your mind wander away, do not follow it,
whereupon your wandering mind will stop wandering of
its own accord. Should your mind desire to linger
somewhere, do not follow it and do not dwell there,
whereupon your mind's questing for a dwelling-place
will cease of its own accord. Thereby, you will come
to possess a non-dwelling mind--a mind which remains
in the state of non-dwelling. If you are fully aware
in yourself of a non-dwelling mind, you will
discover that there is just the fact of dwelling,
with nothing to dwell upon or not to dwell upon.
This full awareness in yourself of a mind dwelling
upon nothing is known as having a clear perception
of your own mind or, in other words. as having a
clear perception of your own nature. A mind which
dwells upon nothing is the Buddha-Mind, the mind of
one already delivered, Bodhi-Mind, Uncreate
Mind...you will have attained to understanding from
within yourself--an understanding stemming from a
mind that abides nowhere, by which we mean a mind
free from delusion and reality alike. (Hui Hai)(46)
The second noble truth of the Buddha identifies this
"seeking" quality of mind as the problem. It is
because of its preoccupation with various types of
grasping that the mind cannot realize its formless
nature. It is not the case that it wants anything in
particular, for as soon as mind obtains what was
wanted it wants something else, as we know. Most of
all, mind wants itself, but the great irony is that
that is the one thing it can never have. This does
not stop mind from trying to grasp itself, and the
result of that reflexivity is ego, or sense-of-self.
That provides a kind of security, but at a tragic
cost, for fear is generated at the same time:
anything which is grasped can also be lost. No
objectifications are stable enough, for "all things
pass quickly away"--fortunately, since success
here would be a sort of petrification. Needless to
say, however, this is not usually experienced as
fortunate, fear of loss of self--which we feel in
many forms, most notably as fear of death--becomes a
suffering which pervades life, consciously or
unconsciously. It results in the sometimes desperate
attempt to construct a kind of "substitute
immortality" through symbols--for example, by
collecting money or possessions (equal to
accumulating life) or by creating culture objects
(for example, books, art works) that will be
gratefully appreciated by posterity (equal to
surviving death in symbolic form).(47)
The solution to this problem is simple but not
easy. In order for formless mind to realize its
formlessness and its corollary, freedom, the
reflexively objectified sense-of-self and all its
projections must collapse. The. difficulty is
P.143
how to approach that without making this
collapse-into-not-seeking just one more thing that
the ego seeks--which is precisely what happens with
the usual spiritual dualism between practice as
means and enlightenment as goal. The alternative is
not to abandon willfully the spiritual search, for
the value of that search is that it is able to take
all the desires and attachments wherein the mind is
dispersed and concentrate them into one; it is the
evaporation of that one which can then put all
seeking to rest. Unless the formless, unborn nature
of mind is clearly realized and not just
conceptually grasped, the unconscious search for
symbolic self-validation and substitute immortality
continues, because fear of loss of self has not been
fully resolved. The only true solution is for the
mind indeed to lose its self: to "let go" of
everything it has been identifying with, to fall
into the Void and realize its "emptiness." Since
formless mind has always been formless, and since
the ego is not a thing but only certain
self-reflexive ways of thinking, this is not really
a death (although emotionally it may seem such), but
a "forgetting" whereby the sense-of-self evaporates.
To study yourself is to forget yourself, says
Dogen, but "men are afraid to forget their minds,
fearing to fall through the Void with nothing to
stay their fall. They do not know that the Void is
not really void, but the realm of the real. Dharma"
(Huang-po). What remains after such a fall is what
there always has been: a formless mind which may be
philosophically objectified as an Absolute but which
is phenomenologically a nothing, a nothing which is
able to experience itself only insofar as it becomes
this or that, which it can do freely because it
lacks nothing. When it realizes that it is nothing
and when it needs nothing, then it is free to seek
anything.
NOTES
1. Other articles and responses published in
Philosophy East and West which treat of this, and
related, issues are. A. L. Herman." A Solution to
the Paradox of Desire in Buddhism," vol. 29, no. 1
(January 1979); John Visvader. "The Use of Paradox
in Uroboric Philosophies," vol. 28, no. 4 (October
1978); Wayne Alt, "There is No Paradox Of Desire in
Buddhism," vol. 30, no. 4 (October 1980); A. L.
Herman, "Ah, But there is a Paradox...." ibid.; John
Visvader. "Repiy to Wayne Alt," ibid.: Roy Perrett.
"The Bodhisatrva Paradox," vol. 36, no. 1 (January
1986); George Teschner, "It Is More Difficult to
Crush a Flower," vol. 36. no. 4 (October 1986).
