P.449

        Most papers published  by Western scholars of Indian
        philosophy  have, until now, been largely exegetical
        in  nature.  This  is  for  very  good  reasons.  An
        enormous  amount  of material  has needed (and still
        needs)  to  be  made  available   to  the  scholarly
        community by way of translation and commentary.  But
        perhaps  there  is  also  room,  and  need, for  the
        occasional   feuilleton   like   this,  an  avowedly
        polemical    piece   attempting    to   follow   the
        philosophical  implications of a particular argument
        or  set  of definitions  to  a conclusion  that  its
        authors  might not have wished to accept.  There is,
        after  all, a long  and honorable  tradition  of the
        application  of this  method  in Indian  (especially
        Buddhist) polemical  literature: what  else  is  the
        prasa^nga? The positive  results of such an approach
        to Indian  philosophy  might  be that  the positions
        argued  for  in the texts  are  taken  with  greater
        philosophical   seriousness   than   the  exegetical
        approach  allows, and that some of their entailments
        might  be more clearly  seen than is at present  the
        case.  Such, in a particular small instance, are the
        goals of the present piece.  The argument given here
        is presented  not  with  the  assurance  that  it is
        either valid or sound (though  naturally  I think it
        to be both), but rather  with the hope that it might
        lead to further discussion.

            The standard  Buddhist account of memory employs
        two technical terms--sm.rti and pratyabhij~naana. In
        this context, for reasons that will become apparent,
        I shall  translate  the former  as 're-presentation'
        (in  the sense  of presenting  again  what  has been
        presented  before), and the latter as 'recognition'.
        The former  will denote the reappearance  in a given
        mental  continuum  (cittasa.mtaana) of the  complete
        experiential   content  of  a  preceding  moment  or
        moments of experience.  Examples: I hear again music
        I heard twenty years ago; I see again the buttons on
        a coat my mother used to wear when I was a child;  I
        touch again my first lover's lips.  In all cases the
        re-presentation   (sm.rti)  is   of   the   complete
        experiential  content  of the  original  experience.
        Recognition  (pratyabhij~naana) denotes  a conscious
        acknowledgment  on the part  of the subject  that an
        experience  she has just had was in fact an instance
        of representation. So, for example, I acknowledge to
        myself  that the music  I just heard  with my mind's
        ear  was  a  re-presentation   of  the  version   of
        Beethoven's  Seventh  Symphony  that I heard  in the
        Roval Albert Hall when I was fifteen. And so forth.

            Buddhist  texts  typically  say that  there  are
        three  severally  necessary  and jointly  sufficient
        conditions that a given mental event must fulfill if
        it   is  to  be  classified   as  an   instance   of
        re-presentation,  a  smara.nacitta.  First, it  must
        have as its object something previously  experienced
        (puurvaanubhuutaartha) and must


                                P.450

        re-present  that object in the sense given.  Second,
        it must be connected  causally  with that previously
        experienced  object.  And third, the mental event in
        which the original  object was experienced  and that
        in which it is re-presented must be part of the same
        mental  continuum  (ekasa.mtaanika).(1)

            Recognition then follows from re-presentation by
        way of a conceptualized (and perhaps even vocalized)
        judgment  that (iti) the experience  in question was
        an instance  of sm.rti.(2) Here we approach close to
        the heart of the argument: what kind of judgment  is
        at  issue  here? Typically,  it  is  said  to  be  a
        judgment of the form I saw this. Buddhist metaphysics
        requires that when and if Buddhas make judgments  of
        this kind, they do so only to speak with the vulgar.
        They do not really  mean it, or at least they do not
        mean it in the sense  in which  a p.rthagjana  would
        mean it, for they know that the personal pronoun has
        no referent, or, more precisely, that it refers only
        to the aggregates (skandha).  So Buddhas cannot have
        recognition in the exact sense in which that term is
        usually  interpreted  in  the  texts.  They  may, of
        course,   be   able   to   make   other   sorts   of
        judgments--for  example, the mental  event  thatjust
        occurred was a re-presentation  in the sense that it
        occurred in the same continuum  as did that event of
        which  it was a re-presentation--and  so be able  to
        preserve  their ability to have (a somewhat modified
        kind of) recognition.

