Plotinus is considered to be the founder of Neo-Platonism. Taking his lead from his reading of Plato, Plotinus developed a complex spiritual cosmology involving three hypostases: the One, the Intelligence, and the Soul. It is from the productive unity of these three Beings that all existence emanates. The principal of emanation is not simply causal, but also contemplative. In his system, Plotinus raises intellectual contemplation to the status of a productive principle; and it is by virtue of contemplation that all existents are said to be united as a single, all-pervasive reality. In this sense, Plotinus is not a strict pantheist, yet his system does not permit the notion of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothingness). In addition to his cosmology, Plotinus also developed a unique theory of sense-perception and knowledge, based on the idea that the mind plays an active role in shaping or ordering the objects of its perception, rather than passively receiving the data of sense experience (in this sense, Plotinus may be said to have anticipated the phenomenological theories of Husserl). Plotinus' doctrine that the soul is composed of a higher and a lower part -- the higher part being unchangeable and divine (and aloof from the lower part, yet providing the lower part with life), while the lower part is the seat of the personality (and hence the passions and vices) -- led him to neglect an ethics of the individual human being in favor of a mystical or soteric doctrine of the soul's ascent to union with its higher part. The philosophy of Plotinus is represented in the complete collection of his treatises, collected and edited by his student Porphyry into six books of nine treatises each. For this reason they have come down to us under the title of the Enneads.
Life and Work
Plotinus was born in 204 C.E. in Egypt, the exact location of which
is unknown. In his mid-twenties Plotinus gravitated to Alexandria, where
he attended the lectures of various philosophers, not finding satisfaction
with any until he discovered the teacher Ammonius Saccas. He remained with
Ammonius until 242, at which time he joined up with the Emperor Gordian
on an expedition to Persia, for the purpose, it seems, of engaging the
famed philosophers of that country in the pursuit of wisdom. The expedition
never met its destination, for the Emperor was assassinated in Mesopotamia,
and Plotinus returned to Rome to set up a school of philosophy. By this
time, Plotinus had reached his fortieth year. He taught in Rome for twenty
years before the arrival of Porphyry, who was destined to become his most
famous pupil, as well as his biographer and editor. It was at this time
that Plotinus, urged by Porphyry, began to collect his treatises into systematic
form, and to compose new ones. These treatises were most likely composed
from the material gathered from Plotinus' lectures and debates with his
students. The students and attendants of Plotinus' lectures must have varied
greatly in philosophical outlook and doctrine, for the Enneads are filled
with refutations and corrections of the positions of Peripatetics, Stoics,
Epicureans, Gnostics, and Astrologers. Although Plotinus appealed to Plato
as the ultimate authority on all things philosophical, he was known to
have criticized the master himself (cf. Ennead IV.8.1). We should not make
the mistake of interpreting Plotinus as nothing more than a commentator
on Plato, albeit a brilliant one. He was an original and profound thinker
in his own right, who borrowed and re-worked all that he found useful from
earlier thinkers, and even from his opponents, in order to construct the
grand dialectical system presented (although in not quite systematic form)
in his treatises. The great thinker died in solitude at Campania
in 270 C.E.
The Enneads are the complete treatises of Plotinus, edited by his student,
Porphyry. Plotinus wrote these treatises in a crabbed and difficult Greek,
and his failing eyesight rendered his penmanship oftentimes barely intelligible.
We owe a great debt to Porphyry, for persisting in the patient and careful
preservation of these writings. Porphyry divided the treatises of his master
into six books of nine treatises each, sometimes arbitrarily dividing a
longer work into several separate works in order to fulfill his numerical
plan. The standard citation of the Enneads follows Porphyry's division
into book, treatise, and chapter. Hence 'IV.8.1' refers to book (or Ennead)
four, treatise eight, chapter one.
Metaphysics and Cosmology
Plotinus is not a metaphysical thinker in the strict sense of the term.
He is often referred to as a 'mystical' thinker, but even this designation
fails to express the philosophical rigor of his thought. Jacques Derrida
has remarked that the system of Plotinus represents the "closure of metaphysics"
as well as the "transgression" of metaphysical thought itself (1973: p.
128 note). The cause for such a remark is that, in order to maintain the
strict unity of his cosmology (which must be understood in the 'spiritual'
or noetic sense, in addition to the traditional physical sense of 'cosmos')
Plotinus emphasizes the displacement or deferral of presence, refusing
to locate either the beginning (arkhe) or the end (telos) of existents
at any determinate point in the 'chain of emanations' -- the One, the Intelligence,
and the Soul -- that is the expression of his cosmological theory; for
to predicate presence of his highest principle would imply, for Plotinus,
that this principle is but another being among beings, even if it is superior
to all beings by virtue of its status as their 'begetter'. Plotinus demands
that the highest principle or existent be supremely self-sufficient, disinterested,
impassive, etc. However, this highest principle must still, somehow, have
a part in the generation of the Cosmos. It is this tension between Plotinus'
somewhat religious demand that pure unity and self-presence be the highest
form of existence in his cosmology, and the philosophical necessity of
accounting for the multiplicity among existents, that animates and lends
an excessive complexity and determined rigor to his thought.