2. This is the fourth in a series of papers
which argue that the diametrically opposed
categories of Advaita Vedaanta and Mahaayaana are in
fact largely equivalent. All-Self versus no-self and
substance versus modes are discussed in
"Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta: Are
Nirvana and Moksha the Same? " International
Philosophical Quarterly 22, no. 1 (March 1982). The
Unconditioned versus "all-conditionality" is
discussed in "The Paradox of Causality in
Maadhyamika," International Philosophical Quarterly
25, no. 1 (March 1985) . Immutability versus
impermanence is discussed in "The Mahaayaana
Deconstruction of Time," Philosophy East and West
36, no. 1 (January 1986). Material from these and
the present article is included in Nonduality: A
Study in Compurative Philosophy, forthcoming from
Yale University Press.
3. Or, if you prefer, "Everything is the cause
of itself and everything is the effect of itself"
(William Blake). Uncaused or self-caused amounts to
the same thing. `Sa^nkara analyzes and refutes the
reality of spatiotemporal relations at many places
in his large corpus. For example, Brahmasuut-
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rabhaa.sya (hereafter BSB), II.i.14-20, argues that
we cannot derive the real nature of causal relations
from a series of discrete cause-and-effect
phenomena. Unless otherwise noted, all Dogen quotes
are from fascicles of the Shobogenzo; the ones in
this paragraph are from the fascicles Bussho and
Genjo-koan, respectively. The historical link--if
any is needed besides the nondual experience
itself--is probably Naagaarjuna, for Maadhyamika
exercised a profound influence not only on all
Mahaayaana philosophy, but also on Advaita. For the
locus classicus of the Maadhyamika critique of
causal and temporal relations, see Naagaarjuna's
Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, chapters 1 and 19,
respectively. For a Vedaantic analysis of causality
clearly influenced by Maadhyamika, see part three of
Gau.dapaada's commentary on the
Maa.n.duukyopani.sad. Gau.dapaada is believed to
have been the teacher of `Sa^nkara's teacher.
4. Muulamadhyamikakaarikaa, XXV. 9.
5. Ma.n.duukyopani.sad, IV. 56 (hereafter
Maa.n.d).
6. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New
York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1978),vol. 1. p.
45. The passage refers to Plotinus and Hegel, but it
also describes the nondualist traditions discussed
in this article.
7. And perhaps our "intimations of immortality":
"Nevertheless, we feel and experience that we are
eternal" (Spinoza's Ethics, V.23, scholium).
8. Maand., II.32.
9. The Puurva-Miimaa^msaa-Suutras of Jaimini,
trans. Ganganatha Jha (Varanasi: Bharatiya
Publishing House, 1979), I.i.2, p. 3.
10. The B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, with the
Commentary of `Sa^nkaraacaarya, trans. Swaamii
Maadhavaananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1975),
I.iv.7, p. 89 (hereafter, B.rUp).
11. The Brahma-Suutra-Bhaa.sya of
`Sa^nkaraacaarya, trans. Swami Gambhirananda
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1972), I.i.4, p. 32
(hereafter BSB).
12. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
13. See BSB, preamble and I.i.4.
14. BSB, 1.i.4; see also Ka.tha Upani.sad,
I.ii.22.
15. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1983), vol. 2, p. 616. To support
his view Radhakrishnan cites BSB, III.iv.27.
16. BSB,IB.i.4.
17. B.rUp, I.IV.7, p. 93.
18. Here, as so often with such matters, we bump
up against the limits of language. To say "the mind
becomes aware of itself" implies a reflexive
process, and such dualism is almost unavoidable,
given the subject-predicate structure of language.
But for `Sa^nkara realization is just the opposite:
the sense-of-self is the result of just such
self-reflexivity, and liberation occurs when the
mind stops trying to grasp its own tail. This issue
is discussed in section III.
19. Maand., IV.30.
20. Maa.n.d., IV. 98.
21. BSB, IV.iii.14, p.884.
22. Anantanand Rambachan, "`Sa^nkara's Rationale
for `Sruti as the Definitive Source of
Brahmaj~naana," Philosophy East and West 36, no. 1
(January 1986).
23. BSB, I.i.3-4, pp. 18-21.
24. For example, B.rUp. II.i.20. That the
scriptures stop false identification is repeated
many times in `Sa^nkara's works, e.g., in B.rUp,
I.i.4, p. 38: "Knowledge (of the Self) serves the
purpose of eradicating the unreal nescience that is
the cause of the worldly state."
25. Upade'sasaahasrii, XVII.159.
26. BSB, I.i.2, p. 17.
27. In the light of this discussion of
`Sa^nkara, the following passage from Plat's
Republic provides a suggestive parallel:
... [O]ur view of these matters must be this. that
education is not in reality what some people
proclaim it to be in their professions. What they
aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul
that does not possess it, as if they were inserting
vision into blind eyes.... But our present argument
indicates... that the true analogy for this
indwelling power in the soul and the instrument
whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eve that
could not be converted to the light from the
darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so,
this organ of knowledge must be turned
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around from the world of becoming together with the
entire soul,... until the soul is able to endure the
contemplation of essence and the brightest region of
being.... Of this thing, then, there might be an
art, an art of the speediest and most effective
shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of
producing vision in it, but on the assumption that
it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it
and does not look where it should, an art of
bringing this about. (Republic, VII, 518b-d, trans.
