1.  Scholars like Davids, Conze, Humphrey, Schrader, Horner, Pande,
Coomarswamy, Radhakrishnan, Sogen, Suzuki, Julius Evola, and Nakamura, just
to name some important scholars, disagree with the claim that Buddha
categorically denied an eternal (nicca) soul, whose teachings then, would be
classified as Annihilationist and Materialist.

2.  Nowhere is there such a tradition as ‘Hinduism’ or ‘Brahmanism’ which
are terms coined by Occidental scholars.  The claim than the Buddha was
‘anti-Hindu’ or ‘anti-Brahman’ is unproven.

3.  Buddha’s unconditioned Attâ (soul) had nothing to do with the five
khandhas schema which are conditioned and mere attributes.  Nowhere in any
five khandha scheme is Attâ refuted. What is refuted is that the five
khandhas are the Attâ (soul).

4.  The lexical rule that Attâ is to be used strictly in a pronominal
fashion, or simply should be used as a signifier for the finite body, is
unwarranted.

5.  The Buddha never considered Attâ to be (wrong view).

6.  If the Buddha disbelieved in an Attâ (soul) why did he not deny the Attâ
unambiguously?

7.  Why didn’t the Buddha identify the Attâ (soul) with the physical body?

8.  Why is the Attâ (soul), in the Atthakatha (commentaries) squarely
equated with the Tathagata which is considered to be transcendent?

9.  Why is there no strict philosophical treatment of the Attâ in Occidental
literature?  It seems odd that an historic study and not a philosophic
study is the preferred treatment of the Attâ/anattâ dispute by Western
scholars.

10.  Modern Buddhist commentators are certainly wrong when they assert that
a work bears a certain meaning which it does not seem to possess in a
particular context.  This is to say, being more precise, modern Buddhist
commentators are off the mark when their interpretation does not close down
certain textual ambiguities and contradictions.

11.  By denying outright the soul, by default, the Theravadins and modern
Buddhists imply that the five aggregates are ultimate.  This of course is
absurd.  They have merely shifted Buddhism to empiricism by ignoring
pro-soul statements.  According to them, what is real is what makes sensory
knowledge possible, namely, the five aggregates which, ironically, according
to the canon, are suffering being synonymous with Mara the Evil One (the
Buddhist devil)!

12.  It begs the question to assume that the no-soul doctrine had been
established at the beginning of the Buddha’s ministry and that Attâ (soul)
was, in every respect, an abhorrent term.  Still, for such a supposedly
abhorrent term, there are countless positive instances of Attâ used
throughout the Nikayas, especially used in compounds which are easily
glossed over by a prejudicial translator.  In meeting these instances, not
surprisingly, these same prejudicial translators have erected a theory that
Attâ is a reflexive pronoun.  This is rather hard to prove since sa and sayam
are the reflexive pronouns of the Pali language, not Attâ.

13.  Much later, the Theravadins were compelled to invent a two truth
theory.  With the numerous instances of Attâ (soul) being found in the
canon, hardly any with pejorative implications, they fabricated the
Abhidhamma taxonomy which they claim was first delivered in heavens by the
Buddha to the gods who could better understand a no-soul theory than mere
humans!

14.  In the Nikayas, hetrodox uses of soul are noted, which are called
‘attânudittha’. One main hetrodox use of soul is in the idea of Eternalism
in which the soul is regarded in a physical sense which lives in perpetuity
like the cosmos.

15.  What is sometimes elaborated upon in the Nikayas is the heterodox uses
of Attâ (soul)‹not its outright, categorical rejection.

16.  That the Buddha denied the theories of Eternalism and Annihilationism
is true.  But Mahavira, the Jain, denied both positions as well.  But did
Mahavira deny, altogether, the principle of a soul?  No he did not.  Neither
did Gotama the Buddha.

17.  The Buddha says many times that we are not to regard our Attâ (soul) as
being connected with the five aggregates.