Since Being and Life itself, for Plotinus,
is characterized by a dialectical return to origins, a process of overcoming
the 'strictures' of multiplicity, a theory of the primacy of contemplation
(theoria) over against any traditional theories of physically causal beginnings,
like what is found in the Pre-Socratic thinkers, and especially in Aristotle's
notion of the 'prime mover,' becomes necessary. Plotinus proceeds by setting
himself in opposition to these earlier thinkers, and comes to align himself,
more or less, with the thought of Plato. However, Plotinus employs allegory
in his interpretation of Plato's Dialogues; and this leads him to a highly
personal reading of the creation myth in the Timaeus (27c ff.), which serves
to bolster his often excessively introspective philosophizing. Plotinus
maintains that the power of the Demiurge ('craftsman' of the cosmos), in
Plato's myth, is derived not from any inherent creative capacity, but rather
from the power of contemplation, and the creative insight it provides (see
Enneads IV.8.1-2; III.8.7-8). According to Plotinus, the Demiurge does
not actually create anything; what he does is govern the purely passive
nature of matter, which is pure passivity itself, by imposing a sensible
form (an image of the intelligible forms contained as thoughts within the
mind of the Demiurge) upon it. The form (eidos) which is the arkhe or generative
or productive principle of all beings, establishes its presence in the
physical or sensible realm not through any act, but by virtue of the expressive
contemplation of the Demiurge, who is to be identified with the Intelligence
or Mind (Nous) in Plotinus' system. Yet this Intelligence cannot be referred
to as the primordial source of all existents (although it does hold the
place, in Plotinus' cosmology, of first principle), for it, itself, subsists
only insofar as it contemplates a prior -- this supreme prior is, according
to Plotinus, the One, which is neither being nor essence, but the source,
or rather, the possibility of all existence (see Ennead V.2.1). In this
capacity, the One is not even a beginning, nor even an end, for it is simply
the disinterested orientational 'stanchion' that permits all beings to
recognize themselves as somehow other than a supreme 'I'. Indeed, for Plotinus,
the Soul is the 'We' (Ennead I.1.7), that is, the separated yet communicable
likeness (homoiotai) of existents to the Mind or Intelligence that contemplates
the One. This highest level of contemplation -- the Intelligence contemplating
the One -- gives birth to the forms (eide), which serve as the referential,
contemplative basis of all further existents. The simultaneous inexhaustibility
of the One as a generative power, coupled with its elusive and disinterested
transcendence, makes the positing of any determinate source or point of
origin of existence, in the context
The One
The 'concept' of the One is not, properly speaking, a concept at all,
since it is never explicitly defined by Plotinus, yet it is nevertheless
the foundation and grandest expression of his philosophy. Plotinus does
make it clear that no words can do justice to the power of the One; even
the name, 'the One,' is inadequate, for naming already implies discursive
knowledge, and since discursive knowledge divides or separates its objects
in order to make them intelligible, the One cannot be known through the
process of discursive reasoning (Ennead VI.9.4). Knowledge of the One is
achieved through the experience of its 'power' (dunamis) and its nature,
which is to provide a 'foundation' (arkhe) and location (topos) for all
existents (VI.9.6). The 'power' of the One is not a power in the sense
of physical or even mental action; the power of the One, as Plotinus speaks
of it, is to be understood as the only adequate description of the 'manifestation'
of a supreme principle that, by its very nature, transcends all predication
and discursive understanding. This 'power,' then, is capable of being experienced,
or known, only through contemplation (theoria), or the purely intellectual
'vision' of the source of all things. The One transcends all beings, and
is not itself a being, precisely because all beings owe their existence
and subsistence to their eternal contemplation of the dynamic manifestation(s)
of the One. The One can be said to be the 'source' of all existents only
insofar as every existent naturally and (therefore) imperfectly contemplates
the various aspects of the One, as they are extended throughout the cosmos,
in the form of either sensible or intelligible objects or existents. The
perfect contemplation of the One, however, must not be understood as a
return to a primal source; for the One is not, strictly speaking, a source
or a cause, but rather the eternally present possibility -- or active making-possible
-- of all existence, of Being (V.2.1). According to Plotinus, the unmediated
vision of the 'generative power' of the One, to which existents are led
by the Intelligence (V.9.2), results in an ecstatic dance of inspiration,
not in a satiated torpor (VI.9.8); for it is the nature of the One to impart
fecundity to existents -- that is to say: the One, in its regal, indifferent
capacity as undiminishable potentiality of Being, permits both rapt contemplation
and ecstatic, creative extension. These twin poles, this 'stanchion,' is
the manifested framework of existence which the One produces, effortlessly
(V.1.6). The One, itself, is best understood as the center about which
the 'stanchion,' the framework of the cosmos, is erected (VI.9.8). This
'stanchion' or framework is the result of the contemplative activity of
the Intelligence.
Emanation and Multiplicity
The One cannot, strictly speaking, be referred to as a source or a
cause, since these terms imply movement or activity, and the One, being
totally self-sufficient, has no need of acting in a creative capacity (VI.9.8).
Yet Plotinus still maintains that the One somehow 'emanates' or 'radiates'
existents. This is accomplished because the One effortlessly "'overflows'
and its excess begets an other than itself" (V.2.1, tr. O'Brien 1964) --
this 'other' is the Intelligence (Nous), the source of the realm of multiplicity,
of Being. However, the question immediately arises as to why the One, being
so perfect and self-sufficient, should have any need or even any 'ability'
to emanate or generate anything other than itself. In attempting to answer
this question, Plotinus finds it necessary to appeal, not to reason, but
to the non-discursive, intuitive faculty of the soul; this he does by calling
for a sort of prayer, an invocation of the deity, that will permit the
soul to lift itself up to the unmediated, direct, and intimate contemplation
of that which exceeds it (V.1.6). When the soul is thus prepared for the
acceptance of the revelation of the One, a very simple truth manifests
itself: that what, from our vantage-point, may appear as an act of emanation
on the part of the One, is really the effect, the necessary life-giving
supplement, of the disinterested self-sufficiency that both belongs to
and is the One. "In turning toward itself The One sees. It is this seeing
that constitutes The Intelligence" (V.1.7, tr. O'Brien). Therefore, since
the One accomplishes the generation or emanation of multiplicity, or Being,
by simply persisting in its state of eternal self-presence and impassivity,
it cannot be properly called a 'first principle,' since it is at once beyond
number, and that which makes possible all number or order (cf. V.1.5).
Presence
Since the One is self-sufficient, isolated by virtue of its pure self-presence,
and completely impassive, it cannot properly be referred to as an 'object'
of contemplation -- not even for the Intelligence. What the Intelligence
contemplates is not, properly speaking, the One Itself, but rather the
generative power that emanates, effortlessly, from the One, which is beyond
all Being and Essence (epikeina tes ousias) (cf. V.2.1). It has been stated
above that the One cannot properly be referred to as a first principle,
since it has no need to divide itself or produce a multiplicity in any
manner whatsoever, since the One is purely self-contained. This leads Plotinus
to posit a secondary existent or emanation of the One, the Intelligence
or Mind (Nous) which is the result of the One's direct 'vision' of itself
(V.1.7). This allows Plotinus to maintain, within his cosmological schema,
a power of pure unity or presence -- the One -- that is nevertheless never
purely present, except as a trace in the form of the power it manifests,
which is known through contemplation. Pure power and self-presence, for
Plotinus, cannot reside in a being capable of generative action, for it
is a main tenet of Plotinus' system that the truly perfect existent cannot
create or generate anything, since this would imply a lack on the part
of that existent. Therefore, in order to account for the generation of
the cosmos, Plotinus had to locate his first principle at some indeterminate
point outside of the One and yet firmly united with it; this first principle,
of course, is the Intelligence, which contains both unity and multiplicity,
identity and difference -- in other words, a self-presence that is capable
of being divided into manifestable and productive forms or 'intelligences'
(logoi spermatikoi) without, thereby, losing its unity. The reason that
the Intelligence, which is the truly productive 'first principle' (proton
arkhon) in Plotinus' system, can generate existents and yet remain fully
present to itself and at rest, is because the self-presence and nature
of the Intelligence is derived from the One, which gives of itself infinitely,
and without diminishing itself in any way. Furthermore, since every being
or existent within Plotinus' Cosmos owes its nature as existent to a power
that is prior to it, and which it contemplates, every existent owes its
being to that which stands over it, in the capacity of life-giving power.
Keeping this in mind, it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of presence
in the context of Plotinus' philosophy; rather, we must speak of varying
degrees or grades of contemplation, all of which refer back to the pure
trace of infinite power that is the One.