Paul Shorey, in Plat: The Collected Dialogues, ed.
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961))
28. "Dogen's Bendowa," trans. Norman Waddell and
Abe Masao, The Eastern Buddhist 4, no. 1(1971): 144.
29. My appreciation of Dogen has been enriched
by many secondary sources, notably: Hee Jin Kim,
Dogen Kigen: Mystical Realist (Tucson, Arizona:
University of Arizona Press, 1975); Francis Cook,
"Enlightenment in Dogen's Zen," Journal of the
international Association of Buddhist Studies 6, no.
1 (1983) ; Stephen Heine, "Temporality of
Hermeneutics in Dogen's Shobogenzo," Philosophy East
and West 33, no. 2 (April 1983). The Sesshin Sessho
quote is in Cook, p. 18. The Bussho quotes are from
Heine, p. 140.
30. In Kim, Dogen Kigen, p. 283.
31. Bendowa, pp. 145-146.
32. Bendowa, pp. 146-148.
33. "That effect which exists for its own sake
is not the effect of causation; accordingly, the
effect of causal law is the same as the effect for
effect's sake" (Shoko Jisso, in Kim, Dogen Kigen, p.
285). The philosophical expression of this paradox
originates with Naagaarjuna. In the
Muulamadhyamikakaaraikaa he argues that because
there is cause and effect, there is no cause and
effect: because everything is dependently originated
(pratiityasamutpaada) , for that very reason
everything is to be experienced as nondependent and
nonoriginated.
34. "Shobogenzo Buddha-nature, Part II," trans.
Norman Waddell and Abe Masao, The Eastern Buddhist
9, no. 1 (May 1976): 88.
35. "Shoji 'Birth and Death,'" trans. Norman
Waddell and Abe Masao, The Eastern Buddhist 5, no.
1(May 1972): 79.
36. "Shobogenzo Genjokoan, " trans. Norman
Waddell and Abe Masao. The Eastern Buddhist 5, no. 2
(October 1972): 139-140.
37. Ibid., p. 140, n.
38. In Kim, Dogen Kigen, p. 267.
39. B.rUp, III.iv.2, vii.23.
40. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian
Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), vol.
1, p. 493.
41. Kenopani.sad, II.3.
42. B.rUp, II.iv.14.
43. From case 19 of the Wu-men-kuan. Case 34
consists of Nan-ch'uan's simple statement: "Mind is
not the Buddha. Knowing is not the way." There are
also significant Christian parallels. John 1:18: "No
man has ever seen God." Johannes Scotus (Erigena):
"God does not know Himself, what He is. because He
is not a what; in a certain respect He is
incomprehensible to Himself and to every
intellect.'' Every individual. says St. Dionysius,
"by the very fact of not seeing and not knowing God,
truly understands him who is beyond sight and
knowledge; knowing this, too, that he is in all
things that are felt and known."
44. "`One Bright Pearl' Dogen's Shobogenzo lkka
Myoju," trans. Norman Waddell and Abe Masao, The
Eastern Buddhist 4, no. 2 (October 1971): 117.
45. Lu K'uan Yu, Ch'an and Zen Teaching, 3d
series (London: Rider and Co., 1962), p. 116.
46. The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai, trans. John
Blofeld (London: Rider and Co., 1969). p. 56. There
is a remarkable parallel in Hegel's analysis of "the
bad infinite" (or "false endlessness": schlechte
Unendlichkeit) in the Encyclopedia, part 1, Logic.
There he defines "determination" as the certain
quality of a something set off by that quality from
other somethings. When it is realized that the
quality of each entity depends on others because in
a sense it has these others within itself as the
conditions of its own determinateness (cf. the Hua
Yen metaphor of Indra's Net) , this becomes
alienation because the nature of each quality varies
as the others do. This is a "bad infinite'' because
insofar as I (for example) try to go beyond
determination, I end up merely exchanging one finite
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determination for another. The solution involves a
reversal of perspective: true infinity is that of
the "free-ranging variable," which always has some
finite value but is not bound to any particular one.
This is "being-for-self."
47. The concept of symbolic immortality projects
is well discussed in Ernest Pecker's The Denial of
Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973) and in Ken
Wilber's The Atman Project (Wheaton, Illinois: Quest
Press, 1980) and Up from Eden (New York:
Doubleday/Anchor, 1981) . This raises important
questions about the nature of our academic research:
is it a collective but no less symbolic immortality
project? If we understand our work as scientific, is
it an attempt at the very objectivity which is
challenged by the subject matter we study?