            But there are deeper problems. A re-presentation
        is supposed  to re-present  the  full  content  of a
        previous moment of experience  and a recognition  to
        judge that this has indeed  occurred.  If we add the
        straightforward   (and  pan-Buddhist)  premise  that
        every  instance  of  experience   belonging  to  all
        non-Buddhas  is tainted  with  passions  of  various
        sorts, especially  egocentricity (asmimaana) and its
        concomitants   (raaga,  dve.sa,  moha) ,  then   the
        following argument is easy to construct:

        (1) An instance  of re-presentation  (smara.nacitta)
            represents  to its subject  the full experienced
            content of a past moment of experience.

        (2) An        instance         of        recognition
            (pratyabhij~naanacitta) is  a judgment  that  an
            immediately   preceding   mental   event  was  a
            re-presentation.

        (3) All   moments   of   experience   belonging   to
            non-Buddhas have some passions as constituents.

        (4) All  moments  of  experience  belonging  to  all
            Buddhas are entirely free from passions.

        (5) All Buddhas make only true judgments.

        (6) No  Buddha   can  experience   an  instance   of
            re-presentation  that  re-presents  a moment  of
            experience  belonging to a non-Buddha [from (1),
            (3), and (4)].

        (7) No  Buddha   can  recognize   that  he  has  had
            re-presented  to  him  a  moment  of  experience
            belonging  to a non-Buddha  [from  (2), (5), and
            (6)].

        To  restate:  Buddhas   can  neither  experience   a
        re-presentation  of any moment of experience  in any
        past life (when they were not Buddhas), nor can they
        judge   that   they   have   so   experienced.   So:
        buddhaanaa.m puurvanivaasaanusm.rti.h puurvanivaa-
        sapratyabhij~naana.m ca na yujyete. Buddhas cannot
        remember their previous lives. Quod erut demonstrandum,
        or, if you prefer, siddham etat.

                                P.451

            This argument  can be challenged, I think.  from
        two perspectives.  First, exegetically, it could  be
        claimed  that I have misrepresented  what  Buddhists
        have typically  meant in such contexts  as these  by
        sm.rti  and pratyabhij~naana, and that premises  (1)
        and    (2)    are    therefore    false.     Second,
        philosophically,  it  could  be  claimed   that  the
        argument  as it stands is invalid, Either challenge,
        fully explored  and discussed, could  prove fruitful
        and productive of new knowledge.

            Finally, a brief  comment  on what  Buddhas  can
        have if they cannot  have memory  of their  previous
        lives.  They can have propositional knowledge of the
        truth  of large (perhaps  infinitely  large) sets of
        propositions  of the form experiential  event  E1 is
        causally  related to experiential  event E in such a
        way  that  it  is  proper   to  say  that  E1  is  a
        re-presentation of E.  But knowledge of propositions
        is, phenomenologically, very  far from  sm.rti  (and
        memory).

                                 NOTES

            1.  This is the burden  of the account  given by
        Vasubandhu    in   the   ninth   chapter    of   the
        Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya:  yadi   tarhi   sarvathaapi
        naasty   aatmaa   katha.m   k.sa.nike.su    citte.su
        ciraanubhuutasyaarthasya      smara.na.m     bhavati
        pratyabhij~naana.m vaa/sm.rtivi.sayasa.mj~naanvayaac
        cittavi`se.saat/kiidr`saac    cittavi`se.saat   yato
        'nantara.m sm.rtir bhavati/ tadaabhogasad.r-
        `sasambandhisa.mj~naadim ato `nupahataprabhaavaad
        aa`srayavi`se.sa`sokavyaak.sepaadibhi.h/   taad.r`so
        'pi hy atadanvaya`s cittavi`se.so na samarthas taa.m
        sm.rti.m bhaavayitu.m tadanvayo 'pi caanyaad.r`so na
        samarthas taa.m sm.rti.m bhaavayitum/ ubhayathaa  tu
        samartha   ity   eva.m   sm.rtir   bhavati   anyasya
        saamarthyaadar`sanaat  (Abhidharmako`sa and Bhaa.sya
        of AAcaarya Vasubandhu with Sphuutaarthaa Commentary
        of AAcaarya Ya`somitra, ed.  Dwaarikaadaas `Saastrii
        (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981), pp. 1215-1216).

            2.     Ya`somitra,     in     his     commentary
        (Abhidharmako`savyaakhyaa) on the  rather  unhelpful
        smara.naad   eva  ca  pratyabhij~naanam   from   the
        Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya, says: tad eveda.m yan mayaa
        d.r.s.tam iti smara.naat (ed. cit., p. 1217).