The Intelligence
The Intelligence (Nous) is the true first principle -- the determinate,
referential 'foundation' (arkhe) -- of all existents; for it is not a self-sufficient
entity like the One, but rather possesses the ability or capacity to contemplate
both the One, as its prior, as well as its own thoughts, which Plotinus
identifies with the Platonic Ideas or Forms (eide). The purpose or act
of the Intelligence is twofold: to contemplate the 'power' (dunamis) of
the One, which the Intelligence recognizes as its source, and to meditate
upon the thoughts that are eternally present to it, and which constitute
its very being. The Intelligence is distinct from the One insofar as its
act is not strictly its own (or an expression of self-sufficiency as the
'act' of self-reflection is for the One) but rather results in the principle
of order and relation that is Being -- for the Intelligence and Being are
identical (V.9.8). The Intelligence may be understood as the storehouse
of potential being(s), but only if every potential being is also recognized
as an eternal and unchangeable thought in the Divine Mind (Nous). As Plotinus
maintains, the Intelligence is an independent existent, requiring nothing
outside of itself for subsistence; invoking Parmenides, Plotinus states
that "to think and to be are one and the same" (V.9.5; Parmenides, fragment
3). The being of the Intelligence is its thought, and the thought of the
Intelligence is Being. It is no accident that Plotinus also refers to the
Intelligence as God (theos) or the Demiurge (I.1.8), for the Intelligence,
by virtue of its primal duality -- contemplating both the One and its own
thought -- is capable of acting as a determinate source and point of contemplative
reference for all beings. In this sense, the Intelligence may be said to
produce creative or constitutive action, which is the provenance of the
Soul.
The Ideas and the 'Seminal Reasons'
Since the purpose or act of the Intelligence is twofold (as described
above), that which comprises the being or essence of the Intelligence must
be of a similar nature. That which the Intelligence contemplates, and by
virtue of which it maintains its existence, is the One in the capacity
of overflowing power or impassive source. This power or effortless expression
of the One, which is, in the strictest sense, the Intelligence itself,
is manifested as a coherency of thoughts or perfect intellectual objects
that the Intelligence contemplates eternally and fully, and by virtue of
which it persists in Being -- these are the Ideas (eide). The Ideas reside
in the Intelligence as objects of contemplation. Plotinus states that:
"No Idea is different from The Intelligence but is itself an intelligence"
(V.9.8, tr. O'Brien). Without in any way impairing the unity of his concept
of the Intelligence, Plotinus is able to locate both permanence and eternality,
and the necessary fecundity of Being, at the level of Divinity. He accomplishes
this by introducing the notion that the self-identity of each Idea, its
indistinguishability from Intelligence itself, makes of each Idea at once
a pure and complete existent, as well as a potentiality or 'seed' capable
of further extending itself into actualization as an entity distinct from
the Intelligence (cf. V.9.14). Borrowing the Stoic term logos spermatikos
or 'seminal reason,' Plotinus elaborates his theory that every determinate
existent is produced or generated through the contemplation by its prior
of a higher source, as we have seen that the One, in viewing itself, produces
the Intelligence; and so, through the contemplation of the One via the
Ideas, the Intelligence produces the logoi spermatikoi ('seminal reasons')
that will serve as the productive power or essence of the Soul, which is
the active or generative principle within Being (cf. V.9.6-7).
Being and Life
Being, for Plotinus, is not some abstract, amorphous pseudo-concept
that is somehow pre-supposed by all thinking. In the context of Plotinus'
cosmological schema, Being is given a determined and prominent place, even
if it is not given, explicitly, a definition; though he does relate it
to the One, by saying that the One is not Being, but "being's begetter"
(V.2.1). Although Being does not, for Plotinus, pre-suppose thought, it
does pre-suppose and make possible all 're-active' or causal generation.
Being is necessarily fecund -- that is to say, it generates or actualizes
all beings, insofar as all beings are contained, as potentialities, in
the 'rational seeds' which are the results of the thought or contemplation
of the Intelligence. Being differentiates the unified thought of the Intelligence
-- that is, makes it repeatable and meaningful for those existents which
must proceed from the Intelligence as the Intelligence proceeds from the
One. Being is the principle of relation and distinguishability amongst
the Ideas, or rather, it is that rational principle which makes them logoi
spermatikoi. However, Being is not simply the productive capacity of Difference;
it is also the source of independence and self-sameness of all existents
proceeding from the Intelligence; the productive unity accomplished through
the rational or dialectical synthesis of the Dyad -- of the Same (tauton)
and the Different (heteron) (cf. V.1.4-5). We may best understand Being,
in the context of Plotinus' thought, by saying that it differentiates and
makes indeterminate the Ideas belonging to the Intelligence, only in order
to return these divided or differentiated ideas, now logoi spermatikoi,
to Sameness or Unity. It is the process of returning the divided and differentiated
ideas to their original place in the chain of emanation that constitutes
Life or temporal existence. The existence thus produced by or through Being,
and called Life, is a mode of intellectual existence characterized by discursive
thought, or that manner of thinking which divides the objects of thought
in order to categorize them and make them knowable through the relational
process of categorization or 'orderly differentiation'. The existents that
owe their life to the process of Being are capable of knowing individual
existents only as they relate to one another, and not as they relate to
themselves (in the capacity of 'self-sameness'). This is discursive knowledge,
and is an imperfect image of the pure knowledge of the Intelligence, which
knows all beings in their essence or 'self-sameness' -- that is, as they
are purely present to the Mind, without the articulative mediation of Difference.
The Soul
The power of the One, as explained above, is to provide a foundation
(arkhe) and location (topos) for all existents (VI.9.6). The foundation
provided by the One is the Intelligence. The location in which the cosmos
takes objective shape and determinate, physical form, is the Soul (cf.
IV.3.9). Since the Intelligence, through its contemplation of the One and
reflection on its own contents, the Ideas (eide), is both one and many,
the Soul is both contemplative and active: it contemplates the Intelligence,
its prior in the 'chain of existents,' and also extends itself, through
acting upon or actualizing its own thoughts (the logoi spermatikoi), into
the darkness or indeterminacy of multiplicity or Difference (which is to
be identified in this sense with Matter); and by so doing, the Soul comes
to generate a separate, material cosmos that is the living image of the
spiritual or noetic Cosmos contained as a unified thought within the Intelligence
(cp. Plato, Timaeus 37d). The Soul, like the Intelligence, is a unified
existent, in spite of its dual capacity as contemplator and actor. The
purely contemplative part of the Soul, which remains in constant contact
with the Intelligence, is referred to by Plotinus as the 'higher part'
of the Soul, while that part which actively descends into the changeable
(or sensible) realm in order to govern and directly craft the Cosmos, is
the 'lower part,' which assumes a state of division as it enters, out of
necessity, material bodies. It is at the level of the Soul that the drama
of existence unfolds; the Soul, through coming into contact with its inferior,
that is, matter or pure passivity, is temporarily corrupted, and forgets
the fact that it is one of the Intelligibles, owing its existence to the
Intelligence, as its prior, and ultimately, to the power of the One. It
may be said that the Soul is the 'shepherd' or 'cultivator' of the logoi
spermatikoi, insofar as the Soul's task is to conduct the differentiated
ideas from the state of fecund multiplicity that is Being, through the
drama of Life, and at last, to return these ideas to their primal state
or divine status as thoughts within the Intelligence. Plotinus, holding
to his principle that one cannot act without being affected by that which
one acts upon, declares that the Soul, in its lower part, undergoes the
drama of existence, suffers, forgets, falls into vice, etc., while the
higher part remains unaffected, and persists in governing, without flaw,
the Cosmos, while ensuring that all individual, embodied souls return,
eventually, to their divine and true state within the Intelligible Realm.
Moreover, since every embodied soul forgets, to some extent, its origin
in the Divine Realm, the drama of return consists of three distinct steps:
the cultivation of Virtue, which reminds the soul of the divine Beauty;
the practice of Dialectic, which instructs or informs the soul concerning
its priors and the true nature of existence; and finally, Contemplation,
which is the proper act and mode of existence of the soul.
Virtue
The Soul, in its highest part, remains essentially and eternally a
being in the Divine, Intelligible Realm. Yet the lower (or active), governing
part of the Soul, while remaining, in its essence, a divine being and identical
to the Highest Soul, nevertheless, through its act, falls into forgetfulness
of its prior, and comes to attach itself to the phenomena of the realm
of change, that is, of Matter. This level at which the Soul becomes fragmented
into individual, embodied souls, is Nature (phusis). Since the purpose
of the soul is to maintain order in the material realm, and since the essence
of the soul is one with the Highest Soul, there will necessarily persist
in the material realm a type of order (doxa) that is a pale reflection
of the Order (logos) persisting in the Intelligible Realm. It is this secondary
or derived order (doxa) that gives rise to what Plotinus calls the "civic
virtues" (aretas politikas) (I.2.1). The "civic virtues" may also be called
the 'natural virtues' (aretas phusikas) (I.3.6), since they are attainable
and recognizable by reflection upon human nature, without any explicit
reference to the Divine. These 'lesser' virtues are possible, and attainable,
even by the soul that has forgotten its origin within the Divine, for they
are merely the result of the imitation of virtuous men -- that is, the
imitation of the Nature of the Divine Soul, as it is actualized in living
existents, yet not realizing that it is such. There is nothing wrong, Plotinus
tells us, with imitating noble men, but only if this imitation is understood
for what it is: a preparation for the attainment of the true Virtue that
is "likeness to God as far as possible" (cf. I.1.2; and Plato, Theaetetus
176b). Plotinus makes it clear that the one who possesses the civic virtues
does not necessarily possess the Divine Virtue, but the one who possesses
the latter will necessarily possess the former (I.2.7). Those who imitate
virtuous men, for example, the heroes of old, like Achilles, and take pride
in this virtue, run the risk of mistaking the merely human for the Divine,
and therefore committing the sin of hubris. Furthermore, the one who mistakes
the human for the Divine virtue remains firmly fixed in the realm of opinion
(doxa), and is unable to rise to true knowledge of the Intelligible Realm,
which is also knowledge of one's true self. The exercise of the civic virtues
makes one just, courageous, well-tempered, etc. -- that is, the civic virtues
result in sophrosune, or a well-ordered and cultivated mind. It is easy
to see, however, that this virtue is simply the ability to remain, to an
extent, unaffected by the negative intrusions upon the soul of the affections
of material existence. The highest Virtue consists, on the other hand,
not in a rearguard defense, as it were, against the attack of violent emotions
and disruptive desires, but rather in a positively active and engaged effort
to regain one's forgotten divinity (I.2.6). The highest virtue, then, is
the preparation for the exercise of Dialectic, which is the tool of divine
ordering wielded by the individual soul.
Dialectic
Dialectic is the tool wielded by the individual soul as it seeks to
attain the unifying knowledge of the Divinity; but dialectic is not, for
that matter, simply a tool. It is also the most valuable part of philosophy
(I.3.5), for it places all things in an intelligible order, by and through
which they may be known as they are, without the contaminating diversity
characteristic of the sensible realm, which is the result of the necessary
manifestation of discursive knowledge -- language. We may best understand
dialectic, as Plotinus conceives it, as the process of gradual extraction,
from the ordered multiplicity of language, of a unifying principle conducive
to contemplation. The soul accomplishes this by alternating "between synthesis
and analysis until it has gone through the entire domain of the intelligible
and has arrived at the principle" (I.3.4, tr. O'Brien). This is to say,
on the one hand, that dialectic dissolves the tension of differentiation
that makes each existent a separate entity, and therefore something existing
apart from the Intelligence; and, on the other hand, that dialectic is
the final flourish of discursive reasoning, which, by 'analyzing the synthesis,'
comes to a full realization of itself as the principle of order among all
that exists -- that is, a recognition of the essential unity of the Soul
(cf. IV.1). The individual soul accomplishes this ultimate act by placing
itself in the space of thinking that is "beyond being" (epekeina tou ontos)
(I.3.5). At this point, the soul is truly capable of living a life as a
being that is "at one and the same time ... debtor to what is above and
... benefactor to what is below" (IV.8.7, tr. O'Brien). This the soul accomplishes
through the purely intellectual 'act' of Contemplation.
Contemplation
Once the individual soul has, through its own act of will -- externalized
through dialectic -- freed itself from the influence of Being, and has
arrived at a knowledge of itself as the ordering principle of the cosmos,
it has united its act and its thought in one supreme ordering principle
(logos) which derives its power from Contemplation (theoria). In one sense,
contemplation is simply a vision of the things that are -- a viewing of
existence. However, for Plotinus, contemplation is the single 'thread'
uniting all existents, for contemplation, on the part of any given individual
existent, is at the same time knowledge of self, of subordinate, and of
prior. Contemplation is the 'power' uniting the One, the Intelligence,
and the Soul in a single all-productive intellectual force to which all
existents owe their life. 'Vision' (theoria), for Plotinus, whether intellectual
or physical, implies not simply possession of the viewed object in or by
the mind, but also an empowerment, given by the object of vision to the
one who has viewed it. Therefore, through the 'act' of contemplation the
soul becomes capable of simultaneously knowing its prior (the source of
its power, the Intelligence) and, of course, of ordering or imparting life
to that which falls below the soul in the order of existence. The extent
to which Plotinus identifies contemplation with a creative or vivifying
act is expressed most forcefully in his comment that: "since the supreme
realities devote themselves to contemplation, all other beings must aspire
to it, too, because the origin of all things is their end as well" (III.8.7,
tr. O'Brien). This means that even brute action is a form of contemplation,
for even the most vulgar or base act has, at its base and as its cause,
the impulse to contemplate the greater. Since Plotinus recognizes no strict
principle of cause and effect in his cosmology, he is forced, as it were,
to posit a strictly intellectual process -- contemplation -- as a force
capable of producing the necessary tension amongst beings in order for
there to be at once a sort of hierarchy and, also, a unity within the cosmos.
The tension, of course, is always between knower and known, and manifests
itself in the form of a 'fall' that is also a forgetting of source, which
requires remedy. The remedy is, as we have seen, the exercise of virtue
and dialectic (also, see above). For once the soul has walked the ways
of discursive knowledge, and accomplished, via dialectic, the necessary
unification, it (the soul) becomes the sole principle of order within the
realm of changeable entities, and, through the fragile synthesis of differentiation
and unity accomplished by dialectic, and actualized in contemplation, holds
the cosmos together in a bond of purely intellectual dependence, as of
thinker to thought. The tension that makes all of this possible is the
simple presence of the pure passivity that is Matter.
Matter
Matter, for Plotinus, may be understood as an eternally receptive substratum
(hupokeimenon), in and by which all determinate existents receive their
form (cf. II.4.4). Since Matter is completely passive, it is capable of
receiving any and all forms, and is therefore the principle of differentiation
among existents. According to Plotinus, there are two types of Matter --
the intelligible and the sensible. The intelligible type is identified
as the palette upon which the various colors and hues of intelligible Being
are made visible or presented, while the sensible type is the 'space of
the possible,' the excessively fecund 'darkness' or depth of indeterminacy
into which the soul shines its vivifying light. Matter, then, is the ground
or fundament of Being, insofar as the entities within the Intelligence
(the logoi spermatikoi) depend upon this defining or delimiting principle
for their articulation or actualization into determinate and independent
intelligences; and even in the sensible realm, where the soul achieves
its ultimate end in the 'exhaustion' that is brute activity -- the final
and lowest form of contemplation (cf. III.8.2) -- Matter is that which
receives and, in a passive sense, 'gives form to' the act. Since every
existent, as Plotinus tells us, must produce another, in a succession of
dependence and derivation (IV.8.6) which finally ends, simultaneously,
in the passivity and formlessness of Matter, and the desperation of the
physical act, as opposed to purely intellectual contemplation (although,
it must be noted, even brute activity is a form of contemplation, as described
above), Matter, and the result of its reception of action, is not inherently
evil, but is only so in relation to the soul, and the extent to which the
soul becomes bound to Matter through its act (I.8.14). Plotinus also maintains,
in keeping with Platonic doctrine, that any sensible thing is an image
of its true and eternal counterpart in the Intelligible Realm. Therefore,
the sensible matter in the cosmos is but an image of the purely intellectual
Matter existing or persisting, as noetic substratum, within the Intelligence
(nous). Since this is the case, the confusion into which the soul is thrown
by its contact with pure passivity is not eternal or irremediable, but
rather a necessary and final step in the drama of Life, for once the soul
has experienced the 'chaotic passivity' of material existence, it will
yearn ever more intensely for union with its prior, and the pure contemplation
that constitutes its true existence (IV.8.5).
Evil
The Soul's act, as we have seen (above), is dual -- it both contemplates
its prior, and acts, in a generative or, more properly, a governing capacity.
For the soul that remains in contact with its prior, that is, with the
highest part of the Soul, the ordering of material existence is accomplished
through an effortless governing of indeterminacy, which Plotinus likens
to a light shining into and illuminating a dark space (cf. I.8.14); however,
for the soul that becomes sundered, through forgetfulness, from its prior,
there is no longer an ordering act, but a generative or productive act
-- this is the beginning of physical existence, which Plotinus recognizes
as nothing more than a misplaced desire for the Good (cf. III.5.1). The
soul that finds its fulfillment in physical generation is the soul that
has lost its power to govern its inferior while remaining in touch with
the source of its power, through the act of contemplation. But that is
not all: the soul that seeks its end in the means of generation and production
is also the soul that becomes affected by what it has produced -- this
is the source of unhappiness, of hatred, indeed, of Evil (kakon). For when
the soul is devoid of any referential or orientational source -- any claim
to rulership over matter -- it becomes the slave to that over which it
should rule, by divine right, as it were. And since Matter is pure impassivity,
the depth or darkness capable of receiving all form and of being illuminated
by the light of the soul, of reason (logos), when the soul comes under
the sway of Matter, through its tragic forgetting of its source, it becomes
like this substratum -- it is affected by any and every emotion or event
that comes its way, and all but loses its divinity. Evil, then, is at once
a subjective or 'psychic' event, and an ontological condition, insofar
as the soul is the only existent capable of experiencing evil, and is also,
in its highest form, the ruler or ordering principle of the material cosmos.
In spite of all this, however, Evil is not, for Plotinus, a meaningless
plague upon the soul. He makes it clear that the soul, insofar as it must
rule over Matter, must also take on certain characteristics of that Matter
in order to subdue it (I.8.8). The onto-theological problem of the source
of Evil, and any theodicy required by placing the source of Evil within
the godhead, is avoided by Plotinus, for he makes it clear that Evil affects
only the soul, as it carries out its ordering activity within the realm
of change and decay that is the countenance of Matter. Since the soul is,
necessarily, both contemplative and active, it is also capable of falling,
through weakness or the 'contradiction' of its dual functions, into entrapment
or confusion amidst the chaos of pure passivity that is Matter. Evil, however,
is not irremediable, since it is merely the result of privation (the soul's
privation, through forgetfulness, of its prior); and so Evil is remedied
by the soul's experience of Love.
Love and Happiness
Plotinus speaks of Love in a manner that is more 'cosmic' than what
we normally associate with that term. Love (eros), for Plotinus, is an
ontological condition, experienced by the soul that has forgotten its true
status as divine governor of the material realm and now longs for its true
condition. Drawing on Plato, Plotinus reminds us that Love (Eros) is the
child of Poverty (Penia) and Possession (Poros) (cf. Plato, Symposium 203b-c),
since the soul that has become too intimately engaged with the material
realm, and has forgotten its source, is experiencing a sort of 'poverty
of being,' and longs to possess that which it has 'lost'. This amounts
to a spiritual desire, an 'existential longing,' although the result of
this desire is not always the 'instant salvation' or turnabout that Plotinus
recognizes as the ideal (the epistrophe described in Ennead IV.8.4, for
example); oftentimes the soul expresses its desire through physical generation
or reproduction. This is, for Plotinus, but a pale and inadequate reflection
or imitation of the generative power available to the soul through contemplation.
Now Plotinus does not state that human affection or even carnal love is
an evil in itself -- it is only an evil when the soul recognizes it as
the only expression or end (telos) of its desire (III.5.1). The true or
noble desire or love is for pure beauty, i.e., the intelligible Beauty
(noetos kalon) made known by contemplation (theoria). Since this Beauty
is unchangeable, and the source of all earthly or material, i.e., mutable,
beauty, the soul will find true happiness (eudaimonia) when it attains
an unmediated vision (theoria) of Beauty. Once the soul attains not only
perception of this beauty (which comes to it only through the senses) but
true knowledge of the source of Beauty, it will recognize itself as identical
with the highest Soul, and will discover that its embodiment and contact
with matter was a necessary expression of the Being of the Intelligence,
since, as Plotinus clearly states, as long as there is a possibility for
the existence and engendering of further beings, the Soul must continue
to act and bring forth existents (cf. IV.8.3-4) -- even if this means a
temporary lapse into evil on the part of the individual or 'fragmented'
souls that actively shape and govern matter. However, it must be kept in
mind that even the soul's return to recognition of its true state, and
the resultant happiness it experiences, are not merely episodes in the
inner life of an individual existent, but rather cosmic events in themselves,
insofar as the activities and experiences of the souls in the material
realm contribute directly to the maintenance of the cosmos. It is the individual
soul's capacity to align itself with material existence, and through its
experiences to shape and provide an image of eternity for this purely passive
substance, that constitutes Nature (phusis). The soul's turnabout or epistrophe,
while being the occasion of its happiness, reached through the desire that
is Love, is not to be understood as an apokatastasis or 'restoration' of
a fragmented cosmos. Rather, we must understand this process of the Soul's
fragmentation into individual souls, its resultant experiences of evil
and love, and its eventual attainment of happiness, as a necessary and
eternal movement taking place at the final point of emanation of the power
that is the One, manifested in the Intelligence, and activated, generatively,
at the level of Soul.
A Note on Nature (phusis). One final
statement must be made, before we exit this section on Plotinus' Metaphysics
and Cosmology, concerning the status of Nature in this schema. Nature,
for Plotinus, is not a separate power or principle of Life that may be
understood independently of the Soul and its relation to Matter. Also,
since the reader of this article may find it odd that I would choose to
discuss 'Love and Happiness' in the context of a general metaphysics, let
it be stated clearly that the Highest Soul, and all the individual souls,
form a single, indivisible entity, The Soul (psuche) (IV.1.1), and that
all which affects the individual souls in the material realm is a direct
and necessary outgrowth of the Being of the Intelligible Cosmos (I.1.8).
Therefore, it follows that Nature, in Plotinus' system, is only correctly
understood when it is viewed as the result of the collective experience
of each and every individual soul, which Plotinus refers to as the 'We'
(emeis) (I.1.7) -- an experience, moreover, which is the direct result
of the souls fragmentation into bodies in order to govern and shape Matter.
For Matter, as Plotinus tells us, is such that the divine Soul cannot enter
into contact with it without taking on certain of its qualities; and since
it is of the nature of the Highest Soul to remain in contemplative contact
with the Intelligence, it cannot descend, as a whole, into the depths of
material differentiation. So the Soul divides itself, as it were, between
pure contemplation and generative or governing act -- it is the movement
or moment of the soul's act that results in the differentiation of the
active part of Soul into bodies. It must be understood, however, that this
differentiation does not constitute a separate Soul, for as we have already
seen, the nature and essence of all intelligible beings deriving from the
One is twofold -- for the Intelligence, it is the ability to know or contemplate
the power of the One, and to reflect upon that knowledge; for the Soul
it is to contemplate the Intelligence, and to give active form to the ideas
derived from that contemplation. The second part of the Soul's nature or
essence involves governing Matter, and therefore becoming an entity at
once contemplative and unified, and active and divided. So when Plotinus
speaks of the 'lower soul,' he is not speaking of Nature, but rather of
that ability or capacity of the Soul to be affected by its actions. Since
contemplation, for Plotinus, can be both purely noetic and accomplished
in repose, and 'physical' and carried out in a state of external effort,
so reflection can be both noetic and physical or affective. Nature, then,
is to be understood as the Soul reflecting upon the active or physical
part of its eternal contemplation. The discussion of Plotinus' psychological
and epistemological theories, which now follows, must be read as a reflection
upon the experiences of the Soul, in its capacity or state as fragmented
and active unity.
Psychology and Epistemology
Plotinus' contributions to the philosophical understanding of the individual
psyche, of personality and sense-perception, and the essential question
of how we come to know what we know, cannot be properly understood or appreciated
apart from his cosmological and metaphysical theories. However, the Enneads
do contain more than a few treatises and passages that deal explicitly
with what we today would refer to as psychology and epistemology. Plotinus
is usually spurred on in such investigations by three over-arching questions
and difficulties: (1) how the immaterial soul comes to be united with a
material body, (2) whether all souls are one, and (3) whether the higher
part of the soul is to be held responsible for the misdeeds of the lower
part. Plotinus responds to the first difficulty by employing a metaphor.
The Soul, he tells us, is like an eternal and pure light whose single ray
comes to reflected through a prism; this prism is matter. The result of
this reflection is that the single ray is 'fragmented' into various and
multi-colored rays, which give the appearance of being unique and separate
rays of light, but yet owe their source to the single pure ray of light
that has come to illumine the formerly dark 'prism' of matter. If the single
ray of light were to remain the same, or rather, if it were to refuse to
illuminate matter, its power would be limited. Although Plotinus insists
that all souls are one by virtue of owing their being to a single source,
they do become divided amongst bodies out of necessity -- for that which
is pure and perfectly impassive cannot unite with pure passivity (matter)
and still remain itself. Therefore, the Higher Soul agrees, as it were,
to illuminate matter, which has everything to gain and nothing to lose
by the union, being wholly incapable of engendering anything on its own.
Yet it must be remembered that for Plotinus the Higher Soul is capable
of giving its light to matter without in any way becoming diminished, since
the Soul owes its own being to the Intelligence which it contemplates eternally
and effortlessly. The individual souls -- the 'fragmented rays of light'
-- though their source is purely impassive, and hence not responsible for
any misdeeds they may perform, or any misfortunes that may befalls them
in their incarnation, must, themselves, take on certain characteristics
of matter in order to illuminate it, or as Plotinus also says, to govern
it. One of these characteristics is a certain level of passivity, or the
ability to be affected by the turbulence of matter as it groans and labors
under the vivifying power of the soul, as though in the pangs of childbirth
(cf. Plato, Letter II. 313a). This is the beginning of the individual soul's
personality, for it is at this point that the soul is capable of experiencing
such emotions like anger, fear, passion, love, etc. This individual soul
now comes to be spoken of by Plotinus as if it were a separate entity by.
However, it must be remembered that even the individual and unique soul,
in its community (koinon) with a material body, never becomes fully divided
from its eternal and unchanging source. This union of a unique, individual
soul (which owes its being to its eternal source) with a material body
is called by Plotinus the living being (zoon). The living being remains,
always, a contemplative being, for it owes its existence to a prior, intelligible
principle; but the mode of contemplation on the part of the living being
is divided into three distinct stages, rising from a lesser to a greater
level of intelligible ordering. These stages are: (1) pathos, or the immediate
disturbance undergone by the soul through the vicissitudes of its union
with matter, (2) the moment at which the disturbance becomes an object
of intelligible apprehension (antilepsis), and (3) the moment at which
the intelligible object (tupon) becomes perceived through the reasoning
faculty (dianoia) of the soul, and duly ordered or judged (krinein). Plotinus
call this three-fold structure, in its unity, sense- perception (aisthesis).
We may best understand Plotinus' theory of perception by describing it
as a 'creation' of intelligible objects, or forms, from the raw material
(hule) provided by the corporeal realm of sensation. The individual
souls then use these created objects as tools by which to order or govern
the turbulent realm of vivified matter. The problem arises when the soul
is forced to think 'through' or with the aid of these constructed images
of the forms (eide), these 'types' (tupoi). This is the manner of discursive
reasoning that Plotinus calls dianoia, and which consists in an act of
understanding that owes its knowledge (episteme) to objects external to
the mind, which the mind, through sense-perception, has come to 'grasp'
(lepsis). Now since the objects which the mind comes to 'grasp' are the
product of a soul that has mingled, to a certain extent, with matter, or
passivity, the knowledge gained by dianoia can only be opinion (doxa).
The opinion may indeed be a correct one, but if it is not subject to the
judgment of the higher part of the soul, it cannot properly be called true
knowledge (alethes gnosis). Furthermore, the reliance on the products of
sense-perception and on dianoia may lead the soul to error and to forgetfulness
of its true status as one with its source, the Higher Soul. And although
even the soul that falls the furthest into error and forgetfulness is still,
potentially, one with the Higher Soul, it will be subject to judgment and
punishment after death, which takes the form, for Plotinus, of reincarnation.
The soul's salvation consists of bringing its mind back into line with
the reasoning power (logos) of its source, which it also is -- the Soul.
All order in the physical cosmos proceeds from the power of the Soul, and
the existence of individual souls is simply the manner in which the Soul
exercises its governing power over the realm of passive nature. When the
individual soul forgets this primal reality or truth -- that it is the
principle of order and reason in the cosmos -- it will look to the products
of sense-perception for its knowledge, and will ultimately allow itself
to be shaped by its experiences, instead of using its experiences as tools
for shaping the cosmos.
The Living Being
What Plotinus calls the "living being" (zoon) is what we would refer
to, roughly, as the human-being, or the individual possessed of a distinct
personality. This being is the product of the union of the lower or active
part of the soul with a corporeal body, which is in turn presided over
by the Higher Soul, in its capacity as reasoning power, imparted to all
individual souls through their ceaseless contemplation of their source
(I.1.5-7). The "living being," then, may be understood as a dual nature
comprising a lower or physically receptive part, which is responsible for
transferring to the perceptive faculty the sensations produced in the lower
or 'irrational' part of the soul through its contact with matter (the body),
and a higher or 'rational' part which perceives these sensations and passes
judgment on them, as it were, thereby producing that lower form of knowledge
called episteme in Greek, that is contrasted with the higher knowledge,
gnosis, which is the sole possession of the Higher Soul. Plotinus also
refers to this dual nature as the 'We' (emeis), for although the individual
souls are in a sense divided and differentiated through their prismatic
fragmentation (cf. I.1.8, IV.3.4, and IV.9.5), they remain in contact by
virtue of their communal contemplation of their prior -- this is the source
of their unity. One must keep in mind, however, that the individual souls
and the Higher Soul are not two separate orders or types of soul, nor is
the "living being" a third entity derived from them. These terms are employed
by Plotinus for the sole purpose of making clear the various aspects of
the Soul's governing action, which is the final stage of emanation proceeding
from the Intelligence's contemplation of the power of the One. The "living
being" occupies the lowest level of rational, contemplative existence.
It is the purpose of the "living being" to govern the fluctuating nature
of matter by receiving its impressions, and turning them into intelligible
forms for the mind of the soul to contemplate, and make use of, in its
ordering of the cosmos. Now in order to receive the impressions or sensations
from material existence, the soul must take on certain characteristics
of matter (I.8.8-9) -- the foremost characteristic being that of passivity,
or the ability to undergo disruptions in one's being, and remain affected
by these disturbances. Therefore, a part of the "living being" will, of
necessity, descend too far into the material or changeable realm, and will
come to unite with its opposite (i.e., pure passivity) to the point that
it falls away from the vivifying power of the Soul, or the reasoning principle
of the 'We.' In order to understand how this occurs, how it is remedied,
and what are the consequences for the Soul and the cosmos that it governs,
a few words must be said concerning sense-perception and memory.
Sense-Perception and Memory
Sense-perception, as Plotinus conceives it, may be described as the
production and cultivation of images (of the forms residing in the Intelligence,
and contemplated by the Soul). These images aid the soul in its act of
governing the passive, and for that reason disorderly, realm of matter.
The soul's experience of bodily sensation (pathos) is an experience of
something alien to it, for the soul remains always what it is: an intellectual
being. However, as has already been stated, in order for the soul to govern
matter, it must take on certain of matter's characteristics. The soul accomplishes
this by 'translating' the immediate disturbances of the body -- i.e., physical
pain, emotional disturbances, even physical love or lust -- into intelligible
realties (noeta) (cf. I.1.7). These intelligible realities are then contemplated
by the soul as 'types' (tupoi) of the true images (eidolon) 'produced'
through the Soul's eternal contemplation of the Intelligence, by virtue
of which the cosmos persists and subsists as a living image of the eternal
Cosmos that is the Intelligible Realm. The individual souls order or govern
the material realm by bringing these 'types' before the Higher Soul in
an act of judgment (krinein), which completes the movement or moment of
sense-perception (aisthesis). This perception, then, is not a passive imprinting
or 'stamping' of a sensible image upon a receptive soul; rather, it is
an action of the soul, indicative of the soul's natural, productive power
(cf. IV.6.3). This 'power' is indistinguishable from memory (mnemes), for
it involves, as it were, a recollection, on the part of the lower soul,
of certain 'innate' ideas, by which it is able to perceive what it perceives
-- and most importantly, by virtue of which it is able to know what it
knows. The soul falls into error only when it 'falls in love' with the
'types' of the true images it already contains, in its higher part, and
mistakes these 'types' for realities. When this occurs, the soul will make
judgments independently of its higher part, and will fall into 'sin' (hamartia),
that is, it will 'miss the mark' of right governance, which is its proper
nature. Since such a 'fallen' soul is almost a separate being (for it has
ceased to fully contemplate its 'prior,' or higher part), it will be subject
to the 'judgment' of the Higher Soul, and will be forced to endure a chain
of incarnations in various bodies, until it finally remembers its 'true
self,' and turns its mind back to the contemplation of its higher part,
and returns to its natural state (cf. IV.8.4). This movement is necessary
for the maintenance of the cosmos, since, as Plotinus tells us, "the totality
of things cannot continue limited to the intelligible so long as a succession
of further existents is possible; although less perfect, they necessarily
are because the prior existent necessarily is" (IV.8.3, tr. O'Brien). No
soul can govern matter and remain unaffected by the contact. However, Plotinus
assures us that the Highest Soul remains unaffected by the fluctuations
and chaotic affections of matter, for it never ceases to productively contemplate
its prior -- which is to say: it never leaves its proper place. It is for
this reason that even the souls that 'fall' remain part of the unity of
the 'We,' for despite any forgetfulness that may occur on their part, they
continue to owe their persistence in being to the presence of their higher
part -- the Soul (cf. IV.1 and IV.2, "On the Essence of the Soul").
Individuality and Personality
The individual souls that are disseminated throughout the cosmos, and
the Soul that presides over the cosmos, are, according to Plotinus, an
essential unity. This is not to say that he denies the unique existence
of the individual soul, nor what we would call a personality. However,
personality, for Plotinus, is something accrued, an addition of alien elements
that come to be attached to the pure soul through its assimilative contact
with matter (cf. IV.7.10, and cp. Plato, Republic 611b-612a). In other
words, we may say that the personality is, for Plotinus, a by-product of
the soul's governance of matter -- a governance that requires a certain
degree of affectivity between the vivifying soul and its receptive substratum
(hupokeimenon). The soul is not really 'acted upon' by matter, but rather
receives from the matter it animates, certain unavoidable impulses (horme)
which come to limit or bind (horos) the soul in such a way as to make of
it a "particular being," possessing the illusory quality of being distinct
from its source, the Soul. Plotinus does, however, maintain that each "particular
being" is the product, as it were, of an intelligence (a logos spermatikos),
and that the essential quality of each 'psychic manifestation' is already
inscribed as a thought with the cosmic Mind (Nous); yet he makes it clear
that it is only the essence (ousia) of the individual soul that is of Intelligible
origin (V.7.1-3). The peculiar qualities of each individual, derived from
contact with matter, are discardable accruements that only serve to distort
the true nature of the soul. It is for this reason that the notion of the
'autonomy of the individual' plays no part in the dialectical onto-theology
of Plotinus. The sole purpose of the individual soul is to order the fluctuating
representations of the material realm, through the proper exercise of sense-perception,
and to remain, as far as is possible, in imperturbable contact with its
prior. The lower part of the soul, the seat of the personality, is an unfortunate
but necessary supplement to the Soul's actualization of the ideas it contemplates.
Through the soul's 'gift' of determinate order to the pure passivity that
is matter, this matter comes to 'exist' in a state of ever-changing receptivity,
of chaotic malleability. This malleability is mirrored in and by the accrued
'personality' of the soul. When this personality is experienced as something
more than a conduit between pure sense-perception and the act of judgment
that makes the perception(s) intelligible, then the soul has fallen into
forgetfulness. At this stage, the personality serves as a surrogate to
the authentic existence provided by and through contemplation of the Soul.
Ethics
The highest attainment of the individual soul is, for Plotinus, "likeness
to God as far as is possible" (I.2.1; cf. Plato, Theaetetus 176b). This
likeness is achieved through the soul's intimate state of contemplation
of its prior -- the Higher Soul -- which is, in fact, the individual soul
in its own purified state. Now since the Soul does not come into direct
contact with matter like the 'fragmented,' individual souls do, the purified
soul will remain aloof from the disturbances of the realm of sense (pathos)
and will no longer directly govern the cosmos, but leave the direct governance
to those souls that still remain enmeshed in matter (cf. VI.9.7). The lower
souls that descend too far into matter are those souls which experience
most forcefully the dissimilative, negative affectivity of vivified matter.
It is to these souls that the experience of Evil falls. For this reason,
Plotinus was unable to develop a rigorous ethical system that would account
for the responsibilities and moral codes of an individual living a life
amidst the fluctuating realm of the senses. According to Plotinus, the
soul that has descended too far into matter needs to "merely think on essential
being" in order to become reunited with its higher part (IV.8.4). This
seems to constitute Plotinus' answer to any ethical questions that may
have been posed to him. In fact, Plotinus develops a radical stance vis-a-vis
ethics, and the problem of human suffering. In keeping with his doctrine
that the higher part of the soul remains wholly unaffected by the disturbances
of the sense-realm, Plotinus declares that only the lower part of the soul
suffers, is subject to passions, and vices, etc. In order to drive the
point home, Plotinus makes use of a striking illustration. Invoking the
ancient torture device known as the Bull of Phalaris (a hollow bronze bull
in which a victim was placed; the bull was then heated until it became
red hot), he tells us that only the lower part of the soul will feel the
torture, while the higher part remains in repose, in contemplation (I.4.13).
Although Plotinus does not explicitly say so, we may assume that the soul
that has reunited with its higher part will not feel the torture at all.
Since the higher part of the soul is (1) the source and true state of existence
of all souls, (2) cannot be affected in any way by sensible affections,
and (3) since the lower soul possesses of itself the ability to free itself
from the bonds of matter, all particular questions concerning ethics and
morality are subsumed, in Plotinus' system, by the single grand doctrine
of the soul's essential imperturbability. The problems plaguing the lower
soul are not, for Plotinus, serious issues for philosophy. His general
attitude may be summed up by a remark made in the course of one of his
discussions of 'Providence':
"A gang of lads, morally neglected, and in
that respect inferior to the intermediate class, but in good physical training,
attack and overthrow another set, trained neither physically nor morally,
and make off with their food and their dainty clothes. What more is called
for than a laugh?" (III.2.8, tr. MacKenna).
Of course, Plotinus was no anarchist, nor was he an advocate of violence
or lawlessness. Rather, he was so concerned with the welfare and the ultimate
salvation of each individual soul, that he elevated philosophy -- the highest
pursuit of the soul -- to the level of a divine act, capable of purifying
each and every soul of the tainting accruements of sensual existence. Plotinus'
last words, recorded by Porphyry, more than adequately summarize the goal
of his philosophy: "Strive to bring back the god in yourselves to the God
in the All" (Life of Plotinus 2).
Central to Plotinus' metaphysics is the process of ceaseless emanation and outflowing from the One. Plotinus gives metaphors such as the radiation of heat from fire or cold from snow, fragrance from a flower or light from the sun. [1]
This basic theme reappears in the scholastic maxim that "good diffuses itself" (bonum diffusivum sui); entities that have achieved perfection of their own being do not keep that perfection to themselves, but spread it out by generating an external image of their internal activity [2]
This then leads to the idea that Arthur Lovejoy, in his book The Great Chain of Being, calls "the principle of plenitude". What this means is that emanation from the One cannot terminate until everything that has possibly come into existence has done so. Creation cannot stop at the world of the Gods, but must continue downwards through all possible levels of being and imperfection. Things cannot all be good, and indeed, as Plotinus says, the universe would be less perfect if they were, just as it may be necessary for a beautiful work of art that not all its parts are beautiful in isolation [3]
In contrast to the monotheistic idea of a God who creates through a
deliberate act of will, Plotinus sees the activity of the Divine Hypostases
is more like the spontaneous operation of nature than the laborious deliberations
of a human craftsman [4]
Plotinus' Mysticism
For Plotinus, and other Greek mystics, such as Plotinus' predecessors
Plato and Pythagoras, Spirituality means the ascent from the lower sense-reality
to the higher spiritual reality. Like twentieth century scientists
such as Albert Einstein, these ancient Greek mystics derived meaning and
purpose from the contemplation of nature. But instead of contemplating
the wonder of visible physical reality, they contemplated the wonder of
the invisible spiritual reality which they saw as the cause and ultimate
meaning behind the physical reality.Plotinus believed that man should reject
material things and should purify his soul and to lift it up to a communion
with the One.
The Hypostases
Also central in Plotinus' cosmology is the a chain of hypostases.
"...With regard to the existence that is supremely perfect [i.e. "The
One"], we must say it only produces the very greatest of the things that
are found below it. But that which after it is the most perfect,
the second principle, is Intelligence (Nous). Intelligence contemplates
the One and needs nothing but it. But the One has no need of Intelligence
[i.e. being the Absolute Principle, it is totally self-sufficient].
The One which is superior to Intelligence produces Intelligence which is
the best ex-istence after the One, since it is superior to all other beings.
The (World-)Soul is the Word (Logos) and a phase of the activity of Intelligence
just as Intelligence is the logos and a phase of the activity of the One.
But the logos of the Soul is obscure being only an image of Intelligence.
The Soul therefore directs herself to Intelligence, just as the latter,
to be Intelligence, must contemplate the One....Every begotten being longs
for the being that begot it and loves it..." [5]
The Logos
As the relationship between a Hypostasis and its products, the Logos
denotes the plan or formative principle from which the lower realities
evolve and by which their development is governed [6]
Plotinus uses the term not to indicate a separate hypostasis (contra
Philo, Christianity, etc), but to express the relationship between a Hypostasis
and its source or its products or both [7]
For Plotinus therefore, the relation between the grades of being, or
hypostases, is a two-fold process. There is a downward process of
Emanation or "outflowing", and a corresponding upward process of return
through Contemplation. This can be represented diagrammatically as
follows:
References
[1] R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p.61
[2] Ibid, p.61
[3] Ennead III. 2. 11; & R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p.65
[4] (Ennead IV. 3. 10; IV. 4. 11), R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, pp.63, 65.
[5] Ennead V:i:6; translated by Joseph Katz, The Philosophy of Plotinus, pp.15-6 (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, New York, 1950)
[6] R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p.68
[7] Ibid, p.68
[8] Ibid, pp.65-66
[9] Ibid, p.67
[25] R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